INDIAN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

based upon

JAYANTAS NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ

C. D. Bijalwan



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TO MY FATHER

PANDIT NARAYAN DATT BIJALWAN

WITH DEEPEST REGARD

AND PROFOUND GRATITUDE

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THE NATURE, FORMS AND VIABILITY OF NEGATION

FOREWORD

The NyāyaTheory of Knowledge has grown and developed as an answer to the challenges posed by Buddhist Naiyāyikas. The Buddhists in keeping with their commitment to the ideology of momentariness maintained that ordinary perception and inference are possible only within the range of *Kalpanā*, a creative faculty of mind. All communicable knowledge for them was possible *a priori*; there exists nothing in the world of experience that could really correspond to our ideas rooted in *Vikalpa*. The Nyāya, true to its realistic ideology defended the dualistic position maintaining that any knowledge as an authentic human concern has to depend upon *Padārhta*, i.e., what there exists in the world of reality. The possibility of *a priori* knowledge is denied and possibility of a strict empiricist position is maintained.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has not only faithfully recorded the controversy between Nyāya and Buddhist Philosophers, he has also in his right as an original thinker contributed his own share to the lot of Nyāya. Dr. Chakra Dhar Bijalwan has carefully studied the role of Jayanta as a historian of Philosophy and also as a Naiyāyika.

This book is the result of painstaking research and critical evaluation of various issues and views. It is bound to help all those scholars who care to study Indian epistemology. Dr. Bijalwan's book presents a landmark in the tradition of textual study of Indian Philosophy.

University of Delhi
25th Nov., 1976

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INTRODUCTION

I have great pleasure in introducing to the scholars of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit '*Indian Theory of Knowledge based upon Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī*, by Dr. C. D. Bijalwan. Nyāya is generally held to be a very dry and difficult śāstra. Fewer are, therefore, authentic expositions of this system. Dr. Bijalwan is well qualified to expound the Nyāya doctrines, since he has acquired sound training along both the traditional as well as modern lines. In the 18th and 19th centuries, when Sanskrit became known to European scholars, they wanted to work in the field of Nyāya, but could not break through the fort of its technical terminology. They have, thus, in that period just smelt the Nyāya texts and put them aside. In 1951, Prof. Daniel Henry Holmes Ingalls came forward with his excellent work entitled as '*Materials for the Study of the Navya-Nyāya Logic*' and, thus, opened the gates for researchers to work in the field of Indian Logic. Soon after several scholars devoted themselves to the study of Nyāya and U.S.A, France, Austria and Australia became prominent centres of Nyāya Studies.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was a scholar of versatile genius. He stood against the attacks made by Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, etc., on the expositions of Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, etc., respectively and successfully re-established the superiority of Nyāya over other systems of Indian Philosophy. Jayanta's success was based upon his extraordinary power to elaborate his own point of view in simple and lucid Sanskrit. The *Nyāyamañjarī*, therefore, has virtually become an outstanding manual of all the schools of Indian Philosophy in general and Nyāya in particular. In addition to analysing the nature, forms and methods of knowledge, Jayanta has also dealt with such problems as the locus of *Jñāna*. Refuting the Sāṁkhya point of view, he rightly asserts that intellect (*Buddhi*) being an inanimate and unconscious principle, cannot be accepted as the locus of knowledge. His definition of *Pramāṇa*, as the sumtotal of conscious and unconscious facts (*bodhābodhasvabhāva*), is very much convincing and quite unique. The great Naiyāyika has, however, overlooked or did not elaborately analyse some problems. For instance, he did not take cognizance of the facts which his posterior scholars referred to with

I am specially thankful to Prof. Janaki Ballabha Bhattacharya for the help that I received from his English translation of a few portions of *Nyāyamañjarī*, published in some issues of Calcutta Review. For the names of other modern scholars, without whose works my task would have been much more difficult, I should like to refer the readers to the foot-notes and index.

During the preparation and finalisation of the script of this book I had the rare privilege of consulting the works of and receiving the blessings as well as valuable suggestions from Prof. V. Raghavan, Prof. R. N. Dandekar, Dr. R. K. Sharma, Prof. D. N. Shastri, Prof. Siddheshwar Bhattacharya, Prof. Dev Raj, Dr. Mandan Mishra, Prof. Gopika Mohan Bhattacharya, Prof. S. S. Barlingay, Prof. Anant Lal Thakur, Prof. R. C. Dwivedi, Dr. M. D. Balasubramaniam Dr. J. D. Ganguli and Shri C. R. Swaminathan. I take this opportunity to pay my respectful homage to all of them.

I am indebted to Dr. G.P. Bhatt, Assistant Director, Philosophy Section, C. H. D. Ministry of Education, Govt. of India, New Delhi, for going through the manuscript and suggesting valuable improvements in it.

I have really no words to express my sincere thanks to my friend, Shri Rajendra Dhasmana, who has spared no pains in helping me in almost every stage of the production and publication of this work.

I am highly grateful to Shri B. R. Chawla, Proprietor, Heritage Publishers, Connaught Circus, New Delhi, for undertaking the publication of this book.

New Delhi
25th Nov., 1976

C. D. Bijalwan

ABBREVIATIONS

B. P.	=Bhāṣāpariccheda
H. I. L.	=History of Indian Logic
J.R.A.S.	=Journal of Royal Asiatic Society
M. S.	=Mīmāṁsāsūtra
N. B.	=Nyāyabhāṣya
N. Bi.	=Nyāyabindu
N. Bi. T.	=Nyāyabindutīkā
N. K.	=Nyāyakandalī
N. Ku.	=Nyāyakusumāñjali
N. M.	=Nyāyamañjarī
N. M. G.	=Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga
N. S.	=Nyāyasūtra
N. S. V.	=Nyāyasūtravṛtti
N. Sr.	=Nyāyasāra
N. V.	=Nyāyavārtika
N.V.T.T.	=Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā
N.V.T.T.P.	=Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikāpariśuddhi
P. K. M.	=Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa
P. P.	=Prakaraṇapañcikā
P. S.	=Pramāṇasamuccaya
P. V.	=Pramāṇavārtika
R. T.	=Rājataraṅgiṇī
S. D.	=Śāstradīpikā
S. D. S.	=Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha
S. K.	=Sāṁkhyakārikā
S. P.	=Saptapadārthī
S. P. B.	=Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya
Ś. V.	=Ślokavārtika
Ś.V.T.T.	=Ślokavārtikatātparyaṭikā
Sr. P.	=Śṛṅgāraprakāśa

T. B.	= Tarkabhāṣā
T. C.	= Tattvacintāmaṇi
T. R.	= Tārkikarakṣā
T. S.	= Tārkasaṅgraha
T. V.	= Tantravārtika
V. B.	= Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya
V.B. Up.	= Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya-upaskāra
V. P.	= Vedāntaparibhāṣā
V. S.	= Vaiśeṣikasūtra
Vā. P.	= Vākyapadīya

CHAPTER I

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

"Any theory is an answer or set of answers to a question or set of questions."[1] When we speak of a theory of knowledge we have, therefore, such questions in our mind as: What is knowledge? What is the difference between valid and non-valid knowledge? What are the methods of arriving at valid knowledge? Many of the philosophers have ventured to answer these questions and so does Jayanta in his celebrated work *Nyāyamañjarī*. But what makes Jayanta's set of answers historically unique is the fact that he first goes through the theories propounded by others and then by the method of elimination and assimilation frames his own set of answers. Though he generally upholds the Nyāya view, a comparative and critical evaluation of *Nyāyamañjarī* reveals that he has shown due awareness of the tenets of other systems as well. That is why the present work, though primarily based upon a comparative and critical exposition of *Nyāyamañjarī* seeks to present a comprehensive and co-ordinated theory of knowledge propounded by Indian thinkers. A comparative study of a work generally implies a free discussion of its similarity or dissimilarity to like works and a critical analysis usually means a judgment on the merits and demerits of the assertions under review in the light of certain specific standards. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's role in the field of learning cannot, in fact, be valued in its true perspective unless we view him as one of the early historians of the philosophical thought, a constructive and pragmatic critic of the old Indian theories of knowledge and reality and, above all, one of the most outstanding logicians of his time. So, the word 'comparison' in his case should mean a parallel study of the important works of Indian Logic, especially those by Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati-

1. D. D. Woozley, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 9.

miśra, Dharmakīrti and Kumārila. In so far as critical judgment is concerned, one is naturally guided by the relative strength of arguments in favour of or against a particular tenet. Though philosophical study is essentially an enquiry, the scope of comparison in the present work has been purposefully confined to the relevant systems of Indian philosophy while modern Western standpoints are referred to only in a casual manner where they are, in some way or other, deemed essential for a better grasp of certain topics.

Indian Logic, rightly acclaimed by ancient Indian scholars as the light of all branches of learning, deals mainly with the means and methods of acquiring, ascertaining and analysing knowledge.[1] Most of the Indian thinkers hold the Vedas to be the fountainhead of all sorts of learning, but there is little evidence to support the view that the Vedic seers were aware of the problems of logic. The facts that the objects immediately present are known through the senses, whereas others are to be cognized through divine testimony or through reflection do not find reference in the Vedas. *Manas* plays a distinct role in almost all the conscious activities of living beings. Its description in the *Vājasaneya Saṁhitā* however, shows that the Vedic seers viewed it as a physical faculty rather than spirit or soul. "The public controversy of the Upaniṣads" as Keith puts it, "may, however, be noted as features which favoured the growth of logic and Sophistry."[2] The *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda Gautamā is the earliest extant systematic treatise on Indian logic and amongst the subsequent texts of *Nyāyaśāstra*, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* has the rare distinction of faithfully introducing the views of almost all the distinguished thinkers of all the relevant systems of Indian philosophy up to the 9th century A. D. and, after due scrutiny, of presenting a comprehensive picture of the Indian theory of knowledge. "In this Nyāyamañjarī" as N. J. Shah also observes, "one finds the triangular cotest among the Naiyayikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Buddhists. Its study gives us a clear idea of the problems of Indian philosophy and their solutions offered by three main branches of Indian philosopy."[3] But, before concentrating upon Jayanta's role, let us first have a bird's eye view of the conceptual development of Indian logic.

1. प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं न्यायः (उपक्रम), *N. B.*
2. Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 10
3. *N. M. Granthibhaṅga*, Intro., p. 3

The system, Nyāya, has its long history of nomenclature as well. The earliest word designating the science of logic is *Ānvīkṣikī*. Kauṭilya, in his *Arthaśāstra*, states that *Ānvīkṣikī* is the science that enables people to evaluate their strength or weakness, helps them to remain unperturbed in prosperity and adversity and infuses subtlety and power into their mind, speech and action. Nyāya was also called Hetuśāstra or Hetuvidyā, that is the science of causes or reasoning. *Ānvikṣikī* was held in great esteem by those who accepted the importance of reasoning for the ascertainment of truth. *Gautama dharmasūtra*, for instance, maintains that the kings must go through a course of training in *Ānvīkṣikī*. Manu is of the view that *tarka* has to play a great role in the field of *dharma*. Nyāya has been enumerated by Yājñavalkya amongst the fourteen principal sciences and Maharṣi Vyāsa clearly states that he has taken great help from *Ānvīkṣikī* in the arrangement of the Upaniṣads.

A number of commentators have contributed a lot to the development of Nyāyaśāstra. During the mediaeval period, the Buddhist thinkers severely criticised Sūtrakāra Gautama, Bhāṣyakāra Vātsyāyana and Vārtikakāra Uddyotakara. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century A. D.) made a significant venture in refuting the arguments of the Buddhists and the Mimāṁsakas, presenting a synthetic view of the Nyāya tenets and thus drawing a clear-cut, all-embracing and comprehensive picture of the Indian theory of knowledge.

The most significant event in the history of Nyāyaśāstra is the development of a Navya Nyāya or neo-logic. Though it is not easy to fix the date of the rise of the Navya Nyāya, Gangeśa (A. D. 1200), the celebrated author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, is generally held to be the founder of this school. It is, however, a fact that the way for this subtle science was paved by the Prabhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and also by Udayana, the author of *Nyāyakusumāñjalī*, who flourished in 10th century A. D.

Though the term 'logic' has been vaguely accepted as the synonym of the Sanskrit word 'Nyāya', there are actually some striking differences between the two. The scope of Nyāya is wider than that of Western Logic. The former deals with the four means of knowledge, namely, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*, whereas the latter is primarily concerned with inference. Western Logic refers to valid thought, whereas Nyāya maintains that validity should necessarily correspond to its object. In Western Logic truth

has been divided into two parts, namely formal and material. But Indian thinkers have viewed knowledge as a compact unit and held that formal logic also depends upon material logic.

It seems that *Ānvīkṣikī* in its early stage dealt with two subjects, namely, soul (*ātman*) and reason (*hetu*). The former was developed into Darśana (philosophy) and the latter into Nyāya (logic). This bifurcation commenced about 550 B.C. Gautama expounded the logical aspect of *Ānvīkṣikī* into a system known as *Nyāyaśāstra*. It seems that *Ānvīkṣikī*, dealing with the soul, was replaced by the word 'Darśana' in the first century B. C The use of the term '*Ānvīkṣikī*' in place of logic is found in *Manusmṛti*[1], *Gautamadharmasūtra*[2], *Rāmāyaṇa*[3], and *Mahābhārata*[4].

"Nyāya functions with regard to things neither unknown nor definitely known, but only with those which are doubtful."[5] The word 'Nyāya' is also used as a synonym of syllogism and, therefore, refers to the science of inference. It seems that the term 'Nyāyaśāstra' assumed currency after the first century A. D., for even Pāṇini and Patañjali do not seem to have been conversant with it.

The chief ingredient of the Nyāya school, viz., inferential reasoning, also was at first designated as *Ānvīkṣikī*. As the science of reasoning developed and was systematized in a separate school, it appropriated the term 'Nyāya', perhaps from the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā school where it was used for general exegetical rules.

"Three distinct causes appear to have contributed to the popularity and predominance of Nyāya as a school of philosophy. The first was the intrinsic worth of the system which was acknowledged as most useful in carrying on the process of reasoning. In the second place, we notice that having supported the authority of the *Veda*, Nyāya was readily recognised as an approved branch of learning and the charge of heterodoxy levelled against it in its early stages was proved baseless. Thirdly, the fact that Nyāya adopted the

1. *Manusmṛti*, 7-43
2. *Gautamadharmasūtra*, Adhyāya 11
3. *Rāmāyaṇa*, Ayo., 100, 36
4. *Mahābhārata*, Śāntiparva, 180, 47
5. तत्र नानुपलब्धे ऽर्थे न निर्णीते प्रवर्तते ।
किन्तु संशयिते न्यायस्तदंगं तेन संशयः, *N. M.*, I-1

Śaiva cult gave it a positive stamp of orthodoxy and gained for it unquestionable recognition."[1] The Ancient school of Indian logic reached the height of its growth at the hand of Akṣapāda. Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* can be aptly called a landmark in the history of Indian logic.

Dr. Vidyabhusan has divided the history of Indian logic into three periods, namely, Ancient (650 B.C.—100 A.D.), Mediaeval (up to 1200 A. D.) and Modern (from 900 A. D.). In the opinion of Bodas, the three periods of the history of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school are to be termed as the Sūtra period, the Bhāṣya period (up to 13th century A.D) and Tīkā period (13th century onwards).[2] According to Dr. D. N. Shastri the most rational and scientific division would be : (1) the period of origin or pre-Diṅnāga period (up to the 5th century A.D.), (2) the period of development or the period of conflict with the Diṅnāga school (up to the 11th century A.D.) and (3) the period of decay or the post-Buddhist period (11th century onward).[3]

Dr. Vidyabhusan's division of Nyāya periods is not without self-contradiction. Under the ancient period he includes Śrikaṇṭha (A.D. 1400), Asaṅga (A.D 300) and Vasubandhu (A.D. 410—483). The beginning of orthodox Nyāya was no doubt earlier than that of the Buddhist and Jaina Logic, but the ideologies of all stalwarts of orthodox schools flourished in the period, which is termed as mediaeval or the period of Buddhist and Jaina Logic. The Buddhist and orthodox logicians did not work in watertight compartments. Crosswise division of the history of Indian logic is, therefore, unscientific. The classification proposed by Bodas is vague and does not take into consideration the conceptual aspect of the history of Nyāya. In Dr. Shastri's scheme Nyāya seems to be too much subservient to Buddhist logic. Moreover, he does not draw any line of distinction between Navya-Nyāya and post Navya-Nyāya period. So it may be more appropriate to divide the history of Indian Logic into four periods which can be termed as (1) Old period (2) Mediaeval period, (3) Navya Nyāya period, and (4) Post Navya Nyāya period.

Gautama should be held as the culminating point of the first period, the forms of which were visible in the Upaniṣads. Right

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1. *H. I. L.*, XIII-XV, Intro., pp. 251-69
2. Bodas, *Tarkasaṅgraha*, Intro.,
3. *Critique of Indin Realism*, pp. 12-13

from Vātsyāyana down to Udyanācārya, including all the contemporary Buddhist and Jaina logicians, should form the second period. Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* can be reasonably called as the landmark of the second period. Navyanyāya naturally started with Gangeśa (A.D. 1200) and continued up to Gadādhara Bhattācharya (A.D. 1650). This should be held as the third period The post Navyā Nyāya period, which should comprise present-day critical writings on this subject, may roughly be counted from the second half of the 17th century A.D.

The systems of Hindu and Greek Logic have developed independently of each other. Hindu Logic in its rudimentary stage can be traced back to as early as the 6th century B.C. Greek Logic assumed a definite form in the 4th century B.C., though its germs can be seen a little earlier in the controversies of the Sophists and Socrates. Dr. Vidyabhusan's observation, i.e., "syllogism did not actually evolve in Indian Logic out of inference and the Hindu logicians owed the idea of syllogism to the influence of Aristotle"[1], needs investigation. "Of Logical doctrine in its early stages," as Keith aptly points out, "there is no reason whatever to suspect a Greek origin: the syllogism of Gautama and Kaṇāda alike is obviously of natural growth, but of stunted development."[2]

For a proper estimation of the evolution of Indian Logic it should be held as a single unit and compartment such as Nyāya, Jaina Logic and Buddhist Logic as its fractions influencing one another. The development of old Nyāya through its commentaries and glosses, clearly owes much to contemporary Buddhist Logic. A critical analysis of any of the works of Indian Logic necessitates the evaluation of Buddhist and Jaina Logic as well.

Indian Logic, thus has three main branches, namely, Vedic, Bauddha and Jaina. The periods of most of the authors belonging to these branches are not ascertainable even now. Let us, however, have a short account of a few of them.

Scholars have divergent opinions regarding the authorship of *Nyāyasūtra*. Some of them, for instance, Dr. Vidyabhusan, maintain that Gautama and Akṣapāda were two different persons. Out of the five subjects discussed in the Nyāyasūtra, viz., (1) *pramāṇa*,

1. *History of Indian Logic* (*Intro*), *XV*
2. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 18

(2) *prameya*, (3) *vāda*, (4) *avayava* and (5) *anyamataparīkṣā*, the first, second and third, which constituted *Ānvīkṣikī*, were compiled by Gautama and the last two were introduced by Akṣapāda. "Akṣapāda," according to Dr. Vidyabhusan, "was, therefore, the real author of the *Nyāyasūtra*, which derived a considerable part of its materials from the *Anvīkṣikī* vidyā of Gautama. Just as Caraka was the redactor of the *Agniveśa tantra* or the *Āyurveda*, Akṣapāda was the redactor of the *Ānvikṣikī* of Gautama." As Nāgārjuna (A.D. 250-320) refers to a number of logical terms presumably from the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Caraka Saṁhitā* (A.D. 78) contains logical forms cruder than those of *Nyāyasūtra*, Dr. H. Jacobi places the date of the Nyāyasūtra between A.D. 200 and A.D. 450 on the ground that the *Nyāyasūtra* attacks Śūnyavāda but does not allude to Vijnānavāda.

Dr. Vidyabhūsan's conjecture that Gautama Medhātithi and Medhātithi Gautama were names of the same person who flourished in about 553 B.C. in Mithilā, is mainly based upon a line in the *Mahābhārata*, viz., *Medhātithir mahāprājno Gautamas tapasi sthitaḥ* and also on a passage in Bhāsa's *Pratimānāṭaka*, viz., *Medhātithir Nyāyasūtram*. But the stanza in the *Mahābhārata* does not necessarily refer to the founder of the Nyāya school. Similarly Bhāsa's reference, as Barnet also states, may be to Medhātithi, the author of a commentary on *Manusmṛti*.

Vātsyāyana, the author of the earliest extant commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* vaguely refers to some other commentators and gives different explanations of some terms or concepts, but their works are no longer available. It seems that there must have been a gap of at least two hundred years between Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana. Dinnāga (A.D. 500) criticises Vātsyāyna. Similarly Vasubandhu's (A.D. 483) theory of syllogism, though most antagonistic to that of Akṣapāda has not been controverted by Vātsyāyana. Dr. Vidyabhuṣan thinks that some doctrines expounded in the *Madhyamika kārikā* and *Lankāvatārasūtra* (A.D. 300) seem to have been interpolated into the *Nyāyasūtra* before or during the time of Vātsyāyana. Therefore, it is nearer approximation to fix the date of Vātsyāyana at about A.D. 400. He was also known as Pakṣila Swāmi. Dr. D.N. Shastri contradicts the view of Dr. Vidyabhusan, stating that the *sūtra*, supposed to be an interpolation, may in fact be referring to the Mādhyamika theory.

In the colophon of *Nyāyavārtika* the family name of Uddyotakara is mentioned as Bhāradvāja. Dharmakīrti, who belonged to

the first part of the 7th century A.D., refers to Uddyotakara. There is a reference to his name in Subandhu's *Vāsavadattā*, which in turn is referred to by Bāṇa in Harṣacarita. Bāṇa was a junior contemporary of King Harṣavardhana who flourished in the middle of 7th century A.D. In the opinion of Dr. Vidyabhusan, Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti have referred to the views of each other. But this is not acceptable because Uddyotakara does not seem to be aware of the revision that Dharmakīrti made in Diṅnāga's definitions of perception, etc. Some scholars are of the view that Uddyotakara was the resident of Srughna, a village situated near Thanesar, the capital of Harṣavardhana. He was fortunate in having a commentator of the calibre of Vācaspatimiśra. "If", as D. N. Shastri states, "Subandhu is placed in the beginning of the seventh century, the close of the sixth century would be the *terminus ad quem* for Uddyotakara"[1] Jayanta quotes Uddyotakara frequently.

According to the colophon of Nyāyasūcī-nibandha, Vācaspatimiśra completed this work in the 898 Vikrama era corresponding to A.D 841.[2] He refers to Trilocana as his teacher from whom he learnt Logic.[3] On account of his 'Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā', he also became famous as Tātparyācārya. Some scholars, however, are of the view that Tātparyācārya was the name of another Ācārya who was a follower of Bhāsarvajña. But the dictum, viz, *Saṃvid eva hi bhagavati Vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam*, on the authorship of which this view is held, has now been found in Tātparyaṭīkā itself. Vācaspatimiśra has laid down a firm foundation of Nyāya realism. He was a versatile genius and enriched all the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy. Jayanta, as has been discussed in detail in the next chapter, was a contemporary of Vācaspatimiśra, but they do not seem to have an aquaintance with each other.

Bhāsarvajña, the author of Nyāyasāra, flourished in the ninth Century A. D. He was a fore-runner of Gaṅgeśa in dealing only with the pramāṇas (epistemology) and leaving the prameyas (metaphysics) altogether. The popularity and importance of *Nyāyasāra* is evident from the fact that it has eighteen commentaries including the one (Nyāyabhūṣana) written by Bhāsarvajña himself. The major point in his analysis of the means of knowledge is that he does not

1. *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 109
2. श्री वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण वस्वंकवसुवत्सरे ।
न्यायसूचीनिबन्धोऽसावकारि सुधियां मुदे ॥
3. *N. V. T. T*, 1.1.4

accept Upamāna (comparison) as an independent way of knowing. There is no proof, whatsoever to support the view that Jayanta wrote a commentary on Nyāyasāra.

Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, in a way, is a thorough review of the tenets of all the relevant schools. So, it is not out of place here to have a short account of a few authorities of other schools whom he has frequently referred to.

Indian Philosophy has been primarily divided into two groups known as orthodox (āstika) and heterodox (nāstika). The former has six systems, namely, Nyāya, Vāiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta and the latter comprises three systems known as Cārvāka, Bauddha and Jaina. Mādhavācārya, however, enumerates as many as sixteen systems. Each school has, to some extent, devised its own method of knowing, but in spite of this, some underlying principles (for instance holding worldly objects as capable of being cognized) render all the systems or schools initially or basically identical at least to some extent.

Scholars are nearly unanimous in placing Diṅnāga in the fifth century A. D. He had been the dominating figure in Indian Philosophy during the fifth to tenth century A. D His main work, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, is available now only in fragments. Most of subsequent works on Indian Philosophy have copious quotations or references from his work. He has the credit of throwing a challenge to the Realism of the orthodox schools and laying down the foundation of his Realist-Idealistic School of Logic. Jayanta has criticised him in his Nyāyamañjarī.

Dharmakīrti had been the main target in Jayanta's criticism of the Buddhist position. Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* and *Nyāyabindu* are the most famous works on Buddhist Logic. He improved upon the works of Diṅnāga and criticised Uddyotakara. I-tsing (A.D. 671-693). Refers to him as a reformer of logic. This shows that he lived in the first quarter of the seventh century A D. He was initiated into Buddhism by Dharmapāla, whom Hsuan Tsang is said to have met in A.D. 633. Dharmottara wrote a commentary on *Nyāyabindu*.

The Jainism was founded by Mahāvīra Swāmin about 600 B.C. Umāswāti's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* is held to be the earliest work on Jaina Logic. After the codification of Jainism by Devardhi Gaṇi (also known as Kṣamāśramaṇa) at a council held at Valabhi in Vīra Sāmvat, 930 or A.D. 453, some Jaina scholars devoted themselves to the systematic study of logic. Siddhasena Divākara's

(about A.D. 480-550) *Nyāyāvatāra* and *Sammatitilakasūtra* are the most authentic and the earliest systematic treatises on Jaina Logic. Jinabhadra Gaṇi (A D. 484-588) and Siddhasena Gaṇi (A.D. 600) wrote commentaries on Umāswāti's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*. *Āptamīmāṁsā* and *Syādvādamañjarī* by Samantabhadra (A.D. 600) *Aṣṭaśāhasrī* (*Āptamīmāṁsāṭīkā*) and *Nyāyaviniścaya* by Akalaṅka, *Aṣṭaśāhasrī* (Commentary on *Āptamīmāṁsā*) by Vidyānand (A.D. 800) *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* by Māṇikyanandī (800 A.D.) and *Prāmeyakamalamārtaṇḍa* (commentary on *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*) by Prabhāchandra are some of the works which are said to have been written before Jayanta. The Jaina logicians have not been frequently mentioned by Jayanta. Arhat is the favourite word with which he refers to them. He does not concern himself with the Jaina position on different aspects of logic.

Kurmārila and *Prabhākara* are also assailed by Jayanta Their date is a matter of controversy. Both commented upon Śabara's Bhāṣya on Mimāṁsāsūtra. Kumārila's commentary on the first part of the first chapter is known as Ślokavārtika, whereas Prabhākara's commentary on the same part of the Bhāṣya is called Bṛhatī. Both are said to have flourished some time during the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. Jayanta refers to the views of Kumārila as well as of Prabhākara and criticises the Mīmāṁsakas more often than usual.

Jayanta, like his fellow logicians, holds knowledge to be a quality. His theory is to be elaborately discussed in the third chapter. Let us now have a short account of other theories of knowledge and see how Jayanta refutes them.

RELATION THEORY

According to the critical realists knowledge of extra mental reality is a three-term relation, viz., of the mind, the object and the content. Moore, however, depicts this relation between a sense-datum and a character.[1] Russell speaks of knowledge as a relation between a knowing subject and the object known.[2] James is of the view that knowledge is a relation of two modes of the same entity—the knower and the object known. According to him the relation is a part of pure experience ; one of its terms becomes the subject of knowledge and the other becomes the object known.[3]

1. *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 255
2. *Our Knowledge of the External World*
3. *Essay in Radical Empiricism*

According to the American neo-realists knowledge is a relation not between a knowing subject and a known object but between two objects.

This theory has been criticized by logicians both in the West and the East. Reid rejects it on the ground that knowledge is not itself a relation but the apprehension of relations.[1] In Indian philosophy, the Bhāṭṭas are perhaps the most outspoken critics of this theory.[2] It is a fact that in the acquisition of knowledge a subject and an object come to be related together, but this relation does not constitute knowledge. In other words, knowledge itself is not a relation.

According to Kumārila there is nowhere a relation which is not based on some action on the part of some agent. Pārthasārathi's analysis echoes the same view when he states that without an occasional cause a subject-object relation cannot arise between the self and the object.[3] The Naiyāyikas reject this theory on the ground that knowledge may be said to arise out of the relation between the soul and the body but it is not simply a relation between the two. It is rather a quality of the soul. Jayanta naturally endorses the Nyāya view.

SELF-SUBSISTENCY THEORY

Amongst the Western philosophers Berkeley is the chief propounder of this theory of knowledge. In Indian philosophy, the Buddhists known as Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins have beeen its main votaries. They believe that consciousness is self-subsistent. They deny the reality of all things except *vijñāna* or consciousness. The subject and the object of cognition, according to them, are the modes of the ālaya which is a continuously changing stream of consciousness. The *Ālayavijñāna* is a whole containing within itself the knower and the known. This theory is also known as Subjective Idealism since it maintains that there are no things other than thinking beings. The things that are believed to be perceived are only the ideas of thinking being. In short, the theory holds that there is no objective world independent of the perceiving mind. In the Vedānta doctrine there is nothing more ultimate than knowledge which reveals itself, and this is similar to the position adopted

1. *Knowledge and Truth*
2. न क्रियाकर्तृ-सम्बन्धादृते संबन्धनं क्वचित्, *S. V.*, p. 60
3. *S. D*, p. 56

by the Vijñānavādins. The Buddhists, however, differ from the Vedāntins regarding the existence of a single intelligent abiding principle and admit only a chain of impressions. The Naiyāyikas are opposed to this view. They believe in the distinctiveness of the self, cognition and the object cognized and deny consciousness as playing all the three roles.[1] Jayanta naturally follows the tract of the Nyāya system.[2]

THE ACT-THEORY

In Western philosophy the Act-theory of knowledge has been propounded by Kant,[3] Spencer,[4] Bergson,[5] Alexander,[6] and Dawes Hicks[7]. It is, therefore, the Behaviourists[8] who go to the extreme when they speak of the identity of knowing with the activity of the body. In Indian philosophy the Mādhyamika Buddhists and the Mīmāṁsakas refer to knowledge as an activity[9]. The Buddhists are of the view that "knowledge is an existent fact that consists in the act of showing and leading to an object."[10] According to Prabhākara, Samvit and *jñāna* are two different things rather than two names of the same thing. The Bhāṭṭas are the staunch supporters of the view that knowledge is an act of the soul. Pārthsārathi emphatically remarks that knowledge is an act of the soul which produces a result in its object just as the act of cooking produces cookedness in rice. There is, however, some inconsistency in the Bhāṭṭa account of this theory. Kumārila upholds it and at the same time states that knowledge is a *dharma* of soul. Similarly Pārthsārathi enumerates knowledge as one of the nine properties of the soul. It is, however, to be observed that whereas the Naiyāyikas refer to knowledge as a quality of the soul and use the term '*guṇa*', the Bhāṭṭas mention it

1. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 44
2. *N. M.*, II. 1-15
3. *Critique of Pure Reason*
4. *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, Ch. XXVI
5. *Creative Evolution*
6. *Space Time and Deity*, Vol. I, pp. 11-12
7. *Critical Realism*
8. Watson, *Behaviourism*, Lecture X
9. ज्ञानक्रिया सकर्मिका, *S. D.*
10. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 14

through the term '*dharma*'. But they seem to overlook the fact that '*dharma*' is different from '*guṇa*' in that whereas 'guṇa' is simply a quality such as redness is of fire, *dharma*, being a property, is an occasional act. It is like the property of burning in fire. Amongst modern European philosophers Moore and Broad have vehemently refuted the Act-theory of knowledge.[1] According to them knowledge is a two-term relation between a knowing mind and a known object. Russell, in his work "*Our Knowledge of the External World*", discards this theory and speaks of knowledge as a relation between a knowing subject and an object known.

In Indian philosophy this theory got an emphatic rebuttal from the Naiyāyikas, particularly at the hands of Jayanta. Jayanta criticizes this theory primarily against the Mīmāṁsā standpoint and it is he who, for the first time in the history of Indian logic, gives a clear and convincing account of the Nyāya position on this specific issue. He argues that if the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that the soul has a distinct activity which is called *bhāvanā* and that the '*karoti*' denotes it, then they stand refuted on the ground that no activity of the soul is ever noticed. The soul is definitely an agent but its agency is unique since it does not depend upon its activity. When the quality of '*kartṛtva*' inheres in it, it becomes an agent without performing any action. Consciousness and other inner states of the soul are not actions but qualities because they are not creatures of the will.[2]

Futher, he argues, if the Mīmāṁsakas cling to this theory on account of their notion that 'to know' is a verb and therefore it denotes an action which naturally belongs to the soul, then, he asserts, the Mīmāṁsakaś should know that there is no hard and fast rule that all verbs denote action. For instance, the verb '*gaḍi*' in the classical list of verbs denotes the position of a face.[3] Moreover, if we analyse the sentence 'I know a jar', we see that jar denotes the object of knowledge. 'I' stands for the soul. What does the verb 'know' convey? The answer is 'quality' and not 'action', since it is super-sensuous ex-hypothesis. Even if it is held

1. Reid is of the view that knowledge is an act of mind.
2. न हि पुरुषव्यापारः कश्चिदुपलभ्यते, विशिष्टगुणसमवाय एवास्य कर्तृत्वम्, *N. M.*, 1-19
3. नायं नियमः क्रियावचनो धातुरिति, गडि वदनैकदेशे इत्यादि दर्शनात्, *N. M.*, 1-16

that the result of the action is presented to consciousness, the result itself should be denoted by the verb 'to know'. Therefore, consciousness is not an action. Jayanta quotes Vātsyāyan in his support and states that he has mentioned '*buddhi*' and 'karma' separately and there is ample evidence to prove that he also considers them as two distinct entities. So, Jayanta concludes that this theory does not stand the test of reason.[1]

Jayanta thinks that the problem of knowledge is capable of being solved. Knowledge, according to him, is a quality which belongs to the self. It is neither a relation nor an activity. He agrees with Gautama in holding that jñāna, *buddhi* and *upalabdhi* are synonymous terms. Memory (*smṛti*), for him, is a non-valid comprehension since it does not ar'se out of the objects themselves. So far as doubt (*sanśaya*) is concerned, Jayanta refers to it as the starting point of all philosophical thinking. *Tarka*, with him, is a kind of hypothetical reasoning which serves to provide a strong presumption in support of the probandum. He opines that an error (*Viparyaya*) is a positive misapprehension in which the mistake consists in indentifying two different objects. A way of knowing (*pramāṇa*), according to Jayanta, is that collocation of conscious as well as unconscious objects which results in bringing about such an apprehension of knowable objects as is different from an illusion and a doubt. He believes that the conscious and the unconscious objects form the conditions of the means of knowledge. Jayanta follows the Nyāya view that the validity and invalidity of a congnition largely depend upon extraneous factors. He, however, accepts that there are some cases of knowledge the truth of which appears to be self-evident. With regard to the jurisdiction of the means of knowledge he states that though the means of knowledge differ from one another it is not possible to confine the various means of knowledge to water-tight compartments. He accepts only four ways of knowing, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*) inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabha*).

Gautama, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Gaṅgeśa and Viśvanātha Pañcānana have been the representative logicians of their own periods. Their works, respectively, *Nyāyasūtra*, *Nyāyamañjarī*, *Tattvacintā-*

1. तस्मान्न क्रियात्मकं ज्ञानम्, यदि च क्रियात्मकं ज्ञानमभविष्यन्न भाष्यकारः क्रियातः पृथगेनं निरदेक्ष्यत, निर्दिशति च, *N. M*, I·19

maṇi and *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* can thus be befittingly acknowledged as the landmarks in the formation and development of the Indian theory of knowledge. *Nyāyamañjarī*, though belonging to the second period, has included in itself the tenets of the first and influenced the thinking of the third and fourth periods. It, therefore, has not only established a link between the old and the new, but also brought about a sort of critical co-ordination between the orthodox and the heterodox systems of Indian philosophy. The following pages of this book, *Indian Theory of Knowledge, based* upon Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, in their wide perspective, seek to represent the sum and substance of the answers that the Indian thinkers have given to various questions regarding the ways of acquiring and testing knowledge.

CHAPTER II

JAYANTA AND HIS NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ

Jayanta was the great grandson of Śakti Svāmin, who was a minister of King Muktāpīda (alias Lalitāditya) of Karkota dynasty of Kashmir, whose reign ended in A.D. 753. His family tree in a descending order is : Śakti, Mitra, Śaktisvāmin, Kalyāṇasvāmin, Candra, Jayanta and Abhinanda. Jayanta's frequent reference to Gauramūlaka, a village in kashmir, which perhaps his grandfather obtained as a gift from the king, bears an evidence to the fact that Jayanta was a resident, if not the owner, of that village.[1] Dr. Stein is of the view that this village was situated in the territory of Rājpuri within the boundaries of Dervābhisāra.[2] As we have said before, Dr. Vidyābhūṣan divides the history of Indian logic into three periods, namely, (1) Ancient, (2) Mediaeval, and (3) Modern. With vague generalisations at times, his classification finds Jayanta in the category of ancient epistemologists. Dr. D. N. Shastri also divides the history of Indian logic into three periods, namely, (1) Pre-Diṅnāga period, (2) period of conflict with the Diṅnāga school and (3) Post-Buddhist period. According to him Jayanta belongs to the second group. Gangeśa's reference to him as *Jarannaiyāyika* shows that in the latter's time he had been an established authority.[3]

Fortunately, we do have some evidence with us to trace Jayanta's period approximately. He mentions Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa and Śaṅkarasvāmin, all of whom flourished before the 8th century A.D. Jayanta criticizes the views of *Yuktidīpikā*, and also quotes a verse from *Śiśupālabadha* of Māgha.

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1. अस्मत्पितामह एव ग्रामकामः सांग्रहणीं कृतवान् । स इष्टिसमाप्ति-समनन्तरमेव गौरमूलकं ग्राममवाप, *N. M.*, I-250
2. *Kalhana's Chronicles of the Kings of Kashmir*, Stein, Vol. II, pp. 144-5, foot-note to verse 1861
3. Gopinath Kaviraj : *Gleanings from H. & B. of Nyāya-Vai*

These works belong to the 8th century A D. He refers to the *Dhvani* theory of Ānandavardhana, who flourished during the times of Avantivarman, a ruler of Kashmir A.D. 855-8837. He also refers to Śankaravarman, another ruler of Kashmir (A.D. 887—902) as a king of the past.[1] Further, taking into consideration his great grandfather's association with King Muktāpīda of Kashmir (A.D. 753) and at the same time allowing a period of about sixty years. as Dr. D. N. Shastri also suggests, for two intervening generations, Jayanta's period falls some time in the beginning of the 9th century A D. Abhinanda wrote his work perhaps in the second half of the 9th century A.D. He mentions his father, Jayanta, as an illustrious '*vṛttikāra*' and his account also supports the contention that Jayanta flourished some time in the first half of the 9th century A.D.

At one place Jayanta himself admits that he has written *Nyāyamañjarī* just to mark his time in prison.[2] Why was he imprisoned? He maintains silence on this point. Kalhaṇa in his *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, however, provides us with some clue. He states that King Śankaravarman of Kāshmir put a Brahmin, named Nāyaka incharge of a seat of learning in a temple and its treasure.[3] Prof. Stein thinks that the Brahmin referred to is the rhetorician Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but Prof. Jānakīballabha Bhattācharya, Pancānana Tarka Vāgīśa, etc., are of the view that the reference applies to Jayanta. According to Chakradhar Jayanta stayed for many years in Khasdeśa under the order of Śankaravarman.[4] The following seem to be the reasons for Jayanta's imprisonment.

Śamkaravarman, perhaps attracted by the scholarship of Jayanta, made him Ācārya of the 'Vāgdevīkulmandira', a seat of learning in a temple of the goddess Sarasvatī, which had a vast treasure belonging to it. Later on when the king exhausted all the resources of the kingdom in wars abroad, it became difficult for him

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1. तदपूर्वमिति विदित्वा निवारयामास धर्मतत्त्वज्ञः ।
राजा शंकरवर्मा न पुनर्जैनादिमतमेवम्, *N.M.*, I-248

2. राज्ञा तु गह्वरेऽस्मिन्नशब्दके बन्धने विनिहितोऽहम् ।
ग्रन्थरचनाविनोदादिह मया वासरा गमिताः, *N.M.*, II-363

3. द्विज स्तयोर्नायकाख्यो गौरीशसुरसद्मनोः ।
चतुर्विद् यः कृतस्तेन वाग्देवीकुलमन्दिरम्, *R.V.*, V-159

4. काश्मीरे क्वचित् खसदेशे चिरकालमारब्धामसौ श्रीशङ्करवर्मणो राज
आज्ञया स्थितवान् इति वार्ता *N M. G.*, p.167

to meet the expenses of his vast army. No other means left to him, the king might have tried to make use of the riches of the temple and Jayanta, as an honest Ācārya with a large number of followers, might have revolted against the king. The opposition led by him would have been a tremendous and strong one, and in order to crush the revolt Jayanta might have been imprisoned. This imprisonment-episode is supported by the statement of Kalhaṇa in *Rājataraṅginī* that Śaṅkaravarman oppressed his subjects and dishonoured learned men. Śaṅkaravarman finds mention in one of Jayanta's verses also. Kalhaṇa illustrates him as a tyrant. Most likely Jayanta happened to be one of the learned men of the period who fell victim to the atrocities of Śaṅkaravarman, and he might have been imprisoned for leading the opposition.

One problem that has exercised the minds of scholars of the day is that of determining the relation between Jayanta and Vācaspatimiśra. There are three views prevalent in this respect, viz., (1) Jayanta was the pupil of and posterior to Vācaspati, (2) Jayanta was prior to and the teacher of Vācaspati and (3) both were contemporaries unknown to each other. Available evidence supports the third view. Those who uphold the first view are simply guided by the farfetched interpretation of the word 'Ācārya' used by Jayanta in *Nyāyamañjarī* while discussing the problem of perception.[1] They also try to substantiate their view by identifying 898 vatsara, which Vācaspati has mentioned as the year of writing *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, with A.D. 841, and thus try to establish Vācaspati's priority over Jayanta.[2] But this contention does not seem accurate since the term 'Ācārya' does not necessarily refer to Vācaspati and none of the original views of Vācaspati find a place in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*. For instance, Jayanta is not aware of Vācaspati's view with regard to the meaning of *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka*. Had he studied Nyāya from Vācaspatimiśra, he would have been certainly conversant with the latter's interpretations. Moreover, Chakradhar, the author of *Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga* solves this problem stating that the term 'Ācārya' refers to Rucikāra, etc., the authors of glosses on *Nyāyavārtika*.[3]

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1. M. M. Gaṅgādhar Shastri ; Chow. Ed., *N. M.*, I-62
2. श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रेण वस्वंकवसुवत्सरे । न्यायसूचीनिबन्धोऽसावकारि सुधियां मुदे ॥
3. इह च सर्वत्राचार्यशब्देन उद्योतकरविवृतिकृतो रुचिकारप्रभृतयो विवक्षिताः, *N. M., Granthi.*, p. 44

The second view that Vācaspati was a pupil of Jayanta is based on the notion that Vācaspati mentions *Nyāyamañjarī* by name in *Nyāyakaṇikā* as a work of his teacher, and in *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* he refers to Trilocana as his teacher. So Trilocana could be none other than Jayanta.[1] But this view also is based upon erroneous presumptions since the title *Nyāyamañjarī* referred to in *Nyāyakaṇikā* might have been some Mīmāṁsā work. Had Jayanta and Trilocana been one and the same person, Jayanta himself would have been the author of the new interpretations of the above mentioned terms, since Vācaspati clearly states that the source of his novel interpretation of these terms is his teacher Trilocana.

The third view that both the stalwarts were contemporaries but did not know each other seems most plausible on the grounds that though Jayanta is thoroughly conversant with the works of almost all his precursors, yet he does not seem well acquainted with the works of his contemporaries. It might be due to the cessation of the academic intermingling of the scholars of Kashmir with their counterparts in the rest of the country due to civil war which broke out in Kashmir after the time of Avantivarman. Another simple and more striking reason for Jayanta's aloofness from contemporary thinking is that he was imprisoned for an indefinite period under the tyranny of Śankaravarman as elaborated above, and so had no opportunity to acquaint himself with the stream of thought current in other parts of the country.

It is just possible that Jayanta's work might not have been in anybody's hands during his lifetime or till his son Abhinanda's *Kādambarī-Kathāsāra* had given it a boost. Moreover, in no work of Vācaspati is his acquaintance with Kashmir traceable. He was an intellectual giant, no doubt, but he was definitely not aware of his contemporary thinkers in Kashmir. So, in the light of the circumstances mentioned above, if Jayanta and Vācaspati were contemporaries and still not known to each other, it is not improbable. The fact of Jayanta's not

1. (a) अज्ञानतिमिरशमनीं परदमनीं न्यायमंजरीं रुचिराम् ।
प्रसवित्रे प्रभवित्रे विद्यातरवे नमो गुरवे, न्यायकणिका ॥

(b) त्रिलोचनगुरून्नीतमार्गानुगमनोन्मुखैः । यथामानं यथावस्तु
व्याख्यातमिदमीदृशम्, *N V. T. T.*, 1.1.4

mentioning Vācaspati's views should not, however, make us ignore Vācaspatimiśra altogether, since without the analysis of his account any study of the Nyāya tenets should remain incomplete and it is more so in case of the present one.

Nyāyamañjarī is a voluminous work of Indian philosophy. It explains the basic tenets of the Nyāya laid down by Gautama in his aphorisms and elaborated by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara in the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika*, respectively. Jayanta is definitely posterior to Uddyotakara. It will be superfluous to state that he thoroughly knows the Nyāya system. In addition he has a thorough knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, Mīmāṁsā, Sāṁkhya and the earlier Vedānta. He has studied all the recondite works of Pāninian Grammar and paid close attention to the proper understanding of the Cārvāka system. His study of Vedic literature and the purāṇas is extensive. He is familiar with the works of Sanskrit literature and rhetorics. His encyclopaedic learning and skill for accurate depiction have made his work a real and trustworthy treasure-house of knowledge. Quotations from other works made use of by him are copious. He discreetly refers to Gnutama's aphorisms to substantiate the theory which he has formulated in defending the views of Vātsyāyana against criticisms by the rival schools, particularly the Buddhists and the Mīmāṁsakas. *Nyāyamañjarī* is an encyclopaedia and it will not be a proper appreciation of Jayanta if we simply take his work to be a running commentary. This work provides glimpses of the history of a number of centuries and is a landmark in that it has very deftly infused the catholic spirit into Indian Logic. Jayanta's eye is sharp and penetrating. He is a loyal and staunch Naiyāyika, but not a blind follower of his predecessors[1]. He subjects the rival hypotheses to severe criticism. His use of harsh and agressive language against his opponents does not display his greatness as a debater and it is also a fact that he has weakness for heaping contumely upon his rivals. Still, as a discriminate philosopher he does not discard anything and every thing simply because it has come from his opponents. At times he has all praise for them.[2] Thus, in *Nyāyamañjarī* we find all systems in one, that too in a novel way. In addition to giving catholic structure to his work, Jayanta exerts

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1. मनुवत्सूत्रकारोऽपि न धर्मस्योपदेशकः, *N. M.*, I-74
2. He refers to Dharmakīrti as '*Sunipuṇabuddhiḥ*', *N. M.*, I-63

his pen to invent new theories. He shows unflinching faith in Vedic religion. He is devoted to Śiva, worshipped by the Hindus of Kashmir from days of yore. He honours the authority of only those scriptures which are not outside the Vedic religion. He holds Nyāya as the highest safeguard for the study of the Vedas.[1]

Jayanta's method of presenting his hypothesis is a peculiar one. He introduces the view of his opponents, analyses their merits and demerits and ultimately puts forward his own theory or supports the existing Nyāya tenets by the method of elimination or assimilation of the rival hypotheses. Jayanta's role in the field of Indian Logic cannot be judged adequately unless we evaluate his contribution in the light of a long conflict between the Diṅnāga school of Buddhism and the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika realism. The conflict started with Diṅnāga's attack on *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana on it. Uddyotakara refers to Diṅnāga as 'Kutārkika' and maintains that his aim of writing *Nyāyavārtika* is to dispel the darkness caused by Diṅnāga in the field of logic.[2] After Uddyotakara the Buddhist camp was fortunate to produce eminent scholars like Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, etc. All of them assailed Uddyotakara one after the other and for a continuous period of about two and a half centuries there was no one in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika camp to challenge the formidable Buddhists. Still, the torch of defending the realism against the Buddhist onslaught was carried on by two great stalwarts of the Mīmāṁsā school, namely, Kumārila and Prabhākara. Meanwhile with the ushering in of the ninth century the good days of the Nyāya returned. It produced such renowned scholars as Vācaspati and Jayanta. Both of the erudite scholars engaged themselves in the difficult task of refuting the Buddhists and proclaiming again the supremacy of the Nyāya over other schools. It is, of course, a different matter that they do not seem to have the requisite opportunity to acquaint themselves with each other's work. From the point of view of Nyāya alone, Jayanta has an edge over Vācaspati. Vācaspati belongs to all orthodox systems

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1. न्यायविस्तरस्तु मूलस्तम्भभूतः सर्वविद्यानां वेदप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वात्. *N. M.*, I-3.

2. कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः करिष्यते तस्य मया निबंधः, *N. V.* (आदिश्लोक) ; *N. M.*, I-28

on account of his expositions on them. But Jayanta is first and last a Naiyāyika and he is so, not as a matter of necessity but by virtue of his conviction. Thus, virtually, it is Jayanta who breaks the silence of the Nyāya camp and gives it new life. As has already been pointed out, the Mīmāṁsakas had also tried to achieve this aim, so it is but natural for Jayanta to assess their standpoints as well. He does find some inconsistency or misrepresentation of facts on the part of the Mīmāṁsakas for which he criticizes them also. In the mean time scholars of other schools have come forward with other theories and Jayanta could not ignore them either. Keeping in view this situation we shall try in the following pages to present the views of all the major relevant schools on every major topic in the form in which they are preserved in their basic texts and also in the form in which Jayanta presents and analyses them. We shall try to point out where Jayanta strikes a new chord either by way of formulating a new theory or in arranging the old matter in a new setting. Wherever no such case exists we shall attempt to compare his views with those of others not referred to in his works, just to elaborate his conviction with greater clarity.

In addition to *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta has written *Nyāyakalikā* (a short commentary on Nyāyasūtra) and *Āgamaḍambara* (a Sanskrit drama). *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* is the only extant commentary on *Nyāyamañjarī*.[1]

It may seem odd to think of a poetic appreciation of a philosophical work. Even then one can hardly by-pass the aesthetic aspect of *Nyāyamañjarī*. Jayanta is a man of versatile talents. Though he has undertaken to write a treatise on philosophy, the work has all the aesthetic appeal of a fine literary writing. At times the reader is bound to forget that he is going through a treatise and not a prose romance. When Jayanta gets angry upon his opponents he addresses them with vocative exclamations such as '*Bho Sādho, nātra pṛthag grahaṇam upayujyate*',[2] the mode of expression has all the characteristics of a drama. Jayanta's summing up of the various discussions in small and compact verses exhibits his mastery of a

1. It is written by Chakradhar, most probably a Kashmirian flourished between 10th and 12th Centuries A.D. It is edited by Nagin J. Shah and published by L. D. Institute, Ahmedabad (72).

2. *N. M.*, I-28

facile diction His selection of apt words, employment of natural figures of speech and his power of infusing suggestion in his remarks make this philosophical work no less a piece of fine literature than a scholium in Logic. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration on the part of his son, Abhinanda when he observes that in the eloquent writing of his father the muse of learning found her perfection.[1]

1. व्यक्ता कवित्ववक्तृत्वफला यस्य सरस्वती, कादम्बरी कथासार (उपक्रम):

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE AND FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE

1. *What is knowledge (Jñāna)* ?

The problem of knowledge (*Jñāna*) has long engaged the attention of thinkers all over the world What is the nature of knowledge ? What are the means of acquiring it ? What is the criterion of the truth of knowledge ? Briefly, these are some of the issues which comprise the subject matter of the epistemological queries that lead to the formulation of a theory of knowledge Even a general survey of the views of different scholars in Western philosophy regarding these issues shows that there are two groups of epistemologists, viz., the sceptic and the dogmatic. According to the former the problem of knowledge does not have any solution but the dogmatists believe that it is capable of being solved. In Indian philosophy, though different systems have adopted divergent attitudes towards these issues, yet even the materialist Cārvākas attempt to analyse knowledge and its means in their own way and thus obviously are of the view that the problem of knowledge is not beyond solution. Therefore, it is clear that the scepticism in this regard has not clouded any school of Indian philosophy. Jayanta being a staunch Naiyāyika, naturally belongs to the school of those logicians, who have presented a thorough analysis of this problem. He has, in his own right, formulated a distinct theory of knowledge Though his assessment is the culmination of the voluminous literature of his own schools and he cannot be credited as solely responsible for formulating the Nyāya theory of knowledge, yet it is he who, for the first time, gives a historical treatment and presents a synthetic account of the divergent views of all the concerned schools prevailing during his time. He refutes the arguments of the opponents and establishes the viability of the Nyāya views, particularly against the Buddhists' attacks. Vācaspati tries to achieve nearly the same objectives, but the loyal commentator in Vācaspatimiśra seems to have prevented him from adopting an independent line. Jayanta, on the other hand, declares that he is not going to explain each and

every aphorism of Gautama and thus picks up simply those sūtras which he thinks to be absolutely essential for the sake of formulating his theory.[1] Vācaspati's *Tātparyaṭīkā* is the third successive regular commentary of the *Nyāyasūtra*, but Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* follows the pattern of an independent treatise. Thus, contrary to his fellow logicians, Jayanta virtually establishes himself as an original thinker and comes out with his own unique and clear propositions almost on all problems of knowledge. It is immaterial how much he has borrowed from Gautama, Vātsyāyan and Uddyotakara or from his formidable opponents. What is important is that when he presents his treatise it looks new and the way he presents it is delightfully unique. For instance, his definition of pramāṇa consists in the elements which have been discussed by other logicians also, but in its final synthetic form the definition turns out to be simply unique. Though the later Naiyayikas viewed Udayana's definition favourably, they seem to have done so due to their questionable habits of clinging to short-cut methods of adopting the resumes. Anyway, even if the identity of Jayanta is merged in the vast ocean of the Nyāya, there is little doubt that from that point of view also his contribution to all aspects of the theory of knowledge would not be less than that of any of his compeers. So, in every way he deserves the honour due for an original thinker. Let us first of all have a bird's-eye view of the various answers provided by the philosophers in the East and the West to the most fundamental question concerning the theory of knowledge, namely, 'what is knowledge ?'

As we have said before, some thinkers hold knowledge as an act, some others regard it as a relation, according to some it is self-subsistent and for some others it is a quality. These are not, however, water-tight compartments. Jayanta, in general, like his fellow Naiyāyikas, upholds that knowledge is the quality of self and refers to jñāna as *guṇa*. He criticizes the other theories on various grounds.

JAYANTA'S THEORY

Descartes and his followers maintain that thought is the essential attribute of the soul, just as extension is the essential attri-

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1. यस्माभिस्तु लक्षणसूत्राण्येव व्याख्यास्यन्ते, परीक्षासूत्रसूचितं तु वस्तु सोपयोगलक्षणवर्णनावसरे-एव यथाबुद्धि दर्शयिष्यते, न पृथक् परीक्षासूत्रविवरणश्रमः करिष्यते, प्रथमसूत्रानन्तरं दुःखजन्मेत्यादि द्वितीयसूत्रं लक्षणानोपयिकत्वान्नेह व्याख्यातम्, *N. M.*, I-11

bute of matter. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta are the main systems of Indian Philosophy that seem to favour the quality theory of knowledge. Gautama refers to knowledge through the term *'buddhi'* and states that the terms *upalabdhi* and *'jñāna'* are its synonyms.[1] He uses these terms in various aphorisms, but we do not come across any serious attempt at defining knowledge in his work. Kaṇāda enlists *buddhi* amongst the qualities.[2] Praśastapāda adds one more word in the list of synonyms of *buddhi* as stated by Gautama and calls it *pratyaya.*[3] Both of them, however, try to define quality (*guṇa*) in general. Kaṇāda holds that guṇa or quality is an entity inhering in a substance not possessing attributes and not standing as an independent cause in conjunctions or disjunctions. Praśastapāda adds one more characteristic of quality and states that it is an entity related to the genus of quality (*guṇatva*), abiding in a substance and devoid of quality and action. He also categorises buddhi into two types, namely, *vidyā* and *avidyā*. The expositions of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra are merely explanatory and add little to defining the term 'knowledge'.

Jayanta, however, analyses the problem in detail. He considers Gautama's use of the terms *'jñāna'* and *'upalabdhi'* as definitive synonyms of *'buddhi'* sufficient for understanding the nature of knowledge.[4] He views this problem against the contention of the Sāṁkhyas, who maintain that these three terms represent different concepts, and that knowledge is a mode of *buddhi*. According to the Sāṁkhyas the puruṣa is immutable and conscious. Pain, pleasure, etc., belong to *buddhi* which is an evolute of *prakṛti*. Knowledge is a mode of *buddhi* which transforms itself into the shape of the object that it cognizes. Though the *puruṣa* is inactive, due to the indiscrimination and intelligence of *buddhi*, activising of puruṣa takes place and the phenomenon of cognition arises as a hybrid. The reflection of *buddhi* in the self is assumed to account for the knowledge of *buddhi* modified into the forms of objects by the self.

Jayanta repudiates the sāṁkhya view vehemently on the ground that as physical qualities are perceived by the sense organs, knowledge is perceived by manas. Knowledge is the property of the

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
1. बुद्धिः उपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्, *N. S.*, 1.1.15
2. *V. S.*, 1.1.6
3. बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानं प्रत्यय इति पर्यायाः, *V. P.*, p. 136 (Hindi Edi.)
4. पर्यायप्रयोगस्यैव लक्षणक्षमत्वात्, *N. M.*, II-58

immaterial substance, i.e., the soul. The soul acquires this property in its bodily setting and that is why *buddhi* is said to be the quality of the soul. He points out that if the Sāṁkhyas themselves hold *buddhi* and *puruṣa as two distinct entities, then it is an error to* impose the properties of *buddhi* on puruṣa and vice versa. He arrives at the conclusion that the Sāṁkhyas have committed this mistake due to their belief in *satkāryavāda.*[1] Moreover, the Sāṁkhya view that knowledge is a substantive mode of matter makes knowledge material, whereas the fact is that knowledge is formless and matter is never without a form. So, like other Naiyāyikas, Jayanta is of the view that knowledge is a quality of the soul. *It is* not the instrument as the Sāṁkhyas *hold it to be. Since the ins*trumentality is ascribed to the mind, Jayanta asserts that *buddhi* is knowledge and not an instrument of knowledge. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians also hold the same view. Annambhaṭṭa clearly *mentions* that *buddhi* is *knowledge itself and not* an *instrument* of knowledge.[2]

2. *The Classification of Knowledge*

Ascertainment of reality (*tattvajñāna*) *has been* the *prime* object of all philosophical speculations in the East and the West. This is particularly proclaimed by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra.*[3] In the Nyāya the term '*tattva*' stands for reality and the term '*jñāna*' is referred to as a synonym of '*buddhi*' which means knowledge or awareness or apprehension of objects. This ascertainment entails investigation, distinction, classification, etc., and aims at giving everything a particular place in the scheme of the whole. The Nyāya naturally follows this course. There is a difference of opinion between the old and the later Naiyāyikas with regard to the classification of '*buddhi*'. But when we speak of the Nyāya classification of knowledge we include the views of the Navya Naiyāyikas also, and in fact, it is the classification made by the Navya Naiyāyikas which is now current. Jayanta, like other old Naiyāyikas, has not clearly classified knowledge in the fashion set by Śivāditya in *Saptapadārthī* and culminated in *Tarkasaṁgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, but his analysis here and there consists in such elements which are not opposed, if not more or less relevant, to the following scheme :

1. *S. K.*, p. 10
2. *T. S.*, p. 21 (Bombay, 1963)
3. प्रमाणप्रमेय...तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः, *N. S.*, 1.1.1



Except for a slight divergence in the scheme of classification of buddhi between old and the the later Nyāya on the one hand and between Śivāditya and Annaṁbhaṭṭa on the other, it is clear that generally the Nyāya includes all types of apprehension under *buddhi* but as far as valid knowledge (*pramā*) is concerned, it is simply that which is brought about by the four means of valid knowledge.[1] Before we analyse the forms of valid knowledge, let us have a brief account of what are termed as the forms of non-valid cognition.

3. *The Forms of Non-valid Cognition*

(a) SMṚTI (MEMORY)

According to Śivāditya, *smṛti* or memory is that kind of knowledge which is brought about by impressions left behind by a former knowledge in the soul.[2] Annambhaṭṭa states that it is a knowledge which is born of a mental impression alone.[3] In memory there is a revival of past experience due to the latent impressions retained in the soul. Jayanta, while analysing *pratyabhijñā*, speaks of *smṛti* in the same fashion in which the Syncretists take it. The addition of the term '*matra*' by Annambhaṭṭa in the definition of

1. *S. P.*, p. 27 (Madras, 1932)
2. अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतुर्भावना आत्ममात्रवृत्तिः
3. संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः, *T. S.*, p. 57 (1963)

memory has been justified by him in the *Dīpikā* on the ground that it excludes *pratyabhijñā* from the sphere of memory. It is noteworthy that Annambhaṭṭa here is simply echoing what Jayanta had said long before, i.e., recognition is a qualified, real and direct perception of the object, whereas in memory the object remembered is always absent but it is brought back to the mind by the law of association.[1] What happens in the cases of memory is that our experiences modify the soul in some way and these modifications are preserved in the soul. These are called impressions and, if aroused by some internal or external causes, they result in memory. Some of the memories require an effort and some are spontaneous. Memory is of two kinds, namely, true (*yathārtha*) and false (*ayathārtha*), according as it reveals a past experience accurately or inaccurately. Keśavamiśra states that when we are awake, memory may turn out to be true or false according as it is connected with the right or the wrong cognition in the past. But dream cognitions are all memory-cognitions and all these are false in character. In dream the non-present objects appear as present and so they are unreal.[2] According to the Mīmāṁsakas memory is non-valid cognition as it does not reveal a truth hitherto unknown.

The Naiyāyikas hold memory as non-valid knowledge, since, according to them, it is different from *anubhava* (experience). The object remembered is different from the object present and there is no correspondence between memory and its object. The main argument of the Prābhākaras against the validity of memory is that it stands in need of previous knowledge. But Jayanta maintains that memory is non-valid cognition since its object is non-existent at the time of its remembrance.[3] Jayanta does not share the Mīmāṁsā view that the knowledge which refers to a previously known object is invalid. According to him what makes memory invalid is the fact that it does not arise out of the objects themselves.[4] The objects which we remember once existed in the past but have now ceased to exist. So they are no longer real and there is no correspondence between the ceased objects and their memory-

1. *N. M.*, II-21
2. *T. B.*, pp. 25, 34
3. तदाहृदस्य वस्तुन स्तदानीमसत्त्वात्, *N. M.*, I-21
4. न स्मृतेरप्रमाणत्वं गृहीतग्राहिताकृतम् ।
अपि त्वनर्थजन्यत्वं तदप्रामाण्यकारणम्, Ibid.

images. Jayanta concludes that memory, as it is not based on any given datum, fails to give valid presentational experiences, and, therefore, it is not a valid knowledge. This standpoint is further strengthened by the fact that memory is excluded from 'valid knowledge' by the insertion of the term *'arthopalabdhi'* in his definition of *pramāṇa*.

(b) SAṀŚAYA (DOUBT)

According to Gautama *Saṁśaya* (doubt) is a conflicting judgment on the precise character of an object.[1] Vātsyāyana comes forward with his classification of 'doubt' into five kinds. He states that (1) it may arise from the perception of such properties as are common to many things, e.g., seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both; (2) it may arise from the cognition of a peculiar and unique property, e.g., when we cognize a sound it makes us doubt whether it is eternal or non-eternal because it is not found in eternal objects like the soul nor in non-eternal objects like water; (3) it may arise due to conflicting testimony, e.g., through a mere study of scriptures one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does while another system states that it does not; (4) it may also be caused by the irregularity of perception, e.g., we perceive water in the tank where it really exists but it appears also to exist in the mirage where it really does not exist. So it leads to a doubt whether water is perceived only when it actually exists or even when it does not; and finally (5) it may arise from the irregularity of non-perception, e. g., we do not perceive water in the radish where it really exists and also on dry land where it does not exist. So, a question arises whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist or also when it does.

There is a difference of opinion with regard to the types of doubt. Even Uddyotakara and Vācaspati differ with Gautama and Vātsyāyana on this point. The former two favour only three types of doubt. Gaṅgeśa considers simply two, whereas Keśavamiśra speaks of only three. According to Praśastapāda there is only one kind of doubt and that is always due to the perception of properties common to many objects. Kumārila mentions three causes of doubt. Jayanta has devoted a long chapter to the problem of doubt but he simply wastes his labour in discussing why it was not necessary for Gautama to write seven aphorisms instead of one to analyse the

1. *N. S.*; *N. V.*, 1.1.23

problem of doubt. Anyhow, he supports Gautama and Vātsyāyana on this score also.

The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that doubt is neither a true cognition nor a false one. Vātsyāyana maintains that it is a wavering judgment where characters common to many objects are discerned, but none of them is specific. The Sāṁkhyas exclude doubt from valid knowledge, since they hold it as an uncertain knowledge. The validity of doubt as a form of knowledge is not acceptable on the ground that doubt, not being a definite and positive knowledge, cannot be tested by coherence or by correspondence. Doubt is not an error since in it mind oscillates between different ideas with the result that it does not carry with it the definite assertion of any character with regard to its object. Jayanta, however, is aware of the value of doubt in the field of philosophical learning. Though it is Vātsyāyana who has justified the inclusion of doubt amongst the sixteen categories, yet it is Jayanta who has formulated a comprehensive theory of doubt and valued it as the starting point of logical investigation.[1] Jayanta's theory of doubt in this sense, bears close affinity to that of Descartes which envisages that knowledge begins with doubt.

(c) TARKA (HYPOTHETICAL REASONING)

Hypothetical reasoning, according to Gautama, is an intellectual act which contributes to the ascertainment of truth by means of adducing logical grounds in favour of one of the alternative possibilities when the reality is not known in its actual character.[2] Vātsyāyana endorses Gautama's views and states that when two contradictory alternatives seem to be equally possible with regard to a particular point of enquiry and the mind oscillates between them, hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) in support of either of them helps to resolve the indecisiveness. He, however, makes it clear that it is not pramāṇa but simply an aid to *pramāṇa*.[3] The fact as to why the hypothetical reasoning has not been regarded as an independent means of knowledge was brought home by Uddyotakara. He maintains that it simply facilitates the operation of a relevant means of knowledge but does not itself determine the

1. तत्र नानुपलब्धेऽर्थे न निर्णीते प्रवर्तते ।
किंतु संशयिते न्याय स्तदंगं तेन संशय:, *N. M. P.*, I-9
2. अविज्ञाततत्त्वेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमूहस्तर्क:, *N. S.*, 1.1.40
3. *N. B.*, 1.1.40

desired characteristics of the datum. It rather helps to determine between two near equal alternatives on the basis of the superior strength of either of the two.[1] Vācaspatimiśra agrees with Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, but lays greater stress upon the aspect of elimination which happens to be his valuable contribution to hypothetical reasoning. According to him the method of elimination helps to prove that one of the alternatives is logically impossible and the remaining one is nearer to truth.[2]

Jayanta has given a lengthy account of the problem of *tarka*. He is of the view that hypothetical reasoning serves to produce a strong presumption in support of the probandum. His main contribution, with this problem in view, however, rests with his analysis of *tarka* in contrast to *saṁśaya* and *nirṇaya*. He maintains that in doubt both the alternatives have equal strength and none of them is specific with the result that the mind oscillates between the two and does not carry with it any definite assertion. In *nirṇaya* the doubt is removed by hearing or assessing arguments advanced by the conflicting parties, and a final judgment is taken in favour of one of them After that there does not remain any possibility of such a state of mind flickering in favour of another alternative. But as far as tarka is concerned, though it favours one of the alternatives, yet it does not leave the other altogether.[3]

THE TYPES OF TARKA. Viśvanātha refers to five typs of tarka, namely, *Ātmāśraya*, *Anyonyāśraya*, *Cakraka*, *Anavasthā* and *Tadanyabādhitārthaprasaṅga.*

Ātmāśraya is an argument that is self-dependent in respect of genesis, subsistence and cognition. We may elaborate it by an instance— 'A is the cause of A'. Here A must be different from itself, because the cause is different from the effect. This is also called *petitio principi* in the terminology of Wetern Logic. *Anyonyāśraya* is a mutually dependent argument. In the instance 'A depends on B, and B depends upon A', actually A cannot

1. *N. V.*, I-41
2. विशेषदर्शनान्निश्चयः प्रमाणेन भवति, न तर्केण तदनुमानमात्रत्वात्तर्कस्य, *N. V. T. T.*, 1.1.40
3. साम्येन हि समुल्लेखः संशये पक्षयो र्द्वयोः ।
निर्णये त्वितरः पक्षः स्पृश्यते न मनागपि ॥
तर्कस्त्वेकतरं पक्षं विभात्युत्थापयन्निव, *N. M.*, XI-145

depend upon B, since to say that 'B depends upon A' is virtually to deny that 'A depends upon B'.

Cakraka is the reasoning in a circular way. If A requires B, B requires C and C requires A, the argument is a case of circular reasoning.

Anavasthā is the *regressus ad infinitum.* If we explain A by B, B by C, C by D, and so on, it is a case of anavasthā since we do not actually explain anything but simply our explanation shapes itself into the form of infinite regression.

Tadanyabādhitārthaprasaṅga is the *reductio ad absurdum.* It indirectly proves the validity of an argument by showing that the contradictory of its conclusion is absurd. This may be done by opposing the contradiction of the conclusion by means of some fact or by applying some universal law. If, therefore, its contradictory be false, the original conclusion must be true and thus based on a valid reasoning.

(d) VIPARYAYA (ERROR)

One of the typical forms of non-valid cognition is known as *viparyaya.* When an object is presented in a form which does not belong to it, it is a case of error or illusion. Why do we commit mistakes? Different systems of Indian philosophy have come out with divergent theories to explain the causes of error. Jayanta also discusses this problem elaborately. Let us see how he presents his theory of viparītakhyāti and on what grounds does he refute the theories propounded by other philosophers.

JAYANTA'S THEORY OF ERROR

Jayanta advocates the *Viparītakhyāti* theory of error. It is to be seen that with him *Viparītakhyāti* is identical to *Anyathākhyāti*, propounded by other Naiyāyikas. He presents this theory while refuting Prabhākarās' theory of *akhyāti.* He does so to support the extrinsic nature of the validity or invalidity of knowledge. The Bhāṭṭas also share this view of error. According to this theory an error is the manifestation of a real object in the form of a different object.[1] In other words, an error is a positive misapprehension in which the mistake consists in identifying two different objects.[2]

Jayanta refers to three alternatives regarding the

1. *N. M.*, I-166
2. *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā*, p. 98

ascertainment of the object (*ālambana*) in *viparītakhyāti*.[1] The first alternative is that silver, which occupies another space and time stimulates the sense organ to produce consciousness of silver at this spot and at this time. But Jayanta points out that like the sky-lotus an object which belongs to no time and occupies no space cannot be experienced The second alternative invisages that the shell which conceals its own distinct form and assumes the form of silver produces consciousness of silver. But Jayanta points out that we have no ground to know that the presentation of silver really refers to the shell. The third alternate suggestion to ascertain the object in *viparītakhyāti* is that the stimulating object is one and its appearance is something different. If silver is the object which produces the judgment 'this is silver', then it is not different from the presentation of unreal silver, and this contention stands automatically rejected with the refutation of *asatkhyāti*.

Jayanta's discussion of the problem of the object (ālambana) of error is somewhat lengthy. If, however, we put his views in a nut-shell we find that he refers to the following two alternatives regarding the *ālambana* of error, viz., the object which is adjacent to the perceiving mind, or that object which produces an awareness and at the same time becomes itself the object of such awareness and is referred to by the demonstrative pronoun 'this'. Jayanta rejects the first alternative holding that in such a situation the ground upon which the object is located, should also be apprehended as an *ālambana*. He also objects to the second alternative holding that if it is accepted, the sense organ such as the eyes should also be taken as *ālambana*.

As regards the objection that the Buddhist theories of *asatkhyāti* and *ātmakhyāti* encroach upon the theory of *viparītakhyāti*, Jayanta's contention is that he has refuted these theories here in the present context as well as in the chapter known as '*Apavarga*' (where he rejects the Buddhist theory of subjective idealism), and when these theories are not themselves based on sound grounds, how can they encroach upon the theory of *viparītakhyāti*. So, in the opinion of Jayanta, the error lies in the misapprehension of one thing for another.

JAYANTA'S VIEWS ABOUT OTHER THEORIES OF ERROR

Asatkhyāti. The Mādhyamikas maintain that nothing is real in this phenomenal world. For instance, in the illusory

1. *N. M.*, I-192

cognition of a shell as a piece of silver neither the shell nor the piece of silver is real. The silver is unreal since it is sublated at the disappearance of the illusion. The shell is also not real since it is but one factor of the sublating cognition, others being the silver and the connection between the silver and the shell. It may be recalled that the Mādhyamikas believe in the ultimate principle of void (*śūnya*) which according to them is different from (1) reality, (2) unreality, (3) from both reality and unreality and (4) from neither reality nor non-reality. It implies that the real nature of things (*śunyatā*) is indeterminable. It is to be seen that unlike the Vijñānavādins who hold that in error the internal appears to be the external, the Śunyavādins maintain that there is no such thing as internal or external; it is all void. In the 'shell-silver' illusion neither the shell nor the silver is real; it is just an apprehension of the unreal as real.

Jayanta refutes this hypothesis of the Buddhists. "What does the term '*asatkhyāti*' mean ?" Is it the awareness of an object which does not exist anywhere or does it mean that it exists somewhere but is absent from the psesent locus ? Jayanta holds that the first alternative is not tenable since nobody experiences an unreal object. If the second alternative is accepted, then it is the same thing as *viparītakhyāti*. It is also unreasonable to hold that impression (*vāsanā*) would present the unreal object since *vāsanā* arises from the experience of real objects. So, "an absolutely unreal object", declares Jayanta, "has a place neither in the world of theory nor in the world of practice."[1]

Ātmakhyāti. The theory of error held by the Yogācāras is knwon as *Ātmakhyāti*. In their opinion there are no objects external to consciousness. If a cognition be different from its object, it must arise either before or after the object or simultaneously with it. It does not arise before the object since at that moment it has no object. It does not arise after the object since the object of cognition disappears at the instant. In case of simultaneousness, there cannot be any difference between the two. Thus the Vijñānavādins believe that a cognition is not different from its objects. Error, according to them, consists in an illegitimate process of projection of subjective ideas as objective and extra-mental facts.

1. नात्यन्तमसतोऽर्थस्य सामर्थ्यमवकल्पते ।
व्यवहारपुरं योढुमियतीमनुपप्लुताम्, *N. M.*, I-164

Jayanta, like other Naiyāyikas. refutes this theory on the ground that if it is accepted, there will be no difference between knowledge and the subject and object of knowledge, since, according to these Buddhists, everything is an idea and in that case, instead of speaking as 'this is silver' one could even speak as 'I am silver'.[1] Moreover, in the Nyāya theory of *anyathākhyāti* this Buddhist view of error, is also included.

Akhyāti. The theory of error advocated by the Prābhākaras is known as *akhyāti* or *vivekākhyāti.* The Prābhākaras are of the view that error is the result of the lack of discrimination between two cognitions. For instance, in the illusory cognition of silver in the shell, the shell, by virtue of its lusture which it has in common with silver, is mistaken as silver on account of obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). The Prābhākaras hold that the following three forms of fusion are responsible for the lack of discrimination between two cognitions : (1) Fusion of the presentation and presentation, e.g., when a crystal appears red on account of an adjacent rose both the crystal and the redness are given in cognition. Though redness is a quality of the rose and not of the crystal, the fact is not apprehended. (2) Fusion of presentation and memory, e.g., when the shell is taken as silver, the presentation of the shell and the memory of silver are confused. It is to be recalled that according to the Prābhākaras 'memory' is a form of invalid cognition. (3) Fusion of memory and memory, e.g., when a person is not able to determine whether a tall object situated at a distance is a post or an ascetic, he gets confused. As in the cited instance the post and the ascetic both are only memory-images. Jayanta's objection to this theory is that it fails to account for the presentative character of the illusion, as confused knowledge cannot inspire the confidence necessary for practical activity. Dr. Chatterjee rightly points out that it is in the form "what I had seen is not silver", and not in the form "what I had remembered is not silver". This clearly shows that the illusion of silver is an error of perception and not of memory. Anyway, Jayanta asserts that it is the cognition of a thing in a different form. So, it can safely be included under *anyathākhyāti* or *viparītakhyāti.* Jayanta further maintains that the Prābhākaras'

1. नात्मख्यातिरपि युक्तिमती, विज्ञानात्मनो हि प्रतिभासेऽहं रजतमिति प्रतीतिः स्यात् नेदं रजतमिति, *N. M.*, I-1६4

view that 'there are two distinct types of consciousness, viz, apprehension, and remembrance, and that they are not mutually distinguished', is not tenable—for the silver is presented to our consciousness not as an object experienced before but as an object which is being experienced now. The subject and the predicate of the judgment 'this is silver' are revealed by the same consciousness; so there is no reason to hold that the consciousness of the subject is an act of perception and that of the predicate is an act of remembrance. Jayanta further points out that the Prābhākaras seem to have borrowed the idea from Dharmakīrti in holding that the knower moves for an object when he fails to distinguish between apprehension and remembrance. But this contention is also wrong since such a movement presupposes the perception of silver and not the defective memory of silver.

As regards the Prābhākaras' contention that *Viparītakhyāti* also accepts the existence of the recollection of silver, Jayanta points out that it is the specific property of silver and not silver itself which is recollected in *viparītakhyāti*. The cause of the illusory judgment is the defective sense organs. Such sense organs aided by the memory of the specific features of an object, e.g., silver, produce illusory judgment such as 'this is silver'. Thus Jayanta finally concludes that the Prābhākaras' theory of *akhyāti* is not based on sound footing.

Alaukikakhyāti. Jayanta refutes *alaukikakhyāti* which, according to him, is advocated by a little known section of the Mīmāṁsakas as a theory of error. According to these Mīmāṁsakas the illusory cognition of shell as silver results in the apprehension of extra ordinary silver. The difference between ordinary and extra ordinary silver, according to them, lies in the fact that while the former serves a practical purpose, the latter does not. The former has existence, whereas the latter has subsistence. According to the Naiyāyikas the illusory judgment, e.g., 'this is silver' actually refers to the shell. But, according to these Mīmāṁsakas, the judgment refers to silver since it is the silver which is presented to our consciousness. As it cannot be used, so it is extraordinary.

Jayanta takes pity on these Mīmāṁsakas for their sheer ignorance of the history of knowledge.[1] He points out

1. *N. M.*, I-172

that they are trying to act as the creator (*prajāpati*) of a new object (*alaukika*) without knowing that the sublative judgment, e.g., 'this is not silver', does not point to the extraordinariness of silver, it rather negates the silver which is falsely identified with the shell. Jayanta further states that it is only the uncontradicted knowledge of silver which would have proved that it is silver. But here the case is different. If these Mīmāṁsakas contend that by the insertion of the predicate *alaukika* the sublative judgment would imply that this is not *laukika* silver, Jayanta sarcastically remarks that the Mīmāṁsakas must know that the art of manoeuvring, which they exhibit in the interpretation of the Vedas, has no use in the field of logic. The Mīmāṁsakas may contend that the positive proposition refers to common silver and the negative proposition points out to extraordinary silver, or that when we see silver and move for it, it is common silver, and when we see it, but do not move, it is uncommon, or that silver which has practical utility is common and the silver which has no such utility is uncommon.

Jayanta objects to all these contentions pointing out that the above division does not have any basis. Moreover, if it is accepted that utility is the criterion of commonness, then a woman who is being embraced in a dream should be common and a jar which is destroyed should be uncommon. Further, if the Mīmāṁsakas hold that the silver taken for the shell is uncommon then why do they move to attain it ? If they maintain that they misapprehend *alaukika* silver for common silver, then it is nothing but *viparītakhyāti*. Thus, on the basis of these arguments, Jayanta advises these Mīmāṁsakas to show a bit of commonsense and gracefully accept the dictates of universal experience.

4. *The Nature of Pramā* (*Valid Knowledge*)

In the beginning of this chapter we have been acquainted with the various forms of non-valid cognition. Now let us see what valid knowledge means and what are the methods of arriving at it. As we have seen before, Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta refer to knowledge through the terms '*buddhi*', '*upalabdhi*' or '*jñāna*', irrespective of the validity or non-validity of a particular type of cognition. The later Naiyāyikas, however, use the term '*pramā*' for valid knowledge and '*apramā*' for non-valid cognition. The terms '*pramāṇa*',

pramiti, '*prameya*' and '*prāmāṇya*', were, however, as current in the old Nyāya as in the later. So we may conclude that old Naiyāyikas used *pramā* in the sense of valid knowledge. Moreover, whatever terms might have been used by the different philosophers and systems in different times. it is clear that all have attempted in their own way to analyse valid knowledge (*pramā*) and the means of arriving at it.

Different systems of Indian philosophy have expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of *pramā*. Prof. D. M Datta seems perfectly right in his observation that "pramā is generally defined as a cogntion having the two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (*abādhitatva* or *yathārthatava* and *anadhigatatva*), and that as regards the first characteristic—truth—all schools of Indian philosophy are unanimous."[1] But on the second characteristic there is a difference of opinion. It is, however, to be seen that even those who hold truth as an essential criterion of knowledge differ amongst themselves regarding the meaning of truth. According to the Naiyāyikas, *pramā* is a definite and assured knowledge of an object which is true and presentational in character. Jayanta's definition of *pramāṇa* consists in the synthesis of all the relevant and essential features of *pramā* as well. He is of the view that *pramā* is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion.[2] Gaṅgeśa maintains that *pramā* is that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists.[3] For Śivāditya it is the experience of the real nature of things.[4] Similar is the position adopted by Viśvanātha. It is, however, Annambhaṭṭa, who makes it clear that what we call *yathārtha* is otherwise khown as *prāmā*.[5] If we compare the Nyāya view of *prama* with Western thinking, it resembles the correspondence theory of Western Realists. With the Buddhists it is the causal efficiency which forms the criterion of truth. This view is termed as the pragmatic theory of knowledge in the West. Dharmakīrti also states that knowledge should correspond with experience.

1. *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 20 (Cal. 1960)
2. अव्यभिचारिणीमसन्दिग्धामर्थोपलब्धिं विदधती, *N. M.*, I-20
3. यत्र यद् अस्ति तत्र तस्यानुभवः, *T. C.*, (Pra. Section)
4. तत्त्वानुभवः प्रमा, *S. P.*, p. 101
5. तद्वति तत्प्रकारकानुभवो यथार्थः यथा रजते–इदं, रजतम् इति ज्ञानम्, स एव प्रमेत्युच्यते, *T. S.*, p. 23

This view resembles the coherence theory of knowledge. According to Kapila *pramā* is determinate knowledge, not known before.[1] Prabhākara holds *pramā* as immediate experience. Another characteristic of valid knowledge, has been mentioned as *'anadhigatatva'* by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas Though Dharmarājādhvarīndra gives two definitions of *pramā*, one of which includes memory in it, the other definition refers to novelty as an essential feature of valid knowledge.[1] This has been rejected by the Naiyāyikas. The other characteristic of valid knowledge according to the Vedāntins is that it should not be subsequently sublated. A detailed analysis of all these views is to be taken in the ensuing pages. Here it may be stated that the characteristics of *pramāṇa* as found in the analysis of Jayanta more or less include all the necessary features of the sound definition of *pramā* as well.

5. *The Nature of Pramāṇa (The Means of Valid Knowledge)*

The term *'pramāṇa'* consists in the root *'mā'* with a prefix *'pra'* and suffix *'lyuṭ'*. Loosely the term stands for knowledge as well as for the means of valid knowledge, but in Indian Logic it is generally used in the second sense. There is however, a marked difference of opinion regarding the exact nature of *pramāṇa* amongst the philosophers.[3] Let us now examine what the different systems have to say and how Jayanta, accepting or refuting their views, formulates his own definition of *pramāṇa*.

The Vaiṣesika View. Kaṇāda, who occupies the first place in the traceable history of the epistemological tradition, has stated that the general definition of *pramāṇa* should be based on the principle that the cause of cognition should be free from defects.[4] Praśastapāda includes perception, inference and ārṣa under *vidyā*, und illusion, etc., under *avidyā*. We, however, do not find any clear-cut definition of *pramāṇa* in his *Bhāṣya*. Śrīdhara refers to an additional characteristic *'adhyavasāya'* meaning that *vidyā* is a definite cognition.[5] But he

1. *S P. S.*, 1.8.7
2. *V. P. P.*, 12, (Lucknow, Vikram 2021)
3. अविसंवादि विज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति सौगताः । अनुभूतिः प्रमाणं सा स्मृतेरन्येति केचन ॥ अज्ञातचरतत्वार्थनिश्चायकमथापरे । प्रमेयव्याप्तमपरे प्रमाणमिति मन्वते ॥ प्रमानियतसामग्री प्रमाणं केचिदूचिरे, *T. R.*, 5-7
4. *V. S.*, 9.2.12
5. *N K*, p. 172 (Vijayanagar Edi.)

creates confusion by including memory under *vidya*. Śámkara Miśra, in his *Upaskāra* on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, however, seems to be less ambiguous when he asserts that a *pramāṇa* is that which produces true knowledge.[1]

The Pre-Jayanta Nyāya View. We do not find any definition of *pramāṇa* in the *Nyāyasūtra*. Gautama simply enumerates four means of knowledge and leaves the term '*pramāṇa*' unexplained. The lacuna caused by the omission of a general definition of *pramāṇa* was filled by Vātsyāyana. According to him *pramāṇa* is that which causes cognition, or. in other words, which is the instrument of valid knowledge.[2] Though the first sentence from Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* reveals that in his opininon the means of knowledge have reference to an object—for it is only when objects are cognised by means of knowledge that it is possible to make an effort to acquire them—yet there is an ambiguity in the definition of *pramāṇa* offerred by him since it merely gives the psychological sense without ana necessary logical implication. Uddyotakara repeats Vātsyāyana's views in somewhat clarifying manner and has not added anything substantial in the already existing etymology-based definition of *pramāṇa* extended by Vātsyāyana. Vācaspatimiśra attempts to give Vātsyayana's definition of *pramāṇa* a logical form by inserting in it the word 'artha' and taking the word '*jñāna*' occurring therein to stand for the valid kind of cognition. Vācaspatimiśra also does not provide us with a comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa*. He does not seem even trying to give all the missing links. So, it is actually Jayanta who has given the Nyāya definition a comprehensive and all-embracing status by way of including in it the missing or scattered links propounded by the logicians of his own tradition and also by evaluating the views propounded by the Ācāryas of other schools. In the subsequent pages we shall see what his opponents have to say, how he reacts to their propositions and how he ultimately defines *pramāṇa*.

The Buddhist View. The Buddhist philosophers differ amongst themselves with regard to the definition of *pramāṇa*. The Sautrāntika. and the Vaibhāṣika, the two realistic schools of Buddhist philosophy, maintain that *pramāṇa* is that which gives

1. *V. B. Up*., p. 224 (Chow. Edi.)
2. *N. B.*, 1.1.2

us a true knowledge of objects. By true knowledge (*pramā*) they mean the identity of content between the cognition and the cognitum, But the idealist school of Buddhism, namely, the Vijñānavāda which is also known as Yogācāra, is of the view that consciousness (*vijñāna*) is the principle of self-manifestation and it is the source of all knowledge. According to vijñanavādins *pramā* is practically useful knowledge and *pramāṇa* is that which brings about such knowledge. Nāgārjuna, the propounder of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, refutes the existence of *pramāṇa* in his work, *Pramāṇa-viddhvaṁsa* ; so there is no question of his accepting or defining the concept of *pramāṇa*. Diṅnāga, on the other hand, presents a positive theory of knowledge which is in sharp contrast to Nāgārjuna's denial of the means of knowledge.

Diṅnāga includes in his definition of pramāṇa the characteristic '*sva-samvitti*' meaning that the effect of a *pramāṇa* should involve self cognition.[1] Dharmakīrti maintains that *pramāṇa* is an uncontradicted experience.[2] He also speaks of *artha sārūpya* as the essence of a *pramāṇa* in his *Nyāyabindu*.[3] It is noteworthy that the epithet '*avisamvādin*' used by Dharmakīrti and also illustrated by Dharmottara resembles the adjectives '*pravṛttisāmarthya*' and '*nirvādha*' occurring in *Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Ślokavārtika* respectively. The essence of a *pramāṇa*, according to Diṅnāga, consists in the cognition of an object (*viṣayādhigama*) and in self cognition (*svasaṁvitti*). Of these two views occurring in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Diṅnāga, the first alone is mentioned by Dharmakīrti. Śāntarakṣita tries to synthesize the definitions of *pramāṇa* by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. He and Kamalaśīla do so by holding that according to the realists (Bāhyārthavādins), the formal similarity (*sārūpya*) obtaining between cognition and its object is to be regarded as *pramāṇa* and cognition of the object as *pramiti*. But, according to the idealist (*Vijñānavādins*), self-cognition is *pramiti* and the capacity to acquire such a congnition is *pramāṇa*. Anyway, to the Buddhists *pramāṇa* and *pramiti* are non-distinct, since, according to them, they are not different entities.

1. स्वसंवित्तिः फलंचात्र तद्रूपादर्थनिश्चयः ।
विषयाकार एवास्य प्रमाणं तेन मीयते, *P. S.*, I-10
2. *P. V.*, II-1
3. *N. M.*, I-20

Considering the Buddhist view of *pramāṇa* in contrast to that of the Nyāya we find that the difference between the two is mainly based upon their divergent assessment of the *pramāṇa pramiti*-relationship. Jayanta quickly picks up the thread of the conflict from this juncture and tries to refute the Buddhist contention tooth and nail. He points out that the term '*pramāṇa*' etymologically signifies an instrument. So, it is that by which something is correctly known, i.e., a true knowledge of objects is generated. The modes of general parlance such as 'we know by means of *pramāṇa*' also lend support to the view that *pramāṇa* and *pramiti* (the result of *pramāṇa*) are two different things. As regards the argument that a piece of knowledge, if it is other than doubt and illusion, produces another piece of knowledge, then the first one will be regarded as *pramāṇa* and in such a case *pramāṇa* and *pramā* have to be regarded as identical, Jayanta states that in such a situation that piece of knowledge which produces another piece of knowledge is included in the collocation of conditions and it is to be called *pramāṇa* and not *pramā*. Jayanta points out that it is this fact which led him to define *pramāṇa* in terms of the collocations not only of the physical but also of psychical conditions.

According to Dharmakīrti knowledge only is *pramāṇa* and not no-knowledge like sense-object contact.[1] Jayanta refutes this contention and maintains that *pramāṇa* may be in the form of knowledge as well as no-knowledge. The later logicians of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika schools also endorse the views of Jayanta on this important and vital issue. The Buddhists hold that the revealer and the revealed owe their existence to a common set of condition. So, according to them, there is no virtual difference between the means and the end of knowledge, since sometimes one is the antecedent and sometimes the other. Jayanta thinks that the Buddhists are led to this conclusion as in their opinion *pramāṇa* is not the generator of *pramiti*. It is not the causal relation but simply the relation of the determinant and the determined which, according to them, exists between the two. Jayanta refutes this contention pointing out that as the Buddhists hold everything momentary, so a phenomenon of consciousness cannot determine its effect since one is not present when the other exists. Hence the Buddhists' contention of holding a short-lived phenomenon of consciousness as *pramāṇa* does not stand the test of reason. The Buddhists con-

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1. ज्ञानं प्रमाणं नाज्ञानम् इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादि, *P. V.*, 1-3

tend that the dependence upon similar sets of conditions and their simultaneity control the co-presence of the determinant and the determined. But Jayanta states that it is also absurd because if the *pramāṇa* and the result of *pramāṇa* are effectuated by similar sets of conditions, then why should consciousness illumine an object ? If, again, to illumine is the nature of consciousness, how can there be any difference in the nature of the object as it is also the effect of similar sets of conditions ?

Jayanta further rebukes those, who subscribe to the view that consciousness is representative and that it alone is *pramāṇa*. What is generally known from the representative view of consciousness is that an idea does not have any form until an object is presented to it, but as soon as the object is presented, it assumes the form of that object.[1] Jayanta states that if one subscribes to this view the reality of external objects cannot be proved, since an object is not grasped by a formless idea. In order to transfer the form of an object to an idea, the object surrenders itself to the idea, and, in such a situation, if the object becomes empty and the idea becomes concrete, there is no corresponding object for a concrete idea If another object is postulated, it will lead to *regressus ad infinitum*. As the reality of an empty object and the existence of an objectless idea is unthinkable, the Buddhist view of subjective idealism is untenable. Even if, for the sake of argument, it is accepted that consciousness is representative, it cannot bring about proper distinction between the means and the objects of kowledge. Thus, Jayanta concludes that the Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa* is absolutely unrealistic.

The Jaina View. There is a considerable difference of opinion amongst the Jaina thinkers regarding the nature of *pramāṇa*. Siddhasena states that a *pramāṇa* is that which illumines itself and the object and which is not sublated.[2] Here it is to be seen that the term '*bādhavivarjita*' is the same as '*bādhavarjita*' of the Mīmāṁsakas and 'avisaṃvādin' of Dharmakīrti. Akalaṅka at one place refers to novelty and uncontradictoriness and at others the characteristic *svaparābhāsaka*'. Māṇikyanandi tries to unify the views of Siddhasena and Akalaṅka. Vidyānanda, on the other hand, follows Sidhasena but, discards the terms used by him and instead introduces '*svārtha*' to cover

1. घर्षे सति साकारं निराकारं तदत्यये, *N. M.*, I-15
2. प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविवर्जितम्, *Nyāyāvtāra*

the same sense. Abhayadeva substitutes the term *'Vyavasāya'* in place of *'nirṇiti'*. In the Jain tradition Vidyānanda was the first thinker to use the term *'vyavasāyātmaka'*. Hemacandra's definition seems to have been formed after some amendments in the above mentioned definitions. He discards the word *'sva'*, selects the word *'nirṇiti'* in place of *'avabhāsa'*, etc., and modifies it as *'nirṇaya'*, and finally introduces the word *'samyak'* in the definition. It is worth nothing that Siddhasena's definition was influenced by Vijñānavāda. It seems that Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandi have borrowed from the Mīmāṁsakas, and Abhayadeva seems to have introduced the term *'vyavasāya'* under the influence of the Nyāya, and finally it is Hemacandra who is influenced by all. Thus, the Jaina theory of *pramāṇa* as presented by Hemacandra is the synthesis of the views of all the systems. It is perhaps the reason that Jayanta does not think it worth while to refute the Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* under a separate heading. It is one of the great qualities of Jayanta that he avoids repetition.

The Prābhākara View. The Prābhākaras define *pramāṇa* as immediate experience (*anubhūti*). Śālikanātha states that valid knowledge is an experience, which is different from memory.[1] Prābhākara's definition on the whole is vague, since it is difficult to define the term *'anubhūti'*. It is too wide because it applies to doubt and illusion. Basically however, Prabhākara's views on this issue are more or less identical with that of the Nyāya. It is perhaps the reason that Jayanta does not think it necessary to criticise his views under a distinct heading.

The Bhaṭṭa View. Kumārila and his followers have formulated such a general definition of *pramāṇa*, that consists in the combination of the main tenets of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika as well as of the Buddhist schools. According to Kumārila, *pramāṇa* is a definite and assured cognition of objects which does not require confirmation by other cognitions.[2] Umbeka maintains that the terms *'dṛḍha'* and *'avisaṁvāda'* exclude doubt and error respectively from valid knowledge.[3] Pārthasārathī explains the

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1. अनुभूतिः प्रमाणं सा स्मृतेरन्या स्मृतिः पुनः, *P. P.*, p. 127
2. तस्माद् दृढं यदुत्पन्नं नापि संवादमृच्छति ।
ज्ञानान्तरेण विज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणं प्रतीयताम् ॥ *S. V.*, II-80
3. दृढमित्यनेन संशयस्य व्युदासः, यदुत्पन्नमित्यनुपपत्तेः
न विसंवादमृच्छतीति विपर्ययस्य, *S. V. T. T.*, II-80

Bhāṭṭa standpoint stating that a *pramāṇa* should be free from defects in the source and subsequent contradiction of the revealed truth. It should not cover the knowledge of the already known objects. Briefly speaking, according to the Bhāṭṭas, a *pramāṇa* is a method of cognition of an unknown object which is not liable to be sublated by subsequent experience.

Jayanta knows that notwithstanding a little semblance of their conceptions of *pramāṇa*, the Bhāṭṭas and the Buddhists disagree on major points. For instance, the Buddhists hold *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* as identical but the Bhāṭṭas opine that they are different. According to them consciousness is inferred through the fact of cognizedness. All acts are inferred from their results and consciousness is an act A knower cannot achieve a result if he does not perform an act. A cause is considered to be so only when it is related to an act. The Bhāṭṭas maintain that though consciousness itself is not directly known or intuited, yet it acts as a means to the awareness of an object like the intuitive sense organ, e.g., the eye. Jayanta quotes Śabasa and Kumārila and states that both of them have clearly mentioned that nobody is directly aware of his consciousness but when an object is known, the preceding act of consciousness is inferred. No object is cognized if the act of consciousness does not precede it. Jayanta refers to this perhaps to show that though the Buddhists and the Bhāṭṭas differ in their assessment of the identity of *pramāṇa* and *pramiti* the Bhāṭṭas seem to have adopted partially the Buddhist theory of consciousness out of confusion in their thinking.

Jayanta, thus joins issue with the Bhāṭṭas stating that consciousness can be experienced directly, that an act is always a means to an end and not the end in itself, that the Bhāṭṭas have themselves admitted the direct intuition of the soul, and in such a case there is no justification in holding that the act belonging to the soul is not directly intuited. Moreover, a verb such as 'does' included in the meaning of '*kāraka*', directly refers to an act. Jayanta further points out that when a thing enters into a specific relation with an act, it is called a *kāraka*. For the sake of producing an act, *kāraka* requires the collocation of other conditions also. Jayanta is aware of the objection which the Mīmāṁsakas may raise, viz., if consciousness is not an act, but merely a result, then the collocation of conditions with it is useless. So he points out that consciousness does not belong to the class of action. It is not reasonable to hold that being an action consciousness is transcendental. Even

if it is held for the sake of argument that consciousness is an action, it cannot be inferred since here it is impossible to frame the major premise.

Regarding the Bhāṭṭas' contention that *pramāṇa* is that which gives new knowledge, i.e., does not apprehend the already apprehended object, Jayanta maintains that whether a *pramāṇa* reveals novel objects or the already apprehended objects is immaterial. Even if a means of knowledge is directed towards an already apprehended object, it produces true knowledge since the knowledge is fresh though the object revealed is old. A piece of true knowledge, discharges its causal efficiency by producing another piece of true knowledge.[1]

Jayanta is of the view hat in the instances of continuous knowledge—'*dhārāvāhika-jñāna*'—also the Bhāṭṭa definition of *pramāṇa* is not tenable. Here the succession of cognition refers to the same thing that has been cognized before and there is no novelty in the subsequent cognition. Thus, though the succession of cognition is not the knowledge of a new object, yet it is a valid knowledge. Jayanta maintains that a continuous perception of a thing, e.g., the palm, does not reveal any new feature in it even if we observe it hundred times. Still, it is a knowledge. Thus, he asserts, that the Bhāṭṭa definition is too narrow.

Another objection put forward by Jayanta against the Bhaṭṭa definition of *pramāṇa* is that its acceptance would eliminate the validity of recognition as a form of knowledge. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is the knowledge of a thing perceived before. Here 'this' is identified with 'that' known in the past. In this situation one of the alternatives is to be accepted, i.e., either we accept *pratyabhijñā* as true knowledge and reject the Bhāṭṭa view of novelty or accept the Bhāṭṭa view of novelty and discard *pratyabhijñā* as a form of knowledge. Jayanta adopts the first alternative on the ground that originality is not an essential feature of true knowledge. Since recognition is thus worthy of being accepted as a form of knowledge, the Bhāṭṭa view of *pramāṇa* does not stand the test of reason.

1. यदपि प्रमाणविशेषणमनधिगतार्थग्राहित्वमभिधीयते परैस्तदपि न साम्प्रतम्, प्रमाणस्य गृहीततदितरविषयप्रवृत्तस्य प्रामाण्ये विशेषाभावात्, *N. M.*, I-20

As regards the argument that if novelty is not accepted as a characteristic of valid knowledge, memory will have to be included in the forms of valid knowledge, Jayanta maintains that memory is not a valid knowledge and that by the insertion of the word '*arthajanyatva*' in the definition of *pramāṇa* memory is excluded. What Jayanta seems to stress is that valid knowledge is produced on the basis of an object. This characteristic excludes memory from the sphere of valid knowledge since it is not generated by an object. It is not a new experience but the resuscitation of some old experience. It is an impression left by a former experience. Jayanta is aware of the possibility of an objection against his thesis, namely, "if memory is not generated by its object then how is the inference of the past rainfall generated by an existing object ?" So he states that the rain that is inferred is cognized as a qualification of the river in the form: "the river is one whose past is characterised by occurrence of rain." Jayanta further holds that though this qualification is inferred, the qualified object—the river—is present and produces its cognition directly. Knowledge of some future events also can be explained in the same way. But in the case of memory, say, of a dead person in the mind of his son, there is no trace of the former, still he is recalled by the latter. Thus, it is clear that memory is not conditioned by an object. So it is excluded from valid knowledge and there is no justification whatsoever to characterise *pramāṇa* as that which does not bring about a cognition of an already cognized object. Jayanta reminds the Bhāṭṭas that revelation of new knowledge has been refered to by Jaimini as a characteristic only of testimony. So there is hardly any justification on the part of his followers' to extend the application of this test to all the means of knowledge.[1]

The Sāṁkhya View. According to the Sāṁkhya, *pramāṇa* is a modification of *buddhi*. Kapila states that *pramā* is a determinate knowledge of an object not known before and *pramāṇa* is that which is most conducive to such a knowledge. Vijñānabhikṣu is of the view that whenever the *puruṣa* is spoken of as having valid cognition, the modification of *buddhi* is *pramāṇa*, but when the *buddhi* is held as the one that cognizes, it is the sense-object contact, etc., that constitute *pramāṇa*.[2]

1. शब्दस्यानुपलब्धेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यं चाह जैमिनिः ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयं भवद्भिर्वर्ण्यते कथम्, *N. M.*, I-21

2. अत्र यदि प्रमारूपं फलं पुरुषनिष्ठमात्रमुच्यते, तदा बुद्धिवृत्तिरेव प्रमाणम्, यदि च बुद्धिनिष्ठमात्रम् उच्यते तदेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिरेव प्रमाणम्. *S. P. B.*

than doubt and illusion'—forms the definition of *pramāṇa*. Jayanta anticipates objections to his definition : It may be argued that *pramāṇa* is the *karaṇa* (instrument) of true knowledge and *karaṇa* is that which is the best of all the causes of an effect Comparison through which we determine the superiority of one thing amongst many, naturally supports the idea that *pramāṇa* is *karaṇa* (the most efficacious condition), but since *karaṇa* involves comparison, so *pramāṇa* should have other conditions as well. Now, if the collocation of all conditions is the instrument, then how can a comparison among them take place ? Collocation is one and there are no other conditions which are outside the collocation. If this definition is accepted, objects of knowledge would also fall in the category of instruments and in such a situation the cognition would not have any object to refer to. he subject, being included in the collocation, ceases to be the subject. And if there is no subject, who is to apprehend the knowable objects ? The Nyāya maintains that the process of knowing comprises the subject, the object, the instrument and the act of knowing. If the above mentioned definition is accepted, the position of Nyāya epistemology is jeopardised. The people in general are noticed as saying that they have grasped things through their eyes, etc., and thus they are also not known to approve of the instrumentality of the collocation.

Jayanta refutes these objections stating that only the aggregate of all the conditions is effective in bringing about knowledge. When any one of them is absent, the effect does not take place. Moreover, no individual condition does acquire the distinction of resulting in knowledge. The distinctive feature of an instrument of knowledge lies in the fact that its presence is invariably followed by the knowledge of object. None of the conditions included in the collocation individually possesses such a distinction. Therefore, the question of comparison does not arise.

To the objection that collocation does not have a process through which it can produce an effect and that it cannot be an instrument when it has no process, Jayanta's answer is that collocation works through the process of any one of the conditions included in it. Collocation is a common property of all conditions. Hence it automatically consists in their individual traits when these conditions collocate together to bring about a cognition. So, it must be accepted that collocation has a process.

A collocation is a mere aggregate and not a whole, that is why nobody states that he sees with the aggregate of all conditions of vision. When a man says he is cooking by means of a pot, he simply attributes the efficiency of the collocation to an individual condition. Therefore, the collocation of all conditions acquires the character of an instrument by virtue of its dependence on each of the distinct conditions. Some logicians hold that collocation of conditions is another name for the co-presence, and that the duality in the character of the individual conditions is not convincing. But Jayanta maintains that the condition which is other than a subject as is neither an illusion nor a doubt is called an instrument. It is usually indicated in a sentence through the third case-ending as in '*dīpena paśyāmi*'. When many conditions collocate, they possess a common property which, though not as distinct as that of a cloth from the threads, is worthy of being distinguished logically. Therefore, the question—'which act is produced by the assemblage of conditions ?'—does not arise and thus the collocation is not without an object or a subject.

The definitions of *pramāṇa* given by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara could have been *wrongly* applied to non-valid cognition also, but Jayanta's *juxtaposition* of the characteristics '*avyabhicāriṇīm*' and '*asandigdhām*' has saved the Nyāya position from the fault of too wide an application. Thus Jayanta reaffirms that *pramāṇa* is the collocation of both conscious and unconscious conditions, distinct from a subject and an object. It produces a true knowledge of the real object. It is other than illusion and doubt.[1] Jayanta's definition of *pramāṇa* has deeply influenced the accounts of later Naiyāyikas and the Syncretists. Śivāditya clearly adopts the term '*sāmagrī*' and explains it as the totality of causes without which the effect is never produced.[2] Similar is the case with Varadarāja. When he sums up the different views in his *Tārkikarakṣā*, he employs the word '*sāmagrī*' and, thus gives

1. अव्यभिचारिणीम् असन्दिग्धाम् अर्थोपलब्धिं विदधती बोध-बोधात्स्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम्, *N. M.*, 1-12 (अथवा) कर्तृकर्मविलक्षणसंशय-विपर्ययरहितार्थबोधाविधायिनी बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणमिति, *Ibid.*, 1-14

2. कार्यायोगव्यवच्छिन्ना सामग्री प्रमाणम्, *S. P.*, p. 137

great importance to Jayanta.[1] It is also interesting to compare Jayanta's concept of '*sāmagrī*' with Mill's definition of a cause as 'the sum total of antecedent conditions', for instance, in the case of a pot the cause is the totality of clay, the quality of clay, the potter, the wheel and the stick.[2]

Bodhābodhasvabhāva. Jayanta defines *pramāṇa* as a collocation of all the conscious and unconscious conditions that are actually operative in bringing about a valid and assured cognition of objects. We have already seen what according to Jayanta collocation means and how it is instrumental in bringing about knowledge. Let us now examine what Jayanta means by the characteristic '*bodhābodhasvabhāva*' as incorporated by him in the definition of *pramāṇa*. The Yogācāra Buddhists believe that consciousness is self-subsistent. In other words they deny the reality of all things except *vijñāna* or consciousness.[3] The subject and object of consciousness, according to them, are the modes of *ālaya* which is a continuously changing stream of consciousness. It is this notion of consciousness, which perhaps actuated Diṅnāga to define *pramāṇa* as '*sva-saṁvitti*' or as that which involves self-cognition. It is to be seen that Jayanta includes the characteristic '*bodhābodhasvabhāva*' just to neutralize the above mentioned Buddhist view of *pramāṇa* propounded by Diṅnāga and also expounded by Dharmakīrti who maintains that knowledge alone is *pramāṇa* and 'non-knowledge' does not constitute it. Contrary to the Yogācāra Buddhists, contention that consciousness alone is *pramāṇa*, Jayanta maintains that both conscious and unconscious objects form the conditions of *pramāṇa*. Jayanta tries to prove this by refuting the Buddhists' view on the ground that consciousness (*bodha*) is the result of *pramāṇa* and not itself a *pramāṇa*. Though at times it may serve as an indirect instrument of knowledge, this fact does not prove that consciousness alone is *pramāṇa*. Further, if it is accepted that knowledge (*bodha*) alone is *pramāṇa*, then unconscious objects, such as lamp, sense-organs, etc., have to be discarded from the sphere of the instruments of knowledge. Jayanta tries to prove that though *bodha* alone is not *pramāna*, it serves as an indirect instrument of judgment.

1. Supra, Foot-note 3, p. 39
2. J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic*
3. Supra, Foot-note, p. 42

causes such as inference, etc. The Buddhist are of the opinion that invalidity inheres in all cognitions, but validity is established by something else. The Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins believe that validity is self-evident and invalidity is determined by extraneous causes.[1]

Jayanta follows the general Nyāya view that the validity and invalidity of a cognition depend upon extraneous factors. Let us see how he formulates his theory and on what grounds he refutes the arguments of his opponents.

(a) JAYANTA'S THEORY OF PARATAḤPRĀMĀṆYA

Jayanta, like his fellow Naiyāyikas, maintains that both truth and falsehood are extrinsic to knowledge in respect of genesis and ascertainment. It is interesting that the Nyāya theory of truth coincides partly with the Buddhist view in respect of extrinsic nature of the test of truth and partly with the Bhāṭṭa view in respect of the extrinsic nature of the test of falsehood. Like other Naiyāyikas Jayanta is of the view that the specific features responsible for the production of truth and falsehood are the merits (*guṇa*) and demerits (*doṣa*) which add the qualities of truth and falsehood respectively to valid and invalid forms of cognition. Hence, in his opinion, truth and falsehood are not intrinsic or natural but extrinsic or adventitious. The ascertainment of truth, according to the Naiyāyikas, depends on some extraneous considerations just as its production depends on some extraneous factors. He further states that fruitful activity is the test of truth and fruitless activity is the test of falsehood. In other words, knowledge is true if it fulfils an extra condition (*Pravṛtti*).

Jayanta is aware of the fact that the Mīmāṁsakas may object to the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge on the ground that if the truth of a judgment is determined at a later stage, then either it is open to the charge of mutual dependence (*cakraka*) or it is futile like placing the cart before the horse. Jayanta, therefore, points out that there are two classes of objects, namely, transcendental and secular. People move to attain transcendental objects when these objects are definitely ascertained as true. With regard

1. प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः सांख्याः समाश्रिताः । नैयायिकास्ते परतः सौगताश्चरम स्वतः । प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिनः । प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम्, *S. D. S.*, p. 557 (Hindi Edi., Chow. 1964)

to secular objects, people move to attain them when they think that the truth of a judgment is highly probable. Similarly when they think that the falsehood of a judgment is highly probable they refrain from trying to attain it. Jayanta, however, accepts that the ascertainment of the truth of a judgment of an object through successful activity is futile as far as that particular object is concerned, but it is useful in the sense that it helps us in determining the truth of similar instances of knowledge in future. For example, when a reliable person advises us about a certain object, we move for it. When we attain the object we find that the statement of that reliable person is true. This knowledge helps us to determine the truth of the Vedas or other scriptures which deal with transcendental objects.

The Mīmāṁsakas may argue that the truth of a judgment cannot be determined afterwards, since judgment lasts only two moments and that when judgment ceases to exist at the next moment, it cannot be ascertained extrinsically. But Jayanta points out that the Mīmāṁsakas themselves hold that the falsehood of a judgment is extrinsically determined. If the false judgment, according to them, is transitory, then how do they determine it ? If they recall it in memory and then judge it extrinsically, the same method is equally applicable in ascertaining the truth of a true judgment.

The compound word '*pravṛttisāmarthya*' has been explained by the old Naiyāyikas in two ways, viz., (1) the confirmation of the knowledge of an object on the basis of a pragmatic test, or (2) the discovery of the unique property of an object. But Jayanta does not agree with these interpretations. He quotes Vātsyāyana to emphasize that he too has a different view of this term. According to him '*pravṛtti*' means 'movement' and '*sāmarthya*' means capability to attain something. As a rejoinder to this interpretation the opponents of the Nyāya may opine that if one fact requires an extrinsic test for its validity, it would lead to *regressus ad infinitum*. Jayanta is alive to this objection and he tries to repudiate it on the ground that human behaviour based upon universal experience goes against the contention of the opponents of the Nyāya. If people try for an object and obtain it, they do not feel the necessity of examining the truth of the experience again. For instance, a man sees water and judges it as water. This judgment prompts him to move, but he also knows that similar judgment takes place even when he misapprehends the mirage for water. So, along with the

judgment that 'this is water' a doubt about its validity also arises in his mind. This doubt is removed by quenching thirst or by bathing, i.e., by practically experiencing the presence of water. Here no further test is required to verify the practical experience. If, on the other hand, his knowledge turns out to be illusory, then it is a case of extrinsic test of the invalidity of cognition. So, Jayanta asserts that the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge does not involve the fault of *regressus ad infinitum.* It may be argued that the act of bathing, etc., could also be performed in a dream. But Jayanta points out that everyone is aware of the difference between a waking consciousness and a dream consciousness.

With regard to the objection raised by the Mīmāṁsakas as to why the Naiyāyikas do not verify the condition of the initial judgment instead of scrutinising only the conditions of the knowledge of practical efficiency. Jayanta's reply is that even if their suggestion is adopted, it would neither support the hypothesis of instrinsic validity nor refute the theory of extrinsic validity. People become very much conscious of the fruit of their knowledge, but they are not found to have such eagerness for scrutinising the condition of their judgment. That is why the conditions of the knowledge of practical efficiency are examined. We may compare here the *pravṛtti samvāda* of the Naiyāyikas with the *arthakriyākāritva* of the Buddhists. For the Buddhists that knowledge is valid which is conducive to fruitful activity. But the Naiyāyikas maintain that truth consists in correspondence (*samvāditva*) and satisfaction, i.e., objective verification and subjective utility. "Correspondence to reality", as Prof. R. D. Ranade puts it, "is a constitutive character of truth, while satisfaction comes in only when it is to be tested. Correspondence is thus the *ratio essendi* of truth while utility is only *ratio cognoscendi*. Truth may exist even if it is not put to practical use. Practicality is just a means of subsequent verification." Moreover, whenever a person has the knowledge of practical efficiency during his waking state he finds that there is perfect correspondence of his knowledge with its object As he has no previous experience of discord between such an experience and its object, the doubt does not arise in his mind. And when there is no doubt, there is no need of ascertaining the truth of the concerned judgment. It is perhaps the Jaina thinker Akalaṅka who holds that the truth of the knowledge of an object, which has been repeatedly cognised is self-evident and that the

truth of a judgment which is not repeatedly cognised is extrinsically determined. But Jayanta takes pity on him saying that this proud fellow does not mean what he says. Actually repetition gives us an opportunity to ascertain our experience. So the truth of such repeated observations also is determined by the successful movement. It is not in any way self-evident Jayanta further states that verification is not an endless process because the knowledge of successful activity does not stand in need of further verification. All knowledge is a means to some practical end and hence it needs to be tested in order to attain practical success. The knowledge of the result, on the other hand, ends in itself, not leading to further result and hence there arises no need to test its truth.

Jayanta accepts that there are some cases of knowledge whose truth appears to be self-evident. The knowledge of familiar objects, e.g., my house, my body, etc., is known as true immediately at the time when it arises and we do not feel the need of verifying it by successful activity. Is then such knowledge intrinsically true ? Jayanta states that the knowledge of truth in such cases is conditioned by familiarity. Therefore, it is not self-evident though it arises quickly. The truth of the knowledge of a new object is ascertained on the ground of practical success to which it leads if it is true. When a new object is cognized repeatedly, it becomes familiar and we need not test the truth of its cognition on subsequent occasions in the same way in which we tested it when it was new. Truth, in such cases, is known through inference based on the knowledge which by itself is neutral, i. e., it is not known to be true or false. Had it been possible there would have been no disappointment in practical activities. On this basis also truth and falsehood are not self-evident, but are always known through inference.

(b) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF SVATAḤ PRAMĀṆYA

What does the compound word '*svataḥprāmāṇya*' mean ? Does it mean that the truth of a judgment emanates from the judgment itself or does it imply that a judgment reveals its own truth to itself ? The second alternative is wrong, since it is against the rule of logic. For instance, in perceptual knowledge such as 'a blue object is blue', the judgment is true, but the question is whether the perception reveals its own truth or not. The answer, according to Jayanta, is in the negative because perception is here simply a knowing process. And a process cannot grasp its own self. It cannot even reveal the truth of its resulting judgment, since

truth is in no way connected with an external sense organ. Even the inner perception is not competent to ascertain the truth of the resulting form. The inner perception is not experienced when the illumination of an object takes place. Thus, the knowledge that 'this is blue' is not experienced to be immediately followed by another judgment that the antecedent is true. Therefore, it is clear that perception fails to grasp the truth of its own judgment. The inference also cannot reveal the truth of the resulting form, since no mark or invariable relation is known to us. Now if it is argued that the above result leads to the inferential knowledge of the truth knowing process, then the Mīmāṁsakas are to be asked : "Does the mark remain unqualified or is it qualified by the adjective 'true' ?" In case the first alternative is accepted, then every result, whether true or untrue, will lead to the inference of the truth of a judgment. And in such a situation there is no possibility of any judgment turning out false. Likewise, the second alternative also is not tenable, because there is no way to find the truth of the result. The Mīmāṁsakas may contend that the very experience of an object may be the source of the illumination of that object. For instance, when a blue thing reveals itself as an awareness of blue, it is itself a piece of knowledge. But Jayanta refutes this view stating that in such a situation erroneous cognitions, e.g., of silver in the shell, would also come under the purview of valid knowledge since awareness of silver is there.

The Mīmāṁsakas may say that the truth of a judgment depends upon the knowledge of the absence of its contradictory judgment. But the question is whether this absence of contradictory judgment arises simultaneously with the judgment or it arises afterwards. Jayanta rules out the first alternative holding that in such a case we should have never been baffled, whereas the fact is that a number of our judgments are erroneous This shows that we transact our business even when we are not perfectly certain of our judgment. As regards the contention of the Mīmāṁsakas that even such a judgment is different from doubt as it does not cause an oscillation between two alternatives, Jayanta points out that as this uncertain judgment does not furnish the knower with a means to determine the true nature of the object, it is tentamount to doubt. Jayanta further states that there are examples where a doubt may assume the form of a judgment. For instance, though the prior judgment that 'this is silver' refers to a single object, yet it is virtually nothing but a doubt. Moreover, it could not have been contradic-

ted after some time if its truth is ascertained. Again, it cannot inspire a person to move, if he knows that the judgment is untrue. It can also be proved by deduction, i.e., All movements are preceded by a doubt, This is a movement, Therefore, this movement is also preceded by a doubt. The Mīmāṁsakas may again contend that "Whenever the act of consciousness appears in the mind of a knower, the invariable mark of its truth is revealed to him, whereas no such mark is noticed on the appearance of a false judgment." But Jayanta refutes this view on the ground that the distinct feature of the said mark is not traceable. If it is held by the Mīmāṁsakas that the absence of misapprehension of untruth constitutes its distinction, then Jayanta points out that they should know that such a distinction may also belong to a false judgment (e.g., of the misapprehension of shell as silver). Jayanta finally makes it clear that what he wants to convey through this discussion is that when a judgment comes into being, it is not ascertained as true. In other words, a judgment does not carry its own truth along with itself. So, he comes to the conclusion that knowledge is not self-evident and that all the arguments put forth by the Mīmāṁsakas do not appear to have cut much ice. Jayanta objects to the first alternative on the grounds that the truth of a judgment being an event in time, is an effect. As every effect has a cause different from itself, the truth of a judgment cannot be the effect and its own cause at the same time. The Mīmāṁsakas may contend that the cause of a judgment does not exist apart from the conditions of its existence and that it does not depend upon an extra property. But Jayanta refutes this argument stating that true judgment is produced by a cause having an extra good quality. What Jayanta wants to prove is that a true judgment is not produced by the bare cause of consciousness. As a false judgment is generated by a consciousness which is accompanied by some defect, so a true judgment is accompanied by some good property. Hence Jayanta asserts that a cause which is assisted neither by a quality nor by a defect, does not exist. With regard to the contention of the Mīmāṁsakas that the instrument of a true judgment does not depend upon anything else to discharge its own function, Jayanta points out that it is true that the collocation of condition produces its effect without depending upon anything else. But it does not mean that the collocation is conscious of its own power. It, in fact, depends on some other factor to verify the truth of its efficiency. Jayanta further states that the contention of the Mīmāṁsakas that a judgment does not depend

upon outside factors to determine its own truth is wrong, since when the initial judgment arises in our mind we do not definitely know that it is true. It is only after some time that truth, say, of the apprehension of 'blue', is ascertained. The factor that ascertains the truth of a judgment is the successful movement (*pravṛttisāmarthya*) that follows it.[1]

7. *The Classification of the Means of Knowledge*

In Western philosophy generally two means of knowledge—perception and inference—are accepted. But different systems of Indian philosophy adopt a divergent scheme of pramāṇas. At one extreme there are the Cārvākas who recognise only one *pramāṇa*, viz., *pratyakṣa*, while at the other extreme we have the Paurāṇikas, who accept as many as eight pramāṇas. If 'p' is taken for *pratyakṣa*, 'a' for *anumāna*, 's' for *śabda*, 'u' for *upamāna*, 'ar' for *arthāpatti*, 'an' for *anupalabdhi*, 'sam' for *sambhava* and 'ai' for *aitihya*, then a progressive delineation of them can be presented in the following chart :

1.	Cārvāka	p							
2.	Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist	p	a						
4.	Sāṁkhya and Yoga	p	a	s					
3.	Nyāya	p	a	s	u				
5.	Prabhākara	p	a	s	u	ar			
6.	Bhāṭṭa and Vedānta	p	a	s	u	ar	an		
7.	Paurāṇika	p	a	s	u	ar	an	sam	ai

(a) JAYANTA'S THEORY

Jayanta is very careful in assessing the merit of the classification of pramāṇas by all these systems. Though being a traditional Naiyāyika he supports the Nyāya scheme very strongly, he is perfectly judicious in presenting the views of his opponents. He is perhaps the first and the last logician who has given serious thought to this problem. He deals with *arthāpatti*, *abhāva*, *saṁbhava* and *aitihya* in the form of separate chapters, possibly actuated by his desire not to reject anything except when it proves redundant on a clear-cut evaluation of all the relevant factors. He, however, seems primarily pre-occupied with his desire to refute the Buddhists' position and to bring home to them that the Nyāya view of four pramāṇas is un-

Jayanta, first of all, states that though the author of the *Nyāyasūtra* has not indicated the number of pramāṇas, yet as he has mentioned only four means in his aphorism, it is obvious that he accepts no less and no more than four pramāṇas. Gautama, according to Jayanta, has performed two functions by a single sūtra, the division of *pramāṇa* and its definition.[1] In his opinion it is not necessary that a sūtra should serve a single purpose of expressing one meaning. It is rather the marked dexterity of the sūtras that they yield more than one meaning. Anyhow, there is no dispute about it that the author of Nayāyasūtra accepts only four pramāṇas. So it is immaterial whether he has counted them or not.

(b) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF OTHER VIEWS

The Cārvākas accept only one *pramāṇa*. Jayanta has given a detailed analysis of their view while refuting their contention with respect to *anumāna*. Similarly the Buddhist opposition to accepting *śabda* as a distinct *pramāṇa* has been refuted by Jayanta in his analysis of śabda. He, however, thinks it singularly worthwhile to criticise the Buddhists' acceptance of only two pramāṇas on the basis of their ontological conviction. "For the Buddhist", as Prof. R. C. Pandeya rightly observes, "knowledge is an epistemic manifestation of Reality."[2] They admit only two means of knowledge. In their opinion there are only two types of knowable objects, namely, perceptible or particular and imperceptible or universal. These two types of objects mutually exclude each other. The Buddhists maintain that a third type of object is not possible. The non-existence of the third type is proved by the fact that what is cognized by the perception of a blue object is a blue object and what is not revealed by it is a non-blue object. There is no such object as is neither blue nor non-blue. Perception determines its own object, excludes its negative and suggests the absence of a third kind. If this view is not accepted, the practical utility of knowledge will be nil because we cannot hold an object as attainable unless we know that it is other than avoidable. Inference also helps in understanding the proposition that there is no middle term between an object of perception and its opposite non-object.

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प्रमाणेषु चतुःसंख्यं तथा सामान्यलक्षणम् । *N. M.*, I-25

2. *Metaphysical Foundations of the Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, The Buddha Jayanti Lecture, Patna

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As regards the Buddhist contention that perception is capable of excluding the possibility of a third type of object and thereby denying the existence of a proof other than perception and inference, Jayanta reminds them that indeterminate perception cannot connect the antecedent event with the consequent and that determinate perception, according to them, is nourished by imagination. Thus, none of the forms of perception can bear so heavy a burden on its shoulders. Even if for the sake of argument we admit that perception has the capacity of excluding the middle in the case of the perception of blue and thus excludes the non-blue, it does not hold good when we try to know the objects as being perceived or as being inferred. Moreover, perception reveals the objects as they are in themselves but never as perceptum. Jayanta quotes Kumārila to assert that the Bhāṭṭas also share the contention of the Naiyāyikas that *pratyakṣatva* is not known directly.[1] In cases of perception we do not experience such distinction as this is perception and this is the object of perception. Jayanta is aware of the Buddhist argument that if a direct awareness is not self-conscious, it cannot reveal an object, so he rejects it on the ground that if we are at first aware of our awareness, the object-consciousness cannot follow it. If it is maintained that awareness is self-conscious and thus it reveals its content, it would lead to *regressus ad infinitum.* Moreover, if awareness is an object of its own self, it becomes an ordinary object As perception is not introspected, it can neither be differentiated from mediate knowledge nor can it suggest that there is no third form of knowledge. So Jayanta concludes that perception is not a proof of the existence of only two types of objects. Since inference is based upon perception and the latter's capacity for restricting the object of knowledge only in two forms has been already rejected, inference also cannot serve this purpose. Even if, for the sake of argument we accept that there are only two types of objects, the distinction in the sets of conditions of all the four means of knowledge and the difference in results that they yield, make sufficient ground to reject the Buddhist hypothesis that there are only two means of knowledge.[2] The later Nyāya logicians with the exception of Bhāsarvajña[3] and the Syncretists with the exception of

1. *S. V. Anu.* 60 ; *N. M.*, I-29
2. अन्ये एव हि सामग्रीफले प्रत्यक्षलिङ्गयोः ।
अन्ये एव च सामग्रीफले शब्दोपमानयोः, *N. M.*, I-30
3. तत्त्रिविधम्, प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागम इति, *N. Sr.*, p. 6 (Poona, 1922)

Śivāditya[1] follow the old Nyāya pattern of pramāṇas set forth by Gautama and aptly propounded by Jayanta.

8. *Jurisdiction of the Means of Knowledge*

The Buddhists maintain that each of the two pramāṇas accepted by them, viz., *preception and inference, has its own exclusive* and distinct jurisdiction. In their opinion a unique particular can only be apprehended by perception and never by inference. Similarly, a universal can be cognized only by inference. The Buddhists uphold this restriction as necessary and call it '*pramāṇavyavasthā*'.[2] The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are opposed to this view and have instead propounded that the same object can be grasped by *perception, inference, etc., under different circumstances. They* are against the restriction in the jurisdiction of *pramāṇas* and thus uphold the principle of "*pramāṇasaṁplava*'. Jayanta has given serious thought to this problem. He criticises the Buddhist contention on various grounds.

Jayanta asserts that if we do not subscribe to the theory of *pramāṇasaṁplava,* the existence of inference cannot be established since knowledge of the relation of invariable concomitance depends upon the apprehension of the probans and the probandum and it cannot be gained without the aid of perception. If the Buddhists uphold that the probandum is known by a first inference, they are simply mistaken since this proposition will lead to a vicious *regressus ad infinitum.* The Buddhists may contend that inference reveals imaginary objects. The knowledge of invariable concomitance is also *supplied by imagination. All syllogisms refer to* conceptual images. Thus neither a *regressus ad infinitum* vitiates the inference nor an intermixture of the means of knowledge is required for having an inferential knowledge. But Jayanta maintains that this contention is nothing but a hoax. The Buddhists specify the universal *relation as that of identity or of causality.* Now the question remains as to whether this relation belongs to real or to imaginary object. It cannot belong to imaginary object for a conceptual image does not represent a real object. Hence the relation of invariable concomitance belongs to real object *only. If the perception of a universal is not assumed, then* the relation of invariable concomitance cannot be discovered. An

1. प्रमा मपि द्विविधा प्रत्यक्षमनुमितिश्च, *S. P.*, p. 27 (Adyar, 1932)
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exclusive particular cannot serve as a mark. If a concept is a mark, its knowledge cannot be but inferential. And if one inference is based upon another, it will lead either to *regressus ad infinitum* or to a vicious circle. Even if it is admitted that there are only two types of knowable objects, there is no bar to maintain that both perception and inference apply to the same object due to some change in the place or time of the concerned knowable object.[1]

Jayanta further asserts that it does not behove the Buddhists to cling to this absurd proposition in order to deny existence of a universal which has been proved by the Naiyāyikas beyond doubt. It is, however, a fact that perception, inference and verbal knowledge differ from one another because of the difference in the condition of their objects. We grasp an object through visual perception as qualified by its specific property. Inferential knowledge grasps the minor term as qualified only by the object inferred on the strength of an induction. Testimony reveals the meaning of a word as associated with the word itself. Still, as the substratum underlying the properties of these objects is sometimes one and the same, there is no contradiction in the assertion that many means apply to the same object. For instance, from the words of a trustworthy person we learn that fire exists at a distant place. We proceed in that direction relying upon his words. When we go nearer we see smoke and infer its existence. When we advance further and approach the fire we see it. There are, of course, some instances where the means of knowledge have a restricted function. For instance, we directly know that we have two hands. But we neither infer the number nor know it from another person. Thus Jayanta asserts that though there are some cases in which a particular means of knowledge has an exclusive sphere, in the majority of instances all means of proof apply to all objects according to the divergence of space and time.[2] So Jayanta concludes that the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇavyavasthā* does not stand the test of reason and that there is no escape from accepting the Nyāya view that the jurisdiction of the means of knowledge cannot be confined to water-tight compartments.

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1. प्रत्यक्षत्वं परोक्षोऽपि प्रत्यक्षोऽपि परोक्षताम् ।
देशकालादिभेदेन विषयः प्रतिपद्यते, *N. M.*, I-32

2. प्रायेण प्रमाणानि प्रमेयमभिसंप्लवन्ते क्वचित्तु प्रमेये व्यवतिष्ठन्ते अपि, *N. M.*, I-34

9. *Conclusion*

Jayanta's theory of knowledge, as we have seen above, consists of a systematic set of answers to a systematic set of questions. On recapitulating these answers we find that in his opinion the problem of knowledge is capable of solution. Knowledge is a quality; it is neither an activity nor a relation. He refers to '*buddhi*' and '*upalabdhi*' as definitive synonyms of *jñāna*. Jayanta has not classified knowledge in the fashion of Śivāditya. We, however, find that *smṛti, saṁśaya, tarka* and *viparyaya* have been counted by him under the non-valid forms of cognition. *Pramā*, according to him, is that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion. He is quite aware of all factors of knowledge known as *pramā, pramāṇa, prameya* and *pramiti*. He defines *pramāṇa* as that collocation of conscious as well as unconscious objects which results in producing such apprehension of knowable objects as is different from doubt and illusion. He strongly supports the viability of only four means of knowledge and refutes others with convincing arguments. He opposes the Buddhist idea of *pramāṇavyavsthā* and successfully endorses the Nyāya view that there are some cases where the means of knowledge do operate exclusively, but in the majoritiy of instances all means of knowledge apply to all objects according to the divergence of space and time.

Some of the novel features that Jayanta has brought out in his treatment of the nature and forms of knowledge are to be found in his introduction of a new characteristic '*bodhābodhasvabhāva*' in the definition of *pramāṇa*. No other logician has stated so clearly as Jayanta that conscious as well as unconscious objects form the collocation of conditions of a means of knowledge. Though he rejects doubt as a form of valid knowledge, yet it is he who has properly evaluated the role of doubt as a beginning point of philosophy. Further, his analysis of the jurisdiction of the means of knowledge is quite clear and convincing. He presents comprehensive view of the problems involving the nature of knowledge. He maintains that every form of true knowledge is directly produced by an object, and memory is non-valid cognition since it is not produced directly. His observation that novelty of knowledge does not constitute the criterion of a means of knowledge is also noteworthy.

There are, however, some points on which Jayanta seems to have failed to convince his readers. For instance, he does

not take cognizance of the following facts which the later Vedāntins and the author of *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* raise against the quality theory of knowledge and which have been recently set forth by Prof. Devaraj in his scholarly work—*An Introduction to Śankara's Theory of Knowledge*. Some of the objections are as follows : (1) There is no justification for positing a conscious seer different from consciousness. Consciousness, in fact, constitutes the very being of the seer as heat does of fire. (2) The Nyāya view which makes consciousness or knowledge a perishable quality will render the self itself perishable. (1) A quality is an intransitive property of a thing and hence cannot have a reference beyond the thing itself. Nor can a substance be the object of its own quality. On the basis of these facts Prof. Devaraj comes to the conclusion that the quality theory of consciousness, it would appear, lands uś in scepticism. It deprives us of the knowledge of the substance or substances. Similarly Jayanta's view that every form of knowledge is directly produced by an object has not been accepted by the Navyanaiyāyikas on the ground that *anumiti*, etc., cannot be held as immediate. Further, his analysis of memory does not carry conviction with some of the logicians of modern times who hold that in some cases memory is true. On the whole, however, Jayanta's treatment of the problem is quite impressive and in spite of some shortcomings he has definitely made great contribution to the field of knowledge. In subsequent chapters we shall see how he deals with the different means of knowledge.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE AND FORMS OF PERCEPTION

1. *The Nature of Pratyakṣa Perception*

The term 'pratyakṣa' consists of two parts, 'prati' (before or near or related to) and 'akṣa' (eye), which conjointly mean 'immediate knowledge'. This term has been generally translated as 'perception' in English. It is used in two forms, viz., as a noun and as an adjective. As a noun it stands for perceptual knowledge and as an adjective it may qualify either knowledge, as in the case of '*idam Jñānam pratyakṣam*' or a source of knowledge as in the case of '*idam pratyakṣam pramāṇam*'. Some logicians like Keśavamiśra, however, prefer the term '*Sākṣātkāra*' to denote the perceptual knowledge and reserve the term '*pratyakṣa*' for the means of perceptual knowledge.[1] Some thinkers like Uddyotakara hold that literally the term '*pratyakṣa*' means what is related to the senses,[2] while others, like Praśastapāda, are of the opinion that literally '*pratyakṣa*' means 'knowledge which is dependent upon the senses'.[3]

(a) JAYANTA'S THEORY

According to Jayanta the term '*pratyakṣa*' signifies a particular species of knowledge. Jayanta is perhaps the first thinker to state categorically that the etymological sense of this term does not convey the required meaning. He is of the view that this term is composed of two parts, '*akṣam*' and '*prati*' (*pratigataḥ*) and, thus it literally refers to 'knowledge', which depends upon sense organ. He, however, cautions that if we accept such a literal meaning of the term, it may apply to pleasure as well. Therefore, he maintains that

1. साक्षात्कारि प्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षम्, *T.B.* (Poona Edi.), p. 5
2. इन्द्रियेणार्थस्य सन्निकर्षादुत्पद्यते ज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम्, *N.V.* 1.1.4 ; प्रतिगतम् अक्षं प्रत्यक्षम्, *N.B.*, 1.2.4 (Intro)
3. अक्षमक्षं प्रतीत्योत्पद्यते इति प्रत्यक्षम्, *V.B.* (*Pratya.*)

here the customary sense is more appropriate.[1] The term *'pratyakṣa'* in this sense applies to such consciousness as is generated by the sense organ, and not simply to objects attached to the sense organ or inherent in them or constituent of them. Jayanta also maintains that this term is not a case of *avyayībhāva* compound in which the compound form becomes indeclinable. It is proved by the fact that the term *'pratyakṣa'* takes the masculine, feminine, and neuter form according to the gender of the noun it qualifies.[2]

There is a marked difference of opinion among the different systems of Indian Philosophy regarding the exact definition of *'pratyakṣa'*. Let us now see how Jayanta formulates his theory of *pratyakṣa* on the basis of his analysis of the views of his precursors and how he refutes the contentions of his opponents. Gautama defines *'pratyakṣa'* as that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is unnameable *(avyapadeśya)*, uncontradicted *(avyabhicārī)* and determinate *(vyavasāyātmaka)*.[3] These three attributes introduced by Gautama in the definition of perception have aroused a good deal of controversy among subsequent logicians. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta have discussed these terms at great length. In addition to the difficulty created by the divergence in the interpretation of these attributes Gautama's treatment of *pratyakṣa* in general also appears to be a problem for Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta since Gautama depicts *pratyakṣa* as a knowledge as well as a method of arriving at such a knowledge, which means that he does not differentiate between *pratyakṣa* as *pramāṇa* and *pratyakṣa* as *pramiti*. Jayanta, like Vācaspatimiśra, differentiates between the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and knowledge (*pramā*). They get over the difficulty by supplying an additional word 'yataḥ' and, thus interpret the aphorism as *'pratyakṣa pramāṇa'*, is that, from which the knowledge based upon sense-object contact arises. Jayanta states that by supplying a word *'yataḥ'* the aphorism of Gautama becomes capable of giving a flawless definition.[4] It is clear that Jayanta twists the meaning of the aphorism by inserting the word *'yataḥ'*.

1. *N.M.* (*Pratyakṣa*)
2. Ibid, I-16
3. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्, *N.S.*, 1.1.4
4. यत एवं यद्विशेषणविशिष्टं ज्ञानाख्यं फलं भवति, तत्प्रत्यक्षमिति सूत्रार्थः, *N.M.*, I-61

He, however, overlooks the fact that Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara do not think it necessary to make such an addition to the sūtra. Anyhow, it is obvious that Gautama does not differentiate between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* and this factor is mainly responsible for making Gautama's definition of *pratyakṣa* more controversial than it would have been otherwise.

All the characteristics of *pratyakṣa* introduced by Gautama have been strongly debated time and again by many a commentator. It is noteworthy that Gautama's definition of *pratyakṣa*, though disagreed with in many respects not only by his opponents but also by the logicians of his own school, has been largely responsible for laying down the foundation of the theory of perception in Indian logic. Jayanta elaborately discusses each and every word of Gautama's *sūtra* and supports it in letter and spirit. The commentators of Gautama differ in various respects. Some of them hold the entire *sūtra* as the definition and some others maintain that '*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyabhicāri pratyakṣam*' forms the definition and the terms '*avyapadeśyam*' and '*vyavasāyātmakam*' refer to the indeterminate and determinate types of perception. Again, some logicians such as Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara interpret the aphorism without any insertion while others such as Vācaspati and Jayanta, as already mentioned above, hold the insertion of the word '*yataḥ*' in the sūtra essential for a flawless definition of pratyakṣa. The following account of the theory of pratyakṣa shows how much interest has been taken by the logicians to solve this problem in their own different ways.

Indriyārthasannikarsa. According to Gautama *pratyakṣa* is brought about by the sense-object contact. In other wards, sense-object contact has been depicted by him as the cause behind perception. This factor of the definition has been discussed elaborately by his successors. Vātsyāyana, the main commentator on Gautama's aphorism, first of all takes up the phrase '*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam*' and analy·es the cause of perception in detail. He maintains that in every perceptual situation the self unites with the mind, the mind with the sense and the sense with the object. Vātsyāyana makes it perfectly clear that sense-object contact is not the only cause of perception. There are others as well, namely, the self-mind contact and the mind-sense contact. Vātsyāyana, however, does not find fault with the author of *Nyāyasūtra* for giving only

one cause of perception. He rather compliments him for having brought forth the idea of sense-object contact in his definition.[1] Vātsyāyana is also of the view that whereas the self-mind contact is common to perception, inference, etc., the mind-sense contact and the sense-object contact are peculiar characteristics of perception. The definition contains only the sense-object contact and not the mind-sense contact, since in a definition the mention of any one character that serves to distinguish a defined thing from others suffices. In other words, a definitive aphorism is not supposed to contain an exhaustive account of all the distinctive features of the thing defined.

Vātsyāyana further states that the apprehension of pleasure or pain by the soul are the cases of perception. The mind is regarded by him as a sense-organ, though unlike other sense organs, it is non-material and devoid of qualities and operates on all objects without being confined to specific ones.[2] In short the sense-object contact, according to Vātsyāyana, is a necessary condition for all kinds of perception including the apprehension of pleasure or pain by the soul. In this account of Vātsyāyana we have at least, a vague idea of the differentiation between *pramāṇa* and *pramā* and that is why his interpretation of the 'sense-object contact' has been of great help to us in determining the psychology of perception.

Uddyotakara explains the phrase '*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyakśam*' elaborately. He holds that perception is that knowledge which is brought about by the sense-object contact. His main contribution to this aspect of the theory of perception is that he has discussed it in detail and enumerated as many as six types of sense-object contact.[3] Vācaspatimiśra states that the Sūtrakāra has included the term '*sannikarṣa*' instead of the terms '*saṁyoga*' or '*samavāya*' since in the adoption of '*saṁyoga*', *samavāya* would have been precluded and in the case of the adoption of *samavāya*, *saṁyoga* would have been excluded. *Sannikarṣa* embraces both, so it is preferable to both of these terms. The inclusion of the term '*artha*' also is quite purposeful since it indicates that

1. *N.B.*, 1.1.4

2. इन्द्रियस्य वै सतो मनस इन्द्रियेभ्यः पृथगुपदेशो धर्मभेदात्, *N.B.*, 1.1.4

3. *N.V.*, 1.1.4

the objects should be knowable in their shape and size. As regards the term *'utpanna'*, Vācaspati is of the view that it is indicative of the fact that the contact of the sense with the object is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge.[1]

Jayanta enumerates sense organs as those of smell, taste sight, touch and hearing. He enlists objects as odour, flavour, etc., and states that the way in which the sense-organs come in contact with their objects is six-fold.[2] The existence of the sense-object contact is proved by the fact that the sense-organs cannot grasp the veiled objects. This contact is not simply one of the conditions. It is rather essential that the sense organs, being the instrumental cause of the act of perception, are united with the other conditions existent in the process of an act of perception. The contact of the sense organs of taste and touch with their objects is seen undoubtedly. As the rest of the sense organs share some characteristics with the above two, it is obvious that they also come in contact with the objects and produce the act of perception. Though this fact is directly suggested to our mind, it has been clearly mentioned in the sūtra to spell out the six-fold division of the contact. The word *'utpanna'* in the sūtra just suggests that both the sense organs and the objects condition the preception of an object.[3] The object is that which is perceived. That the object is causally connected with the act of perception, is proved by the fact that only the object in question is cognised. There are other instances which show that an accusative determines an act. Jayanta concludes that the term *'utpanna'* suggests that the sense organs determine perception as its condition so that the object which is perceived also conditions its perception. It is not proper to conclude that the adjective clause 'which arises from the sense-object contact' excludes the inner perception of pleasure, etc., from the domain of perception. It is rather included in it and is grasped by the inner sense organ. It is, however, not enumerated in the list of sense organs because it is not elemental like the external sense organs.[4]

The perception of an object, according to Jayanta, may be

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1. *N. V. T. T.*, 1.1.4
2. सन्निकर्षस्तु इन्द्रियाणामर्थैःसह षट्प्रकारः, *N. M.*, I-68
3. उत्पन्नग्रहणत्वेन इन्द्रियार्थयो ज्ञानजनकत्वम्, Ibid., I-69
4. भौतिकघ्राणादीन्द्रियधर्मवैलक्षण्यात्तु मनसस्तद्वर्गे परिगणनं न कृतम्, Ibid., I-69

produced by four or three or two phases of contact as the case may be. When we perceive the colour of an external object four phases of contact are required to produce its perception. Here the individual soul is conjoined to the internal organ which in its turn comes into contact with the external sense organ which again is united with the coloured substance in which colour (the object in question) inheres. The inner perception of internal phenomena such as pleasure, etc., requires two contacts to be produced. External organs such as eyes, etc., have no part to play in that. The transcendental perception of the soul by a sage is produced by a single contact only since in that stage a third object, viz., a subject or an object, does not exist besides the soul and the internal organ.

The adjective clause 'arising from the sense-object contact' thus, concludes Jayanta, has rightly been used, since the inner perception of pleasure, etc., is included in the class of perception. The sūtra on perception does not include the contact of the soul with the internal organ in the list of causal factors of perception though it is one of its conditions, because such a contact is the common factor of all forms of consciousness and not a special condition of perception only.

Avyapadeśyam (*unnameable*). The second characteristic of *pratyakṣa*, mentioned by Gautama, is that 'it is non-expressible in words'. This epithet has aroused a great controversy which is most frequently reflected in the available scholiums of the age. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra have discussed the meaning of this term elaborately. But it is Jayanta, who has given as many as six alternative interpretations of this term. The history of its divergent interpretations, however, starts with Vātsyāyana who explains it as 'non-expressible in words' and pleads for its justified inclusion in the definition. He states that every cognition of an object produced by the sense-object contact is (afterwards) denoted by such words as colour, taste, etc. Being denoted by such words, the cognition in question may be taken as produced by verbal testimony. In order to preclude that possibility, the term *avyapadeśya* has been added to qualify perceptual knowledge. Vātsyāyana further explains as to how it differs from testimony and maintains that the name of perceived thing becomes operative only at the time of its being spoken of or communicated to other persons. So, Vātsyāyana concludes that the Sūtrakāra through this characte-

ristic has established that the apprehension of objects produced by the contact of the sense organs with them is not verbal.[1]

Uddyotakara seems conscious of the fact that some commentators explain that the epithet *'avyapadeśya'* is added to the definition with a view to excluding inferential cognition. But he thinks that this view is wrong, since the definition has already another epithet 'sense-object contact' which is quite capable of precluding perception from inference. Though Uddyotakara adopts the term *'avyapadeśya'* for 'unnameable' he has left it unexplained.

According to Vācaspatimiśra, part of Gautama's sūtra, viz., *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyabhicāri* (the uncontradicted knowledge produced by sense-object contact, is the definition of perception and the two words *'avyapadeśyam'* and *'vyavasāyātmakam'* indicate two kinds of perception, viz., indeterminate and determinate. Vācaspati's interpretation of the term *'avyapadeśya'*, therefore, naturally proceeds on different lines. The main inconsistency in this interpretation, according to Dr. D. N. Shastri lies in the fact that the word *'avyabhicāri'* occurs in between the two words. Obviously, all the three are attributes of perception. As the same knowledge which is held to be unnameable (*avyapadeśya*) is also held to be definite or determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*), the former word can in no way suggest indeterminate perception.[2]

Vācaspatimisra is perhaps aware of the objections that were liable to be raised againt his interpretation. So, he states that this interpretation of Gautama's aphorism never occurred to Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. It is so very clear that the students of the Nyāya would themselves understand it. Jayanta, however, does not share this view, since, of the six alternative interpretations of this term given by Jayanta, none agrees with that of Vācaspatimiśra. This interpretation is the innovation of Vācaspati though he refers to his teacher Trilocana as the authority behind it Anyhow, *avyapadeśya*, for Vācaspatimiśra, is a type of perception which is also known as *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate.

Jayanta discusses the inclusion of the term *'avyapadeśya'* in the definition of *pratyakṣa* on the following lines :

(1) He refers to the old logicians' view that what finds expres-

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1. नामधेयशब्देन व्यपदिश्यमानं सत् शाब्दं प्रसज्यते, अत आह अव्यपदेश्यमिति, *N.B.*, 1.1.4

2. *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 431

sion in words is called *'vyapadeśya'* and that the epithet *'avyapadeśyam'* is included in the sūtra to suggest that no such expressible apprehension is taken as the effect (result) of perception. Jayanta holds this interpretation untenable on the ground that mere verbalisation of an apprehension cannot render it non-perceptual and if apprehension itself is wrong, then the word *'avyabhicāri'* given in the aphorism is competent enough to exclude it from the domain of perception. Moreover, the verbalised knowledge also owes its existence to some source of valid knowledge. If it is debarred from perception, it has no scope in other means of knowledge as well. It cannot be linked with inference for it does not partake of the character of an inferential knowledge. There is no provision in Gautama's logic of the fifth source of valid knowledge. Thus, the above interpretation of the term is not tenable.

(2) According to Jayanta some teachers of the Nyāya School maintain that this epithet excludes some other forms of knowledge from the sphere of perception. For instance, a man learning the meaning of a word from the instruction of an experienced person listens to the sentence uttered by him : 'this is a jack-fruit tree (*panasa*)' and ascertains that the yonder object having branches, etc., is signified by the word 'jack-fruit tree'. Here the cognition is jointly produced by the sentence (*vyapadeśa*) of the expert and by the contact of the sense-organ of the perceiver with the object, so these teachers maintain that to exclude such verbalised cognition from the scope of perception, the term *'avyapadeśya'* is included in the sūtra. These logicians hold that Gautama approves the entry of sensuous element into the body of verbal knowledge, but he shuts the door of perception against an element of verbal knowledge in it through the inclusion of the epithet *avyapadeśya* in the definition. From this account it may be concluded that a piece of knowledge which is produced not by words alone but by words accompanied by some other factors belonging to another type is verbal. Jayanta criticizes this view on the ground that the author of the *Nyāyasūtra* cannot be taken as a preacher of moral duty like Manu so as to facilitate us to think that the piece of knowledge in question is verbal.[1] On a closer scrutiny we find that the above-mentioned piece of knowledge is perceptual since it is causally determined by the sense organs.

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1. मनुवत्सूत्रकारोऽपि न धर्मस्योपदेशकः ।
येनैतदनुरोधेन तस्य ब्रूयाम शाब्दताम्, *N. M.*, I-74

(3) Jayanta states that according to some other logicians the epithet '*avyapadeśya*' is given in the sūtra with a view to defending the definition of perception from the charge of defining an absurd object. In this context Jayanta refers to Bhartṛhari's theory that there is no such consciousness in this universe as is not predicated by words and that we are aware of all awareness as qualified by words.[1] In the light of this theory also the definition of perception turns out to be merely verbal, i.e., it has no real thing to define without the inclusion of this word. But with the inclusion of this epithet, Sūtrakāra makes it clear that the consciousness of a person which is unaware of a word and its denotation and of their relation is not derived from words. Though judgments such as 'this is a cow' come under the category of verbalised knowledge, the initial sense-perception is a fit object to be defined and this has become possible by employing the epithet '*avyapadeśya*'. Jayanta refers to the opponents of the above view who disapprove of this solution. They hold that the judgment such as 'this is a cow' owes its existence to the sense-object contact and that it cannot be a piece of verbal knowledge. It is rather a clear case of perceptual judgment. As judgments of this type come within the purview of perception, the charge of the futility of the definition of perception becomes baseless. Hence the epithet '*avyapadeśya*' has not been given in the aphorism to meet the charge that it is impossible to define perception; it must have some other purpose.

(4) Jayanta quotes the views of some other stalwarts who maintain that the judgments, such as 'this is cow' do not refer to objects qualified by their denotative terms. Moreover if indeterminate perception is not distinct from the determinate one, how shall we distinguish one from the other ? When we hear the term 'club-man' a man carrying a staff is present in our consciousness. If this consciousness were not a distinct one it would have been simply an awareness of a man whereas the fact is that a man and staff are not present to our consciousness as unrelated since the staff qualifies the man, i.e., the relation of the qualifying to the qulified governs this consciousness which arises from the knowledge of the term 'club-man'. But this view is objected to on the ground that the noun which is signified by the compound word is the sole object of knowledge. Hence the judgment that 'his is a cow' does not refer to an object as qualified by its name.

1. *N.M.*, 1-76

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1. *N.M.*, 1-76

Therefore, it is not a piece of verbal knowledge. It is a clear case of perception. Hence, the epithet '*avyapadeśya*' has not been included in the sūtra to meet the charge that it is impossible to define perception.

(5) Some other logicians hold that the judgment that 'this is a cow', meant for communicating the acquired signification, should necessarily be generated by the two distinct types of means of knowledge since the judgment is produced by the sense organ together with the memory of a sentence learnt by us. Now, why should not the term '*avyapadeśya*' preclude this judgment from the field of perception? If it is held that words do not directly condition the above judgment but their memory, it is not tenable. Hence these logicians maintain that the hypothesis offered by the ancient logicians that the term *avyapadeśya* excludes verbalised perception from the field of valid perception, seems more reasonable.

(6) After introducing and then criticizing the above mentioned justifications for the inclusion of the epithet in the sūtra, Jayanta refers to another view propounded by the celebrated teachers of the Nyāya school that the author of the *Nyāyasūtra* has realised the role of verbal testimony in the case of signification of objects. Hence to exclude such signification from the sphere of perception, he has given the epithet '*avyapadeśya*' in the sūtra. Jayanta seems partly inclined to this view.

Having studied different interpretations of the term by various anonymous logicians, Jayanta concludes that the author of *Nyāyasūtra* includes both determinate and indeterminate perception within sense-perception and by the term '*avyapadeśya*' he refers to indeterminate perception. He, however, leaves it to the readers to select any of the above mentioned hypothesis which appeal to their minds.[1]

Avyabhicārī (*non-erroneous*). One of the characteristics of *pratyakṣa* as mentioned by Gautama is that it should be non erroneous (*avyabhicārī*). Putting forth illustrious explanations of the epithet, Vātsyāyana states that during the summer, sun-rays usually mix up with the heat waves radiated from the hot surface of a desert and the two together, flickering at a distance, catch the eye of a observer who in turn appre-

1. इत्याचार्यमतानीह दर्शितानि यथागमम् ।
यदेभ्यः सम्यगाभाति गृह्यतां तदसंशयम्, *N.M.*, I-82

hends them as water. Now, if the definition of sense-perception consists of only two terms, *indriyārthasannikarṣa* and *avyapadeśya*, then the apprehension of water under the circumstances mentioned above, would have to be regarded as sense-perception. So, Vātsyāyana maintains that with a view to guarding against this contingency the author of *Nyāyasūtra* has added a further qualification that the cognition should be non-erroneous also. As opposed to non-erroneous (*avyabhicāri*) knowledge, erroneous (*vyabhicāri*) is that cognition in which the thing is apprehended as what it is not. Uddyotakara takes the term '*avyabhicāri*' in the same sense in which the Bhāśyakāra does. He, however, improves upon Vātsyāyana's statement making it clear that it is not the object (*artha*), but its apprehension which is subject to error when we take the flickering rays for water. Vācaspati refers to the following three alternative justifications for the inclusion of the term '*avyabhicāri*' in the *sūtra* :

(1) Though the erroneous forms have been excluded from the domain of perception on the basis of other characteristics, yet this epithet is mentioned to assign an authoritative sanction to it.[1] (2) Though it is essential for other means also that they should be non-erroneous, yet, *pratyakṣa* being the basis of other forms of knowledge, it is implied that the knowledge brought about through other means also should be non-erroneous.[2] (3) The term '*pratyakṣa*' refers to the resultant cognition, but other *pramāṇas* refer to the form of the means of knowledge. To point out this difference the *sūtrakāra* has given the term '*avyabhicāri*' in the sūtra. The sum and substance of Vācaspati's views is that the qualification '*avyabhicāri*' is necessary in the case of perception only because in the case of other forms of knowledge the error lies in the perception upon which every one of them is, in one way or the other, based.[3]

Jayanta follows Vātsyāyana and states that the term '*avyabhicāri*' has been included in the sūtra to exclude erroneous perception from the domain of perception. For instance, the perception of a mirage is erroneous since what is presented to consciousness does not correspond to reality. Here one thing is mistaken for another and it is the epithet '*avyabhicāri*' in the

1. सिद्धे सत्यारम्भो नियमार्थः, *N. V. T. T.*, 1.1.4
2. Ibid
3. Ibid

sūtra which excludes any such possibility. Jayanta objects to the hypothesis that 'indeterminate perception' has the sun-rays as its object but as it causes such 'determinate perception' of water it is erroneous. Jayanta further states that as taking the sun-rays for water is a case of error, so it is immaterial as to which stage or form of 'perception' the mistake occurs.[1]

As regards the, view that the characteristic 'sense-object contact' is powerful enough to exclude such erroneous perception since there cannot be any contact of the sense with the illusory water, Jayanta states that there are three different hypotheses with regard to the presented form of an illusory experience, i.e., (1) Some logicians hold that some of the rays of the sun which conceal their specific character and assume the form of water correspond to the presented form. (2) Some other teachers maintain that water, the memory of which is recalled by the knowledge of its resemblance to the yonder object, is presented to our consciousness. (3) Some others are of the view that the condition of awareness is one thing and what is presented to our consciousness is something different.[2]

These illusions which are causally connected with the sense-organs and the external objects arise from the sense-object contact. If we shut our eyes we cannot take rays for water. The object of the eye is no doubt rays but the apprehension is erroneous since the rays appear as water to the eye. Hence these erroneous forms of apprehension cannot be excluded from the province of true sense perception if we simply define perception as caused by sense object contact. Hallucinations, however, arise independently of the external sense organs, and the characteristic 'sense-object contact' can preclude them. So, Jayanta maintains that to exclude the illusions from the domain of perception the epithet 'non-erroneous' has been suitably given in the sūtra.

Vyavasāyātmaka (*Determinate*). Gautama has enumerated the epithet '*vyavasāyātmaka*' among the characteristics of *pratyakṣa*. Vātsyāyana explains it as determinate or definite and maintains that the Sūtrakāra has incorporated this epithet in the sūtra so that doubtful apprehension such as 'is this smoke or is this dust ?' is excluded from the scope of perception. Such

1. सविकल्पकमविकल्पकं वा यदतस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तद्व्यभिचारि तच्चेह व्यावर्त्यम् । *N. M.*, I-82

2. अन्यदालम्बनं चान्यत्प्रतिभातीति केचन। Ibid., I-83

an exclusion is not possible if we simply define *pratyakṣa* as that which is brought about by sense-object contact. Vātsyāyana further states that it is improper to hold that "doubtful apprehension is produced only by the contact of soul with mind and not by the contact of senses with the object and that there is no necessity for incorporating the term in the sūtra", because in his opinion it is only when one sees the obj.ct with one's eyes that one has a doubtful cognition. Thus in all cases of sense-perception (*vyavasāya*), the sense organ of the perceiver is invariably operative. The mind, on the other hand, operates subsequently for purposes of the representative cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). This is proved by the fact that there is no representative cognition of those whose sense organs have perished. Moreover, the mind, by whose contact the cognition of pleasure, etc., is produced, is as good a sense organ as the eye is. The enumeration of mind apart from the sense organs is only indicative of the fact that there are some differences in the character of the mind and other sense organs, viz., (i) Mind is non-material whereas other sense organs are composed of elemental substances; (2) Mind is effective upon all objects whereas other sense organs are effective upon only a few specific objects ; and (3) Unlike the other sense organs the mind is not endowed with any specific quality. The association of mind is necessary in every act of perception. Without the association of the mind none of the sense organs can apprehend its object. So, it is clear that the mind is a sense organ and that all doubtful cognitions are not independent of sense-operation, even though there are some cases that are due to the operation of the mind alone. Anyhow, Vātsyāyana's contention is that doubtful cognition cannot be excluded simply on the basis of the characteristic 'sense-object contact' and therefore, the inclusion of the epithet *vyavasāyātmaka*' is essential.

Uddyotakara endorses Vātsyāyana in interpreting the epithet '*vyavasāyātmaka*' also. He makes it clear that both the 'mind-soul contact' and the 'sense-object contact' can be regarded equally responsible for producing a doubtful apprehension. Uddyotakara is also of the view that the mind is distinct from the other sense organs in the sense that while the former is connected with all sorts of apprehension, the latter are effective upon specific objects only. The difference between the mind and the sense organs does

not depend upon their being non-material or material since the mind, in fact, is neither material nor non-material.[1]

Vācaspatimiśra, anxious as he seems to include *savikalpaka* perception under the definition contained in the sūtra, remarks that doubtful cognition is already excluded by the qualification 'non-erroneous', and so we should regard the qualification *vyavasāyātmaka* to suggest that it includes *savikalpaka* or concrete cognition so that the epithet *'avyapadesyam'* applies to *nirvikalpaka* or abstract cognition. Vācaspati justifies this interpretation saying that Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara have not mentioned it since this interpretation, being very simple, does not need any explanation.[2] He also refers to his teacher Trilocana as a source of this innovation made in the interpretation of the term *'vyavasāyātmaka.*

Jayanta interprets the term *'vyavasāyātmaka'* on the same line on which Vātsyāyana does. There is, however, difference in the examples which they supply to illustrate their standpoints. Jayanta states that the epithet *'vyavasāyātmaka'* (determinate) has been incorporated in the sūtra to exclude doubt from the range of perception. It is wrong to maintain that the characteristic 'sense-object contact' is enough to achieve this purpose since doubt is grasped by the mind which is not an external sense organ. Jayanta maintains that a doubt expressed in the form 'it is either a pole or a man' is produced by the external sense organ. Doubts such as two astrologers' conflicting predictions are, however, subjective since the inner sense organ is their sole cause.

Some logicians maintain that 'doubt' is an 'error' and the epithet 'non-erroneous' excludes 'doubt' from the domain of perception and, thus, the term *'vyavasāyātmaka'* is superfluous. Jayanta objects to this view stating that 'doubt' is different from 'error' since their causes are different. There is a certainty of opposite truth in an 'error' but in 'doubt' our mind oscillates between two contradictory predictions and fails to arrive at a decision. Error is conditioned by the remembrance of an attribute which does not belong to the object in front of us. A man recollects waterness at the contact of the rays of the sun with his eyes and thus has illusory

1. कार्यधर्मावेतौ भौतिकमभौतिकं च, न कार्यं मनः, तस्मान्न भौतिकं नाप्यभौतिकमिति, *N. V.*, 1.1.4

2. व्यवसायात्मकं साक्षात् विकल्पस्य वाचकम्—तदेतदतिस्फुटत्वात् शिष्यैर्गम्यत एवेति भाष्यवार्तिकाभ्यामव्याख्यातम्, *N.V.T.T.*, 1.1.4

experience. Doubt, on the other hand, is conditioned by the recollection of the two specific features, for example, 'this is a pole or a man' is preceded by the recollection of 'pole-ness' and 'man-ness'. Thus, doubt is a class in itselt and the epithet '*vyavasāyātmaka*' is necessary to exclude it from sense-preception.

Some of the logicians hold that the epithet '*avyapadeśya*' is competent enough to exclude doubt and error from the range of true sense-perception since it is impossible to hold that doubt and error are indeterminate. Jayanta does not share this view and points out that as a piece of determinate perception is not associated with the words denoting its objects, error and doubt owe their existence to the function of their sense-organs but are not verbalised.[1] Therefore, Jayanta asserts that the epithet '*vyavasāyātmaka*' is not superfluous.

(b) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST VIEW

In Buddhist logic there are two traditions of defining *pratyakṣa*—one which does not include the word '*abhrānta*' (non-illusory) in the definition, and the other which incorporates it. The first tradition is started by Diṅnāga and the second by Dharmakīrit. Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, sought to harmonize the two mutually contradictory traditions current among the Buddhist logicians. But he too seems to be inclined towards Dharmakīrti. In the non-Buddhist texts on logic both the traditions are bitterly criticised. It appears that by the time of Śāntarakṣita the Buddhist logicians had already been divided in two camps, one taking the definition of perception to be complete without the inclusion of the word '*abhrānta*' and the other holding it incomplete without such an insertion. Uddyotakara refers to Diṅnāga's definition but Vācaspati and Jayanta put forth Dharmakīrti's definition as a prima-facie view of the Buddhists. Vācaspati's comments are simple but Jayanta's analysis of the Buddist definition of perception excels all the accounts on this topic by other logicians till his time.

According to Diṅnāga *pratyakṣa* is different from imagination and has no connection with names, genus, etc.[2] It is worth noting that this definition does not refer to the sense-object contact, perhaps to include under the fold of perception such forms of direct presentation as mental cognition, self-consciousness and mystic

1. सम्यक् प्रत्ययवत्तस्माद् वाचकोल्लेखवर्जितौ ।
अक्षव्यापारजन्मानौ स्तः संशयविपर्ययौ, *N. M.*, I-35
2. प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढं नामजात्याद्यसंयुतम्, *P. Samuccaya*

cognition. Dharmakīrti defines *pratyakṣa* as non-erroneous cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all constructions (*kalpanā*). He further states that *kalpanā* is a distinct cognition (*pratītiḥ*) of a mental reflex (*pratibhāsa*) which is capable of coalescing with verbal designation. *Pratyakṣa* is such knowledge as is free from such construction when it is not affected by an illusion produced by colour blindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship, sickness or other causes.[1] Dharmottara explains *kalpanāpoḍham* as alien to construction and *abhrāntam* as non-illusive. He is aware of the fact that usually the characteristic 'not being construction' alone would have been quite sufficient to explain the nature of perception, yet without the addition of the characteristic 'not being an illusion' in the definition, such misconceptions as the vision of a moving tree by an observer travelling by ship would not have been guarded off.[2] He however, partly supports Diṅnāga when he states that in empirical illusions its inclusion is of no use. The Buddhists hold that the Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa* i.e., knowledge produced by the sense-object contact, is defective and unsatisfactory in various respects.

It takes no notice of the general feature of every real cognition. A real sense perception or cognition by the senses exists only in the first moment of perception. In the following moment, when the attention is aroused, it is no more that pure sense perception which it was in the first instant.

According to Diṅnāga, Gautama's omission of '*manas*' among the sense-organs is not proper since it is inconsistent with his account of pleasure and pain as objects of cognition. If it is maintained that *manas* is implied then the mentioning of other sense organs is equally useless.[3] He further holds that the Nyāya definition is not free from confusion when it deals with the proper function of sense perception on the one hand and the function of other possible causes of it on the other. Sense perception

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1. कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षम्, *N.Bi.*, 1.4
अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासं प्रतीतिः कल्पना, तया रहितम् तिमिराशु-भ्रमणनौयानसंक्षोभाद्यनाहितविभ्रमं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्, Ibid., 1.4.5
2. तत्रासत्यभ्रान्तग्रहणे गच्छद्वृक्षदर्शनादिप्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढत्वात् स्यात्... तन्निवृत्त्यर्थम् अभ्रान्तग्रहणम्, *N.Bi.T.*, 1.4
3. न सुखादिप्रमेयं वा मनो वास्तीन्द्रियान्तरम् ।
अनिषेधादुपात्तं चेदन्येन्द्रियरुतं वृथा, *P. Samuccaya*

has its own cause, function and object. Its function is to make the object present to the senses; its object and causes are particular things. The general feature of all knowledge is that the cause producing it is at the same time its object. The function of sense-perception is the signalizing of an object. The construction of image is another function executed by another agency. So, the salient feature of sense perception is that it is non-constructive.

"The final outcome of the Buddhist definition", as stcherbatsky points out, "is something quite simple, viz., percePtion is sensation followed by conception, for conception is nothing but the image in a special context."[1] Uddyotakara has criticised this definition on the ground that it involves self-contradiction, i.e., it defines *pratyakṣa* as that which cannot be expressed by a name, and yet it is expressed here by the phrase '*kalpanāpoḍham*'. And if direct knowledge is not denoted by the phrase '*kalpanāpoḍham*', its use is unnecessary. Moreover, the condition that direct knowledge is other than imagination restricts its application to *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* only.

Jayanta, as has been mentioned before, takes Dharmakīrti's definition as a prima facie view of the Buddhists. Though he criticises the complete definition, his analysis is more pointed towards the interpretation of the characteristic '*kalpanāpoḍha*'. The Buddhists hold '*kalpanā*' as knowledge which is expressible in words. So, Jayanta's main contention againsts their theory is, that even if we accept their connotation of the term '*kalpanā*, there is nothing to authenticate it for rendering the characterized means of knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) invalid.

Though Jayanta opposes the Buddhist definition of perception tooth and nail, he is perfectly honest in introducing their standpoints in a clear-cut and unprejudiced manner. His analysis of '*kalpanā*' is very lucid and impressive.

Perception and Kalpanā. Jayanta is aware that according to the Buddhists there are five kinds of imaginative judgment, namely, (1) *jātikalpanā*, i.e., having a universal as its content, (2) *guṇakalpanā*, i.e., having an attribute as its content, (3) *karmakalpanā*, i.e., having an action as its content, (4) *nāmakalpanā*, i.e., having a word as its content and (5) *dravyakalpanā*, i.e., having a substance as its content. These are called imaginative judgments by the Buddhists, as

1. *Buddhist Logic*, part I, p. 105

in their opinion they sometimes super-impose identity between two different objects and at other times super-impose difference between two indentical things. For instance, there is no real difference between an individual and a universal, but a judgment abstracts a universal from an individual and superimposes an imaginary difference between the two, for example, between the cow (individual) and cowness (universal). Nobody experiences a difference, but still it is imagined. There is no difference between a substance and its attribute. They can never be experienced independent of each other, still a difference is thrust upon them. An action is never distinct from the substance. When we say 'Devadatta goes', we see neither more nor less than Devadatta. The judgment involving a word is imaginative, sinces the judgment 'this is Caitra', attributes identity of the name and the named. The judgment involving a substance is imaginative since in cases such as 'this is a club-man' (*daṇḍī ayam*), 'this' and 'club' are two distinct substances but they are mentioned as if they have the same substance.

Concerning the fact as to why these imginary judgments should not be regarded as illusory, the Buddhist maintain that if a real object appears to us to be another, a sublative judgment arises in our mind to negate it. For instance, when we take the rays of the sun for water, a sublative judgment has a scope to appear in our mind. But these imaginative judgments are neither real nor unreal. They are a class by themselves. So the Buddhist maintain that there is a difference between *kalpanā* and the error.

Jayanta vehemently criticizes the above mentioned five types of *kalpanā* and opines that none of the cases cited by the Buddhists to explain the super-imposition of identity in different things or vice-versa stands to reason.[1] If we take these types one by one their contention is refuted on the basis of following facts: (1) An individual is different from a universal. (2) A substance and the attribute which it possesses are not identical. (3) The judgment that 'this is Devadatta' does not mean that 'this is the name Devadatta'. It is wrong to hold that 'Devadatta' is nothing but the name 'Devadatta'. (4) Similarly, in the instance '*daṇḍī ayam*' the basic word '*daṇḍa*' and the nominal suffix 'in' are distinctly presented to our consciousness, i.e.,

1. *N.M.*, I-90

we understand that there is a man, namely, Devadatta, there is a stick and the stick is in the hand of the man. Hence it is obvious that there is no superimposition of identity in this case. (5) Further, an action is really different from a substance. They are also presented to our consciousness as such. Hence the determinate perception, which apprehends an object as qualified by an action, an attribute, a substance, a designation and a universal is not false. If the Buddhists hold that determinate perception is false because a few cases of it are self-contradictory, then their contention can be refuted with the counter charge that indeterminate perception, as in the case of the 'double vision of the moon' is also false. Let these cases of determinate perception which refer to imaginary objects be false. But how can the concrete cases which refer to real objects and are produced by the contact of sense organs be regarded as false?

In addition to the refutation of the existence of various types of *kalpanā* in perception, Jayanta objects to the Buddhist thesis of '*kalpanā*' in general also. He rejects their theory as a mess of senseless arguments and states that the Buddhists have failed to establish the invalidity of imaginary judgments. He enumerates various alternative conditions of such imaginary judgments and rejects them one after another in the following manner:

(1) It is not fair to hold that determinate perception is invalid because it grasps an imaginary object. The Buddhists maintain that when a word is said to denote a universal, it is a mere concept since it is coined by our imagination. The 'real' on the other hand, is exclusively 'particular' and as such cannot be expressed in a word. Jayanta refutes this view and states that an object denoted by a word is real since it is the same object which is revealed by an indeterminate perception.

(2) If the Buddhists hold that 'imaginary judgment is invalid since it does not arise from the sense-object contact and depends upon the remembrance of signification for its coming into being, they are wrong, because the sense-organ continues to function even after the production of an indeterminate perception since it gets a new impetus when it is united with an accessory condition in the shape of the remembrance of a word. A sense-organ which has hitherto failed to produce a determinate perception, produces it when it receives the help of a favourable accessory condition after a lapse of time. Nothing can prevent it from producing a new effect. In cases of both determinate and indeterminate

perception, their causal relationship is determined by means of the joint method of agreement and difference.

(3) If the Buddhists maintain that an imaginary judgment is invalid because it depends upon a number of complicated processes for its appearance, it is again not proper since a judgment cannot forthwith be held wrong simply because one undergoes certain difficult procedures in framing it.[1]

(4) If the Buddhists hold that an imaginary judgment is invalid, for notwithstanding its dissimilarity to the initial indeterminate perception it judges, they are not correct since an awareness never judges. It is rather the knower who alone judges. Even if an awareness, having come in contact with an object, requires the power of judging, this does not render the awareness invalid.

(5) If the Buddhists contend that a determinate perception is invalid since it grasps an object which is already apprehended, this view also is not tenable since novelty, according to the Nyāya, does not constitute the criterion of true knowledge.

(6) If the Buddhists are of the view that a determinate perception is invalid since in it identity is superimposed in different objects and the difference in indentical things, this view also is not sound because such impositions are not the causes of mistake, for a mistake is detected the moment it is contradicted. But we find no such judgments which may contradict the five kinds of imaginative judgments enumerated by the Buddhists. Hence *kalpanā*, concludes Jayanta, never means mistaking one thing for another.

Perception and Illusion. The second characteristic feature of perception, according to Dharmakīrti, is that it should be devoid of illusion (*abhrānta*). As has been already stated, Diṅnāga has not mentioned this epithet though his predecessor Asaṅga has included it in the definition. The omission of this epithet was, thus a calculated move on the part of Diṅnāga. "In dropping the characteristic of non-illusiveness," as Stcherbatsky points out, "Diṅnāga was led by three different considerations. First, illusion always contains an illusive perceptual judgment, but judgment does not belong to the sensuous part of cognition."[2] Diṅnāga is of the view that

1 न हि बहुक्लेशसाध्यत्वं नाम प्रामाण्यमुपहन्ति, *N. M.*, I-89

2. ज्ञानानां न च क्षणिकत्वादिमते बाध्यबाधकभावो बुद्धीनामुपपद्यते, Ibid., I-93

pure sensation does not contain any judgment and thus it cannot contain any illusion. Secondly Diṅnaga's consideration for the omission of this term is that he wants his theory of perception to be acceptable to both the realists who admitted the reality of an external object and to the idealists who denied the reality of an external world. Thirdly, this term admits of many interpretations. Its inclusion, in the opinion of Diṅnāga, would have proved futile to the whole system of his logic. Diṅnāga does not, however, deny the existence of illusive perceptions *in toto* but he suggests to treat them as fallacies of perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*).

Dharmakīrti differs with his master. He reintroduces the epithet '*abhrānta*' in his definition of perception. Stcherbastky seems perfectly right in holding that Dharmakīrti has done so on account of the following reasons :

(1) There is a difference between a sense-illusion and illusion of the understanding. If we take a rope for a snake, it is the illusion of understanding and it ceases as soon as we are convinced that it is a rope. But if a man sees a double moon owing to an eye disease, it is a sense-illusion and it will continue even if he is convinced that the moon is single.

(2) There are, moreover, hallucinations and dreams where the visions are present with all the vividness which is the characteristic feature of direct sense perception. They lack that vagueness and generality which is the characteristic feature of conceptual thought. If we stick to the definition that all conceptual thought is an illusion because it consists in mistaking one thing for another, we must come to the absurd conclusion that hallucinations are right perceptions because they do not consist in mistaking one thing for another. Stcherbastky is not perhaps aware that Dharmottara partly supports Diṅnāga when he states that the inclusion of this term is superfluous if it refers to empirical illusion (*prātibhāsikībhrānti*) since the idea of non-illusiveness in this sense is already contained in the conception of *pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa*. He is, however, of the opinion that the use of this term can be reconciled if it means transcendental illusion (*mukhyavibhrama*) and thus he partly supports Dharmakīrti.

Jayanta finds it futile to include the term '*abhrānta*' in the definition of perception. He maintains that the Buddhists' contention that "this adjective excludes illusory perception" is wrong, since the phrase '*kalpanāpoḍha*' would have been quite enough to

perception, their causal relationship is determined by means of the joint method of agreement and difference.

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check illusions. The Buddhists may argue that some illusions are produced by defective sense organs and not merely by imagination, and to guard them off the term '*abhrānta*' has been included in the definition. For instance, if the retina is divided into two parts by some disease, it gives a double vision of the moon, which is immediate and cannot be excluded from the sphere of indeterminate perception on the basis of the epithet '*kalpanāpoḍha*' alone.

Jayanta refutes this argument holding that if we accept this view of the Buddhists, the rays of the sun which reflect in the sandy soil and are transformed into the form of water and are also immediately perceived as water would also be determined with reference to the epithet '*abhrānta*'. Even if the Buddbists admit it to be so, their bypothesis that "an awareness which is produced by a real object is true and an awareness which is produced by an imaginary object is false" should not hold good.

Jayanta, thus, refutes both of the characteristics—*kalpanāpoḍha* and *abhrānta*—and sarcastically remarks that even Dharmakīrti, a logician of sharp intellect, could not correctly put two words together to define the nature of perception.[1]

(c) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE MIMĀMSĀ VIEW

Jaimini's aphorism '*Satsaṁprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṁ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalaṁbhanatvāt*' forms the basis of the Mīmāṁsā theory of perception.[2] There are, however, divergent views regarding the interpretation and application of this aphorism. Some commentators such as Śabara hold that the entire aphorism is simply a pointer to establish the fact that *dharma* cannot be known by perception[3] while others such as Bhavadāsa are of the view that the aphorism consists of two parts. The first part, i.e., '*Satsaṁprayoga* .. .. *pratyakṣam*' forms the definition viz.,: "Perception is that cognition, which arises on the contact of a person's sense organs with objects", and the second part, i.e., '*animittam vidyamānopalaṁbhanatvāt*' indicates that such a perception can reveal the present things only and not the *dharma*, as *dharma* belongs to the past and the future also. There are others such as Vṛttikāra (Upavarṣa) who maintain that the sūtra is meant for defining perception, but in order to provide a correct definition

1. पदयुगलमपीदं निर्ममे नानवद्यम्, *N. M.*, p. 93
2. *M. S.*, 1.1.4
3. सतीन्द्रियार्थसम्बन्धे या पुरुषस्य बुद्धिर्जायते तत्प्रत्यक्षम्, *S B.*, 1.1:4

it requires a change in the reading, i.e., '*tat samprayoge puruṣasya indriyāṇām buddhijanma satpratyakṣam*', in which case it will mean that "perception is that which arises from the contact of a person's sense organs with that object alone of which it is the sense-perception." The difference between the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras is reflected in the treatment of this problem also. Jayanta refutes Kumārila's and Vṛttikāra's views frankly and firmly, makes only passing observations against Śabara and ignores Prabhākara altogether.

Kumārila apparently seems to endorse Śabara and disagree with Bhavadāsa on the ground that the sūtra does not contain a definition of perception because the aim of the sūtrakāra is to state that *dharma* is known through the Veda only and *pratyakṣa* has nothing to do with it.[1] If the sūtrakāra's intention were to define perception he would have defined inference as well, whereas he has not. If the other means are said to be left by him because they are well known, the principle would have been equally applicable to perception. Sense-perception of the Yogins also apprehends the accomplished entities, so in this respect yogic perception is similar to ordinary perception. So far as Vṛttikāra's definition of perception is concerned, Kumārila neither supports nor condemns it. Later on, however, he suggests an alternative interpretation according to which the sūtra may be regarded as containing a definition of *pratyakṣa.* Thus he states that '*satsamprayoge*' in the sūtra instead of being taken to mean simply 'on the contact with reality', should be interpreted as 'on the right (*sam*) functioning (*prayoge*) with reference to reality or objects (*sat*)'. Thus, according to Kumārila, "perception is a knowledge which is the result of the right functioning of the sense organs with reference to their objects."[2]

According to the followers of Prabhākara *pratyakṣa* is the direct apprehension (*sākṣāt pratītiḥ*) which involves the cognition of three factors, namely (1) the apprehended object (*meya*), (2) the apprehending subject (*mātṛ*) and (3) the act of apprehension (*māna*).[3] This analysis of perception into three factors has been called *tripuṭi-pratyakṣa-vāda*'. The objects of perception inculde substance, generic character and qualities. As far as the subject (*mātṛ*) is

1. भविष्यंश्चैपोऽर्थो न ज्ञानकालेऽस्ति, *S.B.*, 1.1.4
2. *S. V.* (*Pra.*), pp. 38-9
3. साक्षात्प्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षम्....मेयमातृप्रमासु सा, *P.P.* (1961 Edi.), p. 146

concerned, his direct apprehension, according to Śālikanātha, is proved by the fact that no cognition or remembrance of an object is possible without a subject which is the self. In all cognitions the consciousness 'I know' is present and not 'something else knows'. The element of cognition also apprehends itself directly because it is self-illuminating. The self, the object and the cognition are directly revealed in every cognition; the first two always stand in need of a revealer and the third is self-revealed. In other words the cognition manifests the self and the object but for its own manifestation there is no need of a second cognition. As a second light is not required to manifest a light, so a second congnition is not required to manifest a cognition. *Pratyakṣa*, according to the followers of Prabhākara, differs from other sources of knowledge in the sense that the former is the direct cognition of an object which is independent of its relations with other objects, while inference and other sources of knowledge cognize objects in their relation to other objects

Jayanta introduces the Mīmāṁsā theory of perception with a clear observation that if the followers of Jaimini maintain that the sūtra is simply a pointer in characterising '*dharma*' and that it has no direct bearing upon the definition of perception, it is useless to discuss the aphorism in terms of defining perception. On the other hand, if they hold that it embodies the definition of perception they are simply mistaken since it does not escape the defect of being too wide because it is applicable to the cases of doubt and illusion, as they are also based on the sense-object contact (*satsamprayoga*). Jayanta is aware of the fact that even the commentators of Jaimini's own school differ with one another and draw farfetched meanings on account of the divergent interpretations of the phrase '*sat saṁ prayoge*', primarily on the basis of the analytical splitting of this compound into its components in various ways, such as, (1) *satām saṁprayoge* (2) *sati saṁprayoge* (*sati, sam samyak prayoge*), and (3) '*tat saṁprayoge sat pratyakṣam* (with the interchange of the words '*tat*' and '*sat*' in the original sūtra). Jayanta objects to this manoeuvre on the part of the followers of Jaimini and rejects all the interpretations on the following grounds :

(1) If the phrase is interpreted as 'the contact of the sense organ with the existent real object', only those hallucinations which are not conditioned by the real existent objects will be excluded from the domain of perception, but doubt and illusions

which are conditioned by the real objects will not be excluded.

(2) In order to reject the second alternative interpretation, Jayanta quotes a verse from *Ślokavārtika* wherein Kumārila states that this phrase is to be analysed in a different manner, i.e., the term *'sat'* is a participle, the indeclinable word *'sam'* signifies properness, the compound *'samprayoge'* is qualified by the participle *'sat'*, and the precise sense of the aphorism is that "when the contact of the sense organ with an object takes place properly, true sense-perception issues forth." As doubt and illusion involve incorrect sense-object contact, they are excluded from the province of perception.[1] But Jayanta refutes this argument on the ground that the properness of the sense-object contact is supersensuous ; it is not perceived. If it is held that such 'properness' is inferred by the effect, it is also untenable since effect, i.e., apprehension, is not directly qualified by an adjective such as 'proper'. Again, if it is maintained that the adjective is supplied by the people themselves, Jayanta remarks that the Mīmāṁsakas should not take unnecessary pains since in this manner they may very well hold perception to be an accomplished fact.

(3) As regards the third possible analysis of the phrase, Jayanta refers to Vṛttikāra (Upavarṣa) who probably finds the original reading of the aphorism defective and so makes a reciprocal change of the words *'sat'* and *'tat'* in the sūtra to give a proper definition of perception, i.e., "true perception is that which arises from the contact of the sense-organs of a person with that object alone of which it is the perception." But Jayanta is of the view that this interpretation of the sūtra does not suffice, since this definition is applicable to doubt as well. If the Mīmāṁsakas hold that a doubt refers to two distinct objects but one's sense organ does not come in contact with either of them, Jayanta states that in such a situation even, the objects are alternatively referred to the sense organ and thus the definition applies to 'doubt' as well.

After refuting the views of Bhavadāsa, Upavarṣa and Kumārila, Jayanta takes exception to Śabara's statement also. He points out that if the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that though their aim is not to give a definition of perception, they have referred to it just to show that perception is not a proof for ascertaining *dharma*, they may be asked whether it is normal perception which does not reveal

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1. सम्यगर्थे च संशब्दो दुष्प्रयोगनिवारणः ।
दुष्टत्वाच्छुक्तिकायोगो वार्यतामक्षजेक्षणात्, *N. M.*, 1-93

dharma or the transcendental perception of the yogins which does not reveal it. If they resort to the first alternative it is an uncontested pro position and there is no need of taking so much trouble to prove it. If, however, they refer to the second alternative, they cannot escape the fault of self-contradiction since according to them yogic perception is simply a fiction. Moreover, if they believe in the existence of transcendental perception on the basis of the conclusions of rival schools, then, they should either accept that transcendental perception also is real, or, if they are opposed to it, they should not make it a ground. It is useless to try to draw a picture without a canvas or to discuss whether sky-flower' is fragrant or not. Moreover, who knows that nobody's perception reveals *dharma* ? So, it is futile to propose or support something which is not based on sound evidence. Jayanta enters into a long discussion with the Mīmāṁsakas regarding the veracity of yogic perception and tries to prove that the sages endowed with the super-senses can perceive *dharma* and concludes that Jamini's aphorism does not serve any purpose. It neither provides a definition of perception nor gives a proper characteristic of *dharma*.

Jayanta's task in dealing with the Mīmāṁsā definition of perception does not seem confined simply to its approval or refusal. He tries to present a comprehensive Mīmāṁsā view which may be of unifying nature in spite of all the diversities in various aspects. It is, however, not understandable why he has left Prabhākara altogether unnoticed. It is the weakness of Jayanta that by Mīmāṁsā here he primarily means Kumārila, whom he sometimes quotes verbatim and sometimes with adaptations. Anyhow, he has been perfectly successful in taking them to task mainly by pointing out to their mutually conflicting attitudes in interpreting the basic Mīmāṁsa Sūtra and in indirectly establishing the fact that Gautama's definition of perception is preferable to that of Jaimini.

(d) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE SĀṀKHYA VIEW

Jayanta specifically refers to the Sāṁkhya definition of perception and holds it unsatisfactory in comparison to that offered by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*. The Sāṁkhya system consists of three different traditions in defining perception, viz., (1) the one initiated in the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*, probably by Kapila himself, (2) the one propounded by Vindhyavāsin or Varsagaṇya, and (3) the one proposed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The definition given in the Sāṁkhyasūtra either escaped notice or was knowingly spared due to its obscurity by almost all the eminent logicians. The definition as expounded by

Viṅdhyavāsin, however, has been refuted by the Buddhists (Diṅnāga), the Jainas (Akalaṅka) and the *Naiyāyikas* (Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Jayanta) alike. *But it is rather strange* that the definition of perception as proposed by so old a teacher as Īśvarakṛṣṇa, has been commented on and refuted by Jayanta alone. Of course, Hemacandra, the Jaina logician, comments upon it, but he too does nothing except repeating what Jayanta has already said.

The Sāṁkhyasūtra defines perception as '*yat sambaddham sat tadākārollekhi vijñānam tat pratyakṣam*', i.e., *pratyakṣa* is that discernment which being in conjunction (with the thing perceived) portrays the form thereof.[1] Dr. Jwalaprasad is perhaps right in his observation that "The special feature of this definition seems to be to emphasise two points : (1) that the knowledge called '*pratyakṣa*' is regarded more as an act than as a product, which is the implication, for example, in the Nyāya definition, and (2) that it is the form of the object (tadākāra) which is cognised and not the object itself".[2] As has been stated above, Jayanta also is either not aware of this definition or does not regard it worth commenting upon.

Vindhyavāsin (Rudrila) has been stated to have defined perception as '*śrotrādivṛttiravikalpikā*'. He has probably disagreed with the definition given by the early teachers, i.e., "*Śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*" and revised it by embodying the epithet '*avikalpikā*' in it. Dr Sukhlalji Sangvi maintains that Vācaspati quoted Viṅdhyavāsin's definition under the name of Varṣagaṇya[3], but he has not substantiated the statement with facts. Similarly the identity of Viṅdhyavāsin and Īśvarakṛṣṇa as proposed by Takakusu seems simply a hypothesis.[4] Guṇaratna elaborates Viṅdhyavāsin's definition and states that the sense organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified into the form of the objects.[5]

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1. J. R. Ballantyne, (trans.) *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*, I-89
2. *History of Indian Epistemology*, p. 195
3. *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics*. p. 77 ; *N. V. T. T.*, 1.1.4 ; *N. M.*, 1-93 ; *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 5
4. (a) *Origin & Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, p. 149
   (b) "*A Study of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu*", *J.R.A.S.*, 1905, pp. 33-53
   (c) Gopinatha Kaviraja : *Introduction to Jayamaṅgalā*
5. इन्द्रियाण्येव विषयाकारपरिणतानि प्रत्यक्षमिति हि तेषां सिद्धान्तः, *Ṣaḍdar's anasamuccaya*, p. 101

He also makes it clear that the term '*avikalpikā*' refers to the same characteristic, i.e., to be free from imagination, as has been expounded by the Buddhists through the term '*Kalpanāpoḍha*. Jayanta finds much identity between this definition and that provided by the Buddhists and, therefore, remarks that with the refutation of the Buddhist theory it also stands automatically confuted.[1]

According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa "perception is a determinate knowledge in respect of every individual object."[2] Interpreting it Vācaspati states that perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects affected by the sense-object contact. In his opinion, intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahaṁkāra*), mind (*manas*) and the senses (*indriyas*) constitute the apparatus through which external object is apprehended by the subject. When an object excites the senses the *manas* arranges the sense-impressions into a percept, the ego refers it to the self and the intellect forms the concept. Thus, in the Sāṁkhya theory the modification of *buddhi* through the senses instead of sense-object contact is the precondition of perception. The author of *Yuktidīpikā* also elucidates Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's definition and holds that the term *viṣaya* refers to the objects of cognition (gross matters in respect of ordinary persons and subtle ones in respect of the yogins), the word '*prati*' stands for proximity and the word '*adhyavasāya*' implies the function of the intellect or ascertainment by it. To avoid the exclusion of pleasure, pain, etc., from the range of perception the author of *Yuktidīpikā* resorts to grammatical jugglery stating that it is the instance of *ekaśeṣa* compound, i.e., *prativiṣayādhyavasāyaśca* (b) *prativiṣayādhya-vasāyaśca prativiṣayādhyavasāyaḥ*".[3] The first member, in his opinion, speaks of the sense organs in contact with the object and consequently of the operation of the intellect on it. The second member, according to him, refers to the function of the intellect with respect to all entities. In the former case the term '*prati*' is linked with '*viṣaya*' whereas in the second case it is connected with '*adhyavasāya*'. Jayanta refers to this explanation of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Kārikā* as advanced by Rājā who is probably not other than the

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1. श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरपरं रविकल्पिकेति ।
प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमवर्णि तदप्यपास्तम्, *N. M.*, I-93
2. प्रतिविपयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्, *S. K.*, 5 ; Eng. Trans. by C. Kunhan Raja, p. 51
3. *Yuktidīpika* (Ed.), Prof. R. C. Pandeya ; *Development of the Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, p. 171

author of *Yuktidīpikā*. Jayanta states that this definition is too wide since it is applicable to inference, etc., which also refer to the clear and distinct images of objects.

Moreover, '*ābhimukhya*' (being in front of) is common in both of the judgments. The Sāṁkhyas may hold that whereas perception consists in a general image, in case of inference, etc., images are specified. e.g., by means of marks in case of inference and by means of words in case of testimony. Thus, an image which is other than the specific one is perception. But Jayanta refutes their contention on the ground that if their view is accepted there is no need of defining perception, because in a situation where inference and verbal testimony are defined, one shall be able to identify perception as distinguished from them. To him, therefore, there is no way out other than defining perception with a clear-cut characteristic that it is that form of knowledge which is brought about by sense-object contact.

Jayanta's study of the Sāṁkhya views on the nature of perception seems to be inadequate. He has not presented the Sāṁkhya thought consistently. He altogether ignores the Sāṁkhyasūtrakāra, makes a passing judgment on Vindhyavāsin and does not give even a short summary of the views of Yuktidīpikākāra. It is, however, remarkable that he takes up one untouched aspect of the Sāṁkhya theory of perception propounded by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and has, in this way, definitely filled a gap which is in no way less important in the sphere of logistic scholiums.

2. *The Psychology of Perception*

(a) THE SENSE-ORGANS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

The sense-object contact has been regarded as the cause of perception by the Naiyāyikas. Jayanta strongly supports this view and, like other logicians, also discusses the nature, number and functions of the sense organs in respect of their objects. His account is generally the same as given by other old Naiyāyikas in their works, but he excels his fellow-logicians in refuting the Sāṁkhya view (that *ahaṁkāra* is the material cause of the *indriyas*) and also the Buddhist theory of the *aprāpyakāritva* of the senses.[1] The term '*indriya*' is generally derived from the word 'indra'. In English it is translated

1. न खलु कृष्णसारं चक्षुस्तदधिकरणं तु तेजश्चक्षुस्तच्च वेगवद् द्रव्यत्वाद् दूरमपि प्रसरतीति कोऽस्य प्राप्यकारितायां प्रमादः, *N. M.*, II-49

as 'sense'. As far as the physical constitution of an *indriya* is concerned, the Sāṁkhyas and the Vadāntins hold that its material cause is *ahaṁkāra*.[1] The Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, maintain that the five gross elements (*bhūtas*) are the material causes of the sense organs.[2] The Buddhists are of the view that the senses are born of a particular kind of physical substance, i.e., *rūpa*.[3] The Jainas. on the other hand, think that the senses are the product of a peculiar substance known as *pudgala*. Jayanta follows the conventional Nyāya Vaiśeṣika line. There is also a divergence of views regarding the exact denotation of the term '*indriya*'. The Buddhists maintain that *indriyas* are the *golakas* whereas according to the Mīmāṁsakas *indriya* is a peculiar capacity (*śakti*) of the organ.[4] Other logicians, however, largely maintain that an *indriya* is neither the organ, nor its capacity ; it is rather composed of the same substance which is its object.

Jayanta enumerates five external sense-organs, namely, (1) the olfactory (*ghrāṇa*), (2) the gustatory (*rasana*), (3) the visual (*nayana*), (4) the tactual (*sparśana*), and (5) the auditory (*śrotra*). He refers to one internal sense organ, i.e., the mind (*manas*). He argues against the Sāṁkhya theory of ten, twelve or thirteen sense organs and supports the Nyāya tenet. He does not accept the so-called *karmendriyas* as sense organs. He is, however, silent about the Buddhist Abhidharma view of twenty-two sense organs,[5] but is aware of the fact that according to some philosophers there is only one sense organ, i.e., of touch and that all others are mere modification of it, since it pervades all of them.[6] He refutes this idea and supports Gautama's and Vātsyāyana's standpoints. Let us examine what he means by the senses and how he refutes the Sāṁkhyas and also those who believe in a single sense organ.

The olfactory sense (*ghrāṇa*) is that which apprehends smell.

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1. सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात्, *S. K.*, 25
2. घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः *N. S.*, 1.1.12
3. *N. M.*, II-49
4. Ibid., II-53
5. अभिधर्मकोश Vasubandhu, p. 491 (विसुद्धिमग्ग, Kashi V. Edi)
6. न चामत्या त्वचि किञ्चिद् विषयग्रहणं भवति, यथा सर्वेन्द्रियस्थानानि व्याप्तानि, यस्यां च सत्या विषयग्रहणं भवति सा त्वगेकमिन्द्रियमिति, *V. B.*, 3.1.55 ; *N. M.*, II-53

According to the law of 'like apprehending the like' it has the quality of smell on account of which it grasps the smell in other objects. It has been depicted as constituted by the earth to which smell is basically related as an attribute. It is regarded by the Naiyāyikas as located in the tip of the nose. The gustatory sense (*rasanā*) is that which brings about the apprehension of taste. It is constituted by the water and is located at the tip of the tongue. The visual sense (*cakṣu*) is that which brings about the apprehension of colour. It is constituted by a luminous substance called *rajas* and is located in the pupil of the eye. The tactual sense (*tvak*) is that which brings about the apprehension of touch. It is constituted by air. It manifests the quality of touch and it is located in the whole skin of the body. The auditory sense (*śrotra*) is the source of the apprehension of sound. It is located in the ear-hole which is a portion of the physical element *ākāśa*. As the quality of sound belongs originally to *ākaśa*, it is identical to ākāśa, of course, in the form of its limited portion. The Vedāntins are of the view that sound is not exclusively a property of ākāśa because it is perceived in the air and other elements also. The Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, hold that auditory sense is a portion of space.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa enumerates thirteen organs in all.[1] First, he divides them in two groups, viz., (a) Internal, *manas*, *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi* and (b) External, visual etc.[2] The followers of Varṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin also support this view. From the evidence of *Yuktidīpikā*, however, it appears that some of the Sāṁkhyas accept only ten organs. Patañjali includes *ahaṁkāra* within *buddhi*. Thus, in their opinion, there are twelve sense organs. Jayanta's rejection of the so-called *karmendriyas* as sense organs is substantiated by his argument that in such an eventuality all the limbs of the body may have to be counted as sense organs.[3] He maintains that the motor-organs also are *indriyas*. These are named as *vāk* (speech), *pāṇi* (hand), *pāda* (leg) *pāyu* (rectum) and *upastha* (sex-organ). The function of these five organs are speaking, handling, walking, excretion and sexual intercourse, respectively. Every organ has got its special function which according to the Sāṁkhyas cannot be performed by others.

Jayanta criticizes this view on the grounds that there is no justification for motor organs to be held as *indriyas*, since the function

1. करणं च त्रयोदशविधम्, *S. K.*, p. 32 (Chow. Edi.)
2. *S. K.*, 33, 34
3. शक्तिभेदादाश्रयभेदाच्च नानात्वमेवैतदिन्द्रियाणाम्, *N. M.*, II-53

of some of these organs can be performed to certain extent by other parts of the body also. For instance, a man whose feet have been amputated can, to some extent, move by crawling. Birds collect food by their mouth. If these parts of the body are held as *indriyas* for performing one action or the other, then throat, breast, shoulder, etc., should also be enlisted as the motor organs, for these organs are also found to perform the special act of swallowing, embracing, etc.

Jayanta also points out that the function of a sense organ cannot be performed by another one as, for instance, a blind man cannot see with the help of other sense organs, whereas the lame can do with artificial limbs. The Jainas also maintain that the organs of action are to be included in tactual organs.

Jayanta also refutes the Sāṁkhya view of tripartite division of *antaḥkaraṇa* (*manas*, *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi* or *citta*) on the ground that *ahaṅkāra* and *citta* cannot be regarded as *karaṇa* and, therefore, they are not *indriyas*. Thus, Jayanta concludes that the five external and the one internal organs, which grasp the external objects and pleasure, etc , respectively, are the only *indriyas*.[1]

(b) THE NATURE, FORM AND FUNCTION OF MANAS

Though there are some common features between what the Indian thinkers call '*manas*' and the Western philosophers call 'mind', there is a lot of difference between the two. In Indian philosophy the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Sāṁkhyas maintain that *manas* is an internal organ which is the instrument of directly knowing pleasure, pain and so on. In this way *manas* is unconscious like other senses. The only difference between it and other senses is that it is more subtle than the others. So far as consciousness is concerned, it has been regarded by these systems as a prerogative of the self alone. The Western philosophers, on the other hand, are of the view that mind is conscious. Thus, it is only in an ordinary sense that *manas* is referred to through the term 'mind'.

Jayanta refers to *manas* as a sense organ. Except the Buddhists and the Advaita Vedāntins all other systems hold '*manas*' as an internal sense organ (*indriya*). An *indriya* is that which is regarded

1. न्यूनाधिकत्वशमनादत्त इन्द्रियाणि पञ्चैव बाह्यविषयाधिगमक्षमाणि । अन्तःसुखादिविषयग्रहणोपयोगि षष्ठं मनस्तु कथयिष्यति सूत्रकारः, *N. M.*, II-55

as an instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of perception. According to the Naiyāyikas, it is the instrument employed by the abiding self in the internal perception of pain, pleasure and so on. Jayanta forcefully supports this view. The Buddhists do not admit the existence of an abiding self. In their opinion, the *vijñāna-santāna* (stream of consciousness) is the highest reality of consciousness and when there is no *ātman*, there is no necessity of an instrument. The Vedāntins accept the existence of the knower, i.e., the self but some of them do not regard *manas* as an *indriya*. There are divergent views regarding *manas* in the Upaniṣads. It is referred to as higher than or different from the sense organs. Sāṁkara simply points out that according to the *Smṛtis*, *manas* is *indriya* and according to the *Śrutis* it is not.[1] Vācaspati and the authors of *Ratnaprabhā* and *Pañcadaśī* are of the view that *manas* is separately mentioned in the *Śrutis* for the sake of emphasis.[2] Dharmarājādhvarīndra and the author of *Vivaraṇa* forcefully reject Vācaspati's contentions and assert that *manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa* is not an *indriya*, since it is not necessary that an internal perception must correspond to an external perception in all respects. They maintain that so called internal perception is not a perception since it is derivable only through the senses and also due to their belief that there is nothing which can serve as the medium of contact of *manas* with its object in such an internal perception. The Vedāntins further maintain that perception is immediate knowledge and not necessarily derived through the senses. So far as the medium of revelation is concerned, pain and pleasure are directly revealed to the self without the help of any further medium. Further, knowledge, according to the Vedāntins, is not a product ; it is rather identical to consciousness.

Manas to Kumārila, is a sense organ. Sucaritamiśra states that *manas* is the organ of sense and also of attention. It does not dissociate from soul. Cidānanda holds that *manas* is infinite like soul. The Sāṁkhyas consider *Manas* to be an unconscious product of subtle matter (*ahaṁkāra*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds that it is a sense organ of double nature, viz., of knowledge and of action. He asserts that though it is one, it appears to be many on account of the modification (*guṇa-pariṇāma*) of the constituents and also due to the difference of the external objects.[3] He further states that amongst

1. *B. S.*, 2.4.17
2. *Bhāmatī*, *Pañcadaśī*, 2.12.18 ; *Ratnaprabhā*, 2.3.32
3. उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्, *S. K.*, 27

the thirteen sense organs, whereas three internal organs control the channels, others are simply channels.

As the function of *manas* is not exhausted in internal perception alone, it, as a whole, is not *indriya.* Partly it is and partly it is not. Thus, the Navya Naiyāyikas seem nearer to the truth when they say that *manas* is not an *indriya* in case of external perception, because it does not act as *karaṇa.* The difficulty, however, arises in cases of inference, memory, imagination, etc., where it may be regarded as *karaṇa.* To avoid this they maintain that in these cases *manas* is *karaṇa* but not an *indriya.*[1] Gangeśa tries to remove this difficulty by deleting the characteristic 'sense-object contact' from his revised definition of perception. But Jayanta justifies the distinct position of *manas* over and above the *indriyas* on the grounds that other sense organs are physical, are related to particular objects and share the qualities with the perceived objects, but *manas* is non-physical since it is not a product. It is not related to any particular object because all other senses grasp their objects if they are connected with *manas*, whereas it grasps pleasure, etc., without any recourse to external sense organs. Moreover, it does not share qualities with any particular object. According to Jayanta *manas* as an *indriya* is characterized by the following facts: It is not omnipresent or all-pervasive since even in general parlance people are heard saying as "I could not hear this since my *manas* was connected elsewhere." It has a form since a formless entity is not capable of performing action. Still, it is permanent since it is not necessary that only a formless thing is permanent and since it does not depend upon anyone else, and has no limbs. It is limbless since there is no proof of the existence of its limbs. It is swift, otherwise it could not grasp things at distance within no time. It is a substance since it unites with other senses which are also substances. It is unconscious because it is an instrument. Moreover, in one organism only one conscious entity is possible and that entity is 'self'. So *manas* also cannot be regarded as consci. us.[2]

According to the Naiyāyikas *manas* is infinitesimal since we cannot know more than one thing at a time. Had *manas* parts, we could have perceived different things through its different parts. The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that *manas* is atomic, eternal and causeless ;

1. स्मृत्यनुमित्यादौ च मनसो न इन्द्रियत्वेन हेतुत्वम्,
2. अचेतनं च तत् करणत्वादितरेषां ह्येकत्र शरीरे चेतनद्वयसमावेशादव्यवहारः स्यादिति तस्मादेवं रूपं मनः, *N. M.*, 11-43

whereas, according to the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta, it is quite small (*aṇu*) but not atomic (*paramāṇu*) and is produced either out of *ahaṁkāra* according to the Sāṁkhyas or out of nescience (*avidyā*) according to the Vedāntins. With the Buddhists and the Jainas it is medium sized (*madhyamapariṇāma*). The Sāṁkhya view is based on their contention that as *manas* is ultimately derived from *prakṛti*, it belongs to the world of unconscious objects. It differs from the self since the character of the self is consciousness. The Vedānta, the Buddhist and the Jaina view of *manas* is that it is that function of *antaḥkaraṇa* which is concerned with the state of doubt. It is not an independent reality ; it rather represents one of the function of *antaḥkaraṇa*.[1] It is not an *indriya* or sense organ. It is not invisible (as the Naiyāyikas maintain) ; it rather has a medium dimension. The authors of *Pañcadaśī* and *Vedāntasāra*, however, refer to only two functions of *antahkaraṇa*, viz., *manas* and *buddhi*, but whereas the former includes *citta* in *manas* and *ahamkāra* in *buddhi*, the latter includes *ahamkāra* in *manas* and *citta* in *buddhi*. *Manas*, according to them, is not an atomic substance but an inert (*jaḍa*) principle of limited dimension (*paricchinna*). The Advaita Vedāntins maintain that the self (*ātman*) is the only reality and all others including *antaḥkaraṇa* are the creation of nescience. The *manas* depends upon the self for its existence. Although it is inert (*jaḍa*) in itself, it manifests pure intelligence and it is, therefore, only in a secondary sense that it is held as intelligent. Jayanta naturally supports the Nyāya view of the atomicity of *manas*. Like other logicians he also seems to have reached this conclusion on the ground that if *manas* were infinite in size it would naturally be in contact with all the sense organs simultaneously. It cannot be infinite because there can be no conjunction between two substances unless there is movement in one or both of them, and movement is impossible in the case of infinite substances. It cannot be of medium size because a thing of medium size is always an effect of some material cause while *manas* cannot be an effect, for, otherwise, it would not survive death.

(c) THE SELF AND ITS ROLE IN PERCEPTION

Like Vātsyāyana, Jayanta categorically states that in the process of the acquisition of perceptual cognition the self unites with *manas*, the *manas* with the sense organs and the sense organs with objects.

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1. एवं वृत्तिभेदेनैकमन्तःकरणं मन इति बुद्धिरिति चित्तमिति व्याख्यायते, *V. P.* (*Pratyakṣa*), p. 63

According to him sense-object contact is not the only cause of perception, there are others as well, namely, self-mind contact and mind-sense contact. Whereas self-mind contact is common to perception, inference, etc., mind-sense-object-contact is peculiar to perception. Apprehension of pleasure or pain by the self through the instrumentality of *manas* is the proof of its positive role in the field of direct cognition. Jayanta is of the view that in the perception of external objects, a fourfold contact results in a perceptual cognition and the self is present in all of them. In the context of perception the self (*ātman*) refers to the individual soul (*jīvātman*). There are divergent views regarding the 'self' in different systems which are categorised in the following ways :

Dehātmavāda. The Cārvākas maintain that self is nothing but body.[1] Consciousness is an attribute of the body itself. Gautama rejects this view on the ground that like a jar the body is devoid of consciousness. Moreover, consciousness cannot be regarded as the quality of the body. Had it been conscious, the consciousness would have been found in such parts of body as hair and nails, whereas the fact is that in these parts we do not feel any consciousness. Further, knowledge is not a natural quality of the body, it is merely adventitious. Jayanta is aware of the Cārvāka views and rejects them on the same grounds on which Gautama discards them.[2]

Indriyātmavāda. Some of the thinkers maintain that self is nothing but the senses, since apprehensions snch as 'I see' or 'I hear' refer to the senses and thus there is no need to presume an additional entity such as the self. Gautama refutes this view on the ground that we can apprehened an object through both sight and touch and that what is seen by the left eye is cognised by the right. So something common must be there and that is the soul. The eyes are not one but two, since the destruction of one does not cause the destruction of the other. Sometimes, there is an excitement of one sense through the operation of another which would have been impossible unless there exists a soul distinct from the senses.[3]

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1. तच्चैतन्यविशिष्ट देह आत्मा, देहातिरिक्ते आत्मनि प्रमाणाभावात्, *S. D. S.* (Hindi Edi.), p. 4
2. *N. M.*, II-4
3. *N. S*, 3.1.7

Manasātmavāda. According to some philosophers there is no difference between soul and mind because the arguments which are adduced to establish the distinction of the soul from the senses are equally applicable to *manas*. Gautama opposes this view on the ground that in as much as the instrument of cognition can belong only to the cogniser, it is merely a difference in names. Vātsyāyana states that the sense by which the act of thinking is performed is *manas*. If *manas* is regarded as agent something should be presumed as instrument and in that case the difference will be only of words. If it is regarded as instrument the cogniser must be different from it.

Budhyātmavāda. Some thinkers maintain that there is no need of holding a knower over and above the intellect or knowledge. The intellect illumines the object and cognizes it. Thus there is no difference between intellect (*buddhi*) and self (*ātman*). The Naiyāyikas refute this view stating that the intellect or knowledge is a quality which requires a substance as its substratum. The self is thus the substratum of the intellect and therefore both are distinct and different entities.

Indriyādhiṣṭhānavāda. Jayanta follows and expounds the Nyāya view forcefully. According to the Nyāya knowledge belongs to self. The mind and the senses are only the instruments of acquiring knowledge. The self is characterised by desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. It has been already stated how the Naiyāyikas maintain that the self is different from the senses, the body and the mind. The main feature of its distinctiveness is that it acts as a regular and permanent unifying force in the domain of knowledge which neither the senses nor the body could do. Moreover, the body by itself is unconscious and unintelligent and the senses do not explain imagination, memory, ideation, etc. The Nyāya holds it to be a unique substance which is different in different bodies. It is ubiquitous because it is not limited in its activities by time and space. As has been stated before, the body and senses function when they are connected with the self. This is why the Nyāya view is also called as *indriyādhiṣṭhānavāds*.

According to Advaita Vedānta self is eternal and self-shining intelligence.[1] But Jayanta holds that intelligence cannot subsist without a locus. Hence self is not intelligence as such ; it is rather

1. *V. P.* (pratyakṣa)

a substantial principle having intelligence as its attribute. It is not a mere knowledge but a knower. Like other Naiyāyikas Jayanta maintains that the self, in itself, is neither material nor mental. It is rather a neutral substance which has the attribute of intelligence in its relation to the body.[1]

3. *The Objects of Perception*

Jayanta maintains that the objects which are grasped through perception are odour, flavour, colour, touch and sound, their respective substance, e.g., earth, qualities such as number belonging to these substances, movements such as lifting up and the universals inhering in them and their negation. Jayanta refers to the Vaiśeṣika views that sensed objects are those which are grasped by the organs of sight and touch.[2]

(a) PERCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL

The problem of the universal has been tackled divergently by the different systems of Indian philosophy. There are three main views of the universal, viz., (1) the Realistic View expounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, (2) the Nominalistic View propagated by the Buddhists, and (3) the Conceptualistic View propounded by the Vedāntins. Jayanta spiritedly supports the Nyāya view and refutes the Buddhist position vehemently. We shall deal with this problem in detail when we discuss the *apohavāda*. In the present context we confine ourselves to the question how far 'universal' is to be regarded as a fit case of perceptual cognition. It is to be noted that the Nyāya theory of determinate perception depends upon the objective reality of the universal. How much the validity of determinate perception matters to the Naiyāyikas may be gathered from Jayanta's remark : "The very life of the followers of Nyāya consists in the theory of determinate perception."[3] Moreover, how intensively the validity of determinate perception depends upon the principle of the universal may be judged from Srīdhara's observation against the Buddhists charges of ideation in determinate perception : "If we succeed in establishing the universal (as an objective reality), then the knowledge which has the universal as its object will have to be regarded as true perception despite the admixture of word-element in it."[4]

1. *N. M.*, II-41
2. *Ibid*
3. *Ibid.*, I-58
4. *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 310

Sāmānya (universal), according to the Naiyāyikas, is a reality. It has its locus in *viśeṣa* (particular) by virtue of the relation of *samavāya* (inherence). It is an eternal and timeless reality. It bears to many particulars a relation of inherence. It is one, but subsists in many. As has been already stated, the theory of universal is intrinsically associated with the theory of determinate perception. According to the Naiyāyikas the universals which inhere in perceptible objects are perceived by the senses which perceive their substratum. The senses of sight and touch perceive the universals of substances. When we perceive a jar we perceive the universal 'jarness' inhering in it. This perception is brought about by *saṁyukta samavāya*. The universal pertaining to attributes and actions are perceived through *saṁyuktasamavetasamavāya*. Jayanta states that universals are directly perceived.[1] As regards the perception of such universal as the caste of an individual, he remarks that it is cognized by perception aided by somebody's declaration. He further points out : "It cannot be said that there is no perception of universal *Brāhmaṇatva* simply because it requires an announcement (by some one). Even in the case of the cognition of *gotva* instruction is necessary at the time when relation of cow with the universal cowness *(gotva)* is grasped for the first time." Jayanta as D. N. Shastri also aptly points out, overlooks the fact that there is a difference between these two cases since in the former case instruction is required with reference to every individual while in the latter case it is necessary to only once. Jayanta, however, defends the caste-universal on the ground that a *Brāhmin* is recognised through his gentle appearance.[2] But it seems his afterthought is not convincing enough.

The Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the Prābhākaras hold that *samavāya* relation subsists between the universal and its particular whereas the Bhāṭṭas and the Vedāntins are of the view that the relation is that of identity *(tādātmya)*. According to Prabhākara *samavāya* relation is neither one nor eternal. Vaiśesikas, on the other hand, maintain that it is one and eternal but not perceptible. But Jayanta, like other Naiyāyikas, is of the view that *samavāya* relation is one, eternal and perceptible.

The Buddhists are opposed to the Nyāya view of the universal. According to them the individual alone is real and there is

1. *N. M.*, I-204 ; *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 334
2. अपि चोपदेशनिरपेक्षमपि चक्षुः क्षत्रियादिविलक्षणां सौम्याकृतिं ब्राह्मण-जातिमवगच्छति इत्येके, *N. M.*, I-204

no existence of the universal (classness) over and above the particulars. They maintain that it is simply the name of certain objects which is commonly applicable to them and which differentiates them from other objects because other objects are referred to by other names. So the idea of sameness with regard to a number of individuals solely depends upon the fact that they are referred to by the same name. This is called the nominalistic view of class-essence. The Buddhists hold that all individual cows are spoken of as cow since they are not non-cow and, therefore, there is no existence of the universal. The Nyāya objects to this view on the ground that our comprehending notion is in a positive form and not in a negative form.[1] Dr. D. N. Shastri elaborately discusses the problem of *sāmānya* and states that the view that 'the universals are omnipresent and all universals reside in all particulars' is subscribed to only by Jayanta.[2] Kumārila maintains that the universal and the particular are different as well as non-different. The relation between the two is that of identity and not of inherence. Jayanta refers to this view of Kumārila and remarks that the "venerable Kumārila seems to have formulated this theory out of fear of the difficulties involved in the various alternatives regarding the subsistence of the universal.[3] Prabhākara's thesis of the universal conforms to the Nyāya view. They maintain that the universal is different from the particular in which it subsists and that universals are directly perceived. Advaita Vedānta is of the view that universals are identical with the substance in which they are experienced to reside and they have no independent entity apart from the particulars.[4] The perception of universals, according to the Advaita Vedānta, takes place with the perception of the particular through the medium of (a) *saṁyuktatādātmya* in case of the universals of substance, *saṃyuktābhinnatādātmya* in case of the universals of qualities and actions and *tādātmyavadabhinna* in case of the universals of sound. The Vedānta maintains that the universal, as constituted by the common attributes of the individuals, is perceived along with the perception of the individuals.

1. विधिमुखेनैवेकाराकारस्फुरणात्, *T. B.*, p. 32
2. *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 337
   (a) ये चेह वृत्ती सकृत्सूत्रभूतकण्ठगुणादिषु,
   जात्यादीनामनवद्यत्वात्ताभ्यां वृत्तिविलक्षणा, *N. M.*, I-285
3. एतत्तु वृत्तिविकल्पादिभ्यो बिभ्यतैवाभ्युपगत भवता, *Ibid.*, I-284
4. *B. S.* (*Bhāṣya*), 2.2.17

Dr. S. C. Chatterjee rightly points out that these three forms correspond respectively to the second, third and fifth forms of sense-contact by the Naiyāyikas. But where the Naiyāyikas speak of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) the Vedāntin puts in the relation of identity since inherence is not admitted by him as a distinct category.[1]

(b) PERCEPTION OF ABHĀVA

Jayanta clearly mentions that *abhāva* (negation) also is an object of perception since it is objectively real. According to the Naiyāyikas there are two main types of reality, namely, *bhāva* (being) and (2) *abhāva* (non-being). The first stands for positive realities, viz., substance, quality, action, the universal, particularity and inherence and the second for a negative reality generally referred to as *abhāva* or non-existence or negation. Non-existence, however, is taken differently by different systems. With the Sāṁkhyas and the Prābhākaras it means the mere existence of a locus. For instance, the non-existence of a jar on the ground means the existence of the ground alone. But according to Nyāya, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta, non-existence is an entity which is distinct from its locus. It is adjectival to some positive facts Dr. S. C Chatterjee observes: "All objects have two characters, a positive and a negative. A thing exists positively in itself and is characterised negatively by the absence of another thing in it."[2]

We shall deal with the problem of the viability of negation or *anupalabdhi* as a way of knowing separately in the eighth chapter. Here we are simply concerned as to how it is known to us. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas hold that it is comprehended by inference. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins maintain that non-existence is known through *anupalabdhi*. But according to the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya it is grasped by perception. Jayanta follows this line. He refutes the Buddhists, the Prābhākaras, and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. But his main target on the question of perceptibility of negation are the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. The Nyāya theory of the perception of negation (*abhāva*) bears sharp contrast to that of Kumārila which accepts the objective reality of *abhāva* but rules out its comprehension by perception and instead holds non-comprehension (*anupalabdhi*) as a special way of knowing it. Kumārila is of the view that *abhāva* is negative in nature, so it

1. *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*
2. Ibid., p. 176

can only be apprehended by a negative means of knowledge.[1] Jayanta objects to this view and remarks that it is not necessary that an object and the means of its knowledge should be similar in nature. The main argument that Jayanta extends to prove the perceptibility of negation is that when we open our eyes we perceive the ground as well as the non-existence of the jar but when we close them we do not see any of the two. So there is no justification whatsoever to maintain that the cognition of the ground is sense perception and the cognition of the non-existence, for instance of a jar on the ground, is other than sense-perception.[2] Jayanta, like other Naiyāyikas, is of the view that the form of the contact subsisting between sense and non-existence is *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva.* He is aware of the objections the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas raise against the perceptibility of non-existence. He refutes them in the following manner :

The Bhāṭṭas opine that the non-existence of a jar is not a sense object, since it is devoid of *rūpa* (colour) and it has no contact with the sense. Moreover, *Viśeṣaṇabhāva* is not at all a form of contact because contact requires one of the two kinds of relations, viz., *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* or one of their combination, viz., *samyuktasamavāya.* But here non-existence is non-substance. So it cannot have any contact with the ground. As non-existence is different from qualities it does not have the relation of inherence with the ground.

Jayanta objects to this contention stating that it is not necessary that a perceptible object must have colour. Although atoms have colour they are not perceptible by the eye. As regards the viability of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* as a form of contact, Jayanta states that the principle of sense reaching an object for the sake of its cognition i applicable only to positive objects. As the non-existence is *avastu* (negative), the eye can produce its cognition without having a contact with it.[3] Keśavamiśra supports Jayanta but he replaces the term '*vastu*' by '*bhāva*'.[4] Jayanta also criticises

1. *S. V.* (*Abhāva*), pp. 11, 27
2. भूप्रदेशं घटाभावं च विस्फारिते चक्षुषि निरीक्षामहे निमीलिते तु तस्मिंस्तयोरन्यतरमपि न पश्यामः, तत्र समाने च तद्भावभावित्वे भूप्रदेशज्ञानं चाक्षुषम् भावज्ञानं तु न चाक्षुषम्, *N. M.*, I-46-7
3. प्राप्यकारित्वमपि इन्द्रियाणां वस्त्वभिप्रायमेवोच्यते, *Ibid.*, I-49
4. भावावच्छिन्नत्वाद् व्याप्ते सर्वं प्रकाशयदिन्द्रियं प्राप्तमेव प्रकाशयति, न त्वभावमपि अभावं प्रकाशयदिन्द्रियं विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुखेनैव, *T. B.*, p. 18

the Mīmāṁsā view that the awareness of negation is indirect. He points out that when, for instance, the village of Gauramūlaka with all its positive contents is perceived, the negation of absent Garga is also directly cognised. Jayanta's view on the whole is that the non-existence is perceived as a positive entity.

(c) PERCEPTION OF COGNITION

There is sharp difference of opinion among philosophers regarding the way of the cognition of cognition. The Jainas, the Idealist Buddhists, the Sāṁkhyas, the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins maintain, of course with minor disagreement with one another, that cognition is known by itself. Cognition is consciousness which is aware of itself by its very nature. The Prābhākaras have propounded the theory of *tripuṭīsaṁvit* and thus maintain that knowledge manifests knowledge, the object of knowledge and the knower. The Advaita Vedāntins arrive at this conclusion holding that cognition is self-manifest and self-shining. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas are of the view that knowledge is neither self-manifest nor directly perceived. It is inferred from the character Jñātatā (knownness). According to the Bhāṭṭas we cannot cognise cognition immediately by itself or even by internal (*mānasa*) perception. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, assert that knowledge is known by internal perception. Jayanta naturally supports this view.

The Buddhist Idealists and the Advaita Vedāntins agree on the point that cognition is not perceptible, but whereas the Buddhists think that cognition manifests itself the Advaita Vedāntins' view is that cognition is self-luminous in the sense that it is not manifested by any other cognition. According to the Buddhists the concepts of self-luminocity is positive whereas according to the Vedāntins it is negative. The Bhāṭtas maintain that cognition is inferred from cognizedness or *prākaṭya* (manifestness) produced by the cognition in the object.[1] For example, when we know a pot we have an apprehension that the pot is cognized by us and from this cognizedness of the object we infer the existence of the cognition. Pārthasārathī states that as the act of cooking produces cookedness in the object cooked, so the *jñānakriyā* (act of cognition) produces cognizedness in its object and from this cognizedness (as an effect) we infer the existence of its cause, i.e., cognition. Keśavamiśra criticizes the Bhātta view and states that cognizedness

1. *S. D.*, p. 200

is nothing but the character of being the object of cognition. When we apprehend a jar we do not apprehend its cognizedness but we simply apprehend that the jar is the object of cognition. There is no cognizedness apart from its objectivity. Śrīdhara is of the view that Kumārila commits the fallacy of *hysteron proteron* when he argues that a cognition is inferred from cognizedness in its object.

Prabhākara, on the other hand, holds that every cognition perceives itself, the cognizing self and the cognized object. As light reveals the related object and does not require another light to reveal it, similarly cognition manifests other objects and is also self-manifesting. Light reveals its own substratum, e.g., earthen cup. Likewise the cognition reveals the self which is its substratum. Every act of cognition, thus, involves object-consciousness, subject-consciousness and self-conscious awareness.

Prabhākara's doctrine has been criticized on the ground that every cognition does not reveal the self and itself. In the visual perception of a jar the self and the cognition are not apprehended. Had they been apprehended along with the jar they would become objects of visual perception which is not possible.

Jayanta holds that cognition is not self-luminous since a logical determination of self-luminosity is impossible. It is, on the other hand, perceptible because it is a temporary specific quality of the soul, like pleasure.

4. *The Forms af Sense-Object Contact*

In the beginning of this chapter we have seen what Jayanta and other logicians mean by sense-object contact. Let us now examine Jayanta's views about the types of such contact. Like Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra Jayanta refers to six varieties of sense-object contact. Of them (1) *saṁyoga*, (2) *samavāya* and (3) *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇabhāva* are the primary contacts and the remaining three (1) *saṁyukta-samavāya* (2) *saṁyukta-samaveta samavāya* and (3) *samaveta-samavāya* are the combination of *saṁyoga* and *samavāya*.

Jayanta, like other old Naiyāyikas holds that these six kinds of contact between objects and sense organs are responsible for the perception of six kinds of objects, respectively, viz., (1) of substance (pot) by contact, (2) of quality (blue) by inherence in the conjoined, (3) of quality-universal (blueness) by inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined, (4) of sound by inherence, (5) of soundness by inherence in the inhering and (6) of non-existence and

inherence by the adjectivality to the conjoined.[1] The Neo-Naiyāyikas enumerated three other forms of extraordinary contact, namely, (1) *sāmānyalakaṣaṇa* (2) *jñānalakṣaṇa* and (3) *yogaja*, and thus draw a list of as much as nine forms of sense-object contact.[2] Let us have a brief survey of these forms.

Saṁyoga (Conjunction). It is the first of the six kinds of sense-object contact disseminated by the old Naiyāyikas. It occurs between two separable substances. In the context of perceptual knowledge it is to be seen that the senses themselves are substances and they can come into immediate contact with substances alone. Thus, when a substance, e.g., a pot, is conjoined with a sense-organ, e g., the eye, the perception of the pot by the eye is said to be caused by conjunction of the two.

Saṁyukta-samavāya. The sense, e.g., eye, being a substance, can come into direct contact only with another substance, e.g , pot. Even then, if it (eye) grasps something other than a substance, e.g., a colour which is a quality, it does so indirectly, i.e., through the medium of a third term, i.e., pot, since the pot is related to eye through conjunction and to colour through inherence. In other words the grasping of colour e.g , blue of the sky, by the eye involves the relation of conjunction between eye and sky and of inherence between sky and the colour blue. The Naiyāyikas hold it as a case of sense-perception caused by a complex contact known as *saṁyukta-samavāya* or inherence in the conjoined.

Saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya. When the sense-object contact is mediated by two intermediary terms it becomes more indirect than we find it in the preceding case. For instance, if we perceive the blueness of a pot, the universal, e.g.. colourness, inheres in the pot (substance) which is conjoined with the eye. Tnus, perception of blueness by the eye involves two successive inherences and one conjunction. So it is called *saṁyukta-samaveta samavāya* or inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined.

Samavāya. If a sense is in contact with its object which inheres as a quality in the sense itself the contact is called *samavāya*. This is illustrated in the auditory perception of

1. *N.M.*, I-68-69 ; *T. B.*, p. 6; *B. P.*, pp. 59-62
2. अलौकिकस्तु व्यापारस्त्रिविधः परिकीर्तितः ।
सामान्यलक्षणो ज्ञानलक्षणो योगजस्तथा, *B. P.*, 63

'*utpanna*' embodied in the sūtra gives support to the fact that the perception is the result of the contact of sense-organs with their objects.[1] The object in perception is causally connected with the act of perception through the medium of its contact with the sense of the perceiver. The perception of pleasure, etc., is brought about by the contact of the inner sense organ with them. It is to be seen that Jayanta perhaps deals with this problem to refute the Buddists who maintain that the senses function without direct contact with the objects of perception According to them the senses are distant perceptors (*aprāpyakārī*) and do not require direct contact with their objects. Jayanta does not agree with the Buddhists. The Nyāya, the Sāṁkhya, the Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta maintain that the sense can perceive only those objects which are in contact with them.

6. *The Modes of Perception*

Jayanta refers to *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* modes of perception. As he himself deals with the Buddhist, the Mīmāṁsā and the Sāṁkhya views of perception, it is not out of context to evaluate his thesis in the light not only of the exposition given by the old Nyāya but in the wide perspective of the thinking of other systems also. Broadly speaking, there are three divergent views regarding the modes of perception, viz., (a) The Buddhist View, according to which *nirvikalpaka* is the only mode of perception and there is no such thing as *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*; (b) The Grammarians' View, which is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist position and refers to *savikalpaka* as the only possible form of perception and rejects *nirvikalpaka* altogether. The Cārvākas and the Mādhva and the Vallabha sects of the Vedānta also fall in this category; and (c) The Majority View, according to which both *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* are the valid modes of perception. Jayanta, being a staunch Naiyāyika, naturally belongs to the third category. What is remarkable is that the philosophers coming under the third group do not hold both types of ordinary perception equally significant. They also differ in determining the subtle features of these forms. This difference in their approach generally centres round the analysis of indeterminate perception. Jayanta does not analyse the

1. नन्वेवं सत्यर्थाक्षिप्तः कारकत्वादेव सन्निकर्ष इति स्वकण्ठेन कस्मादुच्यते, षड्विधत्वज्ञापनार्थमित्युक्तम्, उत्पन्नग्रहणेन इन्द्रियार्थयोर्ज्ञानजनकत्वम् अर्थस्तु कर्मत्वेन, N.M., I-69

problem as a distinct topic. We simply gather his views from his discussions regarding the nature of *pratyakṣa* from the point of view of the Naiyāyikas and also from his criticism of the Buddhist, the Mīmāṁsaka, and the Sāṁkhya views. Let us examine what basic approaches behind these views are and how far Jayanta has been able to synthesise and evaluate their respective merits.

The Buddhist View. The Buddhists maintain that *nirvikalpaka* is the only type of perception, which, according to them, is but a pure cognition of objects undefined by any element of ideation, i.e., it is free from any definition of name, class, verbal expression, etc. For the Buddhists, perception is pure sensation. The object of perception, as we immediately perceive it, is somewhat a unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), which has no reference to any class. The names, etc., on the other hand, are the construction built up by our mind out of the given experience. The *savikalpaka* perception, thus, is not acceptable to the Buddhists. They maintain that a knowledge attributed with name, relations, etc., is false, as it is the outcome of our mental construction. The Vedāntins closely share their views with the Buddhists on this particular aspect. It is, however, obvious that if we compare the Buddhists' and the Vedāntins' notions of *nirvikalpaka* the Vedānta theory of 'pure being' is more subtle than the Buddhist principle of unique particular. The Naiyāyikas are opposed to this view They hold that *nirvikalpaka* is not merely a cognition of the bare particular but it manifests the universal (*sāmānya*) as well.

Jayanta refutes the Buddhists on the grounds that the universal cannot be constructed by our mind if we do not regard it as directly given. *Nirvikalpaka* is not a knowledge of the abstract universal. Our first cognition of a thing is not merely an apprehension of its unity but also its disjunctive features. When we perceive something its manifoldness is as much manifest to consciousness as is its unitary character. It is cognised as a totality of many parts, qualities and aspects. The Buddhists' view of *Kalpanā* as a super-imposition of difference on identical things or of identity on different things leads them to hold *savikalpaka* as a false perception. But Jayanta, basing his views on various facts the instances of which are already given earlier, firmly holds that none of the cases cited by the Buddhists to explain superimposition stands to reason. Moreover, the cases of superimposition are not invariably the cases of mistake. The Buddhists maintain that a 'universal' (sāmānya) is a mere

characteristics. It is presentative as well as representative in character because it involves the recollection of name, class and such other properties of the object which are experienced in the past. The idea of *nirvikalpaka* form of perception in the Sāṁkhya was mooted out by Īśvarakṛṣṇa through the term *ālocana* but it is Vācaspatimiśra who has discussed it at length in *Sāṁkhya Tattvakaumudī* and propounded the existence of two forms of perception elaborately. Vindhyavāsin, however, refers to indeterminate perception only and his account also resembles the Buddhists. The Sāṁkhyas, on the whole, like the Bhāṭṭas, hold *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* as the two stages in the perception of the same thing. "The former", as Dr. S. C. Chatterjee puts it, "is a stage of universal judgment of an object as an individual whole, while the latter is a verbal judgment of it by way of predication.[1] Jayanta does not find it worthwhile to comment upon the Sāṁkhya view of the types of perception.

In Jaina logic the Āgamic tradition insists that transcendental perception alone be treated as perception. The logical tradition in Jaina philosophy, however, divides perception into two types, namely, '*Sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa*', i.e., empirical perception and '*Pāramārthika pratyakṣa*', i.e., transcendental perception. According to the Jaina tradition, as Dr. Samghavi puts it, transcendental perception is of both sorts, indeterminate as well as determinate. For the Jainas *avadhidarśana* and *kevaladarśana*, both of which are of the nature of cognition of the general, i. e , of mere existence (*sāmānya-bodha*), are indeterminate transcendental perception, while his *avadhijñāna, manaḥparyāya, jñāna* and *kevala jñāna*, all of which are of the nature of cognition of the specific, i.e., of particulars (*viṣaya bodha*), are determinate transcendental perception.[2] Prabhācandra, the author of *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, however, holds that all true knowledge must be a definite and an assured cognition of an object and he thus rejects *nirvikalpaka* as a form of perception. But in spite of this internal divergence it may be presumed that the majority of the Jaina logicians accept both the forms of perception. Some scholars, of course, maintain that the Jainas do not accept the existence of *nirvikalpaka* perception.[3]

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1. *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 195
2. *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, p. 56
3. *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 434; *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 203

Jayanta, however, does not find it necessary to discuss the Jaina position.

The Vedānta also refers to two types of perception-*nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. Dharmarājādhvarīndra maintains that *nirvikalpaka* is that form of perception in which the relation of the predication of one content to another in a subject-adjective way is absent and *savikalpaka* is that in which this relationship is present.[1] Though on the basis of these definition of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* the Vedāntins appear just like other philosophers, the examples given by Dharmarājādhvarīndra to illustrate the definition, render the Vedāntins' position quite different from others. He states that 'This is that Devadatta' is an example of *nirvikalpaka*, implying that indeterminate perception is not necessarily confined to the pre-judgment stage, because there are some judgments also which exhibit all characters of indeterminate perception and they are still capable of being expressed in language. In the instance cited above, the purpose of the judgment is not to assert any adjectival relation but to assert an identity. Hence, it is *nirvikalpaka* though it is expressed in language. It is not recognition since the identity is neither remembered nor inferred but directly perceived. Vedāntins are, however, silent about what the thinkers of other systems say regarding *nirvikalpaka*. Dharmarājādhvarīndra simply states that an identity proposition (*akhaṇḍārtha vākya*) gives us non-predicative or non-relational knowledge, i. e., of a pure being. The implication of the Vedāntins' position is that *nirvikalpaka* is the knowledge of pure being (*sanmātram*). But when determined by certain qualities and distinguished from other objects, the perceptual knowledge is called *savikalpaka*. As the Advaita Vedāntins accept the difference or distinction of objects only in appearance, they hold that the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is instrumental in giving us the ultimate truth. The *savikalpaka*, on the other hand, gives us the truth of appearances. As Dharmarājādhvarīndra was posterior to Jayanta, we do not find any criticism of his views in *Nyāyamañjarī*.

The Nyāya exhibits not only a quaint exposition of the divisions of perception but also presents a systematic development in the thinking of its expounders. There have been logicians who have found enough data in Gautama's aphorism to account for the division of perception into indeterminate and determinate forms.

1. *V.P.*, p. 64

But there are also those who fail to see it there. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara can be placed in this category while Vācaspati and Jayanta champion those who try to link the division with the *Nyāyasūtra* itself.[1] As has already been mentioned, Gautama introduces the epithets *avyayapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* in the definition of perception. Vācaspati holds that the Sūtrakāra refers to *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* forms of perception through these words. He is the first Naiyāyika to introduce the words *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* in the Nyāya. Most of the later logicians follow Vācaspatimiśra. Jayanta also thinks that the germs of indeterminate and determinate forms are in the *Nyāyasūtra*, but unlike others he arrives at this conclusion on the basis of the various interpretation of the term *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* and in this way initiates a new line of thinking, perhaps quite unaware of the similar account by Vācaspatimisra. Jayanta refers to *nirvikalpaka* as a type of perception which is devoid of word-element and thus is vague and indefinite. His views on this specific point bear affinity to that of Diṅnāga and Kumārila, both of whom lay stress on the absence of word-element in the *nirvikalpaka* perception. But he goes totally against the Buddhists in accepting and holding *savikalpaka* as a genuine form of perception. *Savikalpaka*, for him, is that form of perception which is determinate. Making his stand clearer, he comments that though in some cases the recollection of the name of an object may be one of the conditions of determinate perception it is not derived only from verbal testimony since here the sense organ plays an important role, whereas the remembrance of name occupies only a subordinate position.

The post-Jayanta logicians seem equally, if not more, involved in this discussion. Bhāsarvaña describes *nirvikalpaka* as that which manifests the mere form of object, whereas *savikalpaka* is the comprehension of the object with its name, class, etc. He strikes upon a new point by holding that *nirvikalpaka* and *yogaja* perceptions are similar in the sense that both of them grasp the object in abstract form.[2] Gangeśa seems very much influenced by Vācaspatimiśra. He quotes the *Nyāyasūtra* not in its original form but as interpreted and modified by Vācaspatimiśra. He holds *nirvikalpaka* as that which is super sensuous (*atīndriya*), undifferentiated and unqualified and *savikalpaka* as that which is differentiated

1. निर्विकल्पकवत्तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षं सविकल्पकम् ।
समग्रहीच्च तदिदं पदेनानेन सूत्रकृत्, *N. M.*; I-82

2. *N. Sr.*, p. 14-5

and qualified.[1] Thus, he gives a clearer exposition than Vācaspati-miśra, and in doing so he seems to have taken the clue from Jayanta. Keśavamiśra asserts that the 'universal' is as real as the unique particular and so *savikalpaka* is as good a type of perception as *nirvikalpaka*. The novelty of his approach lies in the fact that he makes it clear that whereas sense is the operative (*karaṇa*) cause of indeterminate perception, sense-object contact is the cause of determinate perception. Viśvanātha and Annambhaṭṭa closely follow Gangeśa. Thus, right from Vācaspati and Jayanta if not from Gautama himself, all the Naiyāyikas hold *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* as two valid forms of perception, and whereas Vācaspati may be held as the first to give a clear exposition of this distinction in the Nyāya, Jayanta also is second to none in dispelling the arguments of the Buddhists against *savikalpaka* on the one hand and confuting the rigid stand of the Grammarians against *nirvikalpaka* on the other.

In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* which refers to the nature of perception in the discussion of the existence of the soul, there is no evidence of any attempt at distinguishing between the types of perception. Praśastapāda, however, states that in case of three substances, viz., earth, water and fire, a mere apprehension of form takes place and from the contact of the manas with the soul a qualified perception arises. Praśastapāda does not clearly state that these are the first and second stages of perception, but, as some scholars rightly hold, "Here we have, at least, the germ of the later Nyāya Vaiśeṣika theory of a clear-cut distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*." Śridhara, of course, presents this theory in a more developed form. He maintains that *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* are the two stages of perception. In the *nirvikalpaka* stage the individual and universal are both apprehended but they are not related as substantive and attribute. Among the syncretists Śivāditya thinks that determinate and indeterminate cognitions are involved in both true and false knowledge.[2] Anyhow, if we try to summarize Jayanta's exposition of the forms of perception in the light of the foregoing account of the various systems, we arrive at the following conclusions :

(a) 1. *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is a knowledge of the particular as well as of the universal.

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1. *T.B.* (*Prtryakṣa khaṇḍa*)
2. सविकल्पनिर्विकल्पयोस्तु प्रमायाम् अप्रमायां च अन्तर्भावः, *S.P.*, p. 32

2. It is a conscious but not self-conscious state (*anuvyavasāya*) of knowledge.
3. It is knowledge of uncharacterised object.
4. It is the ground of determinate knowledge.
5. It is the first stage or grade in the total process of perceptual knowledge.

(b) 1. *Savikalpaka* is, on the other hand, a cognition qualified by attributes.
2. It is always expressed in a propositional form.
3. *Savikalpaka* is the second stage or grade of *nirvikalpaka*.
4. It does not add anything that is not contained in the object itself.

Jayanta is aware of the fact that some of the thinkers accept the viability of extraordinary perception which is generally known as *alaukika pratyakṣa*. He is, however, not so enthusiastic on this aspect of the theory of perception as we find Gangeśa, the father of Navya-Nyāya and the logicians of syncretic period. Actually, the old Nyāya does not exhaustively distinguish between the *laukika* and *alaukika* forms of perception and it is thus creditable on the part of Jayanta that in addition to the ordinary modes he at least deliberates upon the extraordinary forms of perception, though simply by way of refuting the supposed contentions of other schools. The concept of *alaukika pratyakṣa*, which assumes distinction in the writings of Gangeśa and the syncretists, manifests itself in three different forms, viz., *sāmānyalakṣana*, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja*.[1]

The Perception of Classes. One of the three forms of extraordinary perception is known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. It is the general comprehension of a class. When we see a jar we do not know the jar as an individual alone but we also get the general class-notion of jar, i.e., the universal jarness or the generic property of jars. In this way when we perceive a particular we virtually perceive also all the particulars of that class to which the particular belongs. There is, however, a difference between direct perception of a particular and perception of a universal on the basis of class-notion. In the first case the object is perceived in its individual as well as class-character, while in the second it is grasped in its class-character alone and that too through the medium of the direct perception of at least one individual of that class. The knowledge

1. *B.P.*, 63

of class-character performs some functions as does the sense-object contact in bringing about ordinary perception. It is called *sāmānya lakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* which, according to Prof. D. M. Datta, "literally means contact through the knowledge of the universal."[1] The viability of this form of perception is asserted by the later Naiyāyikas on the following grounds: First, it is instrumental in arriving at the knowledge of the universal proposition in inference. Second, it is useful in explaining the negative judgment of perception such as "this is not a cow." We cannot say so unless we know all cows through their class-character. Third, we cannot strive for future pleasure if we do not know it through the knowledge of universal pleasurableness.

The Nyāya view of class-perception has been rejected by the Vedāntins on the following grounds: (1) In inference, e.g., of fire from smoke, it is enough if we comprehend 'smokeness' as related to 'fireness'. It is not necessary to know that all smokes are related to fire. If all were known, there would be no need for any inference. What is required in inference, is the knowledge of the universal class-characteristic and not the perception of all the members of the class. Thus, the Nyāya view that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* is necessary for inference does not stand to reason. (2) As regards the second argument of the Naiyāyikas the Advaitins state that one can arrive at a negative judgment, say, "this horse is not a cow", even without having the immediate knowledge of all cows. The characteristic of cowness can be known in the perception of any individual cow. So, the Naiyāyikas' contention on this ground is also not acceptable. (3) The Advaitins refute the third argument of the Naiyāyikas on the ground that in striving after a future pleasure it is not necessary that we should know that particular previously. It is enough to know that the desired pleasure is something that possesses the quality of pleasureness which has been perceived in the past cases of pleasure

Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa. The second type of extraordinary perception, according to the Naiyāyikas, is to be called *jñānalakṣaṇa*. In this form of perception one percept gives rise to another. For instance, when we perceive sandalwood at a distance, we at once know that it is fragrant. Since the sandalwood is at a distance, its fragrance cannot ordinarily be perceived by the nose. It is still perceived, so it is extraordinary. Here our past experience of

1. *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 2

fragrance in the sandalwood does the work of contact between sense and object. The cases of illusion, such as taking a rope for the snake, are also explained by the Naiyāyikas with the theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. The perception of the sandalwood revives the memory of its fragrance perceived in the past. Thus the revived knowledge serves here as a cause of perceiving fragrance in a distantly placed sandalwood. *Jñānalakṣaṇa* is different from *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* since in the former some past experience is the medium of contact between sense and the perceived object, while in the latter it is mediated by the knowledge of the universal. Moreover, "while in *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* the knowledge of the universal leads to the perception of the individual in which it inheres (āśraya), in *jñānalakṣaṇa*, a past knowledge leads to the present perception of its own object."[1]

The Advaitins reject the Nyāya theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*, holding that the knowledge of fragrance in the distantly placed sandalwood is nothing but a case of inference. As regards the cases of illusion, the Advaitins hold that the theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* does not satisfactorily explain the immediacy of the illusory object.

Yogaja Pratyakṣa. The Naiyāyikas maintain that *yogaja* is the third kind of extraordinary perception. This type of perception belongs to yogins only who, by means of their super-human powers can perceive objects which are imperceptible to others. Viśvanātha refers to two categories of yogins and states that in the case of those who have attained spiritual perfection (*yukta*), intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant and spontaneous. But in the case of others who are on the way to perfection (*yuñjāna*), it requires the help of concentration as an auxiliary condition.[2] The *yogaja pratyakṣa* has been accepted by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy whereas regarding the other two types of extraordinary perception there is divergence of views. Actually, *kevalajñāna* of the Jainas, *buddhi* of the Buddhists, *kaivalya* of the Sāṁkhyas and *sākṣātkāra* of the Vedāntins are more or less the other names of *yogaja* perception.

The theory of *yogaja* perception is, however, criticised on the ground that it is beyond the power of ordinary people. The

1. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 121
2. *B.P.*, 65-6

Nyāya is a philosophy of realism and to assign perceptuality to such a subtle and extrasensory form of knowledge is not consistent with its pronounced principles. The *yogaja* perception does not require the help of the senses. So, by accepting it, the Nyāya drifts from realism to Subjective Idealism.

Jayanta's observations regarding the *yogaja* perception are related to his assessment of the Mīmāṁsā view on the viability of the yogic ascertainment of *dharma*. It is a fact that there are degrees in the power of the senses like the degrees of colours. Those whose perception reaches the highest degree of perfection are called 'sages'.[1] Kumārila maintains that though there are cases of superior order of genius and memory in men nobody comes across such superior order of sense-perception as apprehends the transcendental objects.[2] Jayanta refutes this view and states that though *dharma* is transcendental to the sight of normal beings it is sensed by the sages.[3] As regards Kumārila's contention that if a sage perceives a transcendental object then he should also perceive odour, taste, etc. with his eyes, Jayanta points out that it is not only vision but all the senses of the sages which are endowed with supernormal powers.[4]

Taking in view all these distinctive features, we can safely hold that both indeterminate and determinate perception are valid, but *savikalpaka* is more expressive than *nirvikalpaka* perception. The Nyāya account of the modes of perception is more comprehensive and convincing than that of the other systems and if there is anyone to be given the credit of presenting an all-embracing and exhaustive analysis of the problem, it is, obviously, none other than Jayanta.

Jayanta seems less worried about *nirvikalpaka*. The reason obviously is that this form has been opposed only by the Grammarians and some sects of the Vedānta. Jayanta, being the predecessor of most of the Vedānta epistemologists, has nothing to do with them and so far as the Grammarians are concerned, they

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1. *N.M.*, I-95-6
2. ये चाप्यतिशया दृष्टाः, *Ś.V.*, p. 113
3. यद्यपि नास्मदादि नयनविषयो धर्मस्तथापि योगीन्द्रियगम्यो भविष्यति, *N.M.*, I-96
4. रसादिग्राहीण्यपि योगिनामिन्द्रियाणि चक्षुर्वदतिशयवन्त्येवेति न रसादिषु चक्षुर्व्यापारः परिकल्प्यते, *Ibid.*

have been refuted by others also. In such a situation, Jayanta probably thinks that the existence of indeterminate perception is almost an accomplished fact. He, however, makes it perfectly clear on sound grounds that *nirvikalpaka* is one of the forms of perception.

Jayanta supports the validity of *savikalpaka* perception which its main opponents, i.e., the Buddhists, hold as unreal mental image. His main thesis against them is that mere verbalisation cannot invalidate a perception. When a Buddhist states that "the knowledge, say, of 'hundred' is not a sense-perception, but only a mental construction (*vikalpamātra*)", Jayanta retorts, "What is that which is not a mere thought construction for you, Sir? But remember, the upholders of the validity of determinate perception are yet alive."

Jayanta's deep involvement with the theory of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* may be gathered from the fact that in answering a Buddhist proposition that "sense-object should be considered as produced by words and not in any case a sense-perception," he remarks that "the acceptance of the validity of determinate perception is the lifeblood of the Nyāya theory of perception."

7. *Conclusion*

Jayanta's theory of *pratyakṣa*, as we have seen above, is mainly based upon his exposition of Gautama's aphorism dealing with the nature of perception. In the course of his exposition, however, Jayanta hints at certain points which are basically his own innovations. It is Jayanta who categorically states that the etymological sense of the term *pratyakṣa* does not convey the actual meaning. Jayanta differentiates between *pratyakṣa* as *pramāṇa* and *pratyakṣa* as *pramiti* by supplying an additional word '*yataḥ*' in the definition. If we take this aspect seriously we may safely arrive at the conclusion that this is a novel feature and it forms the cornerstone of Jayanta's view of perception. Though Vācaspati has also tried to do the same thing, as we have said before, neither of the stalwarts was influenced by each other. The technical terms used by Gautama in his aphorisms received the attention of almost all logicians but it is Jayanta who surpassed all in giving a vivid analysis of these terms. His observations regarding the inclusion of these terms are free from pretence and deceit. He brings to light a good number of views of the long forgotten logicians.

Jayanta's introduction of the rival theories is remarkably impressive. His account of the Buddhist terms *kalpanāpoḍha* and *abhrānta* is very clear and exhaustive. He is perfectly honest in presenting the views of the Mīmāṁsakas. It is Jayanta who has, perhaps for the first time, brought to light so strikingly the subtle differences of opinion among the Mímāṁsakas themselves with regard to the various aspect of perception. Further, among the old logicians, Jayanta alone has commented upon Īśvakṛṣṇa's definition of perception. Jayanta's analysis of the psychology of perception is quite original. He throws new light on the distinctiveness of *manas* from external sense organs. His account of self as a neutral substance (neither material nor mental) reflects the clarity of his thinking. His most striking contribution to the theory of perception is to be found in his quaint exposition of *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. Jayanta's analysis of *pratyakṣa*, thus, has a number of novel features and it deserves the attention of scholars.

CHAPTER V

THE NATURE AND FORMS OF INFERENCE

1. *The Nature of Anumāna* (*Inference*)

Except the Cārvāka all the systems of Indian philosophy hold that *anumāna* is a distinct means of knowing. The word *anumāna* is generally translated as inference. It is used for two things, viz., inferential cognition (*anumiti*) and the instrument of inferential cognition (*anumiti-karaṇa*). In this way, when the word stands for an abstraction, it means inferential cognition and when it stands for the instrument, it means a source of inferential cognition. The word '*anumāna*' consists of two parts, viz., *anu* and *māna* which mean 'after' and 'cognition' respectively. Thus, '*anumāna*' in a general sense means the cognition coming into being after perception or *parāmarśa*. There is, however, a divergence of views with regard to the exact nature of *anumāna*. Let us see how Jayanta defines *anumāna* and how he refutes the views of his opponents, particularly that of the Buddhists.

(a) JAYANTA'S THEORY

According to Jayanta, *anumāna* is the instrument of the knowledge of an unperceived probandum through the apprehension of a probans with five-fold characteristics together with the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two.[1] In order to assess the actual significance of this definition, let us see what the earlier teachers of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika have said about the nature of a *anumāna*.

Gautama does not define *anumāna*. He simply holds that inference presupposes perception. It is of three types.[2] Vātsyāyana

1. पञ्च लक्षणकाल्लिङ्गाद् गृहीतान्नियमे स्मृतेः ।
परोक्षे लिङ्गिनि ज्ञानमनुमानं प्रचक्षते, *N.M.*, I-101

2. अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च, *N.S.*, 1.1.5

deals with the etymological aspect of the term *anumāna* and states that it is the knowledge of *lingin* arising after the knowledge of *linga*.[1] Vātsyāyana's definition of *anumāna* does not take into account the invariable concomitance of *linga* with the *lingin*. His further deliberations, however, reveal that what is perceived in inference points to something else which is not perceived but with which it is related. So, it is a knowledge that follows another knowledge. Uddyotakara interprets the compound '*tat-pūrvakam*' in three ways, viz., (1) *tāni-pūrvakam*, in which case inference may presuppose all the *pramāṇas*, (2) *tat-pūrvakam*, meaning that it presupposes perception only and (3) *te-pūrvakam*, implying that it presupposes perceptions, i.e., (a) perception of the invariable relation between *linga* and *lingin* and (b) perception of *linga* in the present case.[2] Uddyotakara is of the view that according to this analysis the latter perception, e.g., of smoke on the hill aided by the memory of former perception, e.g., of smoke and fire together in the kitchen, is technically called *parāmarśa* and this is what finally results in inference, e.g., of fire from the perception of smoke on the hill. Uddyotakara strikes a new point probably so far unknown or not stressed in the Nyāya in stating that the knowledge of the probandum is itself a means (*Bhavatu vā yamartho laingikī pratipattiranumānamiti*).[3] Some of the later logicians followed this view. Vācaspatimiśra's views generally conform to that of Uddyotakara.[4]

Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system, holds that inference is the knowledge of probandum derived from the knowledge of the probans. Praśastapāda defines *anumāna* as the knowledge which results from the apprehension of a sign (*linga*). He explains *linga* as that which is related to the probandum and which has co-presence and co-absence with the probandum. Śrīdhara is of the view that the term *darśana* in the definition given by Praśastapāda does not necessarily mean perception of *linga*. It rather indicates a definite knowledge of *linga* acquired by any means whatever. Moreover, in the inference based upon another inference (*anumitānumāna*) the latter inference, e.g., of heat, has the inferred object, e.g., fire, as its *linga* and the inferred fire is not perceived.

1. लिर्गलिगिनो : सम्बद्धयो दंर्शनेन लिगस्मृतिरभिसम्बध्यते । स्मृत्या लिग-
दर्शनेन चाप्रत्यक्षोऽर्थोऽनुमीयते, *N.B.*, 1.1.5
2. *N.V.*, 1.1.5, *N V.T.T.*, 1.1.5
3. अनुमानमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः तत्पूर्वकमिति लक्षणम्, *N.M.*, I-113
4. तत्र प्रतिबन्धग्राहिप्रत्यक्षं स्मरणद्वारेण तत्कारणं लिगदर्शनं तु स्वत एव,
Ibid.

Jayanta defines *anumāna* in the above-mentioned way and comes forward with a categorical statement regarding the structural analysis of the *Nyāyasūtra* consisting in the preliminary account of inference. He holds that the portion '*tat-pūrvakam*' constitutes the definition. '*Tat*' is a pronoun; it signifies perception which is implied from the context. Though Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra have also resolved the compound by holding the initial pronoun in dual number, it is Jayanta who points out a convincing ground for the preference of this alternative. He states that with the initial pronoun '*tat*' in dual number, the definition would not become too wide to comprise comparison, etc. He is also careful enough to state immediately that any two perceptions would not do. They are rather to be specified. One of them should discover the relation of universal concomitance and the other should discover the presence of the reason in the subject of the inference. Jayanta makes it clear that the direct cause of inference is the perception of *liṅga*. Though the perception of universal relation is not its immediate cause, it exerts its influence through memory.

Jayanta anticipates such objections to his specification of two perceptions, as that the context does not supply any specification for it, that it is still too wide since it applies to fallacies such as *savyabhicāra*, *viruddha*, etc., or that it is too narrow since it does not apply to that inference, the reason of which is known by means of verbal testimony, etc. Jayanta refutes the first objection holding that reason is the instrument of inferential knowledge. It cannot establish the object to be proved if its similarity with the example is not cognized. That is why, though supplied in general by context, the perceptions are in fact specific. About the second objection Jayanta states that such an eventuality is not possible since in the definition of *hetu* (reason) it has been clearly mentioned that it is that which proves the object to be established. If perception rightly discovers the relation of universal concomitance no fallacy of reasoning ensues. As far as the allegation that the definition is too narrow is concerned, Jayanta meets it stating that perception is the basis of such cases of the inference also. In his support he quotes Kumārila who holds that when the reason proving the object to be inferred is itself inferred it is proved through perception.[1] Jayanta gives an alternative suggestion to meet all these objections simul-

1. यत्राप्यनुमिताल्लिंगाल्लिंगिनि ग्रहणं भवेत् ।
तत्रापि मौलिकं लिंगं प्रत्यक्षादेव गम्यते, *Ś.V.*, (*Anu.*) ; *N.M.*, I-114

taneously, such as, inferential knowledge generally depends upon perception but there is no hard and fast rule for that and other forms of knowledge also could constitute the condition for inference.[1]

Jayanta is aware of the fact that apart from the difference of opinion regarding the number (singular or dual or plural) of the pronoun '*tat*' there are some thinkers who take exception to this definition, no matter in whatever number the pronoun '*tat*' may be. They may ask as to whether the pronoun '*tat*' signifies the instrument of perception or the resulting consciousness. In the case of the first alternative the compound '*tat-pūrvakam*' should denote perceptual knowledge arising from the sense organ and to have inferential knowledge from that, the term '*pūrvakam*' is to be repeated. And in that case the repeated word is to be assumed and consequently the definition is liable to the charge of the assumption of the unheard word. In the case of the second alternative, if it is regarded as denoting perceptual knowledge, then the knowledge which is generated by perceptual knowledge should not be the instrument of inferential knowledge. The perception of the reason leads to the knowledge of an object which is beyond the reach of the sense organs. This indirect knowledge is not the instrument of inferential knowledge but is itself the resulting consciousness.

Jayanta in his rejoinder to these objections states that there is no need of repeating the word '*pūrvakam*' even if '*tat*' refers to a sense organ (the instrument of perceptual knowledge) since the compound word '*tat-pūrvakam*' denotes the perception of the reason through direct awareness generated by the sense organs. Again, the pronoun '*tat*' denotes the perception of the reason. The compound word '*tat-pūrvakam*' signifies the remembrance of the relation of universal concomitance. This remembrance is *anumāna*. It is the instrument of the mediate knowledge of the consequence since the latter follows the former in immediate succession. The coordination between '*tat-pūrvaka*' and *anumāna* is clear. The remembrance of universal concomitance generated by an actually existing cause is *anumāna*. Moreover, *anumāna* may be interpreted as a synonym of *anumiti*. So the second objection also does not hold good.[2]

Jayanta also suggests an altogether new way to solve the problem. He holds that if we simply insert the word '*yataḥ*' in the

1. प्राधान्याभिप्रायेण प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकत्वमुच्यते न नियमार्थमिति नाव्याप्तिः, *N.M*, I-114
2. *Ibid*, I-114-5

definition, the definition would be as *anumāna* is that from which the knowledge of an object lying beyond the reach of the sense organ, arises through the causality of perception."[1] To clarify the point Jayanta mentions the following process of *anumāna* :

(1) Perception of the reason. (2) the remembrance of the universal concomitance, (3) judgment that the subject of inference contains the probans which is invariably concomitant with the probandum (according to some), (4) knowledge of the consequence and finally (5) the judgment that the consequence is worthy of being accepted or rejected. Thus, Jayanta asserts that each step of this series is causally connected with others and that is why the old Naiyayikas hold that the compound word '*tat-pūrvakam*' constitutes the proper definition of inference.

Jayanta also mentions that there are some logicians who hold that the compound '*tat-pūrvakam*' could apply to comparison, etc., and to avoid this overlapping the Sūtrakāra has restricted it to inference only by inserting the term '*trividham*' in the sūtra. These logicians opine that the term '*trividham*' does so since the reason admits of three kinds or it is to fulfil three conditions such as (1) the presence of the reason in the subject, (2) its presence in a similar instance and (3) its absence in a dissimilar instance. So, on the coordination of the term '*trividham*' with the word '*tat-pūrvakam*' the complete definition of *anumāna* is that it is a way of knowing which depends upon perception and comprises a reason which consists in three types or three conditions. Jayanta, however, refutes these logicians holding that the term '*trividham*' depicts the division and not the definition of inference. Moreover, five conditions are essential for a sound reason, otherwise it will entail the fallacies of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* and *Prakaraṇasama*.

Though it is a fact that there is no need of inserting the word *trividham*, specially when the types of inference are also mentioned in the sūtra, here also as in cases of *chala*, etc., the Sūtrakāra has not adopted the economy in words. Jayanta is also aware of the fact that some of the logicians hold that all the words in the *sūtra* constitute the definition of *anumāna*, but he promptly objects to this view stating that this interpretation does not exhibit the skill of its author in framing a definition.

The significant feature of Jayanta's definition of inference is to be found in his independent account of the problem. He does

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1. प्रत्यक्षफलपूर्वकं परोक्षार्थं प्रतिपत्तिरूप फलं यतो भवति तदनुमानम्, *N.M.*, I-115

not consider it proper to elaborate Gautama's aphorism first and adjust his own views with it as his predecessors did. Instead, he propounds his theory first and adjusts Gautama's aphorism with it later on and comes to the above-mentioned conclusions on the basis of his independent judgment.

(b) THE BUDDHIST VIEW

Diṅnāga defines inference as the cognition of an object through its mark. Dharmottara, however, states that this definition refers to the source and not to the essence of an inference. According to Diṅnāga there are only two means of knowing, perception and inference, and two corresponding objects to them, the particular and the universal. The universals are cognized by inference and the particulars by the senses.[1] Prof. C. D. Sharma rightly observes that for Diṅnāga and his followers the validity of inference is only on the phenomenal plan. Inference has no reference to ultimate reality which is indescribable and beyond all thought determinations. According to Diṅnāga, the whole business of probans and probandum depends on the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin*. This relation is imposed by thought and it has no reference to an external existence and non-existence.[2] A systematic account of the Yogācāra view of *anumāna* is to be found in the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. He introduces the theory of inference by pointing out its two types, namely, *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*. Dharmottara states that the two types of inference are absolutely different from each other and that is why Dharmakīrti points out these types before attempting their definition. He further states that inclusive definition of these types is not possible because inference for oneself is an internal process of cognition and inference for others consists of propositions for the purpose of communication.[3]

Dharmakīrti defines *svārthānumāna* as a cognition which is produced indirectly through a mark consisting of a three-fold aspect and referring to an inferred object.[4] Dharmottara also gives a similar definition in a slightly different language. According

1. *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, 2.1
2. *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p. 131
3. परार्थानुमानं शब्दात्मकं स्वार्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानात्मकम् । तयोरत्यन्तभेदान्नैकं लक्षणमस्ति, *N.Bi.T.*, 2.1
4. तत्र स्वार्थं त्रिरूपाल्लिंगाद् यदनुमेये ज्ञानं तदनुमानम्, *N.Bi.*, 2.3

to him "internal inference is cognition produced by a mark having three aspects and concerning an inferred object.[1] The difference between the inference and its result is just the same as in the case of perception. The three aspects of the mark are (i) it must abide in the inferred object cognised by inference, (ii) it must abide only in homologous instances, and (iii) it must not abide in heterologous instances. The homologous instance is that in which both the probans and the probandum abide. The heterologous instance is that in which the probans and the probandum never reside[2] Dharmottara states that inference is a cognition of an absent thing which cannot be grasped but only imagined. In perception cognition grasps the particular and constructs the symbol. In inference it grasps the symbol and constructs the particular.

Jayanta's difference with the Buddhists rests mainly upon three aspects. First, against the Buddhist view of the three-fold characteristics of *hetu* he states that a mark (*liṅga*) possesses five characteristic features, viz., (1) the presence of the reason in the subject (*pakṣadharnatva*), (2) the presence of the reason in the probative example (*sapakṣadharmatva*), (3) the absence of the reason from the counter example (*vipakṣādvyāvṛttiḥ*), (4) uncontradictedness (*abādhitaviṣayaytva*) and (5) uncounterbalancedness (*asatpratipakṣatva*).[3] A reason which has these five characteristic features leads to the inference of a conclusion. The faulty reasons are those which are devoid of any one of these features. Jayanta is of the view that the presence of these five features in the reason firmly establishes the presence of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Secondly, he does not agree with the Buddhists to divide *anumāna* into two varieties first and define it later on. Third, the Buddhist theories of identity and causality do not appeal to him.[4] We shall discuss these aspects in detail while dealing with the problem of *hetu* and *vyāpti*.

(c) THE MIMAṀSĀ VIEW

The definition of *anumāna* as propounded by Śabara runs as "*Anumānam Jñātasaṁbandhasya-ekadeśadarśanāt-ekadeśāntare-*

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1. त्रिरूपाल्लिगाद्युत्पन्नमनुमेयालम्बनं ज्ञानं तत् स्वार्थानुमानमिति, *N.Bi.T*, 2.3; *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, p. 49
2. *N.Bi*, 2.5
3. *N.M.*, I-101; त्रैरूप्य पुनर्लिगस्यानुमेये सत्त्वमेव, सपक्ष एव सत्त्वम्, असपक्षे चासत्त्वमेव निश्चितम् *N.Bi.*, 2.5
4. तयोरत्यन्तभेदात् नैकं लक्षणमस्ति, *N.Bi.T.*, 2.1

asannikṛṣṭe arthe buddhiḥ."[1] Kumārila explains the compound *Jñātasambandhasya* in four alternative ways, viz., (1) as referring to a person who knows the invariable relation between two things, e.g., smoke and fire, or (2) as referring to the substratum where the relationship, e.g., of smoke and fire is apprehended, or (3) as referring simply to a known relationship, or (4) as referring to both the *liṅga* and the *liṅgin* together. Smoke and fire are parts (*ekadeśas*) of a logical whole.[2] Prabhākara, on the other hand, holds that the word *Jñātasambandhasya* qualifies the term '*ekadeśa*' in the compound *ekadeśadarśanāt* and refers to that whose invariable concomitance with another is known.[3] Kumārila holds that the word *asannikṛṣṭa* means that the object of inference should not be known beforehand through a stronger *pramāṇa* or that it should not be known beforehand as possessing a characteristic contrary to what is sought to be proved. Prabhākara is of the view that the object of inference should not be one that is remembered, implying that inference is apprehension rather than memory. Thus though there are points of difference between the Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara lines of thinking, if we attempt to work out a comprehensive definition of *anumāna* from the Mīmāṁsā standpoints, Śabara's definition of *anumāna* could be recast in the following form:

Anumāna is the knowledge of a thing not in contact with the sense organs from the perception of another object when an invariable relation is known to hold between them.

Śabara's definition of *anumāna* has been subjected to severe criticism on the ground that no new knowledge is brought to light by it. The Bhāṭṭas meet the objection by maintaining that what is given in *vyāpti* is the universal and that there is no warrant for the supposition that in particular cases of inference we are only apprehending a past cognition. The cognition of the relation between the *hetu* and *pakṣa* is the new element even though the probandum is implied in the knowledge of the invariable concomitance. The *vyāpti* gives us the knowledge such as, 'whenever there is smoke there is fire' but we are not aware that the particular hill which we are

1. *Ś.B.*, 1.1.5
2. *T.V.*, (*Anu.*), 2.3
3. कस्य ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्य ? नन्वेकदेशस्य *Bṛhat*, (1929 Edi.), p 69 ज्ञातः सम्बन्धनियमो यस्य, तस्यैकदेशस्य दर्शनादेकदेशान्तरे सन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे या बुद्धिः, *P.P.* (*Anu.*), (1961), p. 196

seeing is fiery, and this apprehension constitutes inference which is, therefore, a distinct addition to knowledge.[1]

Prabhākara's account of inferential cognition is different. The invariable concomitance, knowledge of which is indispensable for inference, is an unconditioned relation. The invariable connection with fire is perceived in case of sn oke but not vice versa. The fire of red hot iron ball is smokeless but it is only when wet wood is kindled that the connection of fire with smoke is observed. Hence a relation free from any *upādhi* alone leads to valid inference. The objection that 'since no new knowledge is given in *anumiti*, *anumāna* ceases to be a *pramāṇa*', is warded off by prabhākara on the ground that direct apprehension (*anubhūti*) and not the cognition of the uncognized (*agṛhītagrāhitva*) constitutes valid knowledge[2]

2. *The Forms of Anumāna*

In Indian logic truth has been regarded as a unit and that is why *anumāna* has not been divided into Formal and Material or Deductive and Inductive or Mediate and Immediate or Syllogistic and Non-syllogistic or Pure and Mixed types. The Indian logicians were, no doubt, aware of its varieties and sub-varieties. But the principles upon which the varieties of *anumāna* are based are different from those of Western inference. *Anumāna* has been classified in various ways, for example, (a) *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, (b) *vīta* and *avīta*, (c) *svārtha* and *parārtha*, (d) *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki* and (e) *anyathānupapannatva* types. Jayanta elaborately deals with the tripartite classification of inference as expounded by Gautama and proposes some innovations in the interpretations of the terms *pūrvavat*, etc., over and above Vātsyāyana.[3]

(a) THE PŪRVAVAT, ŚEṢAVAT AND SĀMĀNYATADṚṢṬA

Gautama holds that *anumāna* is dependent on perception and is of three kinds, namely, *pūrvavat*, śeṣavat and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.[4] "These phrases", as A.B. Keith rightly observes, "are in themselves hopelessly obscure, and Vātsyāyana gives two explanations of fundamentally different character, a fact which may be interpreted

1. *Ś.D.*, (*Chow.* 1916), p. 177
2. सिद्धं चानुमानादिषु प्रमाणत्वमनुभूतेः, *Bṛhatī*, (*Chow.* 1929), p. 80
3. *N.M.*, I-116-23
4. *N.S.*, 1.1.5

either as indicating that even before Gautama there were different views prevalent in the school or that there intervened a considerable interval between Gautama and his followers during which conflicting interpretations of his aphorisms had come into vogue."[1]

Pūrvavat. Vātsyāyana, as we have pointed out above, gives two sets of interpretation of the terms '*pūrvavat*', etc. According to the first, *pūrvavat* inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause, e.g., when we see clouds rising we infer that there will be rain.[2] Uddyotakara criticizes this view holding that no sensible person could venture to cognize the effect simply on the basis of the perception of a cause.[3] According to the second, reason and effect belong to two different places. If the effect is already known or if it does not exist there can be no scope for inference. Jayanta discusses this problem further and endorses Vātsyāyana's line of thinking. He is aware of the opponents' counterarguments and states that some of the logicians hold that the term '*pūrva*' denotes a cause, and the word '*pūrvavat*' denotes an effect; since it has a cause, therefore the type of inference called *pūrvavat* illustrates the inference of a cause by means of an effect. Jayanta refers to the following arguments put forth by these logicians to substantiate their antithesis: (1) It is unreasonable to think that an effect is the subject of an inference. If the effect is existent then what else remains to be established? If it is non-existent, it is unreal like a sky-flower and so cannot be the subject of inference. (2) The reason and the effect are two incoordinate objects. In order to establish the existence of an effect, if we accept the existence of a positive condition as a reason then the reason does not belong to the subject of inference. It is subject to the fallacies known as *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *anaikāntika*. (3) To prove the existence of an effect a non-specific cause cannot serve the purpose of the reason since the relation of universal concomitance must hold between the reason and the consequence. (4) If it is held that the cause from which the effect follows in immediate succession constitutes the reason then the very effect will be perceived with the remembrance of the relation of universal concomitance and in that case the inference of an effect is simply superfluous. (5) It is wrong to contend that the Buddhists lend support to the view that the effect is inferred from the cause. The Buddhists use the term '*utpāda*' and it simply indicates the capacity by which an effect is brought into existence.

1. *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 88
2. *N.B.*, 1.1.5
3. *N.V.*, 1.1.5

Though Jayanta does not finally accept the interpretation of *pūrvavat* based on holding '*vat*' as the remainder of the suffix *matup*, he refutes the above arguments of the opponents of Vātsyāyana on the basis of following facts: (1) The effect, as Kumārila also holds, is not the subject of inference here; the clouds are the subject of inference. What is to be established is that they contain rain which will drop in the immediate future. Hence it is not the effect but the clouds containing future rain, which are inferred. (2) The word '*pūrva*' denotes a cause. The word '*pūrvavat*' denotes the property of a cause. The cloud is the cause of rain, its property, i.e., 'gathering in the sky', constitutes the reason. There is no linguistic defect in the statement of the proposition since a non-specified cause has not been stated as the cause of rain. (3) The fear that the effect following an immediate antecedent is sure to be perceived is unreasonable because when we infer rain, drops of rain do not fall on our head from the clouds. (4) People infer an effect from competent cause and not from capacity.

Another interpretation of the term '*pūrvavat*' as suggested by Vātsyāyana is that it is a type of inference in which out of two things one that is not perceived is inferred from the perception of the other on the basis of a former perception of both of these things together, e.g., inference of unperceived fire from perceived smoke on the basis of the previous perception of fire and smoke together.

Jayanta interprets the tripartite division of inference in another way also, i.e., taking '*vat*' in '*pūrvavat*', etc., as the remainder of the suffix *vati* and holding that it is the universal concomitance between the reason and the consequence which is responsible for the establishment of one by another. The view that '*vat*' in *pūrvavat* etc., is the remainder of the suffix *matup*, is wrong and the division based upon it has no solid ground to stand on. Jayanta finally maintains that '*vat*' is the remainder of the suffix *vati* and interprets *pūrvavat* likewise. Whenever we discover the universal relation of concomitance holding between the reason and the consequence on the basis of our previous perception of the same homogeneous reason with the same homogeneous consequence, it is called *pūrvavat*, e.g., in a kitchen we find that smoke and fire co-exist, so when we see smoke in a hill we infer fire. As regards the question as to how the act of inference is similar to that of perception, Jayanta holds that the particular reason which is perceived along with its details establishes fire which is similar to the fire experienced

before and that is why an act of inference is similar to that of perception.[1]

Śeṣavat. Vātsyāyana holds that in *śeṣavat* inference the cause is inferred from the effect, e.g.. when we see that the water of the river is not as usual but is swollen and swifter, we infer that there has been rain As an alternative interpretation of the term '*śeṣavat*', Vātsyāyana states that it may also signify as 'remainder'. There could be many possibilities with regard to the explanation of a fact. When all the possibilities except one are rejected, the remaining one is cognized through the means of śeṣavat inference, e.g., sound is distinct from the categories of generality, individuality and inherence. There are possibilities of its being a substance, a quality or an action. When we reason by a process of elimination we find that sound cannot be a substance because it inheres in *ākāśa* only where as other substances either inhere in more than one (e.g., the jar) or do not inhere in any one (e.g., the atoms). Sound is not an action because an action brings about conjunction or disjunction whereas sound is the originator of another sound. So, by this eliminative reasoning, we come to the conclusion that sound is a quality.

As Vātsyāyana did, Jayanta gives two types of interpretation of the term '*śeṣavat*' also He refers to the inference of cause from its effect and quotes the same example that Vātsyāyana gives to illustrate the process. He, however, comes to the conclusion that it is not really the cause (rain), but the up-country which has heavy shower of rain, which is inferred from the abnormal swelling of the river ; or a particular country may be the subject of inference instead of the river, holding that this country is in contact with another country which has heavy shower because it has a river with a swollen stream.[2] Jayanta refers to Kumārila just to state that, according t hoim also, the subject of inference is both the consequence as well as the reason. It becomes the consequence when it is qualified by something which has not been established. If the current of the river is embanked somewhere then the water of the river swells somewhere else. Hence, the swelling of the river is not always due to heavy rain only Moreover, as has been stated before, Jayanta holds that the interpretation of these terms on the basis of the suffix *matup* is not sound. So, as in the case of '*purvavat*' he gives an alternative interpretation of '*śeṣavat*' also and

1. *N.M.*, I-116-7

2. इयं वाचोयुक्तिः कार्येण कारणमनुमीयते इति परमार्थतस्तु धर्मो धर्मवत्त्वेन धर्मवाननुमीयते इति स्थितिः, *N.M.*, I-118

holds '*vat*' as the remainder of the suffix *vati*, propounding that the conclusion in this inference is arrived at through the method of elimination.

Jayanta gives an alternative interpretation of '*śeṣavat*' and states that there could be a number of rival suggestions to explain a cause underlying a fact. If all the suggestions except one provided regarding the cause of a fact are rejected the remaining one is to be known as a cause. For example, if we infer fire from smoke and try to find out its fuel, several alternatives may arise in our mind. We may think that it is produced by dry grass or leaves or dry wood. If we reject all of them and also hold earthen pot or piece of stone as irrelevant, and then conclude that fire is produced by the dried clod of cow-dung, then the inference is called *śeṣavat.* Jayanta thinks that the instance that 'sound is a quality' also illustrates the *śeṣavat* type of inference.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. According to Vātsyāyana *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is that in which conclusions are based upon general observations, e.g., we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before it has moved, and from this fact of general observation (analogy) we infer that the sun must be moving even though we cannot perceive its movement. The second explanation offered by Vātsyāyana refers to *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as an inference in which the relation between the antecedent and the consequent, not being a matter of perception, is established on the ground of an abstract similarity with something else, e.g., inference of soul on the basis of the fact that desire, etc., are qualities and that qualities must abide in some substance, namely, the self.[1]

Jayanta holds that when we infer the consequent from the antecedent which is neither a cause nor an effect, it is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, e.g., the taste of a *kapittha* (wood apple) is inferred from its colour. Colour and taste inhere in *kapittha* and they are not causally related to each other. Jayanta is of the view that the example given by Vātsyāyana, i.e., 'sun has motion', is not sound since reaching different places due to motion actually illustrates the inference of cause from its effect.[2] It is rather an example of

1. *N.B.*, 1.1.5
2. यत्पुनर्भाष्यकारेण भास्करस्य देशान्तरप्राप्त्या गत्यनुमानमुदाहृतं तदयुक्तम्, देशान्तर-प्राप्ते गतिकार्यत्वात् कार्येण कारणानुमानं शेषवदेवेदं स्यात्, *N.M.*, I-119

śeṣavat. Moreover, the sun has no contact with the hill, etc., and even if it has contact with the sky, it is imperceptible and the contact presupposes the perception of the things conjoined

Giving an alternative interpretation of this term, Jayanta holds that when an imperceptible object is inferred on the basis of concomitance between the universal of the antecedent (reason) and the universal of the consequent it is called *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference, e.g., we infer the existence of the organ of hearing from that of auditory perception. The sense organs are supersensuous objects, So they are never perceived. As the act of hewing depends upon an instrument such as an axe, so the act of hearing must have some cause and that is why we infer the organ of hearing as the instrument of the act of hearing.

Difference between Śeṣavat and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭā. Jayanta holds that the modes of operation of *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* are different. He is, however, aware of the view of the Mīmāṃśakas who hold that *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is that type of inference in which no particular similar to the consequent has been perceived even at the time of the discovery of the relation of universal concomitance. For example, the judgment that 'Devadatta moves' refers only to Devadatta since his action is not perceived. The judgment that 'Devadatta stands still' and that 'Devadatta moves', refer alike to the same person. Jayanta objects to this contention on the same grounds on which he has refuted *kriyānumānavāda* with reference to the definition of *sāmanya*[1].

Īśvarakṛṣṇa mentions three types of inference but he does not name them. He, however, refers to *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* in a subsequent *kārikā*[2]. Vijñānabhikṣu, Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara follow Gautama and refer to these types of inference.[3] Vācaspati tries to coordinate the Nyāya and Sāṁkhya types of inference by including *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* under *vīta* and *śeṣavat* under *avīta*.[4] Bhāsarvajña distinguishes between *dṛṣṭa* or *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inferences maintaining that in the former a perceptible object is inferred from the perception of a mark. But in the latter an imperceptible object is inferred from the perception of a mark[5].

1. *N.M.*, I.121
2. *S.K.*, 5-6
3. *Māṭharavṛtti*, 5
4. तत्रावीतं शेषवत्, वीतं द्वेधा-पूर्ववत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च, *S.T.K.*, 5
5. तत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थानुमापकं दृष्टम् यथा धूमोऽग्नेरिति । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थानुमापकं सामान्यतो दृष्टम्, *N.Sr.* (*Poona* 122), p. 18

(b) VĪTA AND AVĪTA

Vācaspatimiśra has expounded two types of inference, viz., *vīta* and *avīta*. While *vīta* is based upon the universal agreement in presence, e.g , whatever is smoky is fiery—the hill is smoky, therefore, the hill is fiery—the *avīta* is based upon the universal agreement in absence. For instance, what is non-different from other elements has no smell. The earth has smell ; therefore, the earth is different from other elements. Vācaspati sub-divides the *vīta* into two kinds, viz., *pūrvavat* and *śamānyatoṛṣṭa*. *Avīta* is also termed as *śeṣavat* or *pariśeṣa* inference, i.e., inference by elimination. For example, sound is a specific quality of ether because it is not a specific quality of earth, water, fire, air, space, time *manas* and the self. By the elimination of other alternatives we infer that sound is the specific quality of ether which is the only remaining substance.

(c) SVĀRTHA AND PARĀRTHA

Though the division of *anumāna* into *svārtha* and *parārtha* is not found in *Nyāyasūtra* or *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, its history definitely goes back to Praśastapāda who has mentioned it in his scholium on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. This division is accepted by the Buddhists also. Etymologically what is intended for oneself is *svārthānumāna* and what is intended for others is *parārthānumāna*. *Parārthānumāna* is, however, based upon *svārthānumāna* in the sense that a man cannot convince another if he himself is not convinced. In a *svārthānumāna* the premises are known from our own experience while in *parārthānumāna* premises are discovered by one man and imparted to another through the medium of language. That is why there is a greater possibility of fallacies in *parārthānumāna* than in *svārthānumāna*. Dharmottara is of the view that *parārthānumāna* depends upon words (*śabdātmaka*) whereas *svārthānumāna* is not based upon words. It is simply a mental process. Praśastapāda holds that *parārthānumāna* is that which operates through the help of five membered syllogism. He subdivides *svārthānumāna* into *dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. In *dṛṣṭa* the inferred thing is exactly of the same kind as its prototyped. We infer a cow on the basis of our previous knowledge of cows having dewlaps, while in *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* a property is inferred in a thing from its observation in a quite different kind of thing, as causality is inferred in dead matter, because it is found in living beings. Jayanta has the credit of clearly introducing these two types in the Nyāya and thereby initiating a new tradition so far not accepted in his school. It is probably under the influence

of Jayanta that Keśavamiśra and Annambhaṭṭa adopt these two types and discard other sorts of classifications. Jayanta, on his part, might have adopted this classification under the influence of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists.

(d) KEVALĀNVAYIN, KEVALA VYATIREKIN AND ANVAYA-VYATIREKIN

Uddyotakara is the first logician to introduce *kevalānvayi*, *kevala vyatireki* and *anvaya-vyatireki* as the varieties of inference.[1] He gives as much as six interpretations of the terms *trividham*. In addition to *pūrvavat*, etc., he expounds these three new types. This division is based upon the different methods of establishing *vyāpti*. If a middle term is only positively related to the major term it is called *kavalānvayi*. Here the reason exists in the subject and similar instances and is devoid of dissimilar instances, e.g., all knowable things are nameable the pot is a knowable thing, therefore the pot is nameable Uddyotakara, however, refers to the following example : sound is non-eternal because it is a product. Uddyotakara states that it is an *anvayi* inference for the Buddhists who recognize the non-eternity of all things because there are no dissimilar instances or eternal entities. If the middle term is negatively related to the major term it is called *kevala-vyatireki*. The *vyāpti* here is arrived at only through the method of agreement in absence. It is an inference in which the reason exists in the subject, but does not exist in dissimilar instances. Symbolically, the cases of *vyatireki* inference may be presented as under :

No not-P is M ;
S is M ;
Therefore S is P.

If the middle term is positively and negatively related to the major term in an inference, then it is called *anvaya vyatireki*. In this inference the reason exists in the entire subject and in all similar instances but does not exist in dissimilar instances, such as, sound is non-eternal, because it is produced like a jar. The inference of fire from smoke is also of this kind. This inference can be put in the following form :

All cases of smoke are cases of fire ;
The hill is a case of smoke ;
Therefore the hill is a case of fire.

Jayanta does not accept this division of *anumāna*. Vācaspatimiśra, Gaṅgeśa and Viśvanātha followed the division set forth by

1. त्रिविधमिति, अन्वयी, व्यतिरेकी अन्वयव्यतिरेकी चेति, *N.V.*, 1.1.5

which has evoked such an amount of subtle hair splitting from scholastic disputants as the definition of *vyāpti*."[1] Jayanta's treatment of the problem is quite elaborate, but he puts more emphasis on the problem of ascertaining *vyāpti* rather than on defining its nature. Refutation of the Buddhist views is not only his preoccupation, but, at times, appears as the sole target of his lucubration. The notion of *vyāpti* seems as old as that of inference itself and there is little truth in holding Diṅnāga as the inventor of this concept.[2]

(a) THE NATURE OF VYĀPTI

Etymologically *vyāpti* (*vi+āpti*) is a special relation between two facts which is universal in its nature. Literally *vyāpti* is the state of pervasion, i.e., one of the facts pervades (*vyāpaka*) and the other is pervaded (*vyāpya*). It implies a definite correlation between two facts of which the pervader is present. In the stock example "*Parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt*" smoke is the pervaded and fire is the pervader. This special relationship has been referred to by various seemingly synonymous words such as *liṅga-liṅgi-sambandha*, *gamyagamakabhāva*, *sādhyasādhanabhāva*, *gamakagamyabhāva*, *sādhanasādhyabhāva*, *avinābhāvaniyama*, *prasiddhi* (Kaṇāda), *pratibandha* (Sāṁkhya-Yoga), *sādhyāvinābhāvitva* (Jayanta), *vyāpti* (Navya-Nyāya), *nāntarīyaka* (Śankarasvāmin), *anyathānupapatti* or *anyathānupapannatva* (Jainas), *avinābhāva* (Praśastapāda), etc. But the term '*vyāpti*' has gained more currency as compared to other terms probably due to its easy comprehension and structural compactness. Jayanta, like Gautama, used the term '*niyama*' but he also refers to other terms, e.g., *vyāpti*, *avinābhāva*, etc., and is perfectly familiar with the concept behind them. Before we attempt at presenting Jayanta's theory let us see what the different systems think of the nature of *vyāpti*.

The Vaiśeṣika View. Kaṇāda seems to be aware of invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum and its necessity for inference. He, however, calls it *prasiddhi*.[3] According to Kaṇāda it is a relation between cause and its effect or effect and cause or between two things related by conjunction, inherence, etc. Praśastapāda mentions *vidhi* as a general principle of invariable concomitance

1. *Notes on Tarkasaṁgraha*, (Bombay Sanskrit Series No. LV, 1963) p. 247
2. Sinha. J. N., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, (Cal. 1956). Vol. I, p. 293
3. *V.S.*, 3. 1. 14

derived from the observation of particular instances of co-presence and co-absence of the probans and the probandum. He says that the mark (*liṅga*), inseparably related to the probandum (*sādhya*) in all times and places, leads to its inference.[1] Udayana holds the invariable concomitance *vidhi* as non-separateness of the probans from the probandum.[2] Śrīdhara surpasses all his predecessors in denouncing the Buddhist theory of *vyāpti*.[3] The Vaiśeṣikas, on the whole, hold that invariable concomitance is a natural or unconditional relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* and the basis of this relation is not confined to identity and causality as the Buddists maintain.

The Pre-Jayanta Nyāya View. Gautama and Bhāṣyakāra Vātsyāyana do not mention *vyāpti* by name. Gautama, however, refers to *niyama* and *aniyama* in the sense of invariable concomitance and variable concomitance of the reason with the predicate. Gautama's awareness of this logical basis, though a little vague, can be drawn from his definitions of *anaikāntika*, *hetu* and *jāti*. He states that discrepant reason is that which has variable concomitance with the predicate. He defines *jāti* as an invalid counter argument put forth by an opponent to a reasoning on the basis of mere similarity or dissimilarity of the subject with an example. This implies that the opponent's counter argument becomes invalid because it is unaccompanied by invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate, whereas the argument put forth by the disputant is valid because it is based on concomitance.

Jayanta seems to have taken the clue for adopting the term '*niyama*' for *vyāpti* partly from Gautama and partly from the Buddhists. Vātsyāyana refers to an inseparable relation holding between *liṅga* and *liṅgin* and states that on account of the recollection of a previous perception of smoke and fire together one can infer fire on the basis of perceiving smoke. This is more or less like *vyāpti* but Vātsyāyana does not use the term '*vyāpti*'. He seems to hold this relationship as a ground of inference but he does not define it in a clear-cut manner. In the Nyāya system Uddyotakara is the first to refer to the terms '*avinābhāva*' and '*vyāpti*'. But he criticises those who use the term '*avinābhāva*' and states that its connotation does not fit in explaining the immediate cause of inference. He

1. विधिस्तु यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरग्न्यभावे धूमः अपि न भवति, *V. B.*, (*Anu.*)
2. विधिस्तु-अविनाभावग्रहणप्रकारः, *Kiraṇāvali* (Chow.1918), p. 295
3. *Nyāyakandalī*

refers to three alternative interpretations of *avinābhāva* as *kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha, ekārthasamavāya* and *sambandhamātra* and holds that none of these alternative interpretations makes *avinābhāva* to be the immediately preceding cause of inference. So he rejects the theory of *avinābhāva* and seems to assign its role to the five constituents of inference. Uddyotakara refers to *vyāyti* to refute the Buddhists theory of inference and holds that even if *vyāpti* is accepted it will at the most be useful to ascertain *dharma* subsisting between the *hetu* and *sādhya*. Vācaspatimiśra refers to *avinābhāva* and *vyāpti* but he refrains from defining *vyāpti* elaborately. His exposition of the natural relationship of *sādhana* with *sādhya*, however, is in a way the exposition of the nature of *vyāpti*.[1] Udayana's account of Vācaspatimiśra's view reveals this fact. According to Vācaspatimiśra a natural relation is that which is devoid of conditions, e.g., the relation of smoke with fire. On the other hand, the relation of fire with smoke is conditioned because it depends upon the presence of wet fuel. So it may be implied that, according to Vācaspati, '*vyāpti*' is an unconditional and natural relationship between the *sādhana* and the *sādhya*. This also implies that a conditional *sādhana* becomes *sādhanābhāsa* whereas a *sādhana* devoid of condition invariably becomes a *gamaka* in inferential knowledge. Thus Vācaspatimiśrā's account of *avinābhāva*, on the whole, conforms to the views of Uddyotakara.

The Buddhist View. Arcaṭa, in *Hetubinduṭīkā*, states that *vyāpti* is the character of the probans as well as of the probandum. It is not a symmetrical relation (*ekarūpa sambandha*) but a non-symmetrical relation since the *vyāpya* (probans) and *vyāpaka* (probandum) exhibit two mutually different characteristics (*vibhinna svarūpa*). That is why we can infer from the existence of probans the existence of probandum but not vice versa. '*Vyāpti*, as a character of the probans is referred to by Gaṅgeśa as one of the prima facie definitions of *vyāpti*, and '*vyāpti*' as a chatacteristic of the probandum is referrred to by him as a final definition. Dharamakīrti does not explain the nature of *vyāpti* in *Nyāyabindu* but Dharmottara quotes the relevant extracts from *Hetubindu* and comes to the same conclusion as has been mentioned above with reference to Arcaṭa.[2] Durvekamiśra

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1. तस्मादुपाधि प्रयत्नेनान्विष्यन्तोऽनुपलभमाना नास्तीत्यवगम्य स्वाभाविकत्वं सम्बन्धस्य निश्चिनुमः, *N. V. T. T.*, 1.1.5.

2. साधनस्य साध्येऽर्थे नियतत्वकथनं व्याप्तिकथनम्, *N. Bi. T.* (K. P. J. Research Institute, Patna, 1955) pp. 4-5

also defines *vyāpti* as '*vyāpyavyāpaka-dharmalakṣaṇa*' on the basis of the above account. The Buddhist view of the nature of *vyāpti* is that it is an inseparable relation between two things and is of two kinds, viz., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. Such an inseparable relation can hold between those things that are related by causality or identity. The Buddhists hold that there can be no other inseparable relation, and therefore, the ground of inference is '*avinābhāva*' based on either causation or identity. The relation of causality is one of succession and the relation of identity is one of co-existence.

The Jaina View. *Vyāpti* is termed as '*avinābhāva*' by the Jaina logicians. Hemacandra holds it to be the non-presence of probans in the absence of probandum.[1] The definition of *vyāpti*, as the Buddhist logician Arcaṭa expounded, seems to have been taken into account by Hemacandra. Māṇikyanandī explains *avinābhāva* as '*sahakrama-bhāvaniyam*''.[2] Briefly speaking, the *composite* view of *vyāpti* of the Jaina logicians is that it is the concomitance of a *hetu* with the *sādhya*. It leads to inference. The ascertainment of *avinābhāva* depends upon *tarka*.

The Mīmāṁsā View. Śabara introduces the element of invariable relation in the definition of inference. The phrase '*jñātasambandha*' is definitely indicative of the fact that he holds 'constant association of two things' as the ground of inference. Although he does not refer to *vyāpti* by name, his account of inference amounts to the same thing.

Kumārila holds that the term '*sambandha*' in the Bhāsya refers to the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the middle term with the major term.[3] Kumārila states that *vyāpti* is not a simple assertoric judgment; it is rather a necessary judgment. It is a necessary relation in such form as, if one thing is present the other also must be present. The necessary relation of probans with the probandum implies that not only the observed cases of smoke are cases of fire but that all the cases of smoke in all times are the cases of fire. Pārthasārathī, however, holds that *vyāpti* between smoke and fire amounts to the statement that all the observed cases of smoke are

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1. *Pramāṇamīmāṁsā*, 1. 2. 10
2. इदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवति-असति तु न भवति एव यथाऽग्नावेव धूमस्तदभावे न भवत्येव, *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* 3. 12-3
3. सम्बन्धो व्याप्तिरिष्टात्र लिंगधर्मस्य लिंगिना ।
व्याप्यस्य गमकत्वं च व्यापकं गम्यमिष्यते, *S.V.* (*Anu.*), p. 14

the cases of fire. He is of the view that the term '*vyāpti*' is misleading since the fire on the ground does not make smoke pervade the sky. Instead, he suggests *niyama* as a substitute for the term '*vyāpti*'. He states that *niyama* is the empirical law of invariable association of two things on the basis of which the knowledge of one thing leads to the knowledge of the other. This rule holds good in observed facts and thus inference could attempt to extend its application to unobserved cases as well. Nārāyaṇa holds *vyāpti* as a natural relation, i.e., not dependent on conditions. Interpreting the statement of Śabara, Prabhākara holds that the term *jñātasambandha* refers to *ekadeśadarśana* implying that the uniform relation subsisting between two things, e. g., fire (*ekadeśāntara*) and smoke (*ekadeśa*) must be unfailing, true and permanent, such as that which subsists between cause and its effect. Śālikanātha develops the Prābhākara line of thinking and concludes that "only a definite invariable relation based upon *kārya-kārṇa*, etc., is the ground of inference."[1]

Jayanta's View. Jayanta refers to invariable concomitance (*niyama*) as an essential feature of inference.[2] He holds that it is the presence of *vyāpti* which saves a *hetu* from becoming a *hetvābhāsa.* Jayanta is probably the first logician to define *vyāpti*, taking into consideration its internal and external aspects, i. e., *antarvyāpti* and *bahirvyāpti.* According to Jayanta, when the relation of invariable concomitance is discovered in an abstract manner and it is reaffirmed by a reference to the subject of inference it is inwardly universal (*antarvyāpti*). But when we infer that the hill is fiery we discover that the relation of concomitance holding between smoke and fire exists in all places such as forest, etc., outside the hill. In this situation the relation subsisting between the reason and the consequence is outwardly universal (*bahirvyāpti*). He holds *abādhitatva* (non-contradictoriness of *hetu* and *sādhya*) as an important factor behind the concept of *vyāpti.*

Jayanta does not object to the Buddhists' use of the term '*niyama*' for concomitance. He rather incorporates it in his own definition of *anumāna.* He, however, asks the Buddhists as to what they mean by the term '*niyama*'. He seems to agree with them that it is *vyāpti*, *avinābhāva* or *niyatasāhacarya* but he thinks that the crux of the problem rests not with the explanatory synonyms but with providing convincing methods of ascertaining it. The Buddhists hold identity and causality as the grounds of ascertaining *vyāpti.*

1. *P. P.* (B. H. U. 1961), p. 202
2. गृहीतान्नियमे स्मृतेः, *N. M.* I-101

Jayanta, in his own part, interprets *niyama* as *sāhacarya* and emphatically opposes the Buddhist theory of identity and causality. He is, however, aware of the fact that the Buddhists refer to Kaṇāda as a support to their theory of causality. Kaṇāda has given a list of relations which serve as the basis of inference. He holds that inference is either from effect to cause or from cause to effect or from the inherent to the co-relative or from the negative to the positive term. But Jayanta holds that it is not the intention of Kaṇāda to enumerate all the relations which constitute the basis of inference. He rather mentions them by way of illustration to prove his point that the invariable concomitance between the ground and the consequent constitutes the sound basis for inference.[1]

Jayanta, as has been mentioned above, regards *vyāpti* as the invariability of concomitance. He, however, seems to prefer the terms *niyama* though he has no objection to the use of other synonyms such as *avinābhāva*, *nitya sāhacarya*, etc. Jayanta seems to have adopted the term '*niyama*' for *vyāpti* from Gautama and Buddhists and suffixed *smṛti* to it at the instance of Vātsyāyana. He uses the term *avinābhāva* but does not give prominence to it probably due to the influence of Uddyotakara who rejects it and assigns its role to the five constituents of inference. Similar is the case with the term '*vyāpti*' introduced by the Buddhists and rejected by Uddyotakara who holds that it does not determine *dharma* subsisting between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. Jayanta is, however, silent about *upādhi* whereas Vācaspati states that a natural relation is that which is devoid of *upādhi* (condition).

Jayanta perhaps does not prefer the term '*vyāpti*'. Like Pārthasārathī he also seems to hold that it is misleading since the fire on the ground does not pervade smoke in the sky. The only difference between Pārthasārathī and Jayanta at this juncture is that Pārthasārathī is vocal in supporting the term '*niyama*' and rejecting *vyāpti* whereas Jayanta is silent on both aspects. Jayanta's exposition of the nature of *vyāpti* is not very much striking. His treatment of the problem is destructively directed towards the Buddhists. On this aspect he seems to have forgotten all other schools except the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika. His interpretation of *vyāpti* as *sāhacarya niyama*, however, made an impact on the succeeding logicians. Ann ambhaṭṭa clearly adopts his views.

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1. *N. M.*, I-106-7

(b) ASCERTAINMENT OF VYPĀTI

Ascertainment of *vyāpti* is the most vital aspect of inference. How is *vyāpti* known ? How does one pass from particular cases of the relation between smoke and fire in the kitchen, etc., to the universal proposition such as 'all cases of smoke are cases of fire ? This, in fact, is the problem of induction and does not find an exclusive treatment in Indian logic. It forms part of the theory of inference. In Indian philosophy inference is considered to be a process of reasoning and depends on *vyāpti*, (universal relation). So the most vital question regarding inference relates to the way of getting the universal proposition. The problem is traditionally discussed under the heading *vyāptigrahopāya*. *Vyāpti* being the invariable concomitance, *vyāptigrahopāya* is the method by which one arrives at it. There are divergent views regarding its ascertainment but we shall confine ourselves to those views only which have some relevance to Jayanta's theory.

The Cārvākas' View. All Indian thinkers but the Cārvākas have discussed the ways of ascertaining *vyāpti*. The Cārvākas do not accept *anumāna* as a source of knowing. For them perception is the only way of knowledge. They maintain that it is impossible to ascertain that smoke is invariably and universally accompanied by fire because even if it is accepted that a person knows all cases of smoke in the past and present, future cases will remain outside the limits of his knowledge. So, in their opinion, a universal relation, i.e., *vyāpti* cannot be ascertained. The Cārvākas are radical empiricists. To them all knowledge is limited to the particulars. They contend that the knowledge of the relation between two particular cases does not lead us to determine the relation of all such possible cases at all times. Generalisation is not possible from particulars. Perception does not help us to establish a universal proposition. Perception leads to the knowledge of a particular thing or a limited number of particular things, that is why it cannot become an instrument in arriving at a universal proposition.

The Buddhist Method. The Buddhists accept *vyāpti* as a ground of inference and have propounded the theory of identity and causality in this regard. They maintain that a universal relation can be ascertained without considering all its past, present and future cases if it is proved that the referred cases are related either through causality or through identity of essence. In addition to the presentation of a positive theory of ascertaining *vyāpti*, the Buddhists have

the credit of successfully proving the possibility of this process against the arguments of the Cārvākas. The Buddists reject the contention of the Cārvākas pointing out that their refutation of inference is itself a process of reasoning which again depends on some kind of *vyāpti*. In this way their contention amounts to a refutation of their own position, i.e., 'no process of reasoning is valid', whereas, in fact, when the Cārvākas arrive at conclusions such as God, soul, etc., do not exist because they are not perceived, it is clear that they do so by means of inference. The Buddhists' position regarding the method of arriving at the knowledge of invariable concomitance has been described in the following way by Dharmakīrti in *Prāmaṇavārtika*. *Vpāpti* is known through the knowledge of causality or identity. It can be established neither by observation of some positive instances of a relation, for example, between smoke and fire, nor by the mere non-observation of fire and smoke together in a few negative instances. So *vyāpti* cannot be proved by perception or by non-perception. It is the knowledge of causality which is also known as *kārya-kāraṇabhāva* or *tadutpatti sambandha*.[1] They maintain that when two things are related as cause and effect they are always and everywhere related to each other. The cause cannot be separated from its effect nor the effect from its cause. Hence the Buddhists contend that the law of causality is a universal law. The relation of causality is one of succession and the relation of identity is one of c-oexistence. According to the Buddhists there can be no other inseparable relation and hence the ground of inference must be a relation either of causality or of identity.

The Law of Causality. The Buddhists classify the *hetu* or the middle term into three kinds on the basis of *vyāpti* which the *hetu* has with the *sādhya* or the major term. These three types are known as *svabhāvahetu*, *kāryahetu* and *anupalabdhihetu*. According to the Buddhist, we can infer a cause from its effect but not vice versa. That is why they have not included the *kāraṇahetu* in their classification. Of these the first is based upon the principle of identity (*tādātmya*) between the middle term and the major term. It means that the *hetu* contains in itself the *sādhya* because the latter is an inherent property of the former or because the former (the middle term) is the essence of the latter (the major term). The *kāryahetu* and the *anupalabdhi hetu* are grounded on the principle of causation

1. कार्यकारणभावाद् वा स्वभावाद् वा नियामकात् ।
अविनाभावनियमो दर्शनान्न न दर्शनात्, *P.V.*, III. 31

The former gives us concomitance of the effect with its cause and not vice versa. The latter states the fact that there is agreement in absence between the cause and its effect. The Buddhists maintain that the *vyāpti,* based upon the principle of identity, is ascertained through direct observation by a person who notes the fact that an absurdity attaches itself to a contrary opinion. There is a relation of identity between a 'Śiṁśapā tree' and a tree. But we cannot imagine a Śiṁśapā tree losing its arboreity without losing its own self.[1] The *Vyāpti,* which is based on the principle of causation, involves a knowledge of the relation of cause and effect. This knowledge is said to be ascertained by the test of *pañcakāraṇī.*

The Process of Pañcakāraṇī. To determine whether the relation between two objects is causal or not, the Buddhists apply a test which is known as *Pañcakāraṇī.* This test consists of five steps, viz., (1) non-perception of an effect prior to its production, which means that effect is an event that appears only after a phenomenon known as its cause ; (2) perception of the cause ; (3) the appearance of the effect in immediate succession ; (4) disappearance of the cause, and (5) disappearance of the effect in immediate succession.[2] This Buddhist method of determining the causal relation resembles Mill's method of difference in its double application. "If, all other conditions remaining the same the appearance of one phenomenon is immediately followed by that of another, and its disappearance is immediately followed by the disappearance of the other, then the two are related as cause and effect. When once we know them to be related as cause and effect, we may very well take them as universally related."[3]

The Law of Identity. The principle of identity is another ground on which a universal proposition is based. Identity, according to the Buddhists, is that relation between two such different objects which coexists in the same locus. The Buddhists maintain that there is an identity between the genus and its species or between the class and

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2. सत्यप्यन्वयविज्ञाने स तर्कः परिनिष्ठितः ।
अविनाभावसम्बन्धः साकल्येनावधार्यते ॥

Māṇikyanandī elaborates this method and explains its two sub-laws, namely, the law of *sahabhāva* and *kramabhāva*.[1] From this account of Māṇikyanandī it appears that he does not find Dharmakīrti's words (*tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*) appropriate and so introduces instead new terms indicating a slightly different way of arriving at *vyāpti*. Dharmabūṣana has presented a more comprehensive account of *tarka*. He holds that *tarka* is the totality of memory, recognition and repeated experience.[2]

The Vaiśeṣika Method. Praśastapāda holds that the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is known by the repeated observation of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence.[3] Udayana also holds that *vyāpti* is known through the method of double agreement and not by a single observation. Śrīdhara refutes the Buddhist method of identity and causality. He very interestingly asks the Buddhists as to what the form of relationship between the invariable concomitance on the one hand and causality and identity on the other is. Does the invariable concomitance depend upon causality and identity, or, do the causality and identity depend upon the invariable concomitance ? Niether of the alternatives is tenable since earthiness is a property of smoke but it is not concomitant with fire and similarly there is no invariable concomitance between tree in general and a particular tree Śiṁśapā. The first alternative does not hold good. If causality and identity depend upon invariable concomitance, then the *vyāpti* itself should be regarded as indicator (gamaka) of the existence of the probandum, and in that case causality and identity become useless. Moreover, a probans proves the existence of a probandum even in the absence of causality and identity. For instance, the setting of *kṛttikā* indicates the rise of *Rohiṇī*. Therefore, causality and identity are not the grounds of inference. With the refutation of these two laws Śrīdhara supports his predecessors and comes to the conclusion that repeated observation is the means of ascertaining concomitance.[4]

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1. सहक्रमभावनियमोऽविनाभावः । सहचारिणोः व्याप्यव्यापकयोश्च सहभावः पूर्वोत्तरचारिणोः कार्यकारणयोश्च क्रमभावः, *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra*.
2. *N. D.* (Vir Sewa Mandir, Delhi, 1945) pp. 62-4
3. एवं प्रसिद्धसमयस्यासन्दिग्धधूमदर्शनात् साहचर्यानुस्मरणात्तदनन्तर-मग्न्यध्यवसायो भवति, *V. B.* (*Anu.*)
4. *N. K.* (*Anu.*)

The Pre-Jayanta Nyāya Method. Gautama states that a *pratyakṣa* is the cause of inference. Vātsyāyana elaborates the process and says that first, there is perception of a mark (liṅga, e.g., smoke) ; secondly, there is the recollection of invariable concomitance of the probans (*hetu*, e.g., smoke) with the probandum (*sādhya*, e.g., fire) ; thirdly, there is the inference of the existence of the unperceived predicate (fire) in the subject (hill). If the *liṅga-liṅgi sambandha* is taken to mean 'concomitance', it may be safely said that Vātsyāyana accepts perception as the basis of ascertaining *vyāpti*. Uddyotakara endorses the view of Vātsyāyana but adds that the three conditions mentioned by Vātsyāyana are three successive types of *pratyakṣa* and all of them are the instruments of inference.[1] The last *pratyakṣa* is termed as *parāmarśa* and the first two perceptions and *smṛti* are described as its aids. So it can be presumed that in Uddyotakara's account of inference, *parāmarśa* may serve as the basis of *vyāpti*. Vācaspatimiśra propounds the principle of *Svābhāvikasaṁbandha* which is determined either by *pratyakṣa* when the *sādhana* and *sādhya* are perceived or by *bhūyodarśana sahakṛta tarka* where it is not directly perceived.[2]

The Śaṁkhya Method. The Sāṁkhyas ascertain *vyāpti* through perception. But Vijñānabhikṣu, the commentator on *Sāṁkhyasūtra* refers to *anukūltarka* as a means of ascertaining *niyama*, i.e., *vyāpti*. He holds *vyāpti* as invariable concomitance of reason with the consequent and refers to *anukūlatarka sahakṛta darśana* as the method of arriving at such a concomitance.[3]

The Bhāṭṭa Method. The Bhāṭṭa Method of ascertainment of *vyāpti* consists of two aspects, viz., (a) criticism of the Buddhist method and (b) exposition of repeated experience (*bhūyodarśana*) as their own method.[4] The Buddhist law of causality is criticised by

1. लिंगलिंगिसम्बन्धदर्शनम् आद्यं-प्रत्यक्षं लिंगदर्शनं द्वितीयम्। ....स्मृत्यनन्तरं च पुनर्लिंगदर्शनम्, तदिदम् अन्तिमं प्रत्यक्षं पूर्वाभ्यां प्रत्यक्षाभ्यां स्मृत्या चानुगृह्यमाणं लिंग परामर्शरूपम् अनुमानं भवति, *N. V.*, 1.1.5

2. तस्मादभिजातमणिभेदतत्त्ववद् भूयोदर्शनजनितसंस्कारसहितमिन्द्रियमेव धूमादीनां वह्न्यादिभिः स्वाभाविकसम्बन्धग्राहीति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः, *N. V. T. T.*, 1.1.5.

3. नियमश्चानुकूलतर्केण ग्राह्यः, *S. P.B.*, 5.29

4. भूयोदर्शनगम्या च व्याप्तिः सामान्यधर्मयोः ।
ज्ञायते भेदहानेन क्वचिच्चापि विशेषयोः, *S. V.*. (*Anu.*)

the Bhāṭṭas on the basis that causality is only a law of regular sequence and so is *vyāpti*. Therefore, it will be a case of self-dependence if a law is made to serve as proof of another law. Similarly, the Buddhist law of identity has no ground because tree-ness does not inhere in Śiṁśapā alone as there are trees which are not Śiṁśapās, whereas the nature of one thing inheres in that thing alone. But here treeness inheres in other trees also. More-over, the possibility of inherence of treeness in non-trees in some other places or in some other times cannot be ruled out for ever. On the basis of experience we can only know that treeness and Śiṁśapāness coexist but our experience does not reveal that Śiṁśapā-ness is the nature of treeness. So the Bhāṭṭas hold that neither causality nor identity could serve as a method of arriving at *vyāpti*. Expounding his own method of ascertaining *vyāpti* Kumārila states that it is known through repeated observation. By *vyāpti* he means a necessary relation generally between two particulars. *Vyāpti* is established by the joint method of agreement and difference. Kumārila holds that *vyāpti* is induction from a limited number (*mitadeśatva*) of observed cases. He, however, does not explain as to how a necessary relation can be extracted from a limited number of experiences Pārthasārathī, commenting on the term '*mitadeśatva*', however, states that the ground of the inference of fire from smoke is the premise, such as, 'all observed cases of smoke, are cases of fire' instead of the premise 'all the observed and non-observed cases of smoke are cases of fire'. In other words, in inference we reason from particular to particular rather than from universal to particular.

Pārthasārathī maintains that *vyāpti* is known from frequent experience (*bhūyodarśana*), but what he means by '*bhūyodarśana* is that 'all observed cases of smoke are cases of fire'. Pārthasārathī seems to hold that a specific means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) cannot be named in the present context. He is aware of the fact that even a frequent observation proves the relation of probans and probandum in a limited number of cases only. So he does not accept that all cases of smoke are cases of fire and instead observes that '*bhūyodarśana*' refers to the observed cases and not to all cases of fire.

The later Bhāṭṭas seem to have been influenced by the Naiyāyikas and so, in addition to the method of agreement in presence and agreement in difference, they adopt the method of *tarka* in order to eliminate even the suspicion of invisible extraneous conditions.[1]

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1. प्रदृश्योपाधिशङ्का तु तर्केरेव निरस्यते, *Manameyodaya* (*Anu.*), 27

Umbeka, however, holds that *vyāpti* is known through *arthāpatti*. When we observe smoke with fire a hundred times and never observe it without fire we cannot explain this fact otherwise than by presuming that smoke must be invariably concomitant with fire. So the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire is ascertained through presumption. Pārthasārathī objects to this view arguing that there is nothing which is inexplicable without presuming a *vyāpti* between smoke and fire. The fact of non-observation of smoke without fire is quite explicable by the non-existence of smoke and the non-existence of fire.

The Prābhākara Method. The Prābhākaras refer to *asakṛdarśana* (*i.e.*, repeated observation) but they assign separate roles to the first and the subsequent observations. According to Prabhākara, though the knowledge of *vyāyti* is gained by a single act of sense perception in the very first observation, e.g., of smoke and fire, subsequent observations confirm the *vyāpti* apprehended in the first observation. Prābhākara is of the view that substances are limited by space and time but their conjunction is free from these limitations. The *vyāpti* of smoke with fire, which means a relation of the two free from all spatio-temporal limitations (*deśakālānavacchinna*), is cognized through perception. *Agnimattā*, i.e., the property of being conjoined with fire, belongs to smoke and it is perceived in the same way in which the colour of smoke is perceived. Though both the conjunctions, viz., that of smoke with fire and that of fire with smoke are given by the first perception the former attains the rank of *vyāpti* because it is never contradicted while the latter loses it because it is found to be contradicted when subsequently, fire is seen without smoke. Śālikanātha interprets *vyāpti* as *avyabhicāra* and refers to *asakṛddarśana* as means of its ascertainment. He is of the view that perception as a means of knowing helps us to ascertain the relation of probans and probandum and could ascertain the invariable concomitance subsisting between the two through the perception itself.

Prābhākaras views are rejected on the ground that they are not supported by experience. Sucaritamiśra states that knowledge of *vyāpti* arises after observations of two things together. We know the invariable relation of smoke and fire on the basis of one perception, but not on the basis of first perception as Prabhākara maintains. It is only the final experience helped by the revival of the memory impressions of previous experiences that a person comes to know

that smoke possesses the nature of being invariably accompanied by fire.

Jayanta's Method. Jayanta vehemently refutes the Buddhist law of identity and rejects it on the following grounds :

If we accept the law of identity as a ground for ascertaining invariable concomitance, the middle term becomes identical with the major term and it is impossible to establish the mark, and if the middle term is not recognised the major term also is not known.[1]

Identity between two objects involves the simultaneous apprehension of them. But here, in the present context, if the smoke and fire are simultaneously grasped then what is the need of resorting to inference ? Moreover, if they are not apprehended simultaneously, how could they be considered as identical ?

If the Buddhists hold that in spite of the simultaneous apprehension of effect and cause the inference has a justification, since it is necessary for sublating a contrary character which otherwise may be ascribed to the object to be inferred, Jayanta points out that there is no scope for such an eventuality when an object is rightly determined. For instance, if we see the head, hands, etc., of an organic whole, we cannot hold that the object is a post. As far as the example cited by the Buddhists is concerned, there is no possibility of determining Śiṁśapā as other than a tree since it is just possible that a tree may not be a Śiṁśapā, but it is not possible that a Śiṁśapā will be a Śiṁśapā without being a tree.[2]

If it is accepted that the reason is identical with the consequent, then, like the inference that it is tree because it is a Śiṁśapā, it should also be inferred that it is a Śiṁśapā since it is a tree. Similar is the case with productivity and non-eternality. If they are held identical, any one of the two should lead to the inference of the other, whereas the fact is that if we infer that this is a product because it is non-eternal the difference holding between the two will not exist. And if there is no difference between the reason and the consequent what is the need of inference ?

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1. तादात्म्ये तावद् गमकांगे हेतुसाध्ययोरव्यतिरेके गम्यगमकभाव एव दुरुपपादः, *N. M.*, 1-104

2. प्रमातुः शिंशपात्वं हि यस्य प्रत्यक्षगोचरः ।
परोक्षं तस्य वृक्षत्वमिति नातीव लौकिकम्, *Ibid.*

The Buddhists support the principle of identity on the basis of the fact that full-fledged relation (*Saṃbandha*) and invariable concomitance (*Pratibandha*) are two different things. *Sambandha* belongs to the term and the *relata*, whereas *pratibandha* implies the dependence of one term upon the another and not vice versa. A Śiṁśapā is invariably a tree but a tree is not invariably a Śiṁśapā. The Buddhists call this one-sided dependence *pratibandha* and this is what they indirectly mean by identity.[1] Jayanta objects to this manoeuvring and observes that even if this interpretation is accepted, the term '*niyama*' is more appropriate, than *tādātmya* since the word '*tādātmya*' in fact indicates full-fledged identity which is clearly lacking in the given instances. There are instances where the reason is absent but the consequent is seen to be present. If one exists without the other, how can they be held as identical? Jayanta, therefore, points out that the identity of the probans with the probandum cannot be maintained.[2]

The Buddhists cite the following example to illustrate inference based upon identity. 'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product', and envisage the identity of productivity with destructivity. Jayanta points out that though it is a common experience that every product is bound to be destroyed, the production is not itself a destruction. In other words, they are not identical. Moreover, destruction is negation. It cannot be a property belonging to a substratum since when we cognise destruction the object destroyed is never present to our consciousness.

If the Buddhists contend that in the above example the reason and the consequent both are existent, the suffix '*tya*' in the word '*anitya*' too signifies an abstract quality, which is positive. A positive essence is incompatible with the negative real. *Kṛtakatva* and *anityatva* both are existent and hence the Buddhists insist that it is an instance of inference based upon the law of identity. But Jayanta refutes the Buddhists stating that the reason and the consequent are not present to consciousness in the form described by the Buddhists.

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1. तादात्म्यं प्रतिबन्धः, *N.M.*, I-104
2. अभावेन हि धर्मेण तद्वत्ता धर्मिणः कथम्, अभावग्रहवेलायां धर्मिणोऽनुपलम्भनात्, *Ibid.*, I-105

Jayanta introduces a controversy over the terms '*anityatva*' and '*kṛtakatva*' and joins issue with the Buddhists. He holds that a negative real has also some unique property. Hence the word '*anityatva*' denotes the possession of destruction which has merely an ideal existence and the word '*kṛtakatva*' denotes having origin but not existence. The Buddhists, on the other hand, contend that it should denote such existence as belongs to an object which has been brought about by its cause. But Jayanta points out that it is better to hold that it simply denotes the character of being a product belonging to the said object. He comes to the conclusion that the Buddhist contention of identity of *anityatva* with *kṛtakatva* is not tenable. The syllogism which contains origin and destruction as its middle term and major term does not illustrate the law of identity since the middle term is distinct from the major term.

Jayanta's refutation of the Buddhist theory of Causality. Jayanta holds that the Buddhist theory of causality also is not tenable. The cause and effect relationship must have two objects. The Buddhists believe in the theory of momentariness. So Jayanta asks them as to whether the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two momentary objects or between the two series of momentary objects. The first alternative is not sound since such a relation is not possible between two moments. Even if it takes place it is very difficult to comprehend it because of their subtle character. The two series as of smoke and fire have a mere imaginary existence and, therefore, causal relation does not subsist between them.

The Buddhists believe that the reality of an object consists in its practical efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). If the effect, e.g., smoke, leads to the inference of cause, e.g., fire, then all the attributes of smoke such as bad odour, dark colour, etc., should constitute the reason.

It cannot be held that smoke with limited characteristic features is the effect of fire and smoke with some other characteristics is not the effect of fire. It is evident from the joint method of agreement and difference that smoke with all its attributes is the effect of fire and the Buddhists should simply hold that smoke marked by its class character is concomitant with fire and leads to the inference of fire and in such a case there is no need of holding causal relation as a ground of inference. It is rather sufficient to state that the relation of concomitance is the means of inference. The reason and the

consequent constitute a sound basis of inference. We infer fire from smoke not because of their causal connection but because of their invariable concomitance.[1]

As regards the Buddhist contention that Kaṇāda also expounds the inference of cause from the effect, and that their theory of causality is just the same, Jayanta points out that it is not the intention of Kaṇāda to enumerate the relations which constitute the basis for inference. He rather mentions them to prove that the invariable concomitance between the reason and the consequence constitutes a sound basis of inference. We infer fire from smoke not because of their causal connection but because of their invariable concomitance.

Though, before the advent of Jayanta in Nyāya, his predecessors have also dealt with the problem of ascertaining *vyāpti* and Jayanta's exposition more or less conforms to their views, there are a number of specific features which render his account quite distinct from that of his predecessors.

His superiority over his predecessors, however, consists mainly in the fact that they could not provide the same arguments as have been supplied by him against the Buddhist laws of identity and causality.

Vācaspatimiśra's exposition of the problem would seem much more advanced than that of Jayanta if we consider the problem from the Nyāya point of view alone. But here Jayanta's account is much more sharp than that of Vācaspatimiśra and this is the main factor that makes the dashing logician in Jayanta more colourful than the brooding philosopher in Vācaspatimiśra.

THE FORMS OF VYĀPTI

Samavyāpti and Viṣamavyāpti. There are divergent views regarding the types of *vyāpti.* Kumārila mentions two varieties, namely, *samavyāpti* and *viṣamavyāpti.* When the space or time of the pervader and the pervaded is similar, it is *samavyāpti* and when the pervaded occupies less space or time, it is termed as *viṣamavyāpti.*[2] Besides Udayana and Gaṅgeśa, Jayanta also refers to these types of concomitance.

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1. धूमत्वमात्रमेवाग्निसहचारीति मन्यसे । सहचारित्वमेवास्तु तदुत्पत्तिकथा वृथा, *N.M.*, I-106
2. *Ś. V. (Anu.)*, 4-6

Anvaya-Vyāpti and Vyatireka-Vyāpti. Prasastapāda is perhaps the first to name two varieties of *vyāpti* known as *anvayavyāpti* and *vyatirekavyāpti. Anvayavyāpti* is the positive concomitance of probans and probandum and *vyatirekavyāpti* is the negative concomitance of them.[1] These are the widely known and generally accepted varieties of *vyāpti* and the majority of the logicians have referred to them. Dharmakīrti, Jayanta, Gangeśa, Keśavamiśra, Viśvanātha and Annambhaṭṭa have discussed these types. A combination of these two types results in an another variety known as *anvayavyatirekavyāpti* i.e., a *vyāpti* derived from the joint method of agreement and difference. *Vyatirekavyāpti* is a converse of the *anvayavyāpti.* There is a difference of opinion about *vyatirekavyāpti.* According to some logicians it is not a different *vyāpti* but a mere statement of the *anvaya* obtained by a sort of conversion of the major premise. The process, however, is not simple conversion, but corresponds to that which Bain calls obverted conversion or contra-position.

Sādharmya Vyāpti and Vaidharmya Vyāpti. On the basis of the positive and negative character of concomitance the above-mentioned types are also called as *sādharmyavyāpti* and *vaidharmavyāpti.*

Tathopapatti and Anyathānupapatti. Māṇikyanandī in *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra* and Hemacandra in *Pramāṇamimāṁsā* mention these types by different names, viz., *tathopapatti* and *anyathānupapatti.*

Sahabhāvaniyama and Kramabhāvaniyama. Māṇikyanandī refers to these types of *vyāpti* by the terms *Sahabhāvaniyama* and *kramabhāvaniyama. Abhinavacārukīrti* also mentions these types.

Antarvyāpti and Bahirvyāyti. Jayanta holds that when the relation of invariable concomitance is discovered in an abstract manner and it is reaffirmed by a reference to the subject of inference, we call it *antarvyāpti* (inwardly universal). On the contrary, when we infer that the hill is fiery, we discover that the relation of concomitance holding between smoke and fire exists in all places such as forest, etc. In such cases though the relation in question is believed to be universal, yet it is called *bahirvyāpti* (outwardly universal). At a subsequent period of time, when it is inferred that the forest is fiery, it virtually becomes *antarvāpti.*[2] The Jaina logician Prabhācandra adds one more type in this series, viz., *sakalavyāpti.*[3]

1. *V. B.*, (*Anu*)
2. *N. M.*, 1-102
3. *P. K. M.*, (*Anu.*)

Sub-varieties of Vyāpti The Navya-Nyāya has devoted comparatively more attention to the varieties and sub-varieties of *vyāpti*. The characteristic feature of the division, however, is the difference in the grouping of definitions, rather than in the structure of various types. *Anvayavyāpti* is sub-divided into two types, viz., *pūrvapakṣavyāpti* and *siddhāntapakṣavyāpti*. The class of *Pūrvapakṣavyāpti* comprises twenty-one definitions of which five forming one group are called *pañcalakṣanī*, the other group of fourteen is termed as *caturdaśalakṣaṇī* and last two have the quaint names *sinhalakṣaṇa* and *vyāghralakṣaṇa*. Amongst the above-mentioned types of *vyāpti*, the group of *anvayavyāpti*, *vyatirekavyāpti* and *anvayavyatirekavyāpti* is more popular than others. Jayanta's introduction and treatment of *antarvyāpti* and *bahirvyāpti* are somewhat new to the Nyāya and could be counted in the original contribution that Jayanta has made in the field of knowledge.

4. *The Avayavas (constituents) of Anumāna*

(a) JAYANTA'S THEORY OF PAÑCĀVAYAVA

Anumāna, according to the Nyāya, has five constituents or *avayavas*, viz., *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. If we take the stock example, i.e., the hill is fiery because it has smoke, these constituents could be illustrated in the following way:

(*a*) With a positive instance :

(1)	*Pratijñā*	:	The hill is fiery.
(2)	*Hetu*	:	Because it has smoke.
(3)	*Udāharaṇa*	:	Whatever is smoky is fiery as is the hearth.
(4)	*Upanaya*	:	So, like the kitchen, the hill is smoky.
(5)	*Nigamana*	:	So, like the hearth the hill is fiery.

(*b*) With a negative instance :

(1)	*Pratijñā*	:	The hill is fiery.
(2)	*Hetu*	:	Because it is smoky.
(3)	*Udāharaṇa*	:	What is non-fiery is non-smoky.
(4)	*Upanaya*	:	Unlike the lake, the hill is not non-smoky.
(5)	*Nigamana*	:	Therefore, unlike the lake the hill is not non-fiery, i.e., it is fiery.

Most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians accept these constituents and illustrate their forms and mutual relationship in the following

1. *Pratijñā.* Gautama has enumerated *pratijñā* or thesis as the first of the five members of *anumāna.* He holds that it is the declaration of that which is to be established. Vātsyāyana illustrates Gautama's statement and holds that *pratijñā* is a judgment based upon the synthesis of a subject with a predicate. Uddyotakara's view conforms to that of Vātsyāyana. Like Gautama, Praśastapāda also mentions *pratijñā* as the first of the constituents of *anumāna.* But he slightly amends the Nyāya definition of *pratijñā* holding that the thesis must not be contradicted by perception, inference, etc. Nyāyapraveśakāra uses the term *pakṣa* in place of *pratijñā.* Similar trend is found in the later Nyāya. Jayanta takes *pakṣa* and *pratijñā* as synonyms.

Though there is difference of opinion amongst the logicians of various systems regarding the efficacy of *pratijñā* as a constituent of *anumāna,* as far as its own form is concerned we can hold it as a tentative statement of relation, either affirmative or negative, between the minor term and the major term without giving any justifying grounds. Its validity is asserted by other members. It tells us simply what the locus of inference is and what we want to infer with respect to it.

2. *Hetu.* The *hetu* or reason is the second member of the syllogism. Gautama states that *hetu* is the means for establishing *sādhya* through an affirmative or negative example. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara support the Sūtrakāra and hold that both of the above-mentioned types of example are necessary to ward off fallacy of reason. Praśastapāda refers to it as *apadeśa* and holds that it is the statement of mark or probans which is invariably concomitant with the probandum. It has three characteristics. The Buddhist logicians Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara and the Jaina logicians Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, etc., support the three-characteristic-theory of *hetu.* Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta refer to five instead of three characteristics of reason and thereby introduce an important new feature. *Hetu,* thus, asserts the truth of a tentatively stated proposition. It also necessitates the mention of example (*udaharaṇa*).

The Buddhists have given three characteristics of *hetu.* Uddyotakāra criticizes them vehemently. As far as his own view is concerned he supports the four or five-characteristic theory of *hetu* as propounded by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. He holds that *anvayavyatirekin* is a case of five-characteristic *hetu* and *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin* are the cases of four-characteristic *hetu.*[1]

As has been mentioned before, at the time of Vatsyāyana there were two theories regarding the members of a syllogism, viz., five-member syllogism and ten-member syllogism. Vātsyāyana supported Sūtrakāra's theory of five-member syllogism against the ten-member syllogism theory of some Naiyāyikas. The five members are termed as thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion. Whereas some logicians lay down five more members, viz., inquiry (*jijñāsā*), questioning the reason (*samśaya*), *sakyatāprāpti*, *prayojana* and *sanśayavyudāsa*. Uddyotakāra examines them and also the three-member-syllogism theory of Diṅnāga or that of Māṭhara (the Sāṁkhya logicians).

Jayanta states that a mark (*liṅga*) possesses five characteristic features, viz., (1) The presence of the reason in the subject (*pakṣadharmatva*), (2) the presence of the reason in the probative example (*sapakṣadharmatva*), (3) the absence of the reason from the counter example (*vipakṣavyāvṛtti*), (4) uncontradictedness (*abādhitaviṣayatva*) and (5) uncounterbalancedness (*asat pratipakṣtva*). A reason which has these five characteristic features leads to the inference of a conclusion. The faulty reasons are those which are devoid of any one of these features.

Jayanta is of the view that the presence of these five features in the reason firmly establishes the presence of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum.

3. *Udāharaṇa.* The *udāharaṇa* or example is the third member of the syllogism. Gautama refers to two types of example, namely, *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*.

4. *Upanaya. Upanaya* or application is the fourth member of syllogism. It reasserts the existence of the reason in the subject. It is the application of a general principle to a particular instance. When the *udāharaṇa* indicates that there is a universal relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, the *upanaya* states that the *hetu* abides in the *pakṣa*.

Upanaya is not a mere repetition of reason. It removes all doubts as to the presence of the reason in the subject without which there can be no conclusion. Like reason and example it is also of two kinds.

5. *Nigamana.* The *nigamana* or conclusion is the fifth member of the syllogism. It synthesizes all members of a demonstrative

1. *N. V., (Anu.)*

inference and proves the existence of the predicate in the subject. It differs from *pratijñā* in that it has a conclusive assertion, whereas the latter has only a tentative one.

There is difference of opinion regarding the number of the members of a syllogism. In addition to these five, some Naiyāyikas refer to five more constituents and thereby hold that anumāna has ten constituents. The Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins believe in a three-member syllogism consisting of either first three or the last three of the above-mentioned five members The Mīmāṁsakas reject the five-member syllogism on the ground that it involves avoidable repetition. There are also some Naiyāyikas who put their arguments in the form of three-member syllogism. The Buddhists reduce the syllogism to two members, namely, the *udāharaṇa* and the *upanaya.* They maintain that *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *nigamana* are superfluous.

Jayanta elaborately discusses these constituents But he devotes his attention to *hetu* and supports the five-characteristics theory of it against the argument of his opponents.[1]

(*b*) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF OTHER THEORIES OF THE AVAYAVAS OF ANUMĀNA

Tryavayava Theory. The Sāṁkhyas and the Mīmāṁsakas are of the view that *anumāna* requires just three avayavas. Jayanta rejects this view on the ground that the arguments extended by him for accepting the theory of *pañcāvayavas* automatically refute the contention of those who are in favour of the lesser number of syntactic constituents of *anumāna.*

Dvyavayava Theory. Jaina teachers, as Dr. Sanghvi puts it, are of the view that the number of steps (requisite in an inference for others) is not fixed but may be more or less according as the hearer concerned is less or more competent. According to Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandī pakṣa (*pratijñā*) and *hetu* are the two minimum necessary constituents but the remainders of the Nyāya list may also be necessary in dealing with certain categories of hearers. Hemacandra also endorses this view. Māṇikyanandī further states that two constituents are required in the course of a debate (*vāda*) but in the course of a systematic exposition five constituents could also be employed. Vādirāja, on the other hand, is of the view that *hetu* is the only step required when the hearer is an expert in the subject concerned. Thus, the Jaina thinkers' analysis of *avayavas* depends

1. *N. M.*, I-101

chiefly upon the grasping ability of the hearer though a general notion is that they accept *pakṣa* and *hetu* as the essential constituents of *anumāna*. Dharmakīrti discards *pakṣa* and thinks it sufficient to have only two constituents, namely, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*. Akalaṅka, the Jaina logician, on the other hand, thinks that *pakṣa* and *hetu* are essential while there are some cases of inference where *dṛṣṭānta* is not necessary. Mīṁikyanandī supports this view on the ground that *dṛṣṭānta* is necessary neither for the apprehension of the probandum nor for the ascertainment of concomitance. Thus, though the Buddhist and the Jaina logicians differ with regard to the retention of *pakṣa* and *dṛṣṭānta*, so far as the number of constituents is concerned their views are surprisingly identical. Jayanta's objection to this view of *avayava* is the same as we have mentioned above in respect of the *tryavayava* theory of syntactical constituents.

Daśāvayava Theory. Vātsyāyana states that in addition to the above-mentioned five *avyavas*, the following five more are propounded by some old logicians : *jijñāsa* (the desire to know the truth), *saṁśaya* (the doubt about the real nature of the object), *sakyprāti* (the capacity to lead to knowledge), *prayojana* (the purpose of anumāna), and *saṅśayavyudāsa* (the removal of doubts about the truth of an inference). The author of *Yuktidīpikā* also refers to these additional *avayavas*.

This theory of *daśavayava* has been rejected by the later Naiyāyikas on the ground that these five additional *avayavas* are not necessary since they are at the most psychological conditions rather than logical steps in drawing a conclusion. Vātsyāyana clarifies the point holding that the desire to know (*jijñāsa*) is necessary in all cases of knowledge and it is not simply confined to inference. Though the doubt (*saṁśaya*) inspires in us a desire to know something simply to doubt is not to prove anything. *Sakyaprāpti* refers to the validity of methods but the validity of methods cannot be accepted as a constituent factor behind the inference. Similarly, the purpose that an inference serves, cannot be held as a part of inference itself. As far as the removal of doubt is concerned, it indirectly supports the conclusion but it does not really prove it. Jayanta, on the other hand, strikes a new point maintaining that in the syllogism *jijñāsa saṅśaya* and *sakyaprāpti* are not expressed in words. They are rather mental processes of *pramata* and, therefore, do not figure in the actual structure of the syllogistic sentence. *Prayojana* also is not the part of the *Nyāyavākya*, since the latter stands outside the confines

of the former. With regard to *saṃśayavyudāsa* Jayanta states that it is clearly a different sentence. Therefore, he comes to the conclusion that *jijñāsa*, etc., are the motivating factors (*pravṛttihetavaḥ*) but certainly these do not constitute the syntactical structure of *anumāna*.

5. *The Fallacies of Inference*

It is just possible that a process of inference may appear sound, but in reality it may prove otherwise. Such a defect in the process of inference is called a fallacy and is generally detected only on a close examination. The fallacies of inference evidently arise from the violation of one or other of the principles on which the correctness of inference depends. "The Nyāya account of the fallacies of inference", as Dr. S. C. Chatterjee rightly holds, "is accordingly limited to those of its members or constituent propositions and these have been finally reduced to those of *hetu* or reason."[1] According to Gautama, an inference consists of five constituents, namely, *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya* and *nigamana*. Hence the fallacies may be of five types, but the Naiyāyikas seem to be of the view that the validity of inference depends chiefly on the validity of reason and similarly the fallacies of inference also chiefly arise out of the fallacious *hetu*. That is why the Naiyāyikas in general do not give a separate treatment to the fallacies of thesis and example and discuss only the fallacies of reason. In *Nyāyamañjarī* Jayanta gives an elaborate account of the fallacies of reason, perhaps more detailed than by any one else, but he also refrains from discussing *pratijñābhāsa* and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* and seems to hold their separate treatment simply superfluous. In this work Jayanta categorically states that a valid *hetu* must fulfil five conditions and an invalid reason is that which violates one or other of these conditions. In his *Nyāyakalikā*, however, we find the enumeration of the following eleven types of faulty subjects and three kinds of faulty example[2].

(*a*) THE PAKṢĀBHĀSAS (FALLACIES OF THE SUBJECT)

Jayanta refers to eleven kinds of faulty subjects, though as in the case of faulty examples here also he thinks that these are really the cases of fallacies of reason.[3] He, however, enumerates them as under :

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1. *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 218
2. पक्षे लक्षितेऽपि पक्षाभासाः प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धादयः प्रतिक्षिप्ता भवन्ति, Nyāyakalikā, p. 9.
3. ये चैते पक्षदोषा ये च वक्ष्यमाणदृष्टान्तदोषास्ते वस्तुस्थित्या हेतुदोषा

(1)	*Pratyakṣaviruddha*	: 'Fire is non-hot.'
(2)	*Anumānaviruddha*	: 'The visual organ does not apprehend colour.'
(3)	*Āgamaviruddha*	: 'Liquor should not be drunk by a Brahmin.'
(4)	*Lokaprasiddhi viruddha*	: 'The moon is not possessed of hare.'
(5)	*Svasiddhāntaviruddha*	: 'Sound is eternal.'
(6)	*Svavacanaviruddha*	: 'My mother is barren.'
(7)	*Upamānaviruddha*	: 'The animal resembling a cow is not a wild cow.'
(8)	*Aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*	: 'This earth is rent by the horn of a hare.
(9)	*Aprasiddhaviśeṣya*	: 'The horn of a hare is sharp.'
(10)	*Aprasiddhaviśeṣyaviśeṣaṇa*	: 'This son of a barren mother is armed with a bow made of the horns of a hare'.
(11)	*Pakṣābhasa*	: 'Fire is hot'. This is already known by perception and there is nothing to prove.

(*b*) THE DṚṢTĀNTĀBHĀSAS (FALLACIES OF EXAMPLE)

Though Jayanta holds that faulty examples are really the fallacies of reason in *Nyāyakalikā* he enumerates them separately as well. He mentions three types of faulty homogeneous examples, namely :

(1)	*Sādhyavikala*	: Devoid of the predicate, e.g., sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal ; whatever is incorporeal is eternal, like a cognition'. Here the example 'cognition' is devoid of the predicate, i.e., eternity.
(2)	*Sādhanavikala*	: Devoid of the reason, e.g., 'an atom' is devoid of reason, incorporeality.

एव, नहि पक्षदृष्टान्तमात्रप्रतिष्ठो वादो भवति । अतएव सूत्रकृता हेत्वाभासा एव शास्त्रे लक्षिताः न पक्षाभासा इति, Nyāyakalikā, (*Sarsvati Bhavan, Varanasi*, 1925) pp. 9-10

(3) *Ubhayavikala* : Devoid of both the reason and the predicate; like a jar. Here the example, a jar, is devoid of eternity and incorporeality.

Likewise, there are three types of faulty heterogeneous examples, namely,

(1) *Sādhyāvyāvṛtta* : Not excluded from the predicate, e.g., sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatever is devoid of incorporeality, is devoid of eternity, like atoms. As atoms are not devoid of eternity therefore the example is a faulty one.

(2) *Sādhanāvyāvṛtta* : Not excluded from the reason, e.g., 'like a cognition.' Here the cognition is not devoid of incorporeality.

(3) *Ubhayāvyāvṛtta* : Not excluded from both the predicate and the reason, e.g., 'like ether'. Here the ether is not devoid of eternity and incorporeality.

(c) THE HETVĀBHĀSAS (FALLACIES OF REASON)

The fallacies of reason have been variously named and classified by various logicians, e.g.,

Gautama : (1) *Savyabhicāra*, (2) *Viruddha*, (3) *Prakaraṇasama* (satpratipakṣa), (4) *Sādhyasama*, and (5) *Kālātīta* (*bādhita*).

Kaṇāda : (1) *Aprasiddha*, (2) *Viruddha*, and (3) *Saṁdigdha*.

Praśastapāda : (1) adds '*anadhyavasita*' in the list of Kaṇāda but later on includes it under the sub-types of *asiddha*.

Diṅnāga : (1) *Asiddha*, (2) *Anaikāntika*, and (3) *Viruddha*.

Akalaṅka : (1) *Asiddha*, (2) *Viruddha*, (3) *Saṁdigdha*, and (4) *Akiñcitkara*.

Kumārila : (1) *Asiddha*, (2) *Anaikāntika*, and (3) *Viruddha*.

Prabhākara	:	(1) *Asādhāraṇa*, (2) *Bādhita*, (3) *Sādhāraṇa*, and (4) *Asiddha*.
Bhāsarvajña	:	(1) *Asiddha*, (2) *Viruddha*, (3) *Anaikāntika*, (4) *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*, and (5) *Prakaraṇa-sama*.
Gaṅgeśa	:	*Savyabhicāra*, *Viruddha*, *Satpratipakṣa*, *Asiddha*, *Bādhita*.
Keśavamiśra	:	Follows Bhāsarvajña.
Viśvanātha	:	(1) *Anaikānta*, (2) *Viruddha*, (3) *Asiddha*, (4) *Pratipakṣita*, (5) *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*.
Annambhaṭṭa	:	Follows Gautama.

Jayanta follows Gautama in naming the fallacies of reason but he surpasses almost all his predecessors in giving the detailed account of all the five types of fallacies of reasons. Except for a slight difference in nomenclature, the Naiyāyikas are unanimous in holding that the fallacies of reason are five-fold. Jayanta's contribution lies mainly in giving a detailed and scholarly account of these types and their sub-types.

Asiddha or Sādhyasama. The fallacy of *asiddha* or unproved middle occurs when a reason is supplied to prove the predicate but instead of establishing the predicate the reason itself requires to be proved like the predicate. As the thesis stands in need of proof, so does the reason. That is why Gautama calls it *sādhyasama*. Uddyotakara, however, names it as *asiddha*. Vātsyāyana's illustration of this fallacy runs as 'Shadow is a substance, because it possesses motion.' Here, unless it is really proved that shadow possesses motion, it cannot be accepted as the reason for the proposition that shadow is a substance.

Jayanta refers to this fallacy by both of the names, i.e., *sādhyasama* and *asiddha*, and maintains that a predicate is called, *sādhya* if it stands in the need of proof, in the same way if a reason itself stands in need of proof, it is *sādhyasama* and therefore, fallacious.[1]

Sub-types of Asiddha. Gautama and Vātsyāyana rest content merely with a definition of *asiddha* in general. Praśastapāda, Diṅnāga, Māṭhara and Dharmakīrti refer to the four sub-types of *asiddha*. According to Praśastapāda, these types are *ubhayāsiddha*, *anyatarāsiddha*, *tadbhavāsiddha*, and *anumeyāsiddha*. Bhāsarvajña

1. *N. M.*, II-162

mentions fourteen sub-varieties of *asiddha*. Hemacandra enumerates them on the pattern of Dharmakīrti but his illustrations are identical to that of the *Nyāyasāra*. Jayanta states that this fallacy of reason has numerous sub-varieties, but there is no use of enumerating and illustrating them elaborately. The four sub-types mentioned by him are, however, noteworthy. The sub-types of *asiddha*, namely, *āśrayāsiddha*, and *svarūpasiddha vyāpyatvāsiddha*, mentioned by Gangeśa have, however, become so popular that all other types of classifications have become almost obsolete. Gangeśa maintains that if the fault of the reason is with reference to the minor term, the fallacy is called *āśrayāsiddha*, if it is with reference to reason itself the fallacy is called *svarūpāsiddha* ; and if it is with reference to concomitance, the fallacy is known as *vyāpyatvāsiddha*.

Āśrayāsiddha. One of the conditions of valid reason is that it should be present in the minor term. If the minor term is unreal, the middle term cannot be related to it, consequently, in such a case, the minor premise in which the middle term is related to a fictitious minor term becomes false, e.g., 'the sky-lotus' is fragrant, because it belongs to the class of lotus. Here 'sky-lotus' is fictitious, therefore, the middle term 'class of lotus' cannot belong to it. Consequently, it results in the fallacy of the *āśrayāsiddha* or the baseless middle term.

Svarūpāsiddha. A reason must exist in the subject. If it does not exist, it cannot afford to provide the basis of inference. For instance, in the argument 'sound is eternal, because it is visible', we find that visibility is not present in the subject and its assumption in sound is wrong and is not justified by facts. This differs from *āśrayāsiddha* in the sense that in *svarūpasiddha* the locus is either false or not proper. *Svarūpāsiddha* consists in many sub-types, such as, *śuddhāsiddha*, *bhāgāsiddha*, *viśesaṇāsiddha* and *viśesyāsiddha*, all of which finally resolve into the general characteristic that in all these sub varieties the reason is non-existent in the minor term.

Vyāpyatvāsiddha. A valid inference requires that the middle term must be concomitant with the major term. If this condition is not fulfilled, the inference becomes invalid, since the major premise which should express a universal relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* becomes materially false or fallacious. It may be of two types, *viz*., (1) It may be on account of the non-concomitance of the middle term with the major term, e.g., all reals are momentary ; sound is a real, therefore sound is momentary. Here the major

premise is false, because there is no universal relation between the 'real' and the 'momentary'. (2) Or, it may be on account of the presence of a condition (*upādhi*), e.g., the hill is smoky because it is fiery. Here the relation of the middle term (fire) to the major term (smoke) is conditional since a fire is smoky if there is a wet fuel. Fire in general is not universally accompanied by smoke, but if it is produced from wet fuel, it has smoke. Hence the reason is conditional and so fallacious.

Jayanta refers to four new varieties of *asiddha*, viz., (1) 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible.' The reason is *ubhayāsiddha*, because both Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā admit that visibility does not exist in sound. (2) 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced.' The Mīmāṁsākas regard it as unproved (*asiddha*), but the Naiyāyikas hold it as proved (*siddha*). So it is *anyatarāsiddha*. (3) 'This place is fiery, because it has doubtful smoke or vapour.' Here the reason is doubtful and unproved (*sandigdhāsiddha*). (4) 'Sound is eternal, because the crow is black.' The reason 'blackness' is *vyadhikaraṇāsiddha* because it exists in the locus which is different from the subject.

Viruddha (Fallacy of Contradictory Middle). *Viruddha*, according to Gautama, is one of the five types of fallacious reason. If a reason is employed to establish the existence of predicate, but actually if it contradicts the predicate, then it becomes fallacious. Kaṇāda refers to it as '*aprasiddha*'. Uddyotakara states that it is called *viruddha* since it contradicts an admitted truth, e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is produced.' Here the reason, i.e., 'producedness', contradicts the proposition, 'sound is eternal' instead of proving it. Producedness is pervaded by non-eternity and therefore, it cannot establish the existence of eternity. Vācaspati states that *viruddha* is different from *pratijñāvirodha* in the sense that in the former contradiction relates to the reason, but in the cases of the latter contradiction is related to the proposition. According to Vātsyāyana, the fallacy of the *viruddha* consists in the opposition of one doctrine to a previously accepted doctrine.[1] It is, thus, a contradiction between the different parts of a system. Vātsyāyana refers to two contradictory statements from the *Yogabhāṣya*. But this explanation of *viruddha* by Vātsyāyana does not seem logical, since it does not come under the purview of inferential fallacy. Jayanta is quite aware of the difference between the interpretations offered by Vātsyāyana and

1. *N. B.*, 1.2.6

Uddyotakara. Gangeśa holds *viruddha* as a counter-positive entity of the absence which pervades the predicate. It proves the non-existence of the predicate, though it is advanced to prove its existence.

Sub-types of Viruddha. Diṅnāga describes four sub-types of *viruddha*, namely, (1) *svarūpaviparītasādhana*, (2) *dharmaaviśeṣa-viparītasādhana*, (3) *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* and (4) *dharmiviśiṣṭāviparītasādhana*.

According to Bhāsarvajña, there are eight kinds of contradictory reason (*viruddha*).

Anaikāntika of Savyabhicāra (Fallacy of Inconclusive Middle). There are two views about this fallacy of reason. Gautama calls it *savyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika*, while Kaṇāda names it *saṁdigdha*. Besides Diṅnāga and some of the Jaina and Nyāya logicians, Jayanta calls it *anaikāntika*. The difference in the nomenclature of this fallacy resulted in the divergent opinions about its form and classification as well. The later logicians, however, generally adopted the term *anaikāntika*. This term is usually translated as 'inconclusive middle'.

Gautama holds that *savyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika* is an inconclusive reason and it is so because it has variable concomitance with the predicate as well as with the absence of the predicate.

Vātsyāyana is of the view that *nityatva* is one end and *anityatva* is the other. What remains with either of them is *aikāntika* and what is found in both is *anaikāntika*. If a reason is present in similar as well as dissimilar instances and thus raises the doubt or does not remove the doubt about the predicate, it is inconclusive and, therefore, fallacious. Jayanta's view is identical with that of Vātsyāyana regarding the etymology of the term '*anaikāntika*'. Praśastapāda and Diṅnāga maintain that the *generation of* doubt is the basic factor in all sub-types of this fallacy. Some of the Jaina logicians such as Siddhasena, Māṇikyanandī, etc., adopt the word '*anaikāntika*'. No Jaina logician, however, has discussed whether 'generation of doubt' is a determinant factor of *anaikāntika* or not.

Jayanta states that if a reason does not belong to similar instances, it is faulty and is to be designated as *anaikāntika*, i.e., inconclusive. It is to be recalled that one of the five characteristics of reasons which Jayanta has propounded refers to the fact that a

reason should not be present in the counter-example. A counter-example, according to him, is that which does not belong to conclusion. Keeping in view this characteristic, if a reason belongs to the counter-example also, it is fallacious. For instance, if somebody states that 'sound is eternal because it is knowable', the reason is inconclusive since it (reason, i.e., knowability) belongs to non-eternal objects as well. *Anaikāntika*, on the whole, is that reason which does not lead to a single conclusion.

Jayanta distinguishes *anaikāntika* from *prakaraṇasama* (counterbalanced reason) and *viruddha* (contradictory reason). He holds that in *prakaraṇasama* no common character is taken as a reason whereas in *anaikāntika* a common character is taken as a reason.

Sub-types of Anaikāntika. According to Uddyotakara, there are sixteen sub-kinds of inconclusive reason. Bhāsarvajña reduces them to eight. Diṅnāga classifies them into six. Praśastapāda does not accept *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, recognized by Diṅnāga, as, according to him, these sub-kinds do not generate any doubt. He, on the contrary, holds *asādhāraṇa* as an independent type of fallacy of reason and names it *anadhyavasita*. He refers to *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as a case of *anadhyavasita* or as a sub-type of *viruddha*. Dharmakīrti criticizes Praśastapāda and defends his master through a new illustration pointing out that the probans in it generates doubt, and so, holding that *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* are the sub-types of *anaikāntika*. It is worth noting that Dharmakīrti defends Diṅnāga but he does so by giving an illustration which is based upon the ontological position of the Vaiśeṣikas and thus, he manages to answer Praśastapāda's objections against the line of Diṅnāga. The fight was still going on between the Buddhists and the Vedic logicians. "This prolonged discussion," as Dr. Sanghvi rightly observes, "seems to have culminated in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*." Jayanta defended in great detail Praśastapāda's view that *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* are not the sub-types of *anaikāntika*, but at the same time he refuses to treat 'generation of doubt' as the determinant factor of *anaikāntika* (a refusal that goes against Praśastapāda). Kumārila mentions three kinds of *anaikāntika*, namely, *savyabhicāra*, *viruddhāvyabhicāri* and *asādhāraṇa*. Bhāsarvajña refers to eight types of *anaikāntika* and some of the Jaina logicians also follow him.

Kālātīta or Bādhita (Fallacy of Mistimed Middle). Jayanta, like other Naiyāyikas, holds that in this fallacy the reason refers to

more than one event which succeed one another in time. For establishing the predicate the events constituting the reason should be simultaneous, but if it is proved that they are successive and not simultaneous the reason becomes fallacious and is held as mistimed or *kālātīta* or *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. It is also called *bādhita*. Vātsyāyana gives the following instance to illustrate this fallacy: 'sound is durable, because it is manifested by conjunction, like colour.' Here the argument is fallacious since in the case of colour the manifestation takes place simultaneously with the contact between light and coloured thing but the manifestation of sound is separated by an interval of time from the contact between two objects. So, here the reason is not congruous with the instance and is not capable of establishing the predicate. Uddyotakara gives the same interpretation of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* as Vātsyāyana dces, but Vācaspati takes it in the sense of *bādhita* or contradicted reason.

Jayanta, like Vātsyāyana, opposes those who hold *kālātīta* as a fallacy of reason consequent upon a wrong order of the different members of a syllogism. Jayanta maintains that if reason is concomitant with the predicate and if there is nothing to prevent it from leading to conclusion, it does not affect the validity of inference even if there is the inversion of the natural order of the premises and the conclusion.

Vācaspatimiśra seems to treat *bādhita* in the sense of contradicted reason and holds that here the reason is contradicted by perception, inference and testimony. Varadarāja adds 'comparison' also. Bhāsarvajnā takes *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* in the sense of *bādhita* and enumerates as much as six sub-types of it. Gangeśa clearly enumerates *bādhita* in the list of fallacious reason. Jayanta holds that two inferences of equal strength do not contradict each other. He, however, incorporates the absence of uncontradictoriness as a characteristic of *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* and thereby seems to hold *bādhita* as another name of *kālātīta*.

Prakaraṇasama (*Fallacy of Counterbalanced Middle*). Gautama holds that if a reason is counterbalanced by another reason and does not lead to a definite conclusion and thus begs the same question for the solution of which it is employed, then it is called *prakaraṇasama* or counterbalanced. Vātsyāyana interprets it as oscillation of mind between two contradictory characters of an object brought about by mutually opposed and equally strong arguments and counter arguments. Vācaspati calls it *satpratipakṣa*. Varadarāja maintains that

two reasons cannot be equally strong. When their real specifications are known, the contradiction disappears. Gangeśa thinks that it is a temporary hindrance in inference which remains till a doubt about one of the reasons is removed.

Jayanta refers to *asatpratipakṣatva* (absence of counter reason) as one of the five characteristics of a valid reason and maintains that if a reason is faced with the existence of an equally strong counter reason (*pratipaṣka*), it is fallacious since the opposite reasons counteract each other and fail to establish the conclusion. Jayanta illustrates it as 'sound is eternal, because the properties of the non-eternal are not found in it, like a sky', and 'sound is non-eternal because the properties of eternal are not found in it, like a jar'. Here the two reasons are counteracted by each other and are not capable of leading to any definite conclusion, and we are left with same question with which we started, namely, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.

Jayanta distinguishes a counterbalanced reason (*prakaraṇasama*) from an inconclusive reason (*savyabhicāra*) holding that in the former two different characteristics of the minor term are taken as the middle terms, which lead to opposite conclusions, but in the latter one and the same characteristic of the minor term is taken as a middle term which leads to opposite conclusions. *Prakaraṇasama* is different from *viruddha* in the sense that in the former the opposite conclusion is proved by a different reason but in the latter the reason itself establishes the opposite of what is intended to be proved.

6. *Anumāna as a Valid Source of Knowledge*

(a) THE CĀRVĀKA VIEW

The validity of *anumāna* as an independent source of knowledge is accepted by all the systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka. Jayanta discusses the problem quite elaborately. He refers to the following objections put forth by the Cārvākas against the validity of this way of knowing :

> It is difficult to find out the meaning of the word '*anumāna*'. It needs explanation. Ordinarily technical terms, as '*anumāna*,' '*liṅga*', etc. should convey the sense directly. But, in the present case, the terms '*liṅga*', '*pakṣadharmatā*', etc., are used in a secondary sense. This violates the rules of propriety and renders *anumāna* as an invalid way of knowing.
>
> If a 'particular', e.g., fire, is to be established, then the relation of invariable concomitance between it and the reason, e.g., smoke,

universally accepted. A woman, a child, a cowherd, a cultivator even apprehend unperceived objects on the basis of perceived ones.[1] If inference is held to be invalid all the transactions of the world will cease. People accept or reject objects when they infer that they are conducive to pleasure or pain. If, on the other hand, it is held that the definition of *anumāna* is not sound, such an objection also is untenable on account of the following reasons:

(1) If the words *'liṅga'*, *'pakṣadharmatā'*, etc., are used in secondary sense, it cannot render the *pramāṇa* itself invalid. New wording of a definition cannot affect the purity of a source of knowledge. (2) We conjecture that there is some relation between two objects if the knowledge of one of them leads to the knowledge of the other. (3) The relation of invariable concomitance implies that if the probans exists in a locus, the probandum exists there. The relation of invariable concomitance requires no such laws as identity and causality. It is simply based upon previous experience. It is, however, a necessary condition of inference. (4) On the basis of reasoning we cannot explain as to why there are fundamental differences in the inner essences of objects. (5) It is not proper to hold that inferential knowledge is merely a judgment of the imagination since it is based on the cognition of invariable concomitance. (6) The Cārvākas hold that it is impossible to ascertain the relation of invariable concomitance between two objects. Some logicians oppose this view holding that it is ascertained through inner perception. Jayanta, on the other hand, is of the view that there is no difference of opinion regarding the fact that the internal organ is powerful enough to grasp even such objects which are beyond the range of external sense organs. But, here it is to be seen that we are to comprehend the relation of concomitance between two universals and not between two particulars, and in that case the question of grasping the objects by internal organ does not arise. As regards the Cārvāka's view that universal is not objectively real, Jayanta states that it is not based upon sound foundation. (7) As regards the postulation of the existence of a hypothetical perception similar to the transcendental perception of the sages, Jayanta refers to the views of the Mīmāṁsakas, who refute this sort of postulation on the ground that the universal concomitance between the middle term and the major term is based upon repeated observation. (8) It is not the

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cannot be established since we cannot see all the particulars of all the times. And even if we infer fire in general, we apprehend what has already been apprehended. In other words, it involves *petitio principii*, and *anumāna* thus is simply superfluous.

Even if we observe concomitance between two things a hundred times, there is a possibility of noticing a case where such concomitance may not exist.

The objects of the world change in character and capacity with the change of their time, space and circumstance. Hence it is difficult to infer an object on the basis of our previous experience. Even if we apprehend it, there persists a doubt unless we apprehend all the objects of the three worlds.

There is no necessity of inference for those who can directly perceive all the things of the universe through their divine eyes.

If it is held that the relation of invariable concomitance obtains between two universals and not between two particulars, it is altogether wrong because a universal never exists in the universe objectively.

On the basis of repeated observation, even if it is held that smoke accompanies fire, the conclusion that smoke does not exist where there is no fire is not a logical necessity.

Repeated observation of two things together in a particular place cannot lead us to infer the presence of one of them in another place on the basis of the presence of another thing in that place since the probans cannot be the invariable concomitant of the probandum unless it is definitely understood that there is no presence of the probans where the probandum is not present.

In order to be an invariable concomitant with the probandum, a probans must not belong to a heterologous instance. But the number of heterologous instances is unlimited and it is rather impossible for an ordinary man to perceive that the probans does not belong to these contrary instances.

If the syllogistic process itself is closely examined, we would find that every syllogism is fallacious since the truth of the third premise has not been established but simply assumed.[1]

(b) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE CĀRVĀKA VIEW

Jayanta refutes these charges holding that if the Cārvākas intend to invalidate inference, it is useless since its validity has been

1. *N. M.*, I-101-9

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bare universal but the presence of the universal in the subject which is inferred.[1]

On the basis of the above arguments Jayanta comes to the conclusion that the validity of *anumāna* is accepted even by the common folk and if the Cārvākas carefully examine the definition they would themselves know that it is flawless. Even if they are not convinced of the definition, there is nothing to justify their denial of the existence of inference as a source of knowledge.

7. *Conclusion*

The significant feature of Jayanta's theory of *anumāna* is to be found in his independent treatment of the problem. Jayanta has played a remarkable role in the development of the theory of *anumāna*. His contribution to this aspect of learning can best be evaluated if we compare his theory with that of his predecessors. In Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*, as we have stated before, the actual nature of *anumāna* remains unexplained. It indicated only that *anumāna* is preceded by perception. The combinational part '*vat*' in '*pūrvavat*', etc., is doubtful. *Avayava*, which consists of five parts, has been counted among the sixteen categories. *Hetu* is mentioned as the second member of the syllogism and not as the synonym of *anumāna*. Vātsyāyana too goes some steps further. He introduces the *sambandhanirdeśa* of *liṅga* and *liṅgin* in the sphere of *anumāna*. It is, Uddyotakara who for the first time categorically states that *liṅgaparāmarśa* is *anumāna*. He holds that *liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmṛti* or *liṅgaliṅgisambandhadarśana* is not immediately followed by *anumiti*. Between it and *anumiti* there is *liṅgaparāmarśa* which is immediately followed by *anumiti*. Therefore, Uddyotakara comes to the conclusion that *liṅgagaparāmarśa* alone is *anumāna*. This definition propounded by Uddyotakara became so famous that almost all the Navya Naiyāyikas adopted it in their treatises. In addition to the exposition given to the three types of *anumāna* propounded by Gautama, Uddyotakara has introduced three new types of *anumāna* mentioned by him as *anvayin*, *vyatirekin* and *anvayavyatirekin*. These forms were not known to the Nyāya so far. Uddyotakara presented various explanations of the word *trividham*. On the whole, at the hands of Uddyotakara *anumāna* assumed a much more stronger and clearer form than it had possessed before.

Vācaspatimiśra has the credit of introducing the element of *tarka* in the sphere of *vyāptigrahasāmagrī*. He supports the exposition

1. *N.M.*, 1-110

proposed by Uddyotakara regarding the definition of *anumāna* and examines the two-member syllogism theory propounded by Dharmakīrti. A detailed exposition of *avinābhāva*-relation and a synthetic analysis of *pakṣadharmatā*, etc., in the background of *avinābhāva* have also been introduced in the Nyāya by Vācaspatimiśra. Further, the establishment of *liṅga-liṅgi-sambandha* as a natural relation and acceptance of it without condition have been expounded by him.

Jayanta, as we have seen in the introductory chapter, does not seem aware of Vācaspatimiśra. But, as both of them have been trying to achieve the same ends, it is not out of context to assess Jayanta's innovations in comparison to that of Vācaspatimiśra. In the analysis of *anumāna* one finds Vācaspati fighting a defensive battle against the Buddhists. But so far as Jayanta is concerned, he is always on the offensive. Jayanta has discussed all the aspects of *anumāna*. He has introduced a new type of *hetvābhāsa*, *i.e.*, *anyathāsiddha*. He provides a novel interpretation of the rest of them. His exposition of *samavyāpti* and *viṣamavyāpti* is remarkable. His introduction of *antarvyāpti* and *bahirvyāpti* has won appreciation from a number of later logicians. His thought on *avayava* and *hetu* also are very much important and original. He is the first logician in the Nyāya to divide *anumāna* into *svārtha* and *parārtha* types. It is he who has silenced the Cārvākas once and for all. It is again he, who has adduced convincing and strong arguments against the Buddhist theories of identity and causality. Moreover, it is Jayanta who is successful in presenting a synthetic picture of *anumāna*. A thorough study of his *Nyāyamañjarī* is enough to understand almost all the aspects of *anumāna* from the standpoints of all of his predecessors. *Nyāyamañjarī* is a key to an authentic evaluation of the problem of inference and at the same time serves as a link between the old and the new and between the orthodox and the heterodox systems of Indian philosophy. Vācaspatimiśra has tried to perform a similar role but he could not achieve the same height of eloquence and analytical judgement as Jayanta has exhibited in the field of inference.

Jayanta, however, has his share of faults also. The main shortcomings in his account of *anumāna* may be found in that he defends Vātsyāyana's views by hook or crook against the Buddhist attack, but he is not fair to Uddyotakara. Many suggestions that Uddyotakara has rightly made have been either ignored or taken lightly by Jayanta. For instance, the tripartite division of *anumāna* into *anvayin*, etc., does not find adequate elaboration in *Nyāyamañjarī*. That these forms of *anumāna* were worth attending to is

proved on the basis of their acceptance by the logicians of Navya Nyāya and the syncretic period. His reference to *pakṣadharmatā* and *upādhi* are nothing more than mere passing remarks. He employs such technical terms in his definitions as require further definition. For instance, he maintains that *anumāna* is based upon *hetu* which has fivefold characteristics. This is not easily grasped by those who are not aware of these characteristics in advance. Jayanta is quite confident of his scholastic strength and shoots his logistic arrows so skilfully that his victory over his opponents on all issues becomes a matter of foregone conclusion. Jayanta on the whole, however, is first and last a logician, and logic, as everybody would accept, is primarily inference. His account of *anumāna* ranks supreme in the sense that in his theory of inference he has very elaborately and accurately discussed the inferential tenets propounded by Gautama and explained by Vātsyāyana. He presents his standpoint without pride and prejudices. The study of *anumāna* has become easier after his assessment of such basic elements of inference as *hetu* and *vyāpti* in an original way. Finally, it is he, who has adduced the strongest arguments against the opponents of *anumāna* and proved beyond doubt that it is a distinct source of knowledge.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATURE AND FORMS OF COMPARISON

1. *The Problem of Upamāna (Comparison)*

The Nyāya, the Mīmāṁsā and the Advaita Vedānta accept *upamāna* as an independent source of knowledge. The term '*upamāna*' has been variously translated as comparison, analogy or identification. But as its derivative structure (*up-mā+lyuṭ*) indicates and its connotation suggests, it would be more appropriate to adopt the word 'comparison' as its substitute. If a citizen who has not seen a *gavaya* ever before asks a forester : 'what is a *gavaya* ?' and the forester says that a *gavaya* is just like a cow, and, after that, remembering the instruction of the forester and perceiving the resemblance of a *gavaya* to a cow, if the citizen identifies the *gavaya*, then we have what is generally known as *upamāna*.[1]

The Nyāya deals with it after perception and inference and before verbal testimony, and thus indicates its relative importance as a way of knowing. According to this system, *upamāna* is the means by which we gain the knowledge of a previously unknown object on the basis of its similarity to another object previously well-known. We have such knowledge when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes a class of objects of a certain description and then we apply the word to some objects which fit in with that description though we might not have seen the denoted objects before. Thus, the *upamāna*, as contemplated by the old Nyāya, consists in associating an object not known before with some other well-known object or objects on the remembrance of the instructions of the authoritative person and on the perception of resemblance between the unknown and well-known objects. So, according to the

1. प्रसिद्धवस्तुसाधर्म्यात् अप्रसिद्धस्य साधनम् ।
उपमानं समाख्यातं यथा गोर्गवय स्तथा, *S. D. Samuccaya*

Nyāya, *upamāna* is a way of knowing the denotation of words and solving the problem of identification.[1]

Amongst the later Naiyāyikas, however, Bhāsarvajña does not accept *upamāna* as an independent way of knowing. It is probably under the influence of Jaina, Buddhist or Vaiśeṣika logic that Bhāsarvajña rejects comparison as a separate means of knowledge. He refers to Vṛddha Naiyāyikas (Gautama, etc.) and Jarannaiyāyikas (Uddyotakara, etc.) and includes *upamāna* (as envisaged by them) under verbal testimony. He states that *upamana* as envisaged by the Mīmāmsakas is nothing but recollection.[2] It is rather amusing that in the opinion of Bhāsarvajña the separate mention of *upamāna* in the *Nyāyasūtra* does not even point to its recognition as an independent means of knowing, but simply refers to its serviceableness to establish the validity of verbal authority. Gangeśa and other logicians belonging to Navya Nyāya generally follow the old Nyāya in recognising *upamāna* as a distinct source of valid knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣikas do not accept *upamāna* as an independent source of knowledge. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not even refer to it. Praśastapāda holds it to be a case of inference.[3]

Among other systems of Indian Philosophy the Cārvākas accept only one pramāṇa, i.e., *pratyakṣa*. The majority of Jaina logicians do not recognise *upamāna* as an independent source of knowledge but include it in *pratyabhijñā* (recognition).[4] *Sthānāngasūtra, Bhagvatīsūtra* and *Upāyahṛdaya*, however, refer to *upamāna* amongst the four pramāṇas. But Ācārya Gṛddhapiccha refers to only two pramāṇas, viz., *prtyakṣa* and *parokṣa* and excludes *upamāna* from the list. Almost all the later Jaina logicians follow him. Pujyāpāda, however, includes *upamāna*, *arthāpattī* and *āgama* in *parokṣa*.[5]

The Buddhists hold sense-perception to belong to a specific abstract entity (*svadharma*) alone, devoid of all concrete specification. So they can very well deny resemblance to be an object of sense perception. The perception of similarity plays an important part

1. यथा गौरेवं गवय इत्युपमाने प्रयुक्ते गवा समानधर्मम् अर्थम् इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद् उपलभमानोऽस्य गवयशब्दः संज्ञेति संज्ञा संज्ञिसंबन्धं प्रतिपद्यते, *N. B.*, 1.1.6
2. *N. Sr.* (Poona, 1922) p. 72
3. *V. B.* (*Upa.*)
4. *S. D. S.*, (Riṣ.) p. 4
5. *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1-11

in *upamāna* and it is held to be the case of perception. Dharmakīrti refers to *prtyakṣa* and *anumāna* only as the sources of knowledge. The Sāṁkhyas do not hold *upamāna* to be an independent source of knowledge. Their main argument is that the *atideśavākya* is verbal knowledge, the perception of similarity is perceptual knowledge and the cognition of identification is a case of inference.[1] Yoga agrees with Sāṁkhya.

Upamāna is accepted as an independent source of knowledge by the Mīmāṁsakas. The sense in which the Mīmāṁsakas accept *upamāna* however, is quite different from that of the Nyāya. In Nyāya the cognition of a relation between a word and its meaning is the result of *upamāna* while in Mīmāṁsā it is accepted that reciprocal similarity is known through it. The only difference between Prabhākara and Kumārila is that the latter holds similarity as only a quality of the two objects, while the former regards it as a distinct category. Jayanta refers to the views of his predecessors and opponents faithfully and tries to present a balanced analysis of the problem. He does not oppose the *upamāna* theories of other schools merely for the sake of opposition. He rather formulates his theory quite impartially and independently. Most of the Navya Naiyāyikas and authors of the syncretic manuals accepted *upamāna* as an independent means of knowing almost on the same grounds as Jayanta has put forth. Jayanta objects to the inclusion of *upamāna* in any of the other *pramāṇas* on the ground that in *upamāna* the mode of production of knowledge is different from the mode of production of knowledge in other *pramāṇas*.[2]

2. *The Nature of Upamāna (Comparison)*

(a) JAYANTA'S THEORY

Jayanta determines the nature of *upamāna* after taking into account the views of almost all of his predecessors and contemporaries. In his own system of thought he finds a divergence of opinion regarding *upamāna*, which seems to have motivated him to draw a line of demarcation between the earlier logicians and his contemporaries. Referring to the earlier logicians (Vṛddha Naiyāyikas) he gives a verbatim account of Vātsyāyana's line of thought and Uddyotakāra's

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1. योऽप्ययं गवयशब्दो गोसादृश्यवाचक इति प्रत्ययः सोऽप्यनुमानमेव, *S. T. K.*, p. 40
2. सामग्रीभेदात् फलभेदाच्च प्रमाणभेदः। अन्ये एव च सामग्रीफले शब्दोपमानयोः, *N. M.*, I-30

interpretation of the compound *'prasiddhasādharmya'*. As Jayanta puts it, the earlier Naiyāyikas define *upamāna* (the means) as the statement (*atideśavākya*) of a reliable person asserting the similarity between a known and an unknown object and resulting in the cognition of the relation of a name with the named.[1] According to his contemporaries, *upamāna* is sensuous cognition by a man of an unfamiliar thing through a statement of a reliable person that the unfamiliar thing resembles a certain other thing familiar to him.[2] Accordingly, the citizen's perceiving an animal resembling a cow and cognizing it as *gavaya* is *upamāna*. Gautama defines *upamāna* as the means of cognizing an unknown object through its similarity to another well-known object.[3] Gautama seems to be aware of the opponents' views that *upamāna* is not a distinct means of cognition since the degree of similarity, i.e., perfect, great or partial is not precisely established.[4] He, however, states that *upamāna* does not depend upon the quality or degree of similarity. What is required is the similarity of an unknown object with a well-known object and thus *upamāna* apprehends a thing which is not grasped through perception, inference or verbal testimony.[5] Vātsyāyana states that *upamāna* is the knowledge of an unknown object by means of its resemblance to a known object. But he uses the term *'sāmānya'* in place of *sādharmya* and whereas the Sūtrakāra defines *upamāna* as a *karaṇa* (means of knowledge) and says nothing about *upamiti* (the result of *upamāna*), Vātsyāyana gives a clear-cut exposition of *upamiti* as well.[6] He states that it is the cognition of the relation of a name with the named.[7] The credit for stating this linguistic consideration in unequivocal terms, therefore, goes to Vātsyāyana. He supports the Sūtrakāra in his assertion that similarity is the basis of *upamāna* and that the effect of similarity does not depend upon

1. अत्र वृद्धनैयायिकास्तावदेवम् उपमानस्वरूपम् आचक्षते, संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतीतिफलं प्रसिद्धेतरयोः सारूप्यप्रतिपादकम् अतिदेशवाक्यम् उपमानम् *N.M.* I-128
2. अद्यतनास्तु व्याचक्षते श्रुतातिदेशवाक्यस्य प्रमातुरप्रसिद्धे पिण्डे प्रसिद्धपिण्डसारूप्यज्ञानम् इन्द्रियजं संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिफलम् उपमानम्, Ibid., I-129
3. प्रसिद्ध साधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनम् उपमानम्, *N. S.*, 1.1.6
4. अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः, Ibid., 2.1.44
5. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धे यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः, Ibid., 2.1.45
6. प्रज्ञातेन सामान्यात्प्रज्ञापनीयस्य प्रज्ञापनम् उपमानम्, *N.B.*, 1.1.6
7. Ibid.

its degrees (e.g., perfect, great or partial), but upon its familiarity.[1] He makes it clear that *upamāna* does not proceed on mere resemblance, but on well-known resemblance. He refutes his opponents' theory that in the cases of inference and comparison there is cognition of the unknown through the known and, as such, comparison is nothing but inference. Moreover, in case of the comparison resemblance must be pointed out by such a person as, a forester, who knows both of the objects to another person say, a citizen who knows only one of the two.

Uddyotakara makes an innovation in the analysis of the *Upamāna* by way of splitting the compound *'prasiddha sādharmya'* as *'prasiddham'* and *'sādhārmyam yasyā'* or *prasiddhena vā sādharmayam yasya'* and stating that the compound qualifies the term *'gavaya'*.[2] He also introduces the element of *'vaidharmya'* as a basis of *upamāna* in addition to *'sādharmya'*. He justifies his thesis by pointing out that the term *'sādharmya'* in the aphorism is symbolic and it comprehends *vaidharmya* as well.[3] He makes an improvement in Vātsyāyana's interpretation also by way of presenting a clearer view of the theory of *upamiti*. Uddyotakara refers to the Buddhists' opinion opposing the distinctness of *upamāna* and states that the knowledge of resemblance between a *gavaya* and the cow is not an end in itself; it is rather a step towards knowing the relation between a word and its meaning.

Vācaspatimiśra's account of *upamāna* is largely the same as that of Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. He, however, emphasizes that the essential value of knowledge by similarity consists in a definite identification of an object by a certain name. So far as mere sense-perception is concerned, it can be achieved without comparing it wIth any other object, but the definite knowledge that it is the particular animal *gavaya* depends upon the act of comparison with reference to some kind of similarity.[4] Vācaspatimiśra states that *upamāna* is a distinct means of knowledge since it produces a distinct type of cognition.

Being conscious of the fact that the definition of *upamāna* as propounded by earlier logicians has been subjected to severe criticism

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1. *N.B.*, 2.1.45
2. याऽसौ संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिः स उपमानार्थः, *N.V.*, 2.1.48
3. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यस्य वैधर्म्यस्य च उपमानहेतुत्वात्, *N.V.*, 2.1.45
4. प्रज्ञापनीयस्य गवयशब्दवाच्यतया प्रत्यक्षदृश्यमानगोसादृश्यस्य गवयत्व-सामान्य विशेषवतः पिण्डस्य प्रज्ञापनम् उपमानम्, *N.V.T.T.*, 1.1.6

by the opponents of the Nyāya on the ground of appropriateness of its inclusion in verbal testimony, Jayanta points out that the instruction given by a reliable person plays only a secondary part here. The forester's instruction to a citizen who is desirous of knowing the *gavaya* would be regarded as verbal testimony. As in the case of inference, the knower comes to the inferential conclusion not because of his implicit faith in the veracity of the words but because of his knowledge of the middle term, so, in the case of comparison also, the citizen who identifies the animal does not merely know it as denoted by the term '*gavaya*' occurring in the statement of the forester, but apprehends it through the experience of its similarity to a cow. As the words help only in pointing out the efficiency of the perception of similarity, the statement here is not the immediate cause but only a pointer to another cause, i.e., perception of similarity.

As regards the opponents' charge that *upamāna* as contemplated by the Naiyāyikas can be included in perception, Jayanta states that like the perception of smoke in inference, the knowledge of resemblance in *upamāna* leads the citizen to the cognition of an object which is not sensed, though it contains sensible property. Hence it is a distinct means of knowledge. Perception is not competent to reveal the relation between a name and the object denoted by it since the figure of the *gavaya* only is apprehended by it.[1]

(b) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE MĪMĀṀSĀ VIEW

According to Śabara, *upamāna* is resemblance which brings about the cognition of an object which has not been in contact with the sense.[2] Though in the cases of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* Śabara has defined the results (*pramiti*), in the case of *upamāna* he chooses to define the means (*pramāṇa*). Śabara might have been conscious of the difference between *upamāna* and *upamīti*, but we observe that in his definitions of the pramāṇas the subject is sometimes the means and sometimes the result.

Śabara states that the means of cognition in *upamāna* is a well-known observed resemblance. A similar view is held by the Nyāya and in this way Śabara's definition of *upamāna* as a means is consistent with the Nyāya definition. But whereas the Naiyāyikas maintain that the result of *upamāna* is the cognition of the

1. *N.M.*, I-129
2. उपमानमपि सादृश्यम् असन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिम् उत्पादयति यथा गवयदर्शनं गोस्मरणस्य, *S. B.*, 1.1.5

relation of a name with the named, the Mīmāṁsakas hold that the result of *upamāna* is the cognition that a cow resembles a *gavaya*. Though Śabara's definition does not make it clear whether he means the same thing as is later on meant by Prabhākara and Kumārila with regard to the result of *upamāna*, it is clear that he does not share the Nyāya view. So, Śabara seems to hold that the perception of a *gavaya* qualified by its similarity to a cow is the means (*upamāna*) and the remembrance of a cow is the result (*upamiti*). Anyhow, the definition given in the *Bhāṣya* implies that when an object, on being known, produces the cognition of another object similar to it, then we have what is called *upamāna*. The main objection against this statement is that it would only be a case of remembrance.

To the aforesaid implication of Śabara's statement Kumārila raises the objection that the cognition of a thing, observed in the past due to the perception of a similar thing in the present, is nothing but remembrance and that such remembrance cannot be held to be a *pramāṇa*.[1] So, according to Kumārila, either Śabara is wrong in his judgment or this is not the proper interpretation of his statement. Kumārila refutes the Nyāya view as well. For the Naiyāyikas the result of *upamāna* is the cognition of the relation between the word and the object denoted by it. But Kumārila states that it is not tenable because when the object (*gavaya*) has been ascertained to resemble the cow, the relation of the animal (wild cow) with the word (*gavaya*) is known by the help of the statement of the forester.[2] And in such a case it would be purely a verbal testimony and the element of *upamana* does not enter into it. So, for Kumārila *upamiti* is the cognition of a remembered thing qualified by its similarity to a perceived thing, i.e., 'the *gavaya* is similar to a cow' is a judgment of perception because it arises immediately after perceiving the *gavaya* and the cognition 'the remembered cow is similar to *gavaya*' is the result of *upamāna*.[3]

According to Pārthasārthī, *upamana* is the apprehension of similarity (*sādṛśyajnāna*) of a formerly perceived and recollected object to presently perceived object.[4]

The form of such a knowledge would be as 'the cow which is seen by us in the city is similar to the *gavaya* which we perceived

1. *S. V.* (*Upa.*), 4
2. Ibid., 13
3. Ibid.
4. Venkatramiah, D., *Śāstradīpikā*, (trans. Baroda, 1940), p. 99

just now in the forest.' Here the *gavaya* is the subject and cow is the counter-correlative (*pratigojin*) of the similarity existing in the *gavaya*.

Pārthasārathī states that *upamāna* is not to be included in perception because the city cow is not an object of direct sense-perception nor is it a case of inference for the clear reason that the *upamiti* arises even without the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The man in whom *upamiti* arises is not perceiving the *pakṣa*, *viz.*, cow, which is essential for inferential cognition.

Sucaritamiśra in his *Kāśikāvṛtti* on *Ślokavārtika* states that what is perceived in *upamāna* is that the *gavaya* is similar to the cow and this leads to the cognition that the cow is similar to the *gavaya*. This cognition is not recollective because, though the cow is recollected, its similarity to the *gavaya* is not recollected. Recollection presupposes experience and the similarity of the cow to the *gavaya* could not be experienced prior to the perception of the *gavaya*. So, it cannot be reduced to memory. It is not perceptual, because the cow is not in contact with the eyes. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to perception.

The Prābhākara school agrees with the Bhāṭṭa on the definition and nature of comparison.[1] There is, however, a minor difference between the two schools regarding the nature of *sādṛṣya*. According to Kumārila, it is the assemblage of common features but Prabhākara holds it to be an independent category which cannot be reduced to substance, quality, action or universal.[2]

Śālikanātha states that *upamāna* is the cognition brought about by the perception of similarity and exemplified in the cognition of a cow as being similar to a *gavaya*, arising in the mind of a person who has already perceived a cow in the past and observes now the similarity of the *gavaya* to it.[3] Śālikanātha criticises Śabara for using the word '*smaraṇa*' but this does not mean that Śālikanātha accepts the Nyāya view.[4] He rather points out that the *upamāna* of the Naiyāyikas is nothing but an inference.

1. *P.P.*, (B.H.U. 1961), p. 267
2. *Bṛhati* (Chow. 1929), p. 83
3. सादृश्यात् दृश्यमानाद् यत् प्रतियोगिनि जायते । सादृश्यविषयं ज्ञानम् उपमानं तदुच्यते, *Bṛhatīṭikā* (Chow. 1929)
4. गोस्मरणस्येतिभाष्यमयुक्तम् । न हि स्मरणस्य बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते, *P.P.*, p. 83

The Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras criticize the Nyāya view of *upamāna* propounded by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa contends that the so-called *upamāna* of Nyāya apprehends either the peculiar nature of the wild cow (*gavayasvarūpa*) or the similarity with the cow subsisting in the wild cow (*tadgata gosādṛśya*). It cannot apprehend the former since it is in contact of the visual organ, nor can it apprehend the latter since it is known through recollection of the verbal statement of the forester. The knowledge that the wild cow is similar to the domestic cow is obtained from the recollection of the past verbal cognition, nor is the wild cow qualified by similarity with the cow (*sādṛśyaviśiṣṭagavaya*) apprehended by comparison. If the knowledge of it is not in excess of the recollection of the verbal cognition, it is nothing but recollection. If it is in excess of the recollection, it is nothing but perception, since it is produced by the sense-object interaction aided by recollection, which is merely an auxiliary factor.

Jayanta rejects the Mīmāṁsā theory of *upamāna* on the ground that the concept of *upamiti*, i.e., a cow is like a *gavaya*, propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas is not based on experience.[1] What we experience is that a *gavaya* is like a cow. Even if we assume the possibility of the converse judgment (i.e., a cow is similar to a *gavaya*) it will be, at the most, a judgment of memory. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that it is not the cow that might have been experienced before, but the similarity subsisting in the cow that is being experienced here and that too for the first time. But Jayanta asserts that the similarity subsisting in the cow also is previously perceived. Similarity, as belonging to a cow can be experienced without knowing the similarity belonging to a *gavaya*. When a citizen sees a *gavaya* in a forest, he neither recollects an elephant nor a camel nor a horse but an individual of a distinct class. The memory of a distinct object is not revived without sufficient reason. On the basis of this law, Jaynata argues, the individual thing perceived as similar to the *gavaya* by a person is recalled only in his memory whenever a *gavaya* is perceived, even if it is not distinctly cognized. With regard to the objection of the Mīmāṁsakas that a citizen cannot know that a cow is similar to a *gavaya* if he has no definite knowledge of a *gavaya* (the other correlative of the relation of similarity). Jayanta quotes their own assessment of the similarity, viz., "like a class, similarity too exists

1. प्रसिद्धेन हि साधर्म्यम् अप्रसिद्धस्य गम्यते ।
गवा गवयापिण्डस्य न तु युक्तो विपर्ययः, *N. M.*, I-133

wholly in each of the two members", and says that even when the corresponding member is not seen at the time, a notion of similarity is possible.[1] The Mīmāṁsakas have given two definitions of similarity : (1) Similarity is the common possession of many limbs by two similar objects, and (2) it is the unique source of the awareness of resemblance.[2] Jayanta points out that first definition is vague. It is too narrow to be applied to the picture, etc., of a cow and too wide since it applies to an animal also which is dissimilar to a *gavaya*. It is not clear what the Mīmāṁsakas mean by the word *bhūyastva* (many). If they hold that the number of common limbs should be such as produces the ideas of similarity, then it really amounts to the revised (second) definition of similarity, and in that case the implicit awareness of similarity is logically possible even when a *gavaya* has not been perceived. Moreover, the judgment that a cow is like a *gavaya* is that of memory.

Even if for the sake of argument it is conceded that the Mīmāṁsa *upamāna* is not a case of memory, it may be a case of inference since it is deduced. The syllogism which proves its inferential character will be as 'the cow which is being remembered, is like this (*gavaya*)', because the first one partakes of many common limbs with the second one. Where there is the partaking of many common limbs with another, there is resemblance like the twins. The reason is not doubtful since the limbs which are shared in common have been specified. Moreover, the reason is not unproven since it has been admitted that there is a sharp distinction between the sharing of common limbs and resemblance. So, Jayanta emphatically proves that the *upamāna* as propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas is liable to be included either in memory or in inference. He also makes it amply clear that on the basis of utility also, the Mīmāṁsa *upamāna* does not prove to be a distinct source of knowledge.

3. Upamāna and Other Sources of Knowledge

It is an interesting fact concerning *upamāna* that though the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas agree to accept *upamāna* as a distinct source of knowledge they are poles apart in so far as the delineation of its nature is concerned. Similarly the opponents' grounds for rejecting *upamāna* as a distinct means of knowledge are very much divergent.

1. *Ślokavārtika, Upa.* 35 (E.T. Dr. Ganganath Jha, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1900)
2. *S.V. Upa.* 18 ; *N.M.* I-134

It has been already stated what the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas mean by *upamāna*. Here we propose to evaluate *upamāna* as a distinct source of knowledge in the context of the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā standpoints in particular and in the wider perspective of all the relevant systems of Indian Philosophy in general.

(a) UPAMĀNA VERSUS PRATYAKṢA

Perception of similarity has been regarded as the main factor in *upamāna*. The opponents of *upamāna*, specially the Buddhists, hold that in the given example the citizen regards the animal before him as similar to a cow when he perceives the wild cow. So, it is his sensuous observation that helps him to cognize the wild cow which results in the cognition of its similarity to a cow. This fact leads one to hold that the cognition of the animal qualified by its similarity to a cow is perceptual. However, a point which casts a doubt on this assertion is that it is not enough to observe similarity only in *gavaya*, it is also necessary to observe it in the counter-correlative of the *gavaya*, e.g., the cow. As one the substrata of similarity is beyond the range of perception, how can it be ascertained through perception ? The objection is met with the clarification that the similarity of the wild cow to a cow does not reside partly in the wild cow and partly in the cow. Therefore, the non-perception of the cow cannot be an obstacle to the perception of similarity. Hearing *atideśavākya* is also not essential because in the absence of it one can apprehend that the animal which one perceives in the forest bears similarity to a cow which one saw in the city. Though without hearing *atideśavākya* the citizen does not know that the animal is *gavaya*, it can be perceived without *atideśavākya*. So in their opinion *upamāna* is nothing but perception.

Jayanta objects to this view stating that the perceptibility of a mediate fact does not necessarily prove that the concerned means of knowledge is perception.[1] For instance, the smoke is the mark (*liṅga*) of fire. Its perception in the hill leads a man to infer that the hill is fiery. The perception of smoke here is different from preception as a means because it is a mediate step and the fire which is inferred subsequently is not revealed by perception. Similarly, perception of similarity is a pramāṇa which is different from perception because this perception is not the end in itself, it does not reveal the relation of the name *gavaya* to the animal perceived. When the

1. *N.M.*, I-131

perceiver remembers the statement that a *gavaya* is similar to the cow, only then he comes to the conclusion that the animal concerned is *gavaya*. Therefore, as the perception of fire in the case of inference is different from perception as a means, so the perception of similarity in the case of *upamāna* is different from perception as a means. What we gain from the observation of similarity is the knowledge through acquaintance which in its own turn is acquired through description or instruction. The Nyāya standpoint, however, may be summed up in the words of Udayanācārya that the identification of the relation of a name with the named is the result of *upamāna* and that it cannot be obtained through perception.[1]

(b) UPAMĀNA VERSUS ANUMĀNA

The Naiyāyikas and the Mímāṁsakas have explained *upamāna* in their own different ways and have criticised each other's views on the grounds of the reducibility of each other's *upamāna* to one or the other means of valid knowledge. So, apart from the other opposing schools, the arguments regarding the inclusion of *upamāna* in inference have also come from those who are otherwise its staunch supporters.

The Vaiśeṣikas, as we have stated before, refuse to accept *upamāna* as an independent means of knowing and hold that it can be reduced to inference.[2] Their main argument is that the knowledge of the wild cow depends upon the statement of the forester. The statement itself depends upon the uniform relation of a word to its meaning. The uniform relation is the peculiar condition of inference. So they hold that the Nyāya *upamāna* is nothing but inference. According to Śālikanātha, a Mímāṁsaka of Prabhākara's persuasion, Naiyāyikas' *upamāna* is reducible to inference.[3] The Sāṁkyhyas also hold that the *atideśavākya* is verbal knowledge, the observation of similarity is perceptual knowledge and the final knowledge of identification is a case of inference based upon these two.[4] The Yoga view in this respect is quite similar to that of Sāṁkhya. The critics of Nyāya position try to include comparison in inference

1. सम्बन्धस्य परिच्छेदः संज्ञायाः संज्ञिना सह । प्रत्यक्षादेरसाध्यत्वात् उपमानफलं विदुः, *N.Ku.* 3.8
2. उपमानम् अनुमानाव्यतिरिक्तम्, *N.K.*, p. 220
3. यात्वेतस्य गवय शब्दवाच्यतावगतिः साऽपि गवय शब्दप्रयोगादानुमानिकी *P.P.*, p. 271
4. *S.T.K.*, p. 40

by reducing it to the following syllogism.[1]

All animals, similar to a cow, are gavayas ;
This is an animal similar to a cow ;
Therefore, this is a *gavaya.*

These critics hold that the main condition of inference is that the major premise must be a universal proposition. Here 'all the animals similar to a cow are *gavaya*' is the major premise and so the main condition of inference is fulfilled. Pārthasārthi's view (i.e., the evidence on which *Vyāpti* rests may be perceptual as well as non-perceptual) is also noteworthy in this respect. All the Naiyāyikas, right from Gautama to Viśvanātha, have been aware of the attempt on the part of the logicians of other systems, specially the Vaiśeṣikas, to reduce *upamāna* to inference. Gautama states that the compendious expression 'so' (*tathā*) distinguishes *upamāna* from *anumāna.*[2] Vātsyāyana explains Sūtrakāra's view emphasizing that in *upamāna* the conclusion takes the form 'As is the cow, so is the *gavaya*'. But similar is not the case with inference. Moreover, comparison is different from inference in the sense that in comparison it is necessary to perceive the object which is to be known, but in inference it is not so. In comparison the resemblance must be pointed out by some authority but such is not the case with inference. Uddyotakara also points out that in the cases of inference the object to be known is not perceived but in the cases of comparison the object concerned is perceived.[3] Vācaspatimiśra endorses his predecessor's view. He further states that it produces a different type of knowledge.[4] The most logical ground to establish the distinct character of the Nyāya *upamāna,* however, is revealed by Jayanta. According to him the mode of cognition in *upamāna* is different from the mode of cognition in other *pramāṇas.* Apart from it, he points out, whereas in the cases of inference, concomitance in its positive and negative forms plays a major role, in the case of comparison concomitance is not a necessary factor because a person recognises the animal similar to a cow as having the name '*gavaya*' independently of the knowledge of *vyāpti* between that animal and the name '*gavaya*'.

In the example given the citizen has never before observed the existence of similarity of a wild cow to a cow. When he is not aware

1. *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā.*
2. तयेत्युपसंहारात् उपमानसिद्धे नाविशेषः, *N.S.*, 2.1.48
3. *N.V.*, 2.1.46-7
4. *N.V.T.T.*, 1.1.6

of *pakṣadharmatā*, he cannot be expected to have the idea of concomitance been *liṅga* (*gosādṛśya*) and *sādhya* (*gavaya*). A cognition based upon the instruction of an authority and a simple first-time observation is naturally different from a cognition derived from *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*.

Jayanta does not accept the argument of some critics who reduce *upamāna* to syllogistic form, referred to before. He states that there is a difference between this and the usual syllogism. The ground of inference is the concomitance such as 'whatever is smoky is fiery.' It must derive from agreement in presence and agreement in absence. But the concomitance 'all animals similar to a cow are *gavaya*' is derived from verbal testimony. Jayanta pleads that this is also a basis of difference between *upamāna* and *anumāna*. But if Pārthasārathi's views are accepted, for which practical experience prompts us, the concomitance can be derived from the evidence perceptual as well as non-perceptual. In that case, Jayanta's non-acceptance of the referred syllogism does not carry any weight. However, other grounds put forth by Jayanta and other Naiyāyikas serve as ample proof for establishing the distinct character of the Nyaya *upamāna*.

Amongst the later authors of Nyāya, Nīlakaṇṭha, a noted commentator on *Tarkasaṁgraha of* Annaṁbhaṭts, states that the cognitions derived from *upamāna* are generally probable only, and not certain like those of perception or inference.[1]

Viśvanātha follows Jayanta in rejecting the inclusion of *upamāna* in inference and in stating that it is a fact of experience that verbal comprehension takes place even without the knowledge of invariable concomitance.[2]

In the stock example of *upamāna*, according to the Mimaṁsakas, the cognition takes such form as 'the cow which has been perceived in the city is similar to the *gavaya* which is observed in the forest.' Like the *Nyāya upamāna*, the *upamāna* as propounded by the Mímāṁsakas has been considered by some logicians as reducible to inference. Varadarāja, the author of *Tārkikarakṣā*, subjects the Mimaṁsa *upamāna* to the following formal statement : 'A cow is like a wild cow, since it is the correlate of similarity in a wild cow : whatever is the correlate of similarity in another entity, is like it, as a twin is similar to another twin.'

1. Athlye and Bodas, *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p. 329
2. *N.M.*, I-134

Kumārila seems conscious of such arguments. He puts up a vigorous fight against his opponents. He states that the *upamāna* as expounded by him cannot be reduced to inference since in the case of *upamāna*, e.g., 'a cow is similar to a wild cow', there is neither *pakṣadharmatā* (minor premise) which states a relation between the middle term (*hetu*) and the minor term (*pakṣa*, i. e., the subject) nor *vyāpti* (major premise) which states a universal relation between the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya* or predicate). The middle term which plays a keyrole in inference is not ascertainable in the case of comparison. In the inferential syllogism, the middle term is the property of the minor term. But here, in the referred example, i. e., the cow is like a wild cow,' what can serve as middle term ? The observed similarity of a wild cow to a cow cannot be considered as the middle term since it is perceived as residing in the wild cow which is a major term and not in the cow which is the minor term because the cow is beyond the range of sense-perception. The similarity residing in the cow also cannot be the middle term because it forms part of what is to be proved. The *gavaya* too cannot be the middle term, because it is not in any way related to the minor term, the cow.

The object of *upamāna*, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, is the similarity of *gavaya* in the cow, whereas that which is perceived by tha eye is the similarity which is located in the *gavaya* and the latter could not give rise to any inference that would bring about any idea of the similarity which is located in the cow. So, similarity cannot serve here as the middle term. Similarly, the presence of horns, etc., also cannot be regarded as the middle term since their function ends with the cognition of the *gavaya*. The horns might recall the cow but they cannot lead to the cognition that the cow is similar to the *gavaya* and therefore it could simply be a case of memory. Moreover, the observed hornedness here is a property of *gavaya* and not of the cow. So it cannot be the middle term.

Moreover, concomitance requires repeated prior observation of the invariable relation between the minor and the middle terms and here the *gavaya* is observed for the first time.

Jayanta objects to Kumārila's assertions. According to him, the Mīmāṁsā *upamāna* pertains to memory. The judgment that 'a cow is like a wild cow' is merely memorative. The Mīmāṁsakas hold novelty to be the only criterion of valid knowledge and memory certainly is not new knowledge. He further states that even if it is admitted that it does not pertain to memory it may be

inferential since it is deduced. Jayanta, to stress his rejection of Mimāṁsā views, reduces their *upamāna* to the following syllogism. Whatever has some points in common with something is similar to that thing; the remembered cow has some points in common with the perceived *gavaya*; therefore the remembered cow is similar to the perceived *gavaya*.

Jayanta points out that in this syllogism the reason is the partaking of many common limbs by the referred objects, for example, the second individual of the *gavaya* class. The reason is not doubtful since the limbs which are shared in common have been specified. The reason is not unproven since it has been admitted that there is a sharp distinction between having common limbs and resemblance. The judgment that 'a cow is like a *gavaya*', is only deduced from a major premise which is arrived at by induction and it is obvious that such a judgment cannot take place independently of induction. Hence, the judgment in question, according to Jayanta is not produced by *upamāna* as suggested by the Mīmāṁsakas but either by memory or by inference and if they do not accept one of these two, it would be rather impossible to arrive at such cognition as has been envisaged by the Mímāṁsakas, through any means of valid knowledge.[1]

(c) UPAMĀNA VERSUS ŚABDA

Kumārila is of the view that *upamāna*, as expounded by the earlier Naiyāyikas, is not different from verbal testimony. The Naiyāikas hold testimony as a statement of some authoritative person. In the *Nyāya upamāna* also, the statement of a reliable person plays a major role. In the given example, the citizen does not have a prior knowledge of the *gavaya*, he is instructed by the forester that it is just like the cow, he then goes to the forest, perceives the similarity of the animal to a cow, remembers the statement of the forester and identifies the *gavaya*. Here the forester's instruction, called *atideśavākya*, is similar to the scriptual statement. So, there is no difference between the two. Kumārila further states that on the basis of identification also Nyāya *upamāna* does not differ from verbal testimony. The object of *upamāna* has been regarded by the older Naiyāyikas as the knowledge of the denotation of a name, (e.g., *gavaya*) on the basis of the statement of a reliable person. Thus, it is clear that the recognition of the thing named '*gavaya*' is due to verbal authority.

1. *S. V. Upa.*, 3

Bhāsarvajña also opines that *upamāna*, as expounded by the earlier Naiyāyikas, is not different from verbal testimony since it is based upon the statement of a reliable authority. It may be recalled that according to Gautama and others whom Bhāsarvajña calls as Vṛddha Naiyāyikas the knowledge of resemblance is the result in *upamāna* and that according to Udyotakara, etc., whom Bhāsarvajña refers to as Jarannaiyāyikas and whose views are also shared by the later authors such as Keśavamiśra and Annaṁbhaṭṭa, the resulting judgment in the stock example consists in the assertion that the animal perceived bears the name *gavaya*.

Upamāna has two important factors, viz., perception of the strange animal and the remembrance of the statement of the reliable authority. Gautama, etc., hold *upamiti* as the knowledge of resemblance of a previously unknown object (*gavaya*) to a previously well-known object (cow), while, for Udyotakara, etc., it is the knowledge of the relation of a name (*gavaya*) and the object signified by it (animal). Bhāsarvajña holds that the words of the forester could give the same knowledge which has been assigned to *upamāna* by the Vṛddha as well as the Jarannaiyāyikas.

Jayanta, here also, succeeds in striking at the root of his opponents' arguments. It is difficult, he holds, to obtain the distinct knowledge of the relation of the name with the named simply from the statement of the forester because the object is not perceived when the statement is heard.[1] Besides, one may not rely upon his knowledge. Moreover, his instruction may not be so convincing that all our inquiries about the object are solved. The knowledge which arises from the instruction does not resolve the doubts about the content of the instruction because it is incomplete and depends upon perception. Verbal knowledge, on the other hand, carries with it a sense of completion and depends upon no other proof for the complete expression of its object.[2]

Jayanta appears to hold that convention bestows authenticity upon verbal testimony. Convention rests upon faith, which in its turn requires no tests. On the contrary, when the form of a *gavaya* is made known to us through the instruction of the forester, we have no faith in the veracity of his statement. Hence the correctness of his statement denoting the relation holding between the word

1. नाटविकरटितवाक्याद् विस्पष्ट: संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रत्ययो भवितुम् अर्हति, *N.M.*, I-130
2. *Ibid.*

gavaya and the object concerned cannot be accepted in the same fashion as in which we accept the authenticity of verbal testimony.

In the present case the naming of the object is preceded by perception of similarity. So, how can a means of knowledge, which for the sake of carrying its operation requires some other means of knowledge as a necessary aid, be regarded as identical with a means which is competent enough to operate on its own? In this way, Jayanta rejects all the arguments for the inclusion of the Nyāya *upamāna* in verbal testimony.

(d) UPAMĀNA VERSUS PRATYABHIJÑĀ

The Jainas include comparison in recognition. According to them, it takes such form as 'this is that' 'this is different from that' 'that is like that', 'this is the correlate of that', and the like. So, they hold that the knowledge, e.g., 'a wild cow is like a cow' is recognition. Prabhācandra objects to the Nyāya view of *upamāna*. He holds that the statement of a forester that 'a wild cow is like a cow' depicts the relation of a name with the named. After that when the *gavaya* is observed in the forest, the impression of that knowledge is revived and with the aid of perception and recollection the recognition 'a wild cow is like a cow' is produced.[1]

This view is wrong since the knowledge of the relation of the name and its object is not acquired from the verbal statement simply. The wild cow is not perceived at that time and when it is perceived it cannot be said to be recognised, but Kumārila states that *pratyabhijñā* is considered valid only because over and above the mere cognition of the objects, it cognizes the object as being the same that was perceived before, but occupying another place and time.

Moreover, it cannot be said that in the forest there is a recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of the relation of the word *gavaya* and the object denoted by it because the denotation of words is beyond the senses. The opponents of Mīmāṁsā *upamāna* state that the name '*gavaya*' belongs to an object that resembles the cow and hence as soon as a man sees such an object in the forest the name flashes upon him. Here the perception of the animal lends validity to the remembrance of the name. To this Kumārila replies that the denotation of the name can never be amenable to sense-

1. *P.K.M.*, p. 97-100

perception and hence it would be at the most a case of remembrance.[1]

(c) UPAMĀNA VERSUS SMṚTI

Bhāsarvajña is of the opinion that *upamāna* as propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas is nothing but memory.[2] A similar view is held by Śāntarakṣita and Śrīdhara. Kumārila, on the other hand, holds that memory is different from *upamāna* since memory is always based on the past experience of an object, whereas in *upamāna* the similarly of a cow to the *gavaya* is experienced for the first time. *Upamāna* is based on similarity, and moreover, similarity like the universal resides in its entirety in each of the correlates. It is perceived in a correlate even if the other correlate is not perceived.

The critics of Kumārila say that it is true that the *gavaya* is not perceived at the time of the perception of cow in the city but the similarity of the cow to the *gavaya* exists in the cow even when the cow alone is perceived. So, the cognition that a cow is similar to a *gavaya* is nothing but memory.

Memory is a reproduction of some former experience, when formerly there has been no consciousness of the similarity of the cow to the *gavaya*, the question of its reproduction does not arise. Though the common properties of a cow and a *gavaya* are perceived in a cow the awareness that they exist in a *gavaya* too cannot be possible unless the *gavaya* is perceived. Hence, the cognition that the cow is similar to the *gavaya* is not a revival of a past experience but is a new experience.

Jayanta subjects the Mīmāṁsā view to severe criticism. The Mīmāṁsakas state that the perception lays hold of only a near object. So, the judgment that a cow is like a *gavaya* is not perceptual since the cow to which likeness belongs is beyond the range of sense-perception. Jayanta picks up the thread at this spot and states that in case the Mīmāṁsakas do not accept this as a case of sense-perception, it would be nothing but a case of memory since it is the recollection of the cow which is responsibe for such judgment as the Mīmāṁsakas intend to derive from *upamāna*.[3]

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1. न चास्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानं पुनरुत्पद्यते वने ।
शक्त्योरतीन्द्रियत्वेन स्मृतिरेव हि सेष्यते, *S.V. Upa.*, 14
2. *N.Sr.*, p. 72
3. परोक्षे च गवय सादृश्यप्रत्ययस्य विस्पष्टस्यान्यतोऽसिद्धेरिति, उक्तमत्र
स्मृतिरेवेयं तथावभासनात्, *N.M.*, I-134

(f) UPAMĀNA VERSUS ANALOGY

Dr. Gangānāth Jha has taken analogy as the English equivalent of the term '*upamāna*'.[1] Dr. S. N. Dasgupta also uses analogy as equivalent of *upamāna*.[2] Dr. Rādhākrishnan and Dr. J. N. Sinha either adopt the term in its original form or use the word 'comparison' as its substitute.[3] Dr. S. S. Barlingay suggests that "in contrast with logical analogy, *upamāna* may be *translated* as *philosophic* or *semantic analogy* or *class-perception*."[4] The following analysis of the problem, however, proves that *upamāna* is different from analogy. Analogy in Western logic takes such form as : S and 'P' resemble each other in many respects; 'S' has a characteristic 'X'; therefore, 'P' may also have 'X'. Here 'S' and 'P' both are known to the perceiver. It is only the additional characteristic 'X' which is known to be existing in 'S' but which is yet to be ascertained in 'P'.

Upamāna, on the other hand, takes the following form if 'A' and 'B' are taken to represent the known (cow) and the unknown (*gavaya*) respectively—

'B' is similar to 'A'. So, eithe 'A' is similar to 'B' (Mīmāṁsā) or 'B' means the object 'B' (Nyāya). Here 'A' is known and 'B' is unknown. What we want to ascertain is not a partial characteristic which would have been perceived in 'A' and is yet to be ascertained in "B', but it is either the entire 'B' or the signification holding between 'B' and the object 'B' or an additional quality of 'A'.

Moreover *Upamāna* depends upon the statement of a reliable person, but such outside aid is not necessary in the case of analogy. Whereas *upamāna* yields the knowledge of the relation between a a name and an object, analogy tries to ascertain an additional characteristic in one of the relevant objects on the basis of its existence in another. Analogy is always based on similarity but *upamāna* has dissimilarity and description as additional grounds. In this way it is wrong to hold *upamāna* and analogy as identical.

4. *The Forms of Upamāna*

Varadarāja, has given a wider definition of *upamāna* in his work '*Tārkikarakṣā*'. According to him *upamāna* is the cognition, through the perception of an object denoted by a name occurring in the state-

1. *Ślokavārtika*, (Eng. Trans. *Upa.*)
2. *A History of Indian Philosophy* (*Upa.*)
3. *A History of Indian Philosophy* (*Upa.*)
4. *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic.*, p. 175

ment of an authoritative person, by a person who does not know the meaning of the name.[1] *Upamāna*, in this way is the identification of a previously unknown object from its description given by a reliable person. In this wider perspective *upamāna* should not be restricted to the perception of similarity alone as there are other means also, (for instance, dissimilarity according to Uddyotakara and *Dharmamātratā* according to Varadarāja) throughw hich the denotation of a name could be cognized.

When a man who does not know a horse is told that a horse, unlike a cow, has no cloven hoofs and after perceiving such an animal he comes to know that this is what is called a horse, then we have a case of *upamāna* in which the means of knowing the denotation of an unfamiliar name is the perception of dissimilarity. Further, if a person who does not know a camel is told that a camel is the animal which has a long neck and drooping lips and feeds on thorns and later on perceives such an animal and recognises it as a camel, this is a case of *upamāna* where we know an unknown object from its peculiar characteristics (*dharmamātratā*). Thus it is clear that a statement may contain the description of an unknown object in terms of (1) its similarity, or (2) dissimilarity to other objects, or (3) its peculiar charcteristics. So, Varadarāja adds one more type of *upamāna*, i. e., *dharmamātropamāna* in the list of the forms of *upamāna* given by Uddyotakara.[2]

Viśvanātha refers to another type of *upamāna*. He states that if on hearing that a herb resembling the *mudgaparṇī* is an antidote and then finding such a herb, we come to the conclusion that it is an antidote, then it would be a case of *upamāna*. This special type of *upamāna* brings about the identification of an object from the given description.[3]

5. The Role of Sādṛśya (similarity) in upamāna

The Naiyāyikas regard the notion of similarity as the causal factor of comparison.[4] But if we think in terms of the relative importance of similarity and *atideśavākya*, the latter will be more important than the former in the scheme of *Nyāya upamāna* in spite of the fact that

1. अव्युत्पन्नपदोपेतवाक्यार्थस्य च संज्ञिनि ।
प्रत्यक्षप्रत्यभिज्ञानम् उपमानं प्रचक्षते, *T.R.*, p. 85
2. *N.V.*, 2.1.45
3. *N.S.V.*, 1.1.6
4. *B.P.*, 76

formally recollection of *atideśavākya* has been regarded by the Naiyāyikas as *vyāpāra*.

An operation usually depends upon the instrument and in that case the former is subordinate to the latter. Viśvanātha regards similarity as instrument and recollection of *atideśavākya* as *vyāpāra*.[1] *Atideśavākya* is more important in the sense that the Naiyāyikas lay more stress on it since the signification holding between the word and the object appears to be more dependent on the statement than on the similarity. Both the Mīmāmskas and the Naiyāyiakas hold *atideśavākya* and similarity as the operative and causal factors of *upamāna*, respectively. But whereas the *atideśavākay* is held as of secondary importance by the Mīmāṁsakas, the Naiyāyikas seem to hold similarity less important than *atideśavākya*. The older Naiyāyikas talk of the degrees of sādṛśya (as perfect, great or partial), but do not accept any impact of these degrees on the process or the result of *upamāna*.[2]

Jayanta points out that there is an age-long controversy over the nature of similarity. Sūtrakāra also is conscious of it since he tries to solve it through his assertion that the degrees of similarity do not have any bearing upon its effectiveness.[3] It is its familiarity, which counts. An object by which the knowledge or resemblance to another object is produced, is regarded as similar. Jayanta discards all controversies regarding the degrees as simply superfluous. He states that as 'universal' is at the root of identity, similarlity or 'familiarity' is the basis of similarity.[4]

The Mīmāṁsā View. Similarity is the ground on which the entire structure of *upamāna* rests.[5] Kumārila defines it as a positive entity which consists in the presence in the constituent parts of one class of individuals a number of such features which are common to the constituent parts of the individuals belonging to a different class.[6] It exists in two composite things alone. The idea of similarity arises when the perception of some feature in one object causes the consciousness in the perceiver that similar features are present in the

1. *B.P.*, 89
2. *N.B.*, 2.1.45
3. अत्यन्त प्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः; *N.S.*, 2.1.44
4. अभिन्नप्रत्यये हेतुर्यथा सामान्यमुच्यते ।
सदृशप्रत्यये हेतुस्तथा सादृश्यमुच्यते, *N. M.*, I-132
5. *S. D.*, p. 208
6. *S.V.*, *Upa.* 18

counter-correlate of the object. The objects of similarity may be the objects consisting of parts which are divisible into further parts and so on upto the smallest part, e. g., the atom.

Apart from common parts, similarity is also described in terms of common qualities, common relation, common origin, common actions, etc.[1] But they must be composite entities analysable into constituent parts, qualities, relations, etc. Similarity resides in two individuals of the same class also, as in twins. There is, however, a verse in *Ślakavārtika* which states that the notion of similarity arises only when the objects belong to a different class.[2] Similarity is a universal and universals are eternal in the sense that we cannot think of a time when all the individuals in which a universal inheres are destroyed. The degree of similarity corresponds to the number of universals commonly in the objects compared.[3]

Prabhākara holds that some people have stated that the universal itself is similarity, but this is wrong because a universal like cowness gives rise to the notion of identity in the form 'this is the same thing'.[4]

Jayanta refers to two definitions of similarity by the Mīmāṁsakas, viz., (i) it is the common possession of many limbs[5] and that (ii) it is the unique source of the awareness of resemblance.[6] The former definition of similarity, according to Jayanta, is too narrow to be applied to the picture, etc., of a cow. It is also too wide since it applies to an animal which is dissimilar to a *gavaya*. If the second definition is accepted, the structure of the *Mīmāṁsā upamāna* falls to the ground, since the awareness is possible even when the *gavana* is not perceived and in that case it would serve as a cause of memory and not of *upamāna*.[7]

Rejecting the inclusion of a knowing process based on similarity under recollection, the Mīmāṁsakas may argue that the fact that a

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1. *S.U.*, *Upa.*, 20
2. Ibid., 29
3. Ibid., 20
4. *Bṛhatī*, p. 109
5. भूयोवयवसामान्ययोग: सादृश्यम्, *N.M.*, I. 134
6. सदृशप्रत्यय हेतुत्वादेव सादृश्यम्, Ibid
7. गवि-अनभिव्यक्तसादृश्यग्रहणोपपत्तेः स्मृतिरेवेयम्, Ibid

cow is endowed with similarity to a *gavaya* was not perceived in the past. Recollection of similarity presupposes previous perception of similarity since the wild cow is perceived now for the first time. So, it cannot be a case of recollection. Here Jayanta replies that it is on the basis of the resemblance of an unfamiliar thing with the familiar thing that we know the former and not vice-versa.[1]

Moreover, the Mīmāṁsakas themselves admit that similarity, which consists in the possession of many common parts, can be known without the knowledge of its correlate (*pratiyogin*),

Further, if it is held that the knowledge of similarity in a remembered object is derived from the perception of a similar object (*a gavaya*), then the knowledge of dissimilarity in a remembered object should also be derived from the perception of a dissimilar object. But the Mīmāṁsakas do not accept this position, hence Jayanta holds that the Mīmāṁsakas' view of the role of similarity in *upamāna* is confusing.

6. *The Practical Utility of Upamāna*

Perhaps Vātsyāyana ranks first amongst those who have considered the practical efficacy of *upamāna* as a means of knowledge. Viśvanātha gives a clear exposition of his views to prove an additional type of *upamāna*.[2] Vātsyāyana points out that if we learn that a certain herb called as *mudgaparṇī* resembles *mudga*, then we bring the herb to use as an antidote. It is rather strange that Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra do not find it necessary to comment upon it. Jayanta on the other hand, has given a vivid account of the problem. He presents the Nyāya view and has very successfully refuted the Mīmāṁsā tenet expounded by Kumārila. Jayanta points out that the attainment of final emancipation has been regarded as the goal of the knowledge of the essence of sixteen categories, enumerated by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*. As the means of knowledge are not only enumerated, but occupy first place amongst the categories, it is obvious that they play their role with reference to emancipation. Amongst the four means of knowledge, testimony helps us to acquire the knowledge of the self, inference establishes the veracity of scriptures and perception is the source of arriving at inferential concomitance. These three means have been assigned some special roles. But what about comparison ? Does it serve any purpose in

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1. प्रसिद्धेन हि सादृश्यम् अप्रसिद्धस्य गम्यते ।
गवा गवयपिण्डस्य न तु युक्तो विपर्ययः, *N.M.*, I. 133

2. *N. S. V.*, 1.1.6.

the context of emancipatiton ? Jayanta shoulders the responsibility of answering this question.

Upamāna, according to Jayanta, has a double purpose to achieve. It renders a valuable service in the performance of a Vedic rite which enjoins the killing of a *gavaya*. If one is not acquainted with the *gavaya*, the animal cannot be killed. Further, it has a unique part to play in making one know the plant *Mudgaparṇī* on the basis of a reliable person's instruction that the plant of *Mudgaparṇī* is like the stem of kidney beans.[1] Jayanta comes forward with another suggestion that even if it is held that *upamāna* has no direct bearing on final emancipation the sage Gautama might have been actuated to enumerate *upamāna* amongst the pramāṇas on account of his general sympathy for the common people who usually adopt this way of knowing to acquaint themselves with the numerous unknown objects.[2]

The Mīmāṁsakas also try to prove the efficacy of comparison on the following grounds : The detailed procedure of performing a Vedic rite in honour of the sun-god by offering an oblation of milk-boiled rice is learnt from its resemblance to a sacrifice performed in honour of the god of fire. With regard to the Vedic rite in honour of the god of fire, the injunction is self-sufficient and complete since there is ample provision for the details of unknown subsidiary actions such as the placing of rightly prepared cakes on eight earthen pot-sherds, etc. But the injunction, 'one who is desirous, of acquiring the lusture of the study should offer an oblation of milk-boiled rice to the sun-god' refers only to the principal action and the article of offering but does not give information about other details.

Now the question that arises in our mind is, 'How shall we find out the subsidiary actions ?' We see that there is similarity between barley boiled in milk and *purodaśa* (a cake prepared from cereals), since both are prepared from cereals. Moreover, the respective deities of these two rites resemble each other as they have lustre. Owing to this similarity, comparison throws light on the nature of subsidiary actions so that the subsidiary action of the rite in honour of the god

1. यथा मुद्गस्तथा मुद्गपर्णी••• तामोपधीं भैपज्याय आहरति, संज्ञा संज्ञिसम्बन्ध प्रतिपद्यमान: N.B., 1.1.6 ; *N.S.V.*, 1.1-6 ; *N.M.*, I.-132.

2. सर्वानुग्रहबुद्ध्या च करुणार्द्रमतिर्मुनि: मोक्षोपयोगाभावे ऽपि तस्य लक्षणमुक्तवान्, *Ibid.* I-132

of fire is to be applied to that which is to be prepared in honour of the sun god. Moreover, there is another point, viz., if a substance which has been enjoined as a means for the performance of some rite, is not available, then its substitute will suffice to complete the action. If barley is not available one can use wild rice as a substitute on the strength of comparison. The Vedic sentences which reveal the rites to be performed in honour of the sungod and the god of fire refer to their similarity on the basis of comparison but not on the basis of perception or inference. These functions prove the efficacy of comparison. If comparison had no part to play how could the injunction concerning the rite in honour of the sun-god refer to the injunction regarding the rite in honour of the god of fire? Therefore, the Mímāṁsakas hold that comparison renders a special service in such cases.[1] Kumārila points out some other utility of comparison. If barley is somehow defective, wild rice can be used as its substitute in a Vedic rite.[2] He also adds that when the points of resemblance are not too many, the resulting judgment is that one is like the other to some extent and when the points of similarity are too many, the resulting judgment is that one is closely like the other.

Jayanta holds that the above statements of the Mīmāṁsakas involve inner contradiction. They believe that comparison makes one know that a familiar object is like an unfamiliar one. They have held that comparison reveals that a well-known cow is like a *gavaya* which is not seen before. Having said all this, they cite such examples as run counter to their thesis. In other words, the examples go in favour of the Nyāya tenets. For instance, comparison produces the judgment that an unfamiliar rite in honour of the sungod is like a rite in honour of the god of fire. The second rite is familiar because the details of its subsidiary action are given. The first rite is unfamiliar because the details of its subsidiary actions are not given. The first rite may be compared to a *gavaya*, and the second one to a cow. The above judgment corresponds to the judgment that a *gavaya* is like a cow. If the Mīmāṁsakas were not off their guard, they would have shown that the rite which is complete in its minor details is like the rite of which details are missing. But it is strange enough that they have proved the reverse.[3] Now, the Mīmāṁsakas may contend that the solar rite which is in need of minor details reminds us of the

1. *S.V.* (*Upa.*) 52
2. *Ibid.*, 53.
3. *N.M.*, I-136.

rite observed in honour of the god of fire. Hence, the first approaches the second for the minor details.

Jayanta joins issues with the Mīmāṁsakas and holds that even if the above explanation is taken for granted, the object which is required is settled by memory alone.[1] In that case, there is no necessity of assuming comparison as a distinct proof. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that as the rite observed in honour of the god of fire is remembered so its minor details are borrowed. They also add that the object which is remembered flashes in our mind along with such extra objects as memory cannot supply. Hence, a distinct type of knowledge based upon comparison has been admitted. Jayanta points out that the reason of controverting it has been already mentioned. (Memory is not valid knowledge since it simply reveals known objects. If comparison revives memory only, it is not an instrument of knowledge.) Hence, there is no need of pushing the discussion any further.

Jayanta puts forward an additional point maintaining that the comparison *cannot play the role of the scriptures.*[2] It can neither induce a person to do something nor dissuade him from doing it. Hence, a person who requires definite knowledge by means of comparison cannot transfer the minor details of the rite in honour of the god of fire to the rite in honour of the sun god on the basis of the above knowledge. The Mīmāṁsakas, if they are sincere to their creed, cannot hold that wild rice is like barley; they should rather say that barley is like wild rice. But the judgment that barley is like wild rice serves no useful purpose.[3]

The killing of a *gavaya* in some sacrifice might have been the result of the comparison. But comparison, as defined by the Mīmāṁsakas, does not help to know *gavaya* or to select a substitute. So, in the opinion of Jayanta the Mīmāṁsā theory of *upamāna* is not tenable.[4]

7. *Conclusion*

The foregoing account of *upamāna* shows that only three of the systems of Indian Philosophy accept *upamāna* as a distinct source of valid knowledge. The supporters of *upamāna* also differ with one another.

1. *N.M.*, I-136
2. किं चोपमानप्रतिपादितार्थो न चोदनालक्षणतां बिभर्ति, *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. भवत्यंग······सुमतिभिः, *Ibid.*, I-136

The main conflict, however, subsists between the Mīmāṁaskas and the Naiyāyikas. Jayanta brings the conflict to the forefront. He gives a balanced analysis of the problem. It is mainly his account of *upamāna* which decides once for all the demarcation lines between the *Nyāya* and the Mīmāṁsā views of *upamāna*. It is his exposition again that settles beyond doubt the pragmatic value of this source of knowing, Though he has not come forward with his own definition of *upamāna*, his leaning towards the views of his contemporaries is obvious. On the basis of a close estimate of all the relevant standpoints and particularly on the basis of a thorough investigation of Jayanta's account, one could arrive at the following conclusions regarding the nature and forms of *upamāna*.

In *upamāna*, according to the Naiyāyikas, the process of activity starts from unknown (e.g., *gavaya*), refers to a well-known (e.g., cow) and results in a new knowledge, i.e., '*gavaya* is similar to a cow' or 'the animal perceived is to be called as *gavaya*.' In the *upamāna* as contemplated by the Mīmāṁsakas also activity starts from unknown, refers to a well-known but it results in a new knowledge with reference to the well-known, e.g., 'my cow is similar to this newly received animal.'

Secondly, whereas the Naiyāyikas lay greater emphasis on *atideśavākya*, the Mīmāṁsakas put more weight on similarity.

Upamāna serves as an instrument of identification for the Naiyāyikas but the Mīmāṁsakas hold it as an aid to make up deficiency of descriptive detail in the substitution of one thing for another.

They include it in one or the other means of knowledge. Although it is a fact that *upamāna* is partly dependent on perception with reference to the observation of similarity, it has a touch of inference on account of the fact that it cognizes the unknown through the medium of the known. It also possesses some elements of testimony in the sense that the recollected *atideśavākya* comes from a reliable person. Yet, the partial or seeming presence of the elements of these three *pramāṇas* does not reduce *upamāna* to any one of them or to the sum total of all of them.

So, *upamāna*, though existing on the help of other *pramāṇas* to some extent, is different from them. These *pramāṇas* too, though constituting the structure of *upamāna*, are neither individually nor collectively identical with it.

Jayanta' treatment of *upamāna* is fairly long. Gangeśa refers to his views. The hypothesis of *upamāna*, as offered by the Mīmāmsakas, has been admirably refuted by him. He discards the attempts of other systems to include *upamāna* in any other source of knowledge. He proves beyond doubt that *upamāna* is a distinct way of ascertaining the signification holding between a name and the object denoted by it.

Jayanta does not oppose the Mīmāṁsakas for the sake of opposition. He rather gives a fair exposition of their views. As is evident from the text of *Nyāyamañjarī*, he takes Kumārila's exposition as the prima facie view of the Mīmāṁsā system. He neither leaves out nor adds any point in explaining their tenet. He supports Gautama and Vātsyāyana against the Mīmāṁsakas and gives due importance to the views of his contemporaries. *Upamāna*, according to Jayanta is the sensuous perception of a resemblance which results in the cognition of the relation between the term and the object denoted by it. Like the perception of smoke which is the cause for establishing the fire, the knowledge of resemblance leads one to the establishment of a relation between a term and the object denoted by it. So, it is a distinct proof. He presents the case of earlier and contemporary Naiyāyikas but, as we have said before, he does not come forward outright with his own definition ; we determine his views through inference. Most of the later Naiyāyikas, specially of the syncretic Nyāya Vaiśeṣika period, followed him in their account of *upamāna*.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATURE AND FORMS OF VERBAL TESTIMONY

1. *The Nature of Śabda (Verbal Testimony)*

Etymologically '*śabda*' (*śabdayati*) signifies sound (*dhvani*), literally it stands for 'word' (*pada*) and epistemologically it refers to a source of knowledge, namely 'verbal testimony'. It is, however, in the context of verbal testimony that '*śabda*' has aroused a long, lively and hair-splitting debate in the canons of Indian logic. Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* contains a long discussion on this problem. A general notion that '*śabda*' is a means of knowledge and that it depends upon the statement of a trustworthy authority, does not carry conviction with the Cārvākas.[1] They do not approve of its enumeration as a distinct source of knowledge since they are opposed to believe anything on others' statements because, in that case, they think that they would have to believe the utterances of any fool. Even if the authority is restricted to the statement of a trustworthy person, it would be, in their opinion, at the most included in inference which also they do not accept on account of the fault of *regressus ad infinitum* in the evidence that the logicians propose for the ascertaining of concomitance. The Vaiśeṣikas reject '*śabda*' as a distinct source of knowledge on the ground that it is nothing but inference since in both the cases one has to know an unperceived object from the perception of some related object.[2] In '*śabda*', we know the unperceived objects through the perception of words related to these objects. The Buddhists reduce '*śabda*' to inference if it is based upon the statement of a trustworthy person and to perception if it is used to prove that there are actual facts corresponding to a statement.[3]

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1 *S.D.S.*, (Rishi-Chow, 1964) p. 14

2. एतेन शाब्दं व्याख्यातम्, *U.S.* 9.2.3.

3. तत्रानुमानमेवेदं बौद्धवैशेषिकैः श्रितम् ।
भेदः सांख्यादिभिस्त्विष्टो न तूक्तं भेदकारणम्, *S.V.* (*Śabda*) 15;
History of Indian Logic, pp. 287-8

Leaving aside the Cārvāka, Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist, all the other systems of Indian Philosophy accept '*śabda*' as a distinct source of knowledge, but they also differ with one another with regard to its nature, forms and a number of other aspects. The Nyāya upholds the validity of verbal testimony as a way of knowing and Jayanta elaborates the Nyāya position with extraordinary zeal. In this specific issue of verbal testimony, Jayanta is mainly confronted with the Mīmāṁsakas. Here and there he does not forget to refute the Buddhists. He has all out praise for the authority of grammar. It is of course strange that he is silent about the rhetoricians. He seems to hold that they do not deserve separate treatment over and above the Grammarians.

Anyhow, keeping in view the dimensions of the present study we have to take up only the following topics to formulate a comprehensive view of verbal testimony : (1) the Nature of *śabda*, (2) the Nature of word, (3) the relation of word and its meaning, (4) the word and the referent, (5) the import of a sentence, and (6) the theories of verbal comprehension.

(a) JAYANTA'S THEORY

Jayanta' theory of verbal testimony depends chiefly upon his introduction of divergent views regarding the interpretation and implications of Gautama's definition of *śabda*. According to Gautama, *śabda* is the *upadeśa* (instruction) of an '*āpta*' (reliable person).[1] Vātsyāyana explain the term '*āpta*' as signifying a person who has immediate knowledge of *dharma* (the moral law), who is capable of perceiving objects in their real form and who communicates real knowledge to others out of compassion.[2] *Āpta*, according to Vātsyāyana, can be anyone — a Ṛṣi, or an Ārya or a Mleccha. There is no caste bar for performing the role of a trustworthy person. Uddyotakara introduces a controversy over the interpretation of the compound '*āptopadeśa*' in the Nyāya, obviously to refute the contention of Diṅnāga that verbal testimony is to be included either in inference or in perception. Uddyotakara makes it clear that it is the element of verbalisation which is important in this source of knowledge and which separates it from inference and perception.[3] Vācaspati here and there explains what Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara

1. आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः, *N.S.*, 1.7.1
2. *N.B.*, 1.1.7
3. नायं सूत्रार्थः आप्तोपदेशःशब्दः इति, अपितु इन्द्रियसम्बद्धासम्बद्धेष्वर्थेषु या शब्दोल्लेखेन प्रतिपत्तिः साऽऽगमार्थः, *N.V.*, 1.1.7

have said but he does not seem to have any concrete suggestion to make.

Jayanta frames his theory of verbal testimony with a technical analysis of the terms '*āpta*' and '*upadeśa*' occurring in the aphorism of Gautama. He maintains that without the inclusion of the term '*āpta*' the definition becomes too wide since in that case it would apply to a word which does not produce true knowledge. Similarly, regarding the term '*upadeśa*' he refers to the view that to delineate the nature of verbal testimony and to make the definition self-sufficient and flawless, we have to borrow the words *jñāna*, *artha*, *vyavasāyātmaka* and *avyapadeśya* from the aphorism which contains the definition of *pratyakṣa*. He suggests the inclusion of these words in the definition of *śabda* on the same grounds on which these have been incorporated in his definition of perception.

Upadeśa. Jayanta is aware of those who hold that the definition of '*pramāṇa*' in general has excluded non-valid forms of cognition and that it would be redundant to borrow such words from other aphorisms over and above the compound '*āptopadeśa*' to definite the nature of verbal testimony. As far as the question of keeping the distinction between verbal testimony and other means of knowledge is concerned, the very word '*upadeśa*' is competent enough to serve the purpose. Jayanta examines the etymological meaning of the word '*upadeśa*' and maintains that it is '*abhidhānakriyā*', i.e., that by which the knowledge of something is conveyed. He is, however, aware of the following objections that could be raised againt this interpretation of the term: If it is taken to mean the instrument which produces knowledge, then it may denote other sense organs as well since they also produce consciousness. It is wrong to hold that the term '*upadeśa*' denotes a specific form of consciousness which resembles its cause, since in that case, when the parts of an image are inferred because of its resemblance to the object reflected, the object reflected would also be denoted by the term *upadeśa*, whereas in verbal testimony the awareness does not resemble the word, since a word, being a sound, has no form. If again it is maintained that consciousness signifies only the awareness of sound, then the term *upadeśa* should denote only the auditory sense organ. The sound and the understanding of meaning should not be confused. A word, when it is taken as a mere sound, cannot be denoted by the term *upadeśa*. So the term *upadeśa* should not mean an instrument of knowledge.

Conventionally, the '*abhidhānakriyā*' is the apprehension of the meaning of an audible sound implying an object.[1] A word which consists of a number of sounds produces the knowledge of an object. If it is held that a word is that which conveys the knowledge of some other object, then a mark, such as smoke, should also be called a word ; and a word, the meaning of which is not known, may not be regarded as a word.[2] It is true that to be aware of an object is to know it. Still, to be perceived, to be inferred and to be denoted are not synonymous with one another and it is the term *upadeśa* which differentiates verbal testimony from the remaining means of knowledge.[3]

Āpta : Jayanta's discussion on the term *āpta* (authority) centres round two points. First, he discusses why this term has been included in the definition and second, who is to be regarded as *āpta*. As regards the first point, Jayanta states that it is given to convey the exact character of the definition. If it is not included, then *aitihya* (tradition) would not be distinct from verbal testimony since the element of assertion (*upādeśa*) is common to both. In other words, the correctness of assertion is vindicated with the incorporation of this term and consequently *aitihya* as well as the deceptive sentences of the knave are excluded from the field of verbal testimony.[4] Regarding the second point, i.e., who is *āpta* ?, Jayanta first of all quotes Vātsyāyana and states that the terms 'intention to impart' (*cikhyāpayiṣā*) and 'teacher' (*upadeṣṭā*) in the *Bhāṣya* have special significance. The former indicates that *āpta* is that who is not partially disposed (*vītarāga*) and the latter indicates that he should be efficient in the art of teaching. He who lacks any of these qualities, cannot be a teacher. Jayanta makes it clear that to be a reliable person is not the exclusive prerogative of anyone. It may be enjoyed by all without any discrimination of caste and creed. He further states that a reliable person should not have imperfect knowledge of the subject matter, which he undertakes to impart. But it is not necessary that he should be omniscient.

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1. श्रोत्रग्राह्यवस्तुकरणिका तदर्थप्रतीतिरभिधानक्रिया इत्थं लोके व्यवहारात्, *N.M.*, I-138
2. यतोऽर्थप्रतीतिः स शब्द इतितूच्यमाने धूमादिरपि शब्दः स्यात्, अगृहीत-सम्बन्धश्च शब्दः शब्दत्वं जह्यात् अर्थप्रतिपत्तेरकरणात्, *Ibid.*
3. तत्प्रतीतिविशेषजनने च शब्दस्योपदेशत्वमुच्यते, *Ibid.*
4. एवं हि ऐतिह्यस्य न प्रामाणान्तरता भविष्यति उपदेशरूपत्वाविशेषात्, *Ibid.*, I-137

(b) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST VIEW

Jayanta is aware of the fact that the Buddhists do not accept verbal testimony as a distinct means of valid knowledge. So, in addition to a detailed analysis of the nature of *śabda*, he rebukes the Buddhists for their lack of understanding of the difference between inference and verbal testimony. The main argument adduced by the Buddhists to uphold their standpoint is that the positive and the negative relation between a reason and a consequence is the same as between word and its object. In the case of inference, smokeness is the reason and in the case of verbal testimony, universal belonging to the word performs this role. Jayanta refutes this argument of the Buddhists stating that an inference presupposes the knowledge of relation between a reason and its consequence but the meaning of a sentence can be grasped without the prior knowledge of its relation with the meaning even by those who hear it for the first time and who are so far conversant simply with words and their meanings and not with the relation of sentence and its meaning. As far as prior knowledge of the relation of word and meaning is concerned, it cannot prove the identity between inference and verbal testimony since inference always depends upon the sentence.[1]

Jayanta further points out that if the Buddhists hold that some words are capable of expressing the sense of a sentence their contention is wrong since a word does not produce absolutely complete knowledge. For instance, the word '*gomān*' (a man who possesses cows) requires other words to complete the sense, and if uttered all alone, it would not satisfy our inquisitive mind. A sentence, on the other hand, is complete in itself. Moreover, in inference, the process of knowing moves from subject (hill) to predicate (fiery) whereas in the process of meaning it moves from predicate to subject. Jayanta refers to some other minor points in favour of or against the propriety of comparison between the processes of inference and word-meaning and finally comes to the conclusion that the identity of inference and verbal testimony cannot be established on the ground adduced by the Buddhists. Here, he generally echoes the views of Kumārila and quotes him copiously.[2]

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1. वाक्यमनवगतसम्बन्धमेव वाक्यार्थमवगमयितुमलम्·· सम्बन्धाधिगममूलप्रवृत्तिनाऽनुमानेन तस्य कथं साम्यसम्भावना, *Ibid.*, I-140
2. *N.M.*, I-140 ; *S.V.* (*Śabda*)

(c) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE MĪMĀṀSĀ VIEW

Jayanta does not consider what the Sāṁkhyas have to say about this problem. He probably agrees with Kumārila that they have said nothing. As we have stated above, Jayanta extensively quotes Kumārila in the course of his refutation of the Buddhist view. Let us now see how the Mīmāṁsakas themselves view the nature of verbal testimony.

For Śabara verbal testimony is the knowledge of an object which is not perceived by a sense organ, but is the result of knowledge of words.[1] Kumārila maintains that since in the case of the meaning of a sentence the cognition is produced by means of the meanings of words (making up the sentence) without the recognition of the relation of invariable concomitance as is necessary in inference, therefore the recognition of the meaning of a sentence must be held to be distinct from inference, like sense-perception.[2] Kumārila does not approve of the definition of *śabda* provided by Gautama on the grounds that the Nyāya definition presupposes that all verbal statements are made by persons and that Vedic statements also are the statements of God who is a supernatural person. The Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, maintain that the Vedas are eternal and impersonal, since they are not composed by any one, not even God. So, according to Kumārila, the definition provided by Gautama is too narrow.[3] He criticises the Buddhist view as well and states that inference and testimony are two different things. Jayanta as we have mentioned above, refers to a number of arguments adduced by Kumārila against the Buddhists. But he does not agree with Kumārila regarding the eternality of the Vedic sentences.

Jayanta's delineation of the nature of verbal knowledge is remarkable in the sense that it offers new interpretations of the two main terms in the aphorism of Gautama and justifies the inclusion of these terms in it. To complete the definition of verbal testimony the idea of borrowing the words *jñāna*, etc., from the aphorism dealing with perception, is also unique. In refuting the Buddhist arguments, though he is not original and echoes what Kumārila has already said, he cannot be deprived of the credit of introducing this aspect of the problem in the Nyāya in a clear-cut manner. Regarding the validity of verbal testimony, Jayanta maintains that the tests of

1. शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानाद् असन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम्, *S. B.*
2. *S.V.* (*Śabda*), 109
3. नाप्तस्य सम्भवो वेदे लोके नास्मात्प्रमाणता, *S. V.* (*Śabda*) 52

truth holding good for other means of knowledge are also equally applicable to it and it is not reasonable to think that verbal knowledge, being a class in itself, needs some unique criterion to decide its validity.

2. *The Nature of Word*

(a) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE ETERNALITY OF WORD

Is word eternal ? This question has elicited diametrically opposite answers from the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The former uphold the theory of the eternality of word and the latter regard it as non-eternal. Jayanta ponders elaborately over the problem and supports the conventional Nyāya view against the Mīmāṁsā standpoint. It is interesting to note that the neck to neck fight on this issue has taken place directly between Jaimini and Gautama. On no other problem have the propounders of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā confronted each other so strongly as they seem to have on the above. Gautama adduces a number of points against the eternality of words and Jaimini in favour of it. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara support their master ; similarly Śabara and Kumārila their own. Jayanta picks up the thread from Uddyotakara on one hand and from Kumārila on the other. But he quotes Jaimini and Śabara copiously. Let us see what the founder authorities and followers of these two systems say in favour of or āgainst the eternality of words and how Jayanta refutes the Mīmāṁsā views to establish that word is non-eternal.

The Mimāṁsakas maintain that words are manifested in the form of sounds by human effort ; they are not created by any one.[1] The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, are of the view that words do not exist before their production by human effort, nor do we notice any veil which covers them.[2]

In the opinion of the Mīmāṁsakas, words are not destroyed ; they become unmanifest again when human effort in the form of utterance ceases. But according to Jayanta they do not exist after their utterance.[3] The Mīmāsakas believe that it is not words but sounds which are produced by persons. But Jayanta states that there is no proof for assuming the manifestation as sound and the

1. Raja, K. K., *Indian Theories of Meaning.*
2. प्रयत्नानन्तरम् उपलब्धेः कार्यः शब्दः, *N.M.*, I-188 ; *N.S.*, 2.2.18
3. न ह्येनम् उच्चरितं मुहूर्तमप्युपलभामहे, *N.M.*, I-189

original as eternal word. Moreover, popular usage also goes in favour of the productive nature of words.[1]

Jayanta, like the other Naiyāyikas, points out that many persons in different places utter a word at the same time. Had it been eternal, this could not happen. But the Mīmāṁsakas assert that just as many persons perceive the same sun at a time in different places, similarly they can also utter the same word in different places at the same time.[2]

Whereas Nyāya maintains that there is a difference in the volume of a word in its utterance by one and many persons, the Mīmāṁsā contends that it is not the volume of words which increases or decreases, but rather the sound produced by the human effort alone which has these characteristics. Jayanta, in addition to the above-mentioned arguments, and counter-arguments offers the following grounds to refute the Mīmāṁsakas' contention: The Mīmāṁsakas hold that what we hear is a sound (*dhvani*) and not word (*śabda*). The difference between the two is that the latter is the manifested form of the former which means that a word, for instance, 'cow', in its original form is without a beginning; it is always there in the space. Whenever the obstruction between the ear and the eternal word is removed, the word manifests itself. But the 'manifestasion' and 'beginning' are not one and the same thing. Jayanta does not accept this proposition and refutes the Mīmāṁsakas' argument holding that the sense of a word is communicated without any difficulty if we accept that a universal such as '*gatva*' belongs to sounds.

The Mímāṁsakas are of view that a word, for instance, 'cow', remains the same even if it is uttered at different times and at different places. Had it not been ever present and eternal, how could it be manifested in one and the same form in divergent conditions?[3] But in the opinion of Jayanta this argument is also refuted on the same ground as the previous one.[4]

The Mīmāṁsakas believe that when someone utters, for instance, the word 'cow' eight times, it is not maintained that he

1. शब्दं कुरु, शब्दं मा कार्षीरिति व्यवहारः, *N.M.* I-189
2. आदित्यायौगपद्यम्, *M.S.*
3. गौ शब्द उच्चरिते सर्वंगवीषु युगपत्प्रत्ययो भवति, अत आकृतिवचनोऽयम्, *S.B.*, 1.1.19 ; सर्वत्र यौगपद्यात्, *M. S.*, 1.1.18
4. इत्येदपि प्रत्युक्तम्, सम्बन्धनियमस्य गत्वादिभ्य एव सिद्धेः, *N.M.*, I-204

has uttered eight words ; rather, it is held that he has uttered the word 'cow' eight' times. This shows that the word 'cow' is basically one and it is only its manifestation which takes place eight times.[1] But Jayanta again objects to this proposition maintaining that this interpretation of the suffix '*kṛtvasuc*' is wrong since it has exceptions. For instance, a young lady embraces her husband four times and kisses him eight times and this is referred to with the suffix '*kṛtva*' added to the number four or eight, but embracing and kissing is every time different. Thus, '*kṛtvasuc*' here or in '*pancakṛtvo brāhmaṇā bhuktavantaḥ*' does not prove that word is one and eternal.

Jayanta is aware of the fact the Mimāṁsakas refer to presumption and recognition as the methods of arriving at the conclusion that words are eternal. But he discards presumption as ground for establishing the eternality of words, since in his opinion it amounts to stating that a word which is pronounced to convey its meaning is eternal on the ground that the communication of the meaning of a word cannot be explained in any other way. But this argument is wrong because such communication can be explained otherwise also namely, when the universal of *gatva* is established, it helps to communicate the meaning of a word. The Mīmāṁsakas maintain that when a word is manifested in sound, the impression of the sound first heard, helps us to recognize it when we hear the same sound again. So, on the basis of this recognition, the Mīmāṁsakas enquire as to how they can recognize the sound as the same, if the word has not been eternal ? But Jayanta rejects this view and states that recognition of a sound is not possible since it has a very short duration.[2] Jayanta refers to the two types of definition of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). According to some logicians, recognition is such a sensuous cognition as is produced by the sense organ in cooperation with an impression and points out to the identity of an object which is remembered. According to others, the object which is now recognized was apprehended before ; the past apprehension is now recalled in memory ; it refers to the object which is now recollected. Jayanta states that a judgment of recognition does not invariably establish that the object cognised is eternal.[3] For instance, an action is eternal. So the eternality of word cannot be established on the basis of its

1. संख्याभावात्, *M.S.*, 1.1.20,
2. यद्यपि ध्रियतेऽस्माकं शब्दो द्वित्रानपि क्षणान्, प्रत्यभिज्ञा तु कालेन तावता नावकल्पते, *N.M.*, I-205
3. शब्दे विनाशज्ञानात्तु न सा नित्यत्वसाधिका, *N. M.*, I-206

recognition. According to the grammarians, sound (logos) is an eternal principle without an origin and an end. Bhartṛhari calls this eternal principle '*śabdabrahma*' which is devoid of all differentiation, It, however, remains hidden under the manifested sound which are of two kinds—natural (*prakṛta*) and modified (*vyakta*). Jayanta is aware of the Śābdika views and he rejects them almost on the same grounds on which he discards the views of the Mīmāṁsakas.[1]

(b) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE GRAMMARIANS' THEORY OF SPHOṬA

Jayanta refers to the hypothesis of *sphoṭa* in order to explain the divergent propositions regarding the nature of *pada*. The term '*sphoṭa*' is derived from the root '*sphuṭ*' which means 'to burst', Nāgeśa and Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita define '*sphoṭa*' as that from which the meaning bursts or shines forth. It is also defined as an entity which is manifested by the sounds.[2] The theory of *sphoṭa* was systematized by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*. But the earlier grammarians also seem to have some awareness of the ideas underlying the theory of *sphoṭa*. Among the extant works of grammar, Patāñjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is the earliest one wherein the term '*sphoṭa*' is clearly mentioned. The theory of '*sphoṭa* is an outcome of the grammarians' unique analysis of sentence as the unit of language. They maintain that a sentence is nothing but its meaning and it cannot be divided into parts. They further hold that when we speak of the division of a sentence into words, it is not the words but the sounds that are distinguished. A sentence does not consist of parts, though as a sound-pattern, it can be divided into parts. It is this characteristic of sentence that makes it the unit of language. Unlike the grammarians, Jayanta maintains that word (*pada*) is the unit of language. According to him, basically it is word which has meaning. Sentence-meaning to him is the effect of words and word-meanings. Viśvanātha like his fellow Naiyāyikas, refers to four different factors which lead to linguistic knowledge, *viz.*, (1) knowledge of *pada*, (2) knowledge of meaning, (3) knowledge of denotative function of words, and (4) the knowledge of the meaning of sentence.[3] As regards the words them-

1. एवं नित्यत्वे दुर्बलो युक्तिमार्गः तस्मान्मन्त्रद्यः कार्यं एवेति शब्दः ।
वाचोयुक्तित्वे वैदिको यो ऽनुवादः न्याये प्रयुक्ते किफलस्तत्प्रयोगः,
N.M., I-213

2. स्फुटति प्रकाशतेऽर्थोऽस्मादिति स्फोटः, *Sphoṭavāda*, p. 6, स्फुटत्यर्थोऽस्मादिति स्फोटः, *Śabdakaustubha*, p. 12

3. पदज्ञानं तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः ।
शाब्दबोधफलं तत्र शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी, *B.P.*, 81

selves, the Naiyāyikas are of the view that word is a group of sounds in definite sequence. Sounds have meaning only when they are combined into one entity called word. But how do the sounds in a word combine? The answer, according to the Nniyāyikas, is through memory. The sounds of a word are not perceived simultaneously, but one after the other. The perception of the last sound aided by the memory of the preceding sounds presents itself as a whole. Jayanta, as we have seen before, does not hold sound to be eternal as the Mīmāṁsakas do.

With the Mīmāṁsakas, a word is the aggregate of sounds which are, according to them, eternal. Thus, though they differ with the Naiyāyikas regarding the nature of the sounds, they share the Nyāya view that meaning is conveyed by the last sound aided by the impression produced in the mind of the perceiver by the preceding sounds.[1] The Vedāntins, on the other hand, hold that we perceive sounds in succession but they are synthesized into one whole by the intellect. In the opinion of the grammarians, the abovementioned Nayāy view is defective since in their opinion we cannot have the memory of all-preceding sounds at one moment. Even if we have the impressions of all the preceding sounds by way of memory, it will not serve to give us the knowledge of the thing signified by the word. The grammarians reject the Vedānta view also on the ground that the Vedāntins are not themselves clear as to how these successive experiences of sounds can be simultaneously present before the same intellect. Thus, rejecting the Nyāya and the Vedānta views, the grammarians come forward with a theory of *sphoṭa* and maintain that it is the sound-essence (*sphoṭa*) which is eternal and common to all utterances. This sound-essence is gradually unfolded by the sounds of a word. When a particular word is uttered its *sphoṭa* or unitary principle is manifested and that directly presents the meaning of the word.

The ancient Indian grammarians are unanimous in accepting the *sphoṭa* as the essential element in speech but they differ about the real nature of *sphoṭa*. The difference reflects itself in the analysis of the interrelation of *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. According to Patañjali, *sphoṭa* is the permanent element in word but *dhvani* is the ephemeral element and an attribute of the former.[2] One view is that *sphoṭa* is produced first and *dhvani* afterwards. Another view referred to by

1. पूर्वपूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्यो वर्णः प्रत्यायक इति श्रदोपः, *S.B.*, 1.1.5
2. स्फोटः शब्दः ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः, *Mahābhāṣya*, part I, p. 11

Bhartṛhari is that both *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* are produced simultaneously. According to this theory, there is no interval between the production of *sphoṭa* and that of *dhvani*. *Sphoṭa* is like the flame and *dhvani* is like the light.[1] These two theories are, however, identical in holding that *sphoṭa* is produced by human effort and is ephemeral. The third view refers to *sphoṭa* as a class and *dhvani* as its member.[2] Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita and Nāgeśa ascribe this view to Bhartṛhari himself. But some scholars object to this contention.[3] For Bhartṛhari *sphoṭa* is the word or the sentence taken as a single meaningful unit. He observes that words or sentences can be considered under two aspects, *i.e.*, sound pattern or meaning-bearing symbols.[4] The sound pattern is the external facet of language and meaning-bearing symbol is the internal facet. The first is called *dhvani* and the second *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa*, being an internal aspect, is directly attached to the meaning. It is partless and integral linguistic symbol.[5] According to Bhartṛhari a word has double power. As consciousness or light reveals itself and other objects, so every word has the power to reveal itself and the external things symbolized by it.[6]

The Comprehension of Sphoṭa. The word or sentence located in the minds and taken as an integral symbol is revealed by the sounds produced in a definite order. Each sound helps the manifestation of the '*sphoṭa*'. Bhartṛhari holds that with the perception of sound, word is apprehended by the mind.[7] The process of revelation of the word by the sound is from the indeterminate stage to the determinate one. Maṇḍana Miśra compares the apprehension of *sphoṭa* with the evaluation of a jewel. He states that as a jeweller examining a precious stone has a series of perception, *e.g.*, the first one giving him a general knowledge, the second one giving him the knowledge of the real nature of the gem until the last perception, aided by the impression of the previous perceptions helps him to ascertain the gem's real value. Similarly, one may apprehend *sphoṭa* through the

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1. दूरात् प्रभेव दीपस्य ध्वनिमात्रं तु लक्ष्यते, *Vā. P.*, I-105
2. Ibid., I-94 ; I-103
3. J. Brough
4. *Vā. P.*, I-44
5. "*A Study in Dialectics of Sphoṭa*," *Journal of the Deptt. of Letters*, Calcutta University, 1937, p. 13
6. *Vā. P.*, I-55
7. *Ibid.*, I-85

various stages of the perception of sound.[1] Bhartṛhari gives another analogy stating that as a student tries to learn a verse through repeated readings and grasps it ultimately, so the perception of the last sound of a word aided by the impression left by other sounds helps us to grasp the *sphoṭa*. Nāgeśa makes it clear the justification for the existence of *sphoṭa* and for its unity is the realization that 'this is one word or sentence.'[2] In the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* and *Sphoṭasiddhi*, *sphoṭa* is said to be the result of direct perception.[3] Jayanta also mentions the Grammarians' view that *sphoṭa* is grasped through direct auditory perception.

Classification of Sphoṭa. The eight types of *sphoṭa* described by the Grammarians are known as (1) *varṇasphoṭa* (2) *padasphoṭa*, (3) *vākyasphoṭa*, (4) *akhaṇḍa padasphoṭa*, (5) *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, (6) *varṇajātisphoṭa*, (7) *padajātisphoṭa*, and (8) *vākyajātisphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari seems to hold *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*, as the real *sphoṭa*. As regards *varṇasphoṭa*, Patañjali himself states that from one point of view sounds may be considered to have meaning since roots, suffixes and particles consisting of a single sound have meaning. Bhartṛhari, however, makes it clear that in a speech situation there are actually no isolated sounds in a word and no isolated words in a sentence. Nāgeśa comes to the same conclusion when he speaks of the analysis of sentence into words and of words into sounds as the sole occupation of grammarians. Jayanta is totally against the theory of *sphoṭa*. So, there is no question of his accepting it in any form.[4]

Criticism of the Theory of Sphoṭa. Though Śabara has supported the idea of *varṇasphoṭa* and *padasphoṭa*, Kumārila vehemently refutes *sphoṭavāda* and establishes the theory of *varṇavāda* on the grounds that if we do not accept the existence of a word the technique of substitution will not work ; we cannot verify the meaning of a particular word in a sentence; *śruti* cannot be regarded stronger than a sentence;

1. *Shoṭasiddhi*, p. 131
2. इदम् एकं पदम् एकं वाक्यम् इति प्रत्यय: स्फोटत्वे तदेकत्वे च प्रमाणम्, *Pradipoddyota Mahābhāṣya, Part* I-11
3. स्फोटात्मा तु प्रत्यक्षवेदनीय:, *Sphoṭasiddhi*, p. 171
4. इति विततया वर्णा एते धिया विपर्यीकृताम् ।
दधति पदतां वाक्यत्वं वा त एव च वाचका:, ।।
न च तदपर: स्फोट: श्रोत्रे विभात्यवबोधने ।
न च विधिहतो वाच्ये बुद्धि विधातुमसौ क्षम:,
N. M., I-340

subordinate sentences will have no place in language; and the rules of sentence-construction based on word-meaning will have no basis.[1] Jayanta also refutes the hypothesis of *sphoṭa* on these lines. The doctrine of *sphoṭa* has not been appreciated by modern linguists perhaps on account of its unnecessary mystification. George Thibaut states that *sphoṭa* is a "grammatical fiction in so far it is apprehended by us as a whole".[2] With Keith it is a mysterious entity, a sort of hypostatization of sound, of which action sounds are manifestation.[3] Prof. S. K. De takes *sphoṭa* as somewhat mystical conception.[4] Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja is of the view that another reason for the confusion about the real nature of *sphoṭa* is the misunderstanding of the Sanskrit word '*śabda*' as sound.[5]

3. *The Relation of Word and Meaning*

Speculation about the relation subsisting between word (*śabda*) and meaning (*artha*) has been a constant endeavour of the philosophers, grammarians and rhetoricians all alike throughout the ages. nI Indian Philosophy there are two main views, one that regards the relation between word and its meaning as 'natural' (*autpattika* or *nitya*) and the other that holds it 'conventional' (*sāmayika* or *sāṁketika*). The first is propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas and the second by the Naiyāyikas. Jayanta naturally upholds the Nyāya view against the contentions of the Mīmāṁsakas.[6] He is also aware of the views of the grammarians but he refutes their theory in a passing manner.[7] It is perhaps on account of some sort of similarity in the views of the Mīmāṁsakas and the grammarians that he does not think it worthwhile to refute the grammarians with a greater vehemence.

According to the Mīmāṁsakas, we learn language from our elders, who in their turn learnt it from their elders and so on. But it is impossible to trace the first elder. So they conceive that language and, for that reason, the relation between the word and its meaning, is *anādi* or eternal. The signifying power is inherent in the words themselves. The Mīmāṁsakas call this power *Śakti* and maintain it

1. Puṇyarāja, on *Vā.P.*, 65-78
2. *Vedānta Sūtra* with *Śankara Bhāṣya*, Eng. Trans., p. 204
3. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 387,
4. *Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. II, p. 180
5. *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 141
6. *N.M.*, I-221
7. *Ibid*

as an independent entity.[1] The Naiyāyikas accept the role of the elders in language like the Mīmāṁsakas but they reject the theory of natural relationship and advocate that the relation has a conventional origin. They maintain that the relation between the word and its meaning is created by God and thus contrary to the Mīmāṁsā standpoint ; they locate the original source of language behaviour in God.[2] According to the later logicians, this relationship can also be established by the will of man.[3] Jagadīśa, the author of *Śabdaśakti Prakāśikā* maintains that when the relationship can also be established by the will of God, it is permanent and is called *abhidhā* (or *Śakti*) and when it is established by the will of man it is called *paribhāṣā*. Bhartṛhari also refers to the two types of relationship and calls them *ājānika* or permanent and *ādhunika* or modern.[4]

The Mīmāṁsakas, Objections to the Nyāya View. It is interesting that the Mīmāṁsakas have propounded their theory of the relation of word and its meaning mainly in a negative manner. They try to refute the Nyāya position and seem to think that if the Naiyāyikas are refuted the Mīmāṁsā view is automatically proved. Some of the main grounds for upholding the relation between the word and its meaning as eternal and also for refuting the Nyāya view by the Mīmāṁsakas are as follows : It is illogical to believe in the existence of an age when there was no verbal transaction. Word has an innate power of conveying an object in the same way in which the power of burning is inherent in fire. The relation of words to objects is not created by any one. Even if it is accepted that convention determines the relation of word and meaning the question will arise as to who creates the convention. Is it created by a person, a new speaker or by a new utterance, or is it simple repetition of the old one created by God ? In case of the first alternative, a word cannot convey the same knowledge of the concerned object every time. If the same knowledge is created by every person, then its creation is useless, since it is a simple repetition. Convention cannot be regarded as a creation of God before creation, since there is no time when there is

1. *S. V.* (*Śabda*)
2. *N.M.*, p. 220-23.
3. ईश्वरेच्छा न शक्तिः किन्तु इच्छैव तेनाधुनिकसंकेतितेऽपि शक्तिरस्ति-एवेत्याहुः, *N.S.M.*, p. 266.
4. आजानिक श्चाधुनिकः संकेतो द्विविधो मतः, नित्य आजानिक स्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते । कादाचित्कस्त्वाधुनिकः शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः ।

no use of words to convey the knowledge of objects. Moreover, knowledge, according to Nyāya, exists in the soul. Here convention is that a particular word denotes a particular kind of object. So if it depends upon self how can it be a relation between the word and its meaning ? If convention determines the relation of words to objects then any word could denote any object. With these objections in view, the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that the theory of convention advocated by the Naiyāyikas is not sound.

Jayanta's Refutation of the Mīmāṁsā View. Jayanta raises serious objections to the Mīmāṁsā theory and states that it is unreasonable to maintain that the relation between a word and its meaning is eternal since the eternality of this relationship is not proved by any means of knowledge.[1] The existence of subtle power (*śakti*) apart from cause and auxiliary conditions cannot be accepted, since it is not cognized like a substance. It also cannot be grasped through inference since the same effect may be brought by any cause other than this power. There is no invariable relation between meaning and *śakti*. If this power is to be assumed, the assumption of convention becomes unavoidable.[2] Without convention, the meaning cannot be grasped and if the existence of convention is established the assumption of an external power is redundant. The meanings of words are learnt from the speech and actions of the elders. This proves that their relation to the objects is not eternal.[3]

The Mīmāṁsakas hold that a word has an inborn power of revealing its meaning. But Jayanta points out that if the power of revealing the meaning of an object were innate (*sāṁsiddhika*) in a word, it would have revealed the object even when it is uttered by mistake just as a new lamp illuminates an object.[4] According to the Nyāya, the denotative power (*śakti*) of words is the convention (*samaya* or *saṅketa*) of God that particular words denote particular

1. न नित्यः सम्बन्ध उपपद्यते । शब्दवदर्थवच्च तृतीयस्य तस्य प्रत्यक्षादिना
प्रमाणेनाप्रतीयमानत्वात्, *N.M.*, I-222
2. कल्पयित्वा च शक्तिम् अपरिहार्यः समयः, *Ibid.*
3. शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः समयः । अभिधानाभिधेयनियोगः समय उच्यते,
N.M., p. I-221.
4. प्रकाशकत्वमपि शब्दस्य समयप्रसादोपनतमेव न स्वाभाविकम्, सांसिद्धिके
तथात्वे अमित्वादिप्रयुक्तादन्यतो वा यतः कुतश्चित् अभिनवादपि
दीपादिव शब्दार्थप्रतीतिः स्यात्, *N.M.*, I-223

kinds of objects. The convention is known from the usage of the elders.

As regards the Mīmāṁsakas' view that convention is the creature of human will and that there is nothing to resist it from taking the converse course and thus resulting in indicating the word from the meaning, Jayanta states that if the power of expressing the meaning is denied, then the word itself would be able to denote the meaning. The word '*gau*' which inheres the universal as cowhood, is denotative and the object which is meant by it is expressible.

The Nyāya does not admit that different conventions are created by different persons or by the same person at different times when he utters a word.[1] All words are not equal because God created the convention that a particular word denotes a particular object.

As regards the contention of the Mīmāṁsakas that the meaning of a word is that which has been used by the Āryans and that the meaning of the word which has been accepted by the non-Āryans is not real, Jayanta observes that this thesis cannot be established by any standard of judgment, and if the Mīmāṁsakas are bent upon sticking to this absurd hypothesis they would have no other means than take an oath to prove it.[2]

Jayanta maintains that it is not a fact that a word which has a peculiar meaning in non-Āryan country does not express any meaning. It is also wrong to hold that the meaning of a word which has been accepted by the non-Āryans is contradicted or produces doubt in the minds of the Āryan people. If it is maintained that the meaning of a word current in the Āryan country contradicts its meaning current in the non-Āryan then it may be asked as to why the latter does not contradict the former. To solve this difficulty, Jayanta points out that the Mīmāṁsakas have themselves learnt the meaning of the words '*pika*', *tāmarasa*, etc., from the non-Āryans. In the section of *Aveṣṭi*, i.e., *Rājasūya*, they have explained the word '*rājya*' following in the footsteps of the non-Āryans. A further objection against the Mīmāṁsā view of eternality

1. तदेवं शब्दस्य नैसर्गिकशक्त्यात्मकसम्बन्धाभावाद् ईश्वरविरचितसमय-निबन्धनः शब्दार्थव्यवहारो न-अनादिः, *N.M.*, I-225

2. यत् पुररवादि स एव शब्दस्यार्थो यत्रैनमार्याः प्रयुञ्जते, न म्लेच्छजन प्रसिद्ध इति, तदेतत् कथमिव शपथ मन्तरेण प्रतिपद्येमहि, *N.M.*, I-224

of relation between word and its meaning is that in such a case the local changes in the meaning of words would not have been there.[1]

The Mīmāṁsakas, using their last and the strongest weapon against the Nyāya theory of 'samaya', point out that if God creates the relation between a word and its meaning and communicates it to the people, he has no alternative than to use sentences for the sake of communication. If it is so, how are the words in those sentences connected to the meaning prior to the command of God and how are they grasped by the people without prior knowledge of signification? If other sentences are presumed for this purpose it will lead to *regressus ad infinitum*. And if it is held that it is done by the usage of the experienced predecessors, then what is the use of admitting the relation of denotation as the creation of God?

Jayanta foils the attempts of the Mīmāṁskas by pointing out that God is omniscient. He has super-excellent skill in creating or communicating that which is beyond the ken of our imagination. It is not at all difficult for God who has created the infinite universe by His mere will to create the relation of denotation and communicate it. Jayanta is quite aware of the impact of the last argument of the Mīmāṁsakas but he disposes it of in the spirit of a skilful sportsman. He praises the Mīmāṁsakas for their resourceful armoury but he takes pity on them for their sheer ignorance of the target to be aimed at.[2]

The grammarians have discussed the problem of the relation between word and its meaning elaborately. Right from Vyāḍi upto Nāgeśa all of them have given a serious thought to it. It is, however, Bhartṛhari who surpasses all in the philosophical discussion of meaning. He propounds the theory of identity-in-difference between the word and its meaning. Jayanta does not analyse the grammarians' view adequately; he simply remarks that there is no union (*saṁsleṣa* or cause-effect relation, or substract-content relation or inseparable relation) between the word and its meaning.

1. S. B., 2.3.3; अवेष्टयधिकरणे राज्यशब्दमान्ध्रप्रसिद्धेर्य्यं वर्णितवन्तो भवन्त इत्यलम् अवान्तरचिन्तनेन, तस्मात् समय एव सम्बन्ध इति युक्तम्, *N. M.*, I-224
2. अस्त्रमायुष्मता ज्ञातं विषयस्तु न लक्षितः ।
अस्मदादिषु दोषोऽयमीश्वरे तु न युज्यते ॥
नानाकर्मफलस्थानमिच्छयैवेदृशं जगत् ।
स्रष्टुं प्रभवतस्तस्य कौशलं को विकल्पयेत्, *Ibid.*

The difference between the Mīmāṁsā view and the position adopted by Jayanta is that while the former holds the relation of denotation eternal, the latter maintains that it dates from the dawn of creation. Further, according to the former, the relation of denotation as well as the power of expression inherent in a word is also ascertained while the latter holds that the relation of denotation is exclusively grasped. The Mīmāṁsakas are of the view that the relation of denotation is determined by *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *arthāpatti*, but Jayanta, like other Naiyāyikas, thinks that only the first two are enough for this purpose. The Mīmāṁsakas maintain that if no relation such as of conjunction, inherence or of pervader and pervaded subsists between the word and its meaning, then what is the use of discussing it ? Jayanta shares the view of the Mīmāṁsakas that the relation of coujunction or inherence does not subsist between the word and its meaning but he points out that the relation between the two is that of convention (*samaya*), which is an act of will and determines that this word denoted this object. Hence it is on the strength of the relation of denotation set up by God and the usage of the elders that the meaning of a word is grasped. So, Jayanta finally concludes that the theory of convention (*samaya*) adequately and correctly explains the relation subsisting between the word and its meaning.

4. The Word and the Referent

What does a word signify or refer to ? The answers can be innumerable.[1] To mention only a few for the Sāṁkhyas the referent is the particular (*vyakti*), whereas according to the Jainas it is image (a generic form-*ākṛti*). In the opinion of the Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaitins, a word signifies a universal (*jāti*), but according to the old Naīyāyikas it refers to all the three — *vyakti, ākṛti* and *jāti*. Further, for the later Naiyāyikas the referent is the particular characterized by the universal, whereas the grammarians hold both the particular and the universal as the referent. The grammarians, of course, differ amongst themselves regarding the primacy of *jāti* or *vyakli*. Paṇīni is noncommittal on this point. Kātyāyana and Patañjali assign the main role to *jāti* and the secondary to *vyakti*. Kaiyaṭa and Nageśa leave it to the intention of the speaker to determine what is primary and what is secondary. Bhartṛhari, of course, has a unique proposition to offer and it is that *jāti* is like *Brahman* and *vyakti* is nothing but a sort of His *māya*.

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1. *Tantravārtika*, p. 293

There is also a difference of opinion between the two schools of Mīmāṁsā. Whereas the Bhaṭṭas, on the one hand, maintain that the relation between universal and an individual is natural and not causal,[1] the Prābhākaras on the other hand are of the view that the universal is not related to individual eternally. Expounding the Prābhākara theory of *jāti*, Śālikanātha states that the universal is known through perception and the knowledge of the particular is preceded by the knowledge of the universal. When the individual is destroyed, the relation that it has with the universal is also destroyed.[2] Prabhākara maintains that the universal is separate from things in which it is manifested and Kumārila holds that the universal is never found separated from the individual.[3] He, however, makes it clear that according to the context one and the same thing may be regarded as individual and universal.[4] But words always mean the universals as residing in the individuals.[5] Kumārila's contention that the individuals are also universals in a relative sense is influenced by the Vaiśeṣika theory of *sāmānya*, which is used synonymously with *jāti*.[5] According to Praśastapāda, *sāmānya* is of two ,types high (*para*) and low (*apara*); the first is the existence, and the second is the substance (*dravyata*).[7] As the Naiyāyaikas have also accepted this theory of *sāmanya* propounded by Kaṇāda, there is little difference between the two. Still, there is a divergence in the emphasis these schools put in the manifestation or the manifest. Anyhow, we are concerned here with Jayanta's answer to the above-mentioned question and it is obvious that being a seasoned old Naiyāyika, his answer to the concerned query (what does a word signify ?) is that it refers to all the three *vyakti*, *ākṛti* and *jāti*. Let us see what the different thinkers speak in support of their divergent propositions and how Jayanta reacts to them.

(a) THE REFERENT AS THE PARTICULAR (VYAKTI)

"Meaning", says Prof. Pandeya, "cannot hang in the air. Being a relation it has two terms on which it depends."[8] Now let us find out

1. स्वाभाविकश्च सम्बन्धो जातिव्यक्त्यो र्न हेतुमत्, *S. V.*, 16.31
2. जातिराश्रयतो भिन्ना प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञानगोचरः, पूर्वाकारावमर्शेन प्रभाकरगुरोः मंता, *P.P.I.* (B.H.U. 1861), *p.* 64
3. *S. V.*, 16.25
4. *Ibid.*, 53-56
5. *Ibid.*, 59-61
6. सामान्यं विशेष इतिबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्, *V.S.*, 1.2.3
7. सत्ता सामान्यं परम्, अपरं द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादि, *V. B.*, p. 276-7
8. *The Problem of Meaning*, p. 188

what these two terms are. One is the word and other, as we have mentioned above, is the referent. But a further question arises, namely, 'What is the referent ?' The answer, according to the Sāṁkhyas, as mentioned above, is a particular (*vyakti*).[1] Now, how have the Vyaktivādins, reached this conclusion ? It is on the basis of the Sāṁkhyas' assumptions, says Jayanta, that for all practical purposes reference is made to the individual and never to the univer-sal. The individual alone is endowed with intelligent activity, capacity for doing work and desisting from it. Moreover, the content of perceptual knowledge is the individual and not the abstract universal. Further, even the universalists admit that in many cases the import of a word includes within its scope the individual as well. The contention of the individualists has been objected to by the Ākṛtivādins and the Jātivādins on various grounds. The opponents of *vyaktivāda* maintain that if a word, say '*gau*' merely denotes an individual, say, 'cow' we cannot employ it to convey another cow. It is not proper to hold that another individual is nothing but an indi-vidual since the word '*gau*', in that case, would be used for a horse as well, because horse also is another individual. Further, in many instances, words refer to universals and not to individuals alone. For instance, law provides that man is not to be killed. If the word 'man' here means a particular man and not man in general, a person may kill all men he comes across except any one particular man.

(b) THE REFERENT AS THE IMAGE (ĀKṚTI)

It is observed that when an intelligent person speaks or hears the word 'cow', he does not employ this word to signify an animal having the name 'cow'. Rather, he has an animal in mind which has dewlap, horns and so on. Hence the Ākṛtivādins, for instance, the Jainas, maintain that the word 'cow' signifies an image. They further hold that the image of an object is perceptible. Our sense organs point to the fact that the image of a cow is distinct from that of a horse. Thus, if the perceptible object constitutes the meaning of a word, then the image of an object is naturally the referent of a word.[2] This theory has been rejected by scholars under the refutation of *Jātivāda*. Still, a number of opponents of the *Ākṛtivāda* do find it worthwhile to criticize it separately over and above their refutation of *Jātivāda* on the grounds that, first, the image of an object

1. *Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṁgraha*, p. 181
2. तदयुक्तंप्रतिव्यक्ति भिन्नसंस्थानदर्शनात् । आनन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यां सम्बन्धाप्रत्यसंभवात्, *N.M.*, I-291

varies from individual. It is not possible for anyone to know all images of all individuals belonging to a class. Second, it is to be asked whether the word denotes a few images or all images. If they hold that the above relation holds between a word and a few images, it is wrong since there is no reason to stick to this limitation. If they resort to the second alternative, then an infinite number of relations is to be postulated. Third, the image of an object is not relation to an action such as 'sending'. An individual is taken from one place to another but not its form. Fourth, if somebody is told to bring a cow, he does not bring the picture or the earthen model of a cow.

(c) THE REFERENT AS THE UNIVERSAL (JĀTI)

The Mīmāṁsakas take *ākṛti* and *jāti* as idential as far as the import of word is concered. Kumārila states that it is the class itself that has been called '*ākṛti*'.[1] Jaimini vehemently refutes *Vyaktivāda* in favour of *Ākṛtivāda*, and Śabara supports him. The Mīmāṁsakas maintain that a word refers to a class and indirectly indicates an individual through the class.[2] They try to establish their theory of the universal as referent by refuting the particular. They are of the view that a word cannot denote a single individual, an aggregrate of individuals or all individuals. There cannot be an eternal relation between a word and an object if the word refers only to an individual. An aggregrate of objects also cannot be the referent of a word since it is impossible to know all individuals.[3] Moreover, if different individuals do not have anything in common, even the consciousness ofthem as individuals would then become impossible.[4]

The Mīmāṁsā theory of the referent as universal has been objected to by various systems. Pārthasārathī himself quotes the Buddhists' contention that if the universal is distinct from the individual, they must appear to be so ; if they are regarded identical, what is the good of accepting *jāti* over and above *vyakti* ?[5]

1. *S. V.*, (*Ākṛti* 3, *Eng. Trans. Dr. Ganganatha Jha*), p. 282.
2. *N. R. M.*, p. 121, भाट्टमते तु जातिरेव शक्या लाघवात्, व्यक्तिस्तु आक्षेपलभ्या, *T. C.*, p. 578
3. *S. V.* (*Ākṛtīvāda*)
4. *Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosaphy*, R. C. Pandeya, p. 191.
5. पृथक्त्वे व्यक्तितो जातिः, *S. D.*, 1.1.5.5

Jayanta, like his predecessors, refutes the Mīmāṁsā theory of referent on the following grounds.[1] The universal is not the meaning of a word (*pada*) since a word is not a mere stem (*prātipadika*) or a combination of stem and inflexion. An inflexion indicates case, number and gender simultaneously and a universal can neither be marked with a number nor can it have a case or a gender. As regards the suggestion that by the acceptance of an individual as a secondary meaning, the cases, etc., are to be associated with it and that this would remove the inconsistency, Jayanta points out that this hypothesis is against the rules of grammar. It is absurd to hold that a number is indirectly related to a universal through the medium of an individual. If a number is not related to an individual first, it is logically absurd for it to be related to be a universal.

As far as the Mīmāṁskas' contention that a universal is directly related to a Vedic action is concerned, Jayanta points out that in the instance quoted by the Mīmāṁsakas, i.e., "one should arrange fire in the shape of a hawk", there is no mention of a universal. Jayanta sarcastically states that such arguments hardly support the viability of *jāti* as a referent ; they simply indicate that the Mīmāṁsakas are actuated by their challenging spirit. Gangeśa in the *Jātiśaktivāda prakaraṇa* (*śabdakhaṇda*) of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭa in the *Pariśiṣta kāṇḍa* of *ṣaktivāda* refute the views of Kumārila and Prabhākara almost on the same lines on which Jayanta rejects them, mainly holding that words no doubt mean universals but universals are known only through inherence in particulars. The grammarians join hands with the Naiyāyikas in refuting the Mīmāṁsā theory of referent as universal. Patañjali states that a universal cannot have any gender or number and thus it cannot be regarded as the referent of a word.[2] It is not possible to confine a universal cow.[3] If universal is one it cannot be present in different individuals and different places at the same time.[4] Again, if this theory is accepted, the destruction of one individual would lead to the destruction of all.[5]

(d) THE REFERENT AS THE PARTICULAR AND THE IMAGE PARTICIPATING IN THE UNIVERSAL

The Nyāya view of the referent of a word is more or less a modulated

1. *N. M.*, I-294-7

2. तथा च लिंगवचनसिद्धिः, *Mahābhāṣya.*, 1.2.3.64

3. चोदनासु तस्यारम्भात्, *Ibid*

4. *Ibid*

5. *Ibid*

combination of the Sāṁkhya, Jaina and the Mīmāṁsā propositions.

Gautama himself maintains that a word refers to all the three — individual, image and universal.[1] Vātsyāyana elaborates Gautama's views and states that amongst these three, for the purpose of distinction, the individual, is prominent. Eminence is given to the universal if we have to convey a general notion, and if the occasion requires a practical usage importance is attached to the image.[2] Uddyotakara enters into a long discussion on this point and vigorously supports Vātsyāyana's views. Any reference to a universal is to the universal residing in an individual and any refrence to an individual is necessarily to the individual participating in a universal. He states that the universal is neither a collection of things nor an organic whole; it inheres in things which, on their own part, participate in them. Vācaspati makes it clear that the apprehension of all the three—the individual, the image and the universal—is simultaneous, and not a process in which the proposition '*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*' results first in the apprehension of '*Gaṅgātva*' and then in the knowledge of the bank of the river Gaṅgā. Thus, the view of these four old logicians, if put in a synthetic and summary form, is that the individual, the image and the universal together constitute the meaning of a word. It is not necessary that we have the knowledge of the universal before we acquaint ourselves with the individual. To them the individual and the universal are inseparable. We have already seen how Jayanta refutes the Mīmāṁsā theory of *Jātivāda*. Now what he himself supports is naturally the *Vyaktyākṛtijātivāda* propounded by Gautama, mainly by taking up the grammatical aspect of the problem and stating that it is not logical to hold that the meaning of inflexion is at first related to an individual and then to a universal since a word simultaneously denotes the individual as well as the universal. Thus, the establishment of his theory is based, on one hand, upon the refutation of the distinctive features of *vyakti* and *jāti*, and on the other, upon the assimilative synthesis of their divergent aspects. We may recapitulate the following points which, in his opinion, account for bringing about unity in diversity. We cannot ignore the fact that it is the individual alone whom we manipulate, but it is also a reality that an individual always participates in a universal since a cow is a cow on account of the fact that it has something which makes it known as a cow. It has something common with all cows. Moreover, whether a word refers to an individual or to a universal, in every case it necessarily presents-

1. व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः, *N. S.*,
2. *N. B.*, 2.2.8.

the image of the concerned object. So, the Nyāya view that all these three taken together constitute the meaning of a word seems most plausible. Thus the referent of the word 'cow', according to Jayanta, is the image of the creature which is a particular participating in the universal 'cowhood'.

(c) JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF APOHA

Jayanta introduces the Buddhist theory of *apoha* just to explain the universal as an object of apprehension. The Buddhists, as we have already seen, do not accept the reality of the universal. The universal, for them, is a fiction. A general name such as 'cow', according to the Buddhists, does not stand for any positive entity commonly inhering in diverse particulars. Cows are called 'cows' not because they have common characteristics but because they are all alike in being different from a horse, buffalo and so on ; there is nothing in common among individual cows except the name 'cow'. The Buddhists have adduced unique grounds for explaining the apparent similarity in different particulars and call it *apoha*. It is to be recalled that Gautama, the Buddha, refers to *anitya*, *duḥkha* and anātma as the fundamental points of his philosophy. In the *Pratītya-sumutpāda*, the concept of '*anitya*' assumes the form of *Kṣaṇikavāda* which, at the hands of Nāgārjuna, has been raised to the status of '*śūnyavāda*'. Though Diṅnāga has his differences with Nāgārjuna, both seem to have some similarity of views regarding momentariness. Jayanta seems aware of the fact that this concept of momentariness made it incumbent even upon the idealist Buddhist to reject the principle of class-characteristic which the realists have designated as *jāti* or the universal. Still, the Buddhists seem to have realised that in spite of rejecting the class-characteristic as an object of apprehension on the basis of the momentariness of everything, they cannot altogether ignore the fact that there are individuals who have a number of common elements which prove that they are similar in spite of many other diversities. To overcome this difficulty they have come forward with the theory of *apoha*, which Jayanta has rejected outright.

Though the Buddhists in general accept *apoha*, it is interesting that in the Buddhist camp itself there are three views or stages of development regarding the theory of *apoha*. The first, propagated by Diṅnāga, holds *apoha* as total negation of all others and accepts the existence of something positive only by implication. The second propounded by Śāntarakṣita, advocates that words mean something

positive and negation of the others is rendered only by implication. The third, expounded by RatnakIrti maintains that words mean something unique. He further holds that negation and affirmation are simultaneous. Anyhow, a general notion of the Budddist concept of *apoha*, without going into the detail of these views or stages, is that a word, for instance, *gau*, signifies the negation of all others except a 'cow', or, in other words, it refers to 'not non-cow'.

Jayanta is aware of the fact that Diṅnāga has expounded the theory of *apoha* as a counterpart of the Realists' theory of the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*). According to him, there are two types of the objects of knowledge (*prameyas*), namely, (1) the particular, which is externally real, and (2) the universal which is only ideal but objectively unreal. The former is grasped by sense-reflex (*grahaṇa*) and the latter by intellect (*adhyavasāya* or *vikalpa*). Likewise, the means of knowledge, according to him, are also of two types, namely, (1) *pratyakṣa*, and (2) *anumāna*. The former grasps only the particular (*svalaṣaṇā*) and the latter the generalized (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*). By the introduction of his theory of *apoha*, Diṅnāga draws yet another sharp distinction between the two sources of knowledge, namely, sense and intellect. The former is affirmative and the latter negative. Unlike Jayanta who believes that words have direct reference to objective realities, Diṅnāga maintains that words deal with conceptual images which are purely subjective constructions of mind (*vikalpa*) and whose essence is the negation of all counter-correlates. For instance, the word 'cow' does not actually mean the animal with dewlap, horns and so on; it means only the exclusion of all objects that are not cows.

"Diṅnāga", as Prof. R. C. Pandeya also holds, "thus advocated *apoha* as total negation of the other and accepted the existence of something positive only by implication. Uddyotakara also refuted this theory but its strong criticism came from Kumārila and Jayanta. Kumārila's objection to the *apoha* theory of Diṅnāga is that even if it is accepted that the class 'cow' is only the negation of all that is not cow, how can 'non-cow' be excluded until the cow itself is established? In this situation, if 'non-cow' is the negation of cow, the Buddhists, must explain the nature of the cow negatived by the particle *nañ*. If 'cow' is said to be the nature of the negation of 'non-cow' it will be a case of arguing in a circle. If again, 'cow' is self-established, the postulation of the theory of *apoha* is useless. Bhāmaha also expresses similar views. Another argument adduced

by Kumārila is that if there is no actual universal and words mean the negation of others, then the word 'cow' and 'white cow' will become synonymous, since both of them mean the negation of non-cow. So, Kumārila comes to the conclusion that *apoha* is nothing but another name of the universal. A spirited presentation of the theory of the universal and refutation of the theory of *Apoha* have been attempted by all important Nyāya Vaiśeṣika writers including Uddyotakara, Jayanta, Vacāspatimiśra and Śrīdhara. Some of the main grounds which the Buddhists have adduced to establish that the meaning of a word is essentially negative in the nature, and the counter arguments extended by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika writers in general and Jayanta in particular to refute the Buddhist contention, are as under :

The Buddhists maintain that similarity between absolutely different things can be established only by their counter-correlates. But Jayanta's argument against this contention is that with the acceptance of the universal there is no need of postulating *apoha.*


The Buddhists argue that the words have the elements of existence and non-existence. For instance, the word 'cow' can be connected with 'is' or 'is not'. If the meaning of the word were exclusively positive, it could not be connected with 'is not' as that would be a contradiction. Neither could it be connected with 'is' since that would be superfluous. Hence, the cognition of the common element must be attributed to some cause which is negative in nature. This argument of the Buddhists is refuted by Jayanta on the ground that with the assumption of the existence of a positive universal there is no logical contradiction involved in connecting 'is' or 'is not' with a word.

The Buddhist maintain that the essence of words consists in the negation of their counter-correlates. If this principle is not accepted, it will be difficult to recognize the difference between the thing referred and its counter-correlate. But Jayanta refutes this argument holding that on hearing a word, it is the positive idea that comes to our mind. In addition to the above-mentioned points, there are some other objections put forth by various scholars against the theory of *apoha.* For instance, Uddyotakara states that a word can express only one meaning at a time. If the word 'cow' signifies 'non-cow', it cannot give the positive ideas of a cow at the same time. Moreover, even if it is accepted that *apoha* could explain some of the substantives, it fails

to explain the meaning of such words like 'and', 'thus', 'all' and so on.

Jayanta points out that a substratum has various properties and all of them cannot be perceived simultaneously by a person through a single proof. Thus Jayanta is of the view that concepts refer to and words denote real external objects which are not mere negation of their opposites. The Buddhist may contend that concepts refer to an image which is tinged by the reflection of real exclusion, but Jayanta points out that it is also wrong, since we cannot carry on worldly transactions with such an image. An imaginary object, which does not exist anywhere cannot characterize consciousness. Jayanta further states that as there is no distinction between the exclusion from the heterogeneous and homogeneous objects, so the hypothesis that 'judgments of perception only refer to one of these two types of exclusion', does not stand the test of reason. Moreover, if the concepts are internal phenomena they cannot characterize consciousness. Further, if they are absolutely unreal they have no practical efficiency. Hence it is necessary that one should postulate objects corresponding to his judgment, and with the acceptance of this principle the Buddhist theory of *apoha* is shattered to pieces.

The Types of Apoha. According to Śāntarakṣita, *apoha* is of three kinds, namely, (1) special (*paryudāsa*), and (2) simple (*prasajyapratiṣedha*). The first contains an affirmation of the contrary and has two sub-varieties namely, (*a*) logical (*buddyātmaka*), and (*b*) ontological (*arthātmaka*). The logical variety of *apoha* involves the mental image which we have in our perceptual judgment. It is the same as the externally reflected image appearing in our determinate perception. The main reason why *buddhyātmaka* is regarded as *apoha* is that every thought-image appears in the form distinct from other thought images. Śāntarakṣita is of the view that when a word is spoken, it is the thought-image of an object which is directly evoked in our mind through *paryudāsa* and therefore that is the principal meaning of a word. The essence of thought-image, *e.g.*, 'cow', is this that its essence is not the essence of another image, say, of a horse. According to this analysis of Śāntarakṣita, the principal meaning of a class-name, *e.g.*, 'cow' is the thought-image of the cow. The exclusion of non-cows is only a subordinate meaning. The types of *apoha* are thus three in number which can best be presented by the following table.



Jayanta, as we have seen above, does not approve of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*. So, for him, it is out of question to accept any of its types or sub-types.

5. *The Import of a Sentence*

In the delineation of 'Sentence And Its Form', Alan H. Gardiner seems to echo the views of Jayanta when he says that sentences come into existence only through purposeful acts of human beings seeking, for different reasons of their own, to draw the attention of their fellowmen to various matters of interest.[1] In this theory of Gardiner, we find purposiveness as the main aim of the utterance of a sentence and it is interesting that Jayanta also ultimately comes to the same conclusion about the meaning of a sentence. It is, however, true that Gardiner arrives at this conclusion easily but Jayanta has taken a long route to reach his destination. Let us find out what the different routes known to Jayanta are and why he rejects all but the above-mentioned one. Jayanta refers to a number of divergent views regarding the import of a sentence. He introduces and rejects them on various grounds and finally proves that it is the purpose (*phala*) which is to be regarded as the import of a sentence. According to some thinkers, sentence refers to ideas in their non-relational character. But Jayanta points out that this view stands rejected on the ground that the existence of external objects is real. As regards the contention that the meaning of a sentence is not different from the meaning of a word, Jayanta remarks that the opponents must know that the ideas in the utterance of a word, *e.g*,, 'cow' and of a sentence, *e.g.*, 'Bring a white cow' are different. But it cnnnot be maintained to be so unless it is accepted that the objects referred to by a word and by a sentence are distinct.

1. *The Theory of Speech and Language*, (Oxford 1932), p. 181

Moreover, when we use words such as cow, horse, man, elephant and so on, the meaning of every word comes to our consciousness. But when we use a sentence as "Bring a white cow", the meanings of the words used in this sentence are presented to our mind as related to other words in the sentence.[1] Further, a sentence does not convey merely a negative sense, since, on the one hand, what is presented to our consciousness is a positive object, and on the other, the negative sense also presupposes the relation of the subject, e.g., 'cow', with the predicate, e.g., 'white', in the sentence 'The cow is white.' If we do not know that the cow is white, we cannot know that she is not black.[2] The knowledge of the absence of blackness pre-supposes the presence of whiteness. When the word 'white' is connected with the word 'cow', it excludes the connection of the word 'black' from the word 'cow'. Thus, it is to be accepted that the sentence refers to external objects and not to ideas. Some logicians believe that a sentence refers to a verb, since a sentence without verb is not capable of being used, because, in such a situation it does not satisfy the requirement of the listener. They maintain that on careful deliberation it is found that the accomplished facts are the means to realise the objects to be accomplished. Thus, an object which is to be accomplished occupies the superior position. So, they believe that it is this superior position which is the meaning of a sentence and which is not distinct from the meaning of a verb. Jayanta objects to this view on the ground that from the realistic point of view an intelligent man does not undertake a fruitless action even if he is ordered by his superiors or enjoined by the scriptures.

A fool or a dullard also carrries out the order of his superiors either in order to avoid slap or to gain a sweetmeat. If it is maintained that the superiority of verb or action is based upon the linguistic consideration, it is also wrong, since in that case it will be difficult for the Mīmāṁsakas to connect the word, e.g., '*svargakāmaḥ*', with the verb, e.g., '*yajeta*'. Jayanta's discussion is lengthy. He firmly holds that no sentence purports to convey an action as its principal meaning. A number of thinkers are of the view that the meaning of a sentence is the exclusion of the contrary of the concerned meaning. For instance when someone says that it is white he means thereby that it is

1. न हि शुक्लपदार्थेन संसृष्टो गोपदार्थः कृष्णादिभ्यो व्यावृत्त इत्यवगम्यते
N.M, I-302

2. फलस्य वस्तुतस्तावत्प्राधान्यमवगम्यते ।
न सचेताः क्रियां काञ्चिदनुतिष्ठति निष्फलाम्, *Ibid*, I-303

not black. But this view, as it resembles the *apoha* theory, stands rejected by Jayanta on the same grounds on which he has refuted *apoha*.

Another sect of logicians conjectures that a sentence signifies the operation of an agent (*puruṣa-vyāpāra*) directed towards an end (*bhāvya-niṣṭha*). It is known as the meaning of the verb '*karoti*' and it is also designated as *bhāvanā*, i.e., a process, Jayanta does not share this view either. He first of all asks : What is *bhāvanā* ? He himself argues if it is the activity of an agent who causes something to come into being, then the so-called activity of a person is nothing but an action which has been already refuted. If it is held that *bhāvanā* is distinct from action, it is also not tenable, since the rules of Pāṇinian grammar do not go in favour of drawing such meaning from the term *bhāvanā*.

Some other logicians are of the opinion that a sentence signifies an injuction. The followers of this school are divided in two groups, viz., one, which maintains that the suffix '*ṇini*' impels person to action since they are aware of its impelling force, and the other which holds that an injunction impels us to discharge our duty. Jayanta rejects this view on the ground that injunction also leads a person towards the purpose. Moreover, when a listener hears an injunctive sentence, how does he learn that the optative tense denotes instigation ? If the Mīmāṁsakas hold that he knows it from another source of valid knowledge, their contention is not tenable since it suffers from the fault of *regressuș ad infinitum.* Some of the logicians hold *pratibhā* as the meaning of a sentence, but Jayanta maintains that *pratibhā* is identical to ideas (*vijñāna*) ; so, with the refutation of *vijñāna* in this context, *pratibhā* also stands refuted. Another batch of logicians believe that a sentence denotes a new enterprise (*uddyoga*). But Jayanta points out that the term *uddyoga* in the present context is vague. It is said that it refers to *ātmaspanda*. But if *ātmaspanda* is identical to *buddhi* or *prayatna* or *vyāpāra*, it stands rejected with the refutation of *pratibhā* or *bhāvanā* as the meaning of a sentence. Thus Jayanta, concludes that this unique suggestion of some logicians cannot be accepted.[1] Thus, rejecting [the above-mentioned various alternative suggestions, Jayanta states that it is the purpose (*phala*) which is the import of a sentence, since no sentence is uttered without a purpose. The purpose is sometimes directly mentioned ; sometimes it is grasped

1. तस्मादश्रुतपूर्वेण कृतमुद्योगपर्वणा । स भारतमनुष्याणां गोचरो न तु मादृशाम्, *N. M.*, I-335

from the context, and sometimes it comes out of a close analysis of the concerned utterance, but, in the opinion of Jayanta, there is no doubt about it that purpose (*phala*) is invariably the import of each and every sentence.

6. *The Theories of Verbal Comprehension*

When we hear a sentence, we have some sense. Now the question is whether this sense arises directly from the words synthetically related in the form of a sentence, or through the meaning of the words comprising the sentence. To solve this problem the Mīmāṁsakas have brought forth two conflicting theories, namely, *anvitābhidhānavāda* and *abhihitānvayavāda*. The former is initiated by Kapila and elucidated by the Prābhākaras and the latter is introduced by Śabara and elucidated by the Bhaṭṭas.[1] Let us now examine what these theories mean and what makes Jayanta to reject both of them and propound instead *tātparya* as a theory of verbal comprehension.

(a) ĀNVITĀBHIDHĀNAVĀDA

It literally means 'the theory of expression of the correlated.' The Prābhākaras hold that the words of a sentence have the double function of giving their individual as well as construed meanings. In other words, this theory contends that both the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation are conveyed by the words constituting a sentence. According to the Prābhākaras the meaning of a word is grasped in its relation to something, which is to be done (*kārya*). Śālikanātha states that the word alone does not express any meaning. It is evident from the fact that we hear and comprehend language from the usage of our elders in the form of sentences.[2] The Prābhākaras do not deny the existence of individual words and their isolated meanings ; what they assert is that the isolated meaning, apart from its relation in a sentence is not possible. In other words, sentence has a unitary meaning and the constituent words possess meaning if they are related to the unitary sentence-meaning. The Prābhākaras elucidate this theory by laying particular stress on the natural method by which children learn the meaning of words. When a child hears a sentence uttered by one elder to another and observes the action, he understands the whole meaning by the whole statement. Though

1. पदानि हि स्वं स्वमर्थम् अभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि अथेदानीं पदार्था अवगता सन्तो वाक्यार्थं गमयन्ति, *S. B.*, 1.1.25
2. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in its Sources*, Jha, *G. N.*, p. 137

there are many words in a sentence, the unity of sentence-meaning is achieved through the unity of purpose.[1]

Jayanta, criticizing the Prābhākaras' theory of *anvitābhidhāna*, observes that it is true that one comprehends meaning from the usage of experienced persons. It is also a fact that all linguistic transactions are executed by means of sentences and words convey their meaning by a joint effort. But the following facts go against the Prābhākara theory of *anvitābhidhāna*.

If one is to grasp the indivisible whole of the meaning of a sentence, in that case learning will be impossible since sentences are infinite in number.

To illustrate the relation of word-meaning and the sentence-meaning, the propounders of the theory of *anvitābhidhāna* have referred to the example that the different parts of a carriage have distinct functions. If this bears analogy to word-meaning and is admitted by the Prābhakaras, the different function of each word is also to be admitted.

If the distinct function of every word is not accepted, the necessity of the etymological analysis of a word for the understanding of meaning will become superfluous. Moreover, in such a case, one may use the word 'horse' in place of 'cow' in the sentence 'Bring a cow' even if one intends to convey the meaning of the sentence 'Bring a cow'.

(b) ABHIHITĀNVAYAVĀDA

It literally means 'the theory of correlation of the expressed'. Unlike the Prābhākaras, the Bhāṭṭas maintain that the sense of a sentence is derived through the meanings of the words. The words convey only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual relation is conveyed by the word-meanings and not by the words themselves. The meaning of a sentence, according to the Bhāṭṭas is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by the words. Though the meaning of individual words can also be comprehended separately, as far as the sentence-meaning is concerned, it comes about by the association of word-meaings constituting the sentence.

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1. भूयांसो यद्यपि स्वार्थाः पदानां ते पृथक्-पृथक् प्रयोजनतयात्वेकवाक्यार्थं संप्रचक्षते, वाक्यार्थमातृकावृत्ति, *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*, (*Varanasi* 1904), p. 2

To establish their theory of *abhihitānvaya*, the Bhāṭṭas have raised a number of objections against the theory of *anvitābhidhāna*. Some of them are as follows :

(a) If it is held that the first word or any one word means the unitary sense of the sentence, the other words in the sentence will be superfluous.

(b) This theory involves the fallacy of interdependence.

(c) We understand the isolated word-meanings of the words separately. Otherwise, a word learnt from its usage in one context cannot be applied in another context.

(d) Even if we forget the earlier words in a long sentence, we comprehend the sentence, since we remember the meanings of the forgotten words.[1] So, the Bhāṭṭas contend that in comparison to the Prābhākaras' theory of *anvitābhidhāna* their theory of *abhihitānvaya* is flawless.

Jayanta, however, offers the following objections against the Bhāṭṭa theory of *abhihitanvaya* : (1) A person understands the meaning of a word when he is instructed. Experienced persons employ sentences to express their ideas. These sentences are never replaced by words. (2) It is not possible for a word to convey a complete idea without having the assistance of other words. (3) According to the linguists, a collection of words expressing a unit of meaning is a sentence. We cannot accept that a single word can express such a unit of meaning. On the contrary, as all bearers conjointly carry a palanquin, so all words without an exception conjointly express the meaning of a sentence. (4) Moreover, if a word could express a self-complete meaning independent of the meanings of other words, all other words would be useless. (5) Though words in a sentence perform a team work, the collection is not noticed to maintain itself distinct from the constituent words. As a carriage consists of several parts, but we cannot single out the role of a part completely independent of others, so a single word, even if employed does not independently point to the meaning of a sentence. Words which conjointly convey their meaning in this way, constitute a sentence. Thus, it is clear that a collection of words which expresses a complex whole of meanings is a sentence.[2] With the acceptance of this propo-

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1. पूर्वंभागेषु वाक्यस्य विस्मृतेष्वपि दृश्यते । वाक्यार्थविगतिः पुंसां पदार्थस्मृतिशालिनाम्, *S. D.*, (*Nirnaya Sagar, Bombay*, 1915). p. 135
2. संहत्यार्थं मभिधत्ति पदानि वाक्यम्, *N. M.*, I-367.

was the first to bring forward the theory of *tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti*.[1] *Tātparya*, as we have seen above, virtually is a modified form of *abhihitānvaya*. But Jayanta has given it the status of an independent theory. He left so great an impact in this field that Abhinavagupta even accepts Jayanta's modified form of *abhihitānvaya* and ignores what was basically advocated by Kumārila. Ānyway, according to Jayanta, words express their isolated word-meanings through the power of *abhidhā*, but as far as the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is concerned, it is accomplished through another power, known as *tātparya*. So, in the opinion of Jayanta, neither *anvitābhidhāna* nor *abhihitānvaya* can explain the exact nature of verbal comprehension.[2] As Prof. Raghavan aptly puts it, "Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, casts bitter remarks on Anandavardhana and considers the poets and literary critics as unfit to discuss such serious problems as *Śabdavyāpāra* and *pramāṇa*."[3] It is remarkable on the part of Jayanta that he is the first logician to discuss so elaborately the theories of verbal comprehension. He himself states that Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of the sentence. They discussed only the exact import of the words. Their silence shows that in their opinion a sentence is only a collection of words and that the sentence-meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings. Jayanta obviously initiates a new thinking in this field of learning to dispel the confusion created by the Mīmāṁsakas. As we have seen above, he not only rejects both the Mīmāṁsā theories but has propounded a new theory known as *tātparyavāda* which can definitely be counted as one of the important contributions of Jayanta to the stock of knowledge.

7. *Conclusion*

Jayanta has discussed the problem of *śabda* in great detail. He justifies the acceptance of *śabda* as a distinct means of knowledge, and gives serious thought to the philosophy of language. He tries to explain the views of his predecessors and evaluates the arguments put forth by the eminent thinkers of other schools. His account of *śabda* is as much relevant to grammar, rhetorics and linguistics at it

1. *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 221
2. शब्दानामिव सामर्थ्यं तत्र तत्र तथा तथा ।
अथवा नेदृशी चर्चा कविभिः सह शोभते ॥
विद्वांसोऽपि विमुह्यन्ति वाक्यार्थगहनेऽध्वनि, *N. M.*, I-45
3. *Bh[illegible] Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* (Madras 1,163), p. 145

is to logic. Jayanta convincingly proves that words do not exist before their production by human efforts, nor do we notice any veil which covers them. Jayanta introduces the hypothesis of *sphoṭa* and refutes it with same vigour with which Kumārila rejects it. His arguments for proving that 'the relation between word and its meaning is conventional', are stronger than those extended by other logicians of his own school.

His discussion of the peculiarity of meaning in Āryan and non-Āryan countries exhibits his Catholic spirit, broadness of vision and a practical linguistic approach. He criticizes the Buddhist hypothesis of *apoha*, asserting that the words denote real objects which are not mere negation of their opposites. Jayanta's introduction of *tātparya* as a theory of verbal comprehension received wide support from the posterior logicians.

Jayanta's long discussions about the existence of God and the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas are not very much relevant. Jayanta, as we have said before, sometimes departs from the main problem and devotes more attention to the side issues. This has made his account of *śabda* unnecessarily lengthy. His views on *prāmāṇyavāda* are original, yet his analysis of *Viparītakhyāti* is not adequately distinct. If we try to recapitulate his contentions, we would find that, according to him *śabda* is a means of knowledge and it depends upon the statement of a trustworthy person. Jayanta maintains that the truth of a piece of knowledge is not self-evident. He is of the view that truth or falsehood applies only to a judgment and that there is no contradiction in nature.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NATURE, FORMS AND VIABILITY OF PRESUMPTION

1. *The Viability of Other Sources of Knowledge*

Jayanta specifically rejects *sambhava*, *aithiya*, *arthāpatti* and *abhāva* as distinct sources of knowledge. He is, howeyer, silent regarding *ceṣṭā*, *smṛti* and *pratyabhijñā*. The omission of these in his list of prospective pramāṇas is an ample proof that he has not taken their claim for pramāṇahood seriously. Before analysing the nature of *arthāpatti* in this chapter and of *abhāva* in the next, let us see here what Jayanta has to say about *sambhava* and *aitihya* as independent means of knowledge.

(a) THE PROBLEM OF SAMBHAVA

The controversy of the viability of *sambhava* (conclusion) as independent means of knowledge is pretty long. Gautama himself is aware of it. From the available evidence it seems that the Paurāṇikas are the propounders of *sambhava* as an independent means of knowledge. Jayanta, however, does not specify the sources. Anyway, he agrees with his fellow logicians in holding that it is not an independent way of knowing.

If we speak of, say, 'a thousand', the number includes 'hundred'. The Paurāṇikas call this process of knowing *sambhava* and refer to it as an independent means of knowledge. None of other major systems share the Paurāṇika view. Jayanta, like his fellow logicians, interprets *sambhava* as the cognizance of a 'part' from the knowledge of a 'whole' with which it is inseparably connected. For instance, in the above example we cognise number 'hundred' from the number 'thousand'. Both the numbers are inseparable, since hundred is the tenth part of thousand. Jayanta states that it is nothing but inference, since it depends on invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum. Kumārila and Prabhākara also include it in inference.

Udayana refers to its two forms, viz., possible inclusion and certain inclusion. He is of the view that the first, being uncertain, is invalid and the second is simply an inference. Thus, Jayanta's line of thinking against the Paurāṇika view on this problem has found wide endorsement from almost all quarters.

(b) THE PROBLEM OF AIṬIHYA

Jayanta, like Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, etc., has discussed *aitihya*. He holds *aitihya* as a succession of rumours or the tradition spreading from generation to generation and (emanating from unknown speakers. There is a ghost in this tree, is the example provided by Jayanta to explain the nature of *aitihya*. There is, of course, no difference between him and other opponents of *aitihya* in holding that *aitihya* is not different from verbal testimony. One may contend that there is an authoritative sanction behind verbal testimony and that there is a lack of such an authority behind *aitihya*, but Jayanta states that the term '*āpta*' does not constitute the essential features of the definition of *Śabda* and the element of 'statement' (*upadeśa*) is common to both *Śabda* and *aitihya*. The Bhāṭṭas also hold that tradition is a rumour which is handed down from generation to generation. It is not a separate means of knowledge, since if it is certain it is to be included in verbal testimony and if its source is not definite it lacks validity.

2. *The Problem of Arthāpatti*

Jayanta follows the conventional Nyāya line in rejecting presumption as a source of knowledge. Though his predecessors have also dealt with the problem, his detailed, comprehensive and synthetic treatment of *arthāpatti* in *Nyāyamañjarī* seems to have surpassed all former accounts. He has convincingly proved the superiority of the Nyāya exposition against that of the Mīmāṁsā. It is perhaps for the first and the last time that a triangular conflict regarding *arthāpatti* has been brought to surface and resolved with ingenious and erudite argumentation. Dharmarājādhvarīndra, who has given a fair account of *arthāpatti*, is posterior to Jayanta and none of the Vedāntins prior to Dharmarāja has thought it worthwhile to provide a systematic analysis of the problem. So, at the time of Jayanta, the main exponents of *arthāpatti* were the Mīmāṁsakas. Thus Jayanta has to analyse this problem against the views of the Mīmāṁsakas. Though his conclusions are conventional, his presentation is novel and unique. He refers to the conflict subsisting between both the schools of Mīmāṁsā. Though at times he seems sympathetic towards the Prābhākaras,

ultimately he refutes both the schools contending that since *arthāpatti* is reducible to inference, it is not a distinct way of knowing.

3. *The Nature of Arthāpatti according to the Mīmāṁsakas*

In the *Bhāṭṭa* scheme, six *pramāṇas* are accepted while the followers of Prabhākara restrict them to five. *Anupalabdhi* (negation) is elevated to the rank of *pramāṇa* by the Bhāṭṭas but the Prābhākaras refuse to concede *pramāṇatva* to it. Apart from *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda* *arthāpatti* also is accepted as a source of knowledge by both the schools of Mímāṁsā, though the Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas differ regarding some aspects of this problem. It is in the *Śābarasbhāṣya* on the aphorisms of Jaimini that we get a short account of *arthāpatti* as a way of knowing.

According to Śabara, *arthāpatti* is the presumption of an unperceived object on the ground that a fact already seen or heard cannot be explained without that presumption, for instance, if it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, the presumtion would be that he is somewhere outside, as otherwise the fact of his being alive and not in the house could not be explained.[1] Although Śabara's statement is simple, it raised a great controversy among the followers of the system.

Kumārila regards presumption as a distinct means of knowledge. Unilke Prabhākara, Kumārila does not change the sequence of words in Śabara's definition but elaborates them in his own way. According to him, the word *dṛṣṭaḥ* in the *Bhāṣya* means that the fact is known by any of the five means and the word '*śrutaḥ* signifies that it has been learnt from the non-scriptural or scriptural source. So, the meaning of Śabara's statement would be that when a fact known cannot be explained except by assumption of some other fact, not in evidence, it is called presumption.[2] But Sucaritamiśra states that the basis of presumption is the inexplicability which lies in the apparent inconsistency of two cognitions. In one instance we find that fire burns the object which comes in contact with it, but in another we find that if some medicine is applied to the object, it does not burn. We presume that when the burning power is present, burning takes place and when it is destroyed, though the visible form of fire may remain as before, the burning does not take place[3].

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1. अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वाऽर्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थकल्पना यथा-जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभावदर्शनेन वहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना *S.B.*, 1.1.5
2. *S. V.* (*Arthā.*), 1.2
3. *Sucaritamiśra*; *S. V. T.* (*Arthā.*)

Interpreting Śabara's *Bhāṣya* pertaining to *arthāpatti,* Prabhākara changes the order of words from "*dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho anyathā nopapadyate ityarthakalpanā*" to "*dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho arthakalpanā anyathā nopapadyate iti*" meaning that in *arthāpatti* a seen or heard fact is the means of knowing another fact which is inexplicable without the former. Prabhākara further states that if the phrase '*anyathā nopapadyate*' in Śabara's definition of *arthāpatti* means the impossibility of the existence of object without another object, then it is nothing but the inference of cause from its effect because the effect cannot take place without a cause.[1] As regards the view that in inference the conclusion is drawn from a known relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* but in presumption such a relation is not known. Prabhākara holds that the cognition of inexplicability cannot arise unless we already know the relation between what is explained and what explains it. So, *arthāpatti* also rests upon the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* and such a relation can be regarded as an exclusive characteristic of inference.

Kumārila and Prabhākara, both regard *arthāpatti* as a means of knowledge, but they differ in the details regarding the nature and the range of *arthāpatti.* Though both the schools depend on Śabara's *Bhāṣya*' regarding *arthāpatti,* they interpret it in their own different ways.

Kumārila interprets the definition of *arthāpatti* without making any change in the sequence of words in it, but Prabhākara tries to avoid the inconsistency of facts in Śabara's statement by changing the order of words from "*dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho'nyahtā nopapadyate-ityarthakalplnā*" to "*dṛṣṭaḥ srutovārthakalpanānyathā nopapadyate*".

According to Kumārila, the words '*dṛṣṭaḥ śrutovā*' in the *Bhāṣya* refer to two kinds of *arthāpātti.* But Prabhākara interprets the words as meaning the same thing. '*Dṛṣṭaḥ*' means well-known and '*śrutaḥ*' is another word meaning the same thing in common usage. Thus, according to Prabhākara, there is no *Śrutārthāpatti* or presumption of a sentence or word. According to Kumārila the word *dṛṣṭaḥ* (seen) stands for all the six means of cognition (perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and negation) and the word (heard) *śruta* refers to the presumption

1. केयमन्यथानुपपत्तिरिति ? यदि तावदस्यानेन विना सद्भावो नोपद्यते
इति । तदेवेदं कार्यतः कारणानुमानमुपन्यस्तं न प्रमाणान्तरम्,
Bṛhatī, (Arthā), p. 85

of a fact. Śālikanātha says that what is presumed on hearing the sentence, 'Caitra who is fat does not eat during the day', is the fact of eating at night and not the sentence, 'he eats at night'. The inexplicability that is removed by the presumption consists in the conflict between fatness and fasting and not between the sentences, 'Caitra is fat' and 'He does not eat in the day'. So, the conflict between two facts must be resolved by presuming another fact. Even when the words 'eats at night' are uttered after uttering the sentence 'Caitra who is fat does not eat during the day', the conflict arising in the mind of the person on hearing the latter sentence is not resolved if he does not know the meaning of the word 'night'. Therefore, a conflict is to be resolved through the presumption of a fact and not of words. The only argument that Kumārila offers in favour of *śrutārthāpatti* is that all determinate cognitions are accompanied by the memory of words and the cognition resulting from a verbal inconsistency is a determinate cognition. But Śālikanātha has exposed the weakness of this argument and Kumārila's commentators admit the point raised by him.

4. The Problem of Śrutārthāpatti.

The problem of *Śrutārthāpatti* is much more complex than the general theory of *arthāpatti*, There are three main standpoints regarding it ; (1) The Nyāya does not accept *arthāpatti* as a distinct way of knowing ; so, according to the Naiyāyikas, this form of presumption also is reducible to inference.[1] (2) Kumārila enumerates it as one of the two main types of presumption and tries to establish its distinctness not only from other sources of knowing, but from other types of presumption also.[2] (3) Prabhākara, on the other hand, does not find any propriety either in assigning an independent role to it or in considering it a distinct variety of presumption.[3] There is an apparent similarity between the Nyāya and the Prābhākara views, but the grounds on which both of them discard *śrutārthāpatti* are different.[4] Dharmarājādhvarīndra accepts *śrutārthapātti* as a distinct

1. श्रुतार्थपत्तिरपि वराकी नानुमानाद् भिद्यते *N. M.*, I-42
2. पीनो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते चेत्येवमादिवचः श्रुतौ ।
रात्रिभोजनविज्ञानं श्रुतार्थापत्तिरिष्यते, *S. V.* (*Arthā.*) 51
3. श्रुतग्रहणमिदानीं किमर्थम् ? दृष्ट इत्येव वक्तव्यम् । उच्यते अभिधानान्तरमेव (दृष्टश्श्रुतो वेति) उपलब्धेर्वाचकम्, *Bṛhatī*, (*Arthā.*) Chow. 1929, p. 89
4. अभिधानान्तरमेव, *Bṛhatī*, p. 89

type of presumption but he goes a step further and propounds two sub-varieties of *śrutārthāpatti* and in a way makes a reasonable improvement in the theory of *śrutārthāpatti*.[1]

Jayanta's exposition of this problem is quite exhaustive. He holds that *śrutārthāpatti*, as propounded by Kumārila, is reducible to inference. He reproduces the Prābhākara view with more clarity than that with which it is put in *Bṛhatī*, etc. In the person of Jayanta, the Prābhākaras accidently got so tactful an advocate that the Bhāṭṭas seem to have virtually lost their ground in the conflict. Jayanta here fights to the finish, overpowers both of the schools of Mīmāṁsā by entangling them in a fierce mutual fighting and successfully proves that *arthāpatti* in one form or the other is not different from inference.

Jayanta, as has been his practice throughout, is extraordinarily fair to his opponents in presenting their standpoints accurately and elaborately. His treatment of *śrutārthāpatti* also is not an exception to this practice.

The Bhāṭṭa Theory of Śrutārthāpatti. The Bhāṭṭas interpret Śabara's statement as implying two main types of presumption, e.g., *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti*. 'Devadatta who is fat, does not take his meal during the day'. On hearing such assertion, we arrive at the idea of 'his eating at night'. Kumārila holds it to be a distinct type of knowledge and calls it '*śrutārthāpatti*'. Kumārila is conscious of his opponents' views advocating its inclusion in other sources of knowledge. But he ignores their criticism and tries to prove the distinctiveness of '*śrutārthāpatti*' from other sources of knowledge.

Śrutārthāpatti versus Perception. Kumārila holds that *śrutārthāpatti* is not the subject of direct sense-perception because taking meal at night is beyond the range of our vision. It is not even a case of auditory perception because our ears are not capable of grasping an unuttered word or clause.[2]

Śrutārthāpatti versus Comparison. The Bhāṭṭas state that *śrutārthāpatti* cannot be regarded as a case of comparison, since there is no similarity either between the sentence which is heard, i.e., 'does not

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1. श्रुतार्थापत्तिश्च द्विविधा अभिधानानुपपत्तिः अभिहितानुपपत्तिश्च, *V. P.*, (*Arthā*)
2. न ह्यनुच्चारिते वाक्ये प्रत्यक्षं तावदिष्यते, *S. V.* (*Arthā*) 60

parts) does not convey a consistent meaning. Therefore, the given part of the sentence implies its own remaining part out of grammatical necessity. So, what is presumed here is 'a portion of the sentence' and not the object meant by it.

Kumārila is quite aware of the following objections that could be raised by his opponents against this hypothesis. There is no point in presuming a portion of the sentence since this objective could also be achieved through the presumption of the complementary meaning by the existing meaning. The sentence 'Bulky Devadatta does not eat in day' could lead to presume the complementary meaning, i.e., natural food, in the same way in which the smoke leads to the inference of fire.[1] Moreover, a portion of the sentence which is presumed is not meant for invisible merit but for understanding the relevant meaning and in that case there is no fault if one holds that the complementary meaning is presumed and not the complementary sentence. In other words, the presumption relates to the fact and not to the clause.[2]

The Bhāṭṭas refute the above objections on the following grounds: A sentence which does not convey a complete meaning but produces an imperfect knowledge of objects is not a source of valid knowledge. Eyes and other sense-organs, revealing only a portion of an object with which they come in contact, produce valid knowledge, whereas a sentence conveying only a portion of the complete meaning cannot be a source of valid knowledge. A sentence is a complete whole in which each of its constituents, i.e., parts of speech, fulfils its duty and tends to convey the meaning of the sentence. These parts do never stop half-way but invariably complete the task of expressing complete meaning of a sentence. A sentence which expresses a complete meaning is a source of knowledge. Such a sentence bears a significant name. Therefore, wherever we hear a portion of a sentence we fill up the gap, supplying the understood portion by our imagination. How can we get the complete and consistent meaning if the understood portion is not supplied? In many cases the Vedic injunctions are incomplete. By means of presumption based upon testimony, they are made complete. But in these cases if we do not complete the Vedic injunction, which enjoin rites, the latter, being merely implied,

1. अवगमनैराकांक्ष्यसिद्धये तदर्थकल्पनमेव युक्तम्, *N. M.*, I-42

2. वचनैकदेशकल्पनमप्यर्थावगतिसिद्ध्यर्थमेवेति तत्कल्पनमेवास्तु किं सोपानान्तरेण, *Ibid.*

eat in the day' and that which is not heard, i.e., 'eats at night', or between the meanings of these sentences.

Śrutārthāpatti versus Verbal Testimony. *Śrutārthāpātti* is the presumption based upon testimony and not the verbal testimony itself. In the usual verbal testimony, the sentence is complete but in *śrutarthāpatti* a portion of it is given and another is to be presumed. In the usual verbal testimony, the words which are heard, have the competence to convey the complete sense, but such is not the case with presumption based upon testimony. In the given example that which is heard conveys the negative meaning, i.e., 'does not eat during the day' and not the positive meaning, i.e., 'eats at night'. Therefore, the knowledge that he takes his food at night is based upon the part of the sentence which is presumed by us.

Śrutārthāpatti versus Inference. The presumption of unuttered words is not an inference, since they are known even when the concomitance is absent.[1] Moreover, it is not possible here to determine the mark. If the sentence 'he eats at night' is the probandum and 'Devadatta who is flabby but does not take his meal during the day' is the probans, then the probans in question does not belong to the subject of inference, i.e., the speaker of the sentence, but belongs to such a locus as contains the negation of the probandum and hence it is not an invariable mark. Moreover, we find here no such property as can be proved by means of the probans in question just as we prove that a hill is fiery because it is smoky. Neither the sentence 'He does not take his meal during the day' nor its meaning can constitute the mark which will help us to infer the sentence 'He takes his meal at night'. If the sentence containing the phrase 'at night' is not heard, then how can it be held as belonging to the subject of inference ? But if it is heard, there is no need of inferring it. Here, we cannot even hold that the inconsistency inherent in the sentence does not stir our imagination to supplement it by the assumption of another sentence, i.e., 'He takes his meal at night' in order to make it a consistent one.

Kumārila holds that what happens in *śrutārthāpatti*' is that the sentence which is being heard, implies a syntactical relation with its own unheard part. It implies the remaining portion because the sentence which is not given here, by itself (not having the complete

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1. न च साकांक्षप्रतीतिकारिणस्तस्य प्रामाण्यम्, *N. M.*, I-42

will not be strictly Vedic. The Vedic mantra (a prayer) which speaks of a kind of ceremony in honour of the departed ancestors (*aṣṭaka* by name) leads us to assume an injunction which enjoins *aṣṭaka*. Sometimes, we also assume a complete Vedic injunction on the basis of an incomplete injunction. The Vedic injunction "one should perform *viśvajit* sacrifice" is an instance of an incomplete Vedic injunction. The injunction does not contain a word which may denote that the sacrificer is to get the fruit of the action. In such a case it does not carry the sense which it intends to convey. The object of an injunction is to induce a man to perform the rite prescribed by it. But only a man who is aware of the fruit of the rite and intends to have it, is persuaded to do so. Hence the above injunction should be supplemented by the word '*svargakāmaḥ*' so that the complete injunction should amount to saying that one who is desirous of heaven should perform *viśavajit* sacrifice. In case of subsidiary rites such as *aindrāgni*, etc., a general hint has only been given by the basic injunction as to their observance. In order to know the details of the rites that make them up, we are to assume some injunction which assert that the subsidiary rites bear a close resemblance to principal rites to which they belong. On the basis of the aforesaid analysis, the Bhāṭṭa theory of *śrutārthāpatti* could be summed up in the following form :

Śrutārthāpatti is the presumption of an unheard clause with a given sentence, when the sentence involves an inner contradiction and is inexplicable without the presumption of such a clause. It is not only different from other sources of knowing but from other types of presumption as well. The proper evaluation of *śrutārthāpatti* depends upon the appropriate conception of the sentence. It is interesting to note that almost all the arguments of the Bhāṭṭas regarding *śrutārthāpatti* centre round the structural and textural dimensions of the sentence. In the stock example of *śrutārthāpatti*, i.e., 'Flabby Devadatta does not take his food during the day', the Vedāntins think that the presumption (He takes his food at night) is that of a fact, but the Bhāṭṭas hold it to be a case of the presumption of a clause.[1]

Prabhākara's Rejection of Śrutārthāpatti. Though Śabara's statement clearly mentions the terms '*dṛṣṭaḥ*' and '*śrutaḥ*', Prabhākara holds that the apparent meaning of the statement is not the real one. So, unlike Kumārila, who interprets 'Śabara's statement as implying

1. *N. M.*, I-43; *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*, 279

the two main types of presumption, Prabhākara and his followers refuse to accept *śrutārthāpatti* as one of the two distinct types of presumption. The Prābhākaras hold that there is no point in accepting *śrutārthāpatti*, since the functions assigned to it by Bhāṭṭas have already been covered under the routine range of the denotative power of words. Jayanta reproduces and reviews the Prābhākaras' standpoints that the heard portion of the sentence could imply its unuttered portions on the basis of the following terms :

Words have short as well as an unlimited denotative range. As an arrow has a short or long process, i.e., it hits a near or a remote object or it pierces and passes through a thin or thick object quickly or slowly ; similarly the function of a word of conveying its meaning continues as long as the knowledge of its meaning continues to arise in our mind.

Sometimes pragmatic experience plays a great role in determining the meaning. A man who is worthy of being initiated into the art of the proper use of words by the experienced teachers or elders attentively notes the usage of the old teachers or elders and comes to learn that such and such sentences are capable of conveying such and such meanings. So, it is obvious that the words which constitute these sentences determine their meanings.

Implicit words also contribute in determining the meaning. If we reflect on the nature of conditions which regulate the meanings of the sentences then we come to know that there are some cases which show that even understood words determine meanings of sentences. For example, there are a few Vedic injunctions which are elliptical in their character. An illustration of this type is *viśvajitā yajeta*, i.e., a person who intends to enjoy heavenly bliss should perform the sacrifice called *viśvajit*. In this injunction the compound word *śvargakāmaḥ* (one who intends to enjoy heavenly bliss) is not given. Still, the implicit word contributes towards the conveying of the complete meaning of the above injunction.

Sometimes the given words do not even contribute to the meaning. There are also some injunctions in which the given words which are heard are given up since they do not help to convey the complete meanings of these injunctions. An illustration of this type is *ubhayam havir ārtim ṛcchet*. Here the word *ubhayam* has been abandoned since it is not capable of expressing the complete meaning of a great Vedic injunction. In connection with the directions of the new moon and the full-moon sacrifices, it has been stated that if both the

articles which are to be offered are spoiled, then 'Indra' should be offered five plates of rice. Now, the prima facie view is that an emphasis should be laid upon the adjective *ubhayam*. But the conclusive view is that even if one of these two articles to be offered is spoiled, the compensatory rite should be observed. Hence the word *ubhaya* loses its significance since its absence opens up a wider scope. The actual traditional practice is that the word *ubhaya* should be given up. Thus, it has got no part to play when the meaning of the above two conjoined injunctions is conveyed.

In some cases, no importance is attached to a subordinate clause which does not shape the meaning of the main injunction, e.g., in the Vedic sentence "*Prayājaśeṣeṇa havīṁṣyabhidhāryati*" (i.e., one sprinkles the articles with such clarified butter which remains after the completion of *prayāja* sacrifice), the clause *prayājaśeṣeṇa* referes to the procedure of sacrificing the animal in *Vājapeya* sacrifice. There is also no ruling as regards the preservation of such clarified butter and the provision of a pot which contains it. It is just possible that the sentence, a portion of which is not given, may also directly convey a meaning. In that case there is no use of assuming the type of presumption based upon testimony. As in the so-called instances of presumption based upon testimony, the meaning is directly conveyed by the incomplete sentences, so that the intermediate process of supplying the silent portion in order to render the sentence complete is superfluous.

A comparative analysis of the Bhāṭṭa and Vedānta account of *śrutārthāpatti* shows that whereas Kumārila altogether ignores *abhihitānupapatti*, i.e., the presumption of facts, Dharmarāja has given equal weightage to it. In fact, as Dr. G. P. Bhatt also rightly points out, it is more reasonable to say that the object of *arthāpatti* in 'Flabby Devadatta does not eat in the day' is a fact rather than a clause. The statement is grammatically complete but the sense involves inconsistency; therefore, a fact is presumed and not a clause. Thus, the Vedānta account of *śrutārthāpatti* seems more reasonable than the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara account of it.

Jayanta's Criticism of Śrutārthāpatti. It has been already mentioned before that the Bhāṭṭas object to any attempt to reduce *arthāpatti* to inference. But Jayanta holds that *śrutārthāpatti* is not different from inference. Jayanta advances the following arguments to prove his thesis and to refute the Bhāṭṭa standpoint:[1]

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1. *N. M.*, I-42

The example of the so-called presumption, based upon the verbal testimony, is a weak one since *śrutārthāpatti* is not different from an inference. It is really absurd to presume the part of a sentence since the meaning of the absent part also can be inferred from its effect which serves the purpose of a genuine mark. As fire is inferred from smoke, so one can infer the taking of meal as the mark (essential condition) of flabbiness on the basis of noticing the great bulk of a person. There is no difference in these two instances.

From our repeated observations we have learnt that flabbiness is the effect of the taking of meal. In some cases the mark is perceived but in other cases it may be known by means of the verbal knowledge. As there is no great gulf of difference between these two types of mark, there is no difference between the *śrutārthāpatti* and the inference.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas contend that an incomplete sentence cannot convey its full meaning. They do not mean to say that the sentence that 'Flabby Devadatta does not take his meal during the day', fails to convey that he is flabby, but what they simply intend to suggest is that the knowledge that 'he is flabby' requires a complement, i. e., 'he takes food at night', which is not given in the basic form of the sentence. So, what the Bhāṭṭas do is that they propose to presume the complementary portion of the sentence and call it *śrutārthāpatti*. But Jayanta puts them in a dilemma by asking them as to which of the constituents of the given sentence require a complement ; is it a word, or its meaning, or its knowledge?

If the Bhāṭṭas hold that a word requires a complement, then it may be said that as no inarticulate sound requires a complement, so no word (which does not refer to a meaning) requires a complement. If it is the contention of the Bhāṭṭas that the meaning of the given sentence requires a complement, let its requirement be fulfilled by having a complementary meaning. And in that case, there is no point in presuming a portion of the sentence. If the knowledge brought about by the given part of the sentence is held as requiring a complement, even in such a case, it is the object which is required to make the already acquired knowledge comprehensive. And for that purpose the simple course to be adopted is that the additional objects themselves should serve as complements. And in this situation, the presumption of a part of the given sentence becomes superfluous.

Jayanta is aware of the objections that the Bhāṭṭas could raise against his refutation of their proposition. So, at this juncture also,

he reproduces and then rejects their counter arguments. The Bhāṭṭas state that the presumption of the object and not of the referents themselves would render the Vedic sentence non-Vedic. But Jayanta holds that if the sentence is presumed, the meaning would become non-Vedic with the same logic since the presumed portion of the sentence is non-Vedic. So, the fact of a Vedic injunction becoming non-Vedic is a weak shelter. Moreover, if the directly given sentence and the subsequent portion indirectly assumed from it both constitute a Vedic text according to the Mīmāṁsakas, then with the same logic the given and the suggested meaning would also be regarded as Vedic. And, in that case, there is hardly any propriety in the gratuitous presumption of a clause or a sentence.

Jayanta, further holds that on the basis of the above-mentioned facts, the arguments of those also automatically stand refuted, who hold that 'flabbiness', as in the given example, is sensuous and 'taking food at night' is super-sensuous and the relation of concomitance holding between them cannot be ascertained. Jayanta seems to propound that if one portion of a logical whole is ascertained, the remaining part could be inferred, and the injection of super-sensuous colouring to the implicit part is totally unwarranted.

On reviewing the aforesaid account of *śrutārthāpatti* by Jayanta, we arrive at the conclusion that according to him *śrutārthāpatti* is not a distinct means of knowledge. The arguments advanced by the Bhāṭṭas are not based on sound footing. Jayanta seems quite sympathetic towards the Prābhākaras on this specific issue. He does not consider the Vedānta standpoint, since Dharmarāja is posterior, and up to the time of Jayanta the Vedāntic theory of knowledge was not properly worked out. He seems to have left an impact on posterior logicians since none of them accepts *śrutārthāpatti* as a distinct way of knowing.

5. *Arthāpatti and Other Sources of Knowledge*

The basic argument put forth by the Mīmāṁsakas regarding the distinct character of presumption is that all the cases of presumption have for their object transcendental powers which cannot be known through any other *pramāṇa*. This is the touchstone on which the Mīmāṁsakas have tested the distinctness of presumption from other sources of knowledge.

Presumption and Perception. On the one hand the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas regard a sub-variety of presumption as based upon perception, and on the other, they stress that presumption is totally different from perception. Kumārila states that the assumption of the burning power of the fire is based upon the sense-perception. So, the simple cognition of fire is perception and the cognition of the burning power in fire is the result of presumption.[1]

Presumption and Abhāva. It may be said that Caitra's absence may be known by means of non-perception. But the Mīmāṁsakas hold that when we know something by means of non-perception, we know it as located upon some particular well-defined locus. But the negation of Caitra belongs to all places except his house. Hence it cannot be known by non-perception.

Jayanta, at this juncture, sarcastically remarks that the initial proposition of the Mīmāṁsakas is that there are six kinds of presumption. But they, being cowed down by the side glance of the angry Naiyāyikas, have taken to heels deserting presumption based on non-perception like a doe in a forest. He expresses himself in the form of the following dictum. If you (Mīmāṁsakas) desert this young lady (in the shape of the former illustration or presumption) who absolutely depends upon you for her protection, then how will the other ladies (other forms of presumption) count upon your protection with confidence ?[2]

Presumption and Hypothesis of Western Logic. It will be interesting to enquire whether we have any analogue of this process of knowledge in Western philosophy. It may be compared to the hypothesis of Western logic in so far as both of them are suppositions set to explain given facts. But, like an *arthāpatti*, a hypothesis may not be always inspired by the motive of solving a conflict or contradiction.

Presumption and Transcendental Proof. We have a closer parallel, however, in the transcendental proof which Kant employs throughout in his *Critique*. The proof consists in arguing from the consequent of its only possible antecedent without which the consequent cannot be explained.

As in *arthāpatti*, so in this kind of argument Kant is goaded by an apparent conflict to find out the only possible fact that solves it.

1. तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो ज्ञाताद् दाहाद् दहनशक्तिता, *S. V.*, (*Arthā.*, 3)
2. त्वदेकशरणां बालामिमामुत्सृज्य गच्छतः ।
कथं ते तर्कयिष्यन्ति मुखमन्या अपि स्त्रियः, *N. M.*, I-42

(a) IS ARTHĀPATTI REDUCIBLE TO INFERENCE?

As has been explained in the previous chapters, the Buddhists, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga refuse to accept *arthāpatti* as a distinct way of knowing simply because they hold it reducible to inference. Jayanta champions this group in the same way in which Kumārila leads the opposite one.

Those, who hold presumption to be a form of inference put forth the stock example, i. e., 'The living Caitra is not present in his house', in the form of the following syllogism :

(a) The living Caitra exists outside the house,
(b) because he is living and is not found in the house,
(c) like myself.

Here 'living Caitra' is the minor term ;
'exists outside' is the major term ; and
'non-exisence in the house' is the middle term.

The Bhāṭṭa View. Kumārila quotes the same stock example and on the basis of it tries to prove that the cases of presumption cannot be regarded as the cases of inference. Amongst the types of presumption, Kumārila picks up 'presumption based upon negation' as a test case, and Bhaṭṭa Umbeka justifies the selection of this type on the ground that it is related to the only example of presumption which has been given by Śabara himself. The example runs as 'the living Caitra is not present in his house'. So, on cognizing the absence of the living Caitra from his house and in order to solve the inconsistency between his living and his absence from his house, one presumes that Caitra would be present somewhere outside his house.

Kumārila advances the following arguments to substantiate his objection to the reducibility of presumption to inference :

(a) Caitra's 'non-existence in the house' cannot be regarded as the middle term, because the house, as qualified by Caitra's absence, does not fulfil the conditions of the middle term since the middle term should be the property of the minor term ; but here 'non-existence in the house' is not the property of Caitra, since he is not cognized as qualified by his absence in the house, for it is only the house that is cognized and not Caitra. So, neither 'Caitra's house' nor 'the non-visibility of Caitra' in the house nor 'outside' can be regarded as the middle term.

(b) The Mīmāṁsakas hold that a living man's absence in the house cannot be accepted as true, so long as we have not become

cognizant of his existence outside; till then the former proposition has all the appearance of absurdity. Therefore, whatsoever be regarded here as the middle term depends upon the conclusion, whereas in usual inference the case is just the reverse. In other words, in the case of inference the means of proof should be logically prior to the conclusion but on the contrary, in this case, the matter to be proved comes first and the means of proof is found later on.[1]

(c) The Mīmāṁsakas further add that presumption is different from inference in the sense that presumption corroborates the findings of the two independent means of proof, namely, testimony and non-perception, which grasp the existence and non-existence of the same object, i. e., Caitra.[2] But, in the case of inference, the relation of invariable concomitance holding between fire and smoke is grasped by a single means.[3]

(d) As regards the Naiyāyikas' suggestion that here the relation of invariable concomitance is indirectly grasped by means of a hypothetical judgement, based on a subsequent agreement in absence, the Mīmāṁsakas state that in such a case even the major premise is obtained through presumption.

(e) *Arthāpatti* arises when there is a doubt or contradiction in the mind, and one tries to free the mind from it by making an assumption which dissolves the conflict; it is obvious that there is no such situation in the case of inference.

The followers of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāmsā adopt a different line of thinking to distinguish between inference and presumption. Jayanta reproduces and criticises their views elaborately. The Prābhākaras hold that in the case of inference the so-called probans is not dependable if the probandum does not exist on the locus of the probans in question. The adjectival phrase 'otherwise not logically valid' qualifies a probans in the case of inference. For example, smoke cannot logically exist on the subject of inference if fire

1. (a) नं हि गृहं वा चैत्रो वा तदभावो तददर्शनं वा चैत्रस्य धर्मः तद्
बहिर्भावस्य वेत्यपक्षधर्मत्वादन्यतमस्यापि न लिगत्वम्, *N. M.*, I-34
(b) जीवतश्च गृहाभावः पक्षधर्मोऽत्र कल्प्यते ।
तत्संवित्तिर्बहिर्भावं न चाबुद्ध्वोपजायते, *S. V.* (*Arthā*), 19.
2. प्रमेयानुप्रवेशप्रसंगादपि नेदमनुमानम्, *N. M.*, I-34
3. प्रमाणद्वयसमर्पितैकवस्तुविपयाभावभावसमर्थनार्थमर्थापत्तिः, प्रवर्तमाना
प्रमेयद्वयं परामृपत्येव अन्यथा तत्संघटनायोगात्, *Ibid*, I-35

does not exist there. But, in the case of presumption the reverse is the order subsisting between the implicans and the implicate. The implied object cannot be proved if the implier does not exist.[1] Let us take a familiar example. It cannot be proved that a living person is staying outside, if he is not absent from his house. When a living person goes out of his house, he stays outside. It is interesting to note that the Prābhākaras explain the extract of Śabara's commentary dealing with presumption in the light of this new hypothesis.

Prabhākara's view that the presence of a living person outside is impossible without his absence from his house, But Jayanta states that in such a case they should also admit that if he is absent from his house, he is surely present outside his house, and in this situation, it is to be settled first of all as to "What is the nature of inexplicability involved in the proposition?" If it is a metaphysical or epistemological impossibility, the so-called presumption is not better than inference since the latter thought process also moves in a similar manner. If the probans is known before, the probandum is known afterwards and if the probans is not previously known, the probandum cannot be known. If the absence from the house is an established fact, its effect is to be subsequently produced since a cause is invariably antecedent to its effect. Such a cause alone is productive of its effect. Now it is to be noted that when a living person is first absent from his house does he not necessarily at that moment stay outside the house ? Hence casual relation does not hold between one's absence from house and one's presence outside and this fact does not improve upon the Prābhākaras' thesis that presumption is a distinct source of knowledge.

As regards the Mīmāṁsakas' contention that the relation of invariable concomitance holding between the *implicans* and the *implicate* can in no way be discovered since such a relation is discovered when the objects thus related are within the range of vision:,[2] Jayanta holds that such an argument does not appeal to reason. He further points out that the Mīmāṁsakas themselves are not sure of the truth of their argument. A doubt as to whether or not the invariable relation holds between the *implicans* and the *implicate* has arisen in their mind but they have not been able to arrive at the definite conclusion that the above relation does not subsist

1. अनुमाने गमकविशेषणमन्यथानुपपन्नत्वमनलं विना धूमो हि नोपपद्यते, इह तु विपर्ययः गम्यो गमकेन विना नोपपद्यते, *Bṛhatī*, p. 86

2. *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 275

between them. Hence they have put forward another example to prove their thesis, viz., 'When a living person is at home he is not out.' But if the Mīmāṁsakas think that it is a better example, they should have given it at the outset.

(b) IS INFERENCE REDUCIBLE TO ARTHĀPATTI ?

The Nyāya does not regard *arthāpatti* as a distinct source of knowledge. Hence the question of its reducibility does not arise. Jayanta, however, holds that inference and presumption are identical. But, as has been already explained, he is in favour of reducing *arthāpatti* to *anumāna* and not vice versa.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas try to establish the distinctiveness of *arthāpatti*. Pārthasārathi discusses the question of reducing inference to *arthāpatti* at greater length. He holds that inference would have been reduced to presumption if by some means other than inference it could be understood that all places having smoke have fire;[1] whereas the fact is that it is only the minor term wherein the association of smoke with fire has been perceived and not in all places. Moreover, in inference, concomitance is a major factor but in *arthāpatti* the emphasis is on apparent contradiction.

The Vedāntins hold that even if we arrive at the conclusion of an inference through *arthāpatti*, we have to depend for our data on a previous inference. Therefore, inference cannot be reduced to *arthāpatti*. Dharamarāja, however, seems to hold that *vyatireki* inference is reducible to presumption and here, at this point, there is a face-to-face conflict between Dharmarāja and Jayanta in particular and the Vedānta and Nyāya in general.[2]

6. *Utility of Arthāpatti* (*presumption*)

The Advaita Vedānta and the Mīmāṁsā regard presumption as a separate source of knowledge because in their opinion it provides us with the knowledge of facts which cannot be explained otherwise. Mīmāṁsakas frequently use *arthāpatti* for explaining the Vedic texts by presuming missing words and meanings without which the Vedic texts cannot be correctly understood. They also base their beliefs on presumption in such cases as survival of the self after death.

The Advaitins hold *arthāpatti* useful for explaining the Vedānta texts. For example, the Upaniṣads sometimes speak of the creation

1. *S. D. Arthā.*, (1916), p. 121
2. *V. P. Arthā.*, p. 212

of the world by *Brahman* and out of *Brahman* but sometimes they teach that there is no multiplicity and hold that *Brahman* is the only reality. This conflict is resolved by supposing that creation is not a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *Brahman*, but only an apparent change (*vivarta*) like the appearance of a rope as a snake. The supposition of *māyā* as the power of *Brahman* to create an apparent world is a kind of presumption.

The Advaitins use this method also in assuming some unperceived facts and principles for explaining experienced facts. For example, they suppose the existence of an objectless blissful consciousness during dreamless sleep, in order to explain the memory which we have on rising from such a sleep when we say 'I had a comfortable sleep'.

Jayanta and other opponents of *arthāpatti* are not blind to its implications. What they preach is that there is no need of holding it as independent and distinct from inference. In other words, it may be inferred that whatever importance they attach to inference automatically holds good regarding the implication of *arthāpatti* as well. Jayanta seems to hold that whatever role the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins assign to *arthāpatti* may be entrusted to inference. So, from the point of view of utility also, *arthāpatti*, according to Jayanta, is not a distinct means of knowledge.

7. *Conclusion*

Though Jayanta does not accept *arthāpatti* as a distinct source of knowledge, his account of the problem is quite elaborate and contains many novel features. His presentation of the Mīmāṁsā views is perfectly impartial. His refutation also is not based on the twisting of facts. The main points of his theory of presumption could be summed up as under :

Jayanta introduces the problem with a reference to the Bhāṭṭa interpretation of Śabara's statement, that whenever a fact known to us or learnt from a verbal source seems to be apparently absurd and requires the assumption of some other fact to explain it, it is called presumption. This definition of *arthāpatti* is held by Jayanta as the prima facie view of the Mīmāṁsakas. It is strange that he has nothing to remark against Śabara though he ruthlessly takes his followers to task. Why he spared Śabara is not clear. Probably he thinks that with the refutation of the Bhāṭṭa views, Śabara's statement also stands automatically rejected. Jayanta is aware of the divergent interpretations of Śabara's statement by Kumārila and Prabhākara.

Jayanta seems to hold Kumārila as the main interpreter of the Mīmāṁsā position of *arthāpatti* and assigns a stop-gap role to Prabhākara. As has been said already, the Bhāṭṭas contend that presumption is a distinct source of knowledge but Jayanta rejects their tenet stating that it is not different from inference on the aforesaid grounds.

Jayanta states that the Mīmāṁsā concept of super-sensuous power is a superfluous assumption since the effect does not presuppose such a power. Moreover, if the cause itself does not have the capacity to produce an effect, then any cause could produce any effect. Further, even if we accept it for the sake of argument, it will lead to *regressus ad infinitum*.

It is the considered opinion of Jayanta that the presumption based upon negation also is reducible to inference.

Jayanta is of the view that Prabhākara's standpoint that the sequence of the implicans (*gamaka*) and the implicate (*gamya*) in inference is different from the sequence of the *implicans* and *implicate* in presumption, is not based upon sound judgment.

Jayanta holds that presumption of unuttered words (*śrutārthāpatti*) is simply absurd since the meaning of the *implicit* part of a sentence could be easily inferred from the meaning of the existing part.

From this account it is apparent that Jayanta's contribution rests mainly in the fact that he has presented the problem in all its details. From the point of view of his own system, his exposition of *arthāpatti* is remarkable since it sets at rest the controversy over the various side-issues of the problem and tries to prove the superiority of the Nyāya position over that of the Mīmāṁsā. Had he been not earlier to Dharmarājādhvarīndra, he would have certainly refuted him on the same lines on which he overpowered the Prābhākaras. It is probably he, from whom the latter logicians also got inspiration and requisite evidence to reject *arthāpatti* as a distinct way of knowing.

CHAPTER IX

THE NATURE, FORMS AND VIABILITY OF NEGATION

1. *The Problems of Abhāva (Negation)*

In Indian Philosophy, *abhāva* (negation) has been discussed in two froms, viz., as an ontological reality and as a way of knowing. In the first form it is mentioned by such words as *asat*, *alīka*, *nirūpākhya*, *niḥsvabhāva*, etc., and in the second form it is referred to as *anupalabdhi*. A general epistemological notion of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas regarding negation is that there is some reality known as abhāva and there is a way of ascertaining it which is known as *anupalabdhi*. Here we are primarily concerned with the problem of *abhāva* as a means of knowledge. But its acceptance or non-acceptance as such involves some consideration of its ontological aspects as well. We shall, however, discuss the ontological aspect of negation only where it is absolutely necessary for epistemological analysis.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins accept *anupalabdhi* as a distinct source of knowledge. All other systems are opposed to it. Jayanta refers only to the views of the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras and the Buddhists and comes to the conclusion that though *abhāva* is a reality, *anupalabdhi* is not a distinct way of knowing. Let us, however, have a brief survey of what the different systems think of negation as a source of knowledge and why they accept or reject it.

In the fourth chapter we have seen that sense-object contact is a necessary factor in the ordinary modes of perceptual cognition. This holds good as regards the cognition of *bhāva* (existence of things) but as far as the question of the cognition of *abhāva* (non-existence of things) is concerned, it has been answered divergently by different philosophers. *Abhāva* is reckoned as an independent category in Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*. Praśastapāda simply states that it is *anumāna*. There is a difference of opinion between the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas about the method of cognizing *abhāva*. The Naiyāyikas maintain that it is an object of perception, but in the opinion of the

Vaiśeṣikas it is cognized through inference. The Naiyāyikas hold that non-existence of a pot on the ground is not identical with the bare ground, it is rather adjectival to it. *Abhāva* is the character of the ground and it is perceived in the same ways in which the colour, size, etc., of the ground are perceived with the perception of the ground. To avoid the difficulty of lack of contact between the sense and such a character, the Naiyāyikas have assumed special type of contact between the sense and *abhāva* which they call *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*.

The Bhāṭṭas and the Advaita Vedāntins hold that *abhāva* is the non-existence of an object in a specific locus and its ascertainment requires an independent means of knowledge called *anupalabdhi*. The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, maintain that though *abhāva* has no objective reality, it is capable of being cognized through perception. The Buddhists believe that reality consists of existence only and negation as a way of knowing is already included in inference.

The Sāṁkhya view is identical with that of the Prābhākaras. They maintain that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is nothing but the ground that is devoid of any content. And the bare ground is nothing but the ground itself. Thus, the cognition of the non-existence of the jar on the ground is the cognition of the ground. Therefore, the Sāṁkhyas conclude that the non-existence of the jar on the ground can be cognized through perception. Mere non-perception cannot prove non-existence, since it may be due to other causes, such as excessive distance or proximity, disturbance of sense organs, absent-mindedness, etc. The Yoga also does not accept negation (*anupalabdhi*) as a distinct means on the same grounds on which the Sāṁkhyas reject it.

This brief survey shows that Indian thinkers can be grouped in three camps regarding the epistemological analysis of *abhāva*, viz., (1) The Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins who maintain that *abhāva* is an entity and is cognized through *anupalabdhi* (2) The Prābhākaras, and the Sāṁkhyas who are of the view that *abhāva* is not an entity and that this can be ascertained through perception. (3) The Naiyāyikas who hold that *abhāva* is a reality but it can be cognized through perception and that there is no need of accepting *anupalabdhi* as an additional source of knowledge. Jayanta refers only to the Bhāṭṭa, Prabhākara and the Buddhist views on the problem of *abhava*. In the subsequent pages we shall see how he refutes them and establishes the Nyāya standpoint.

2. *The Nature of Abhāva*

In the earlier works of the Mīmāṁsā school the problem of *abhāva* has not been adequately discussed. Jaimini simply refers to two types of logical negation, namely, *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapratiṣedha*. Thus, it is Śabara who has touched the epistemological aspect of the problem for the first time. Kumārila analysis the metaphysical as well as the epistemological aspects and is largely responsible for formulating the theory of negation (*anupalabdhi*) as a distinct way of knowing.[1]

The basis of Kumārila's theory is that in the case of an object where other means of knowledge do not function towards the comprehension of its existence, we have negation as the only means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-existence of an object depends upon the validity of negation as a way of knowing. On this basic thesis of Kumārila, the Bhāṭṭas have built up a comprehensive theory of negation which though vigorously refuted by the Naiyāyikas, made a tremendous impact in the field of learning. The Bhāṭṭas believe that every object has two forms—one of existence and the other of non-existence.[2] When a pot has existence in a room, it can be cognized by means of perception or by some other means of knowledge. When no such means yield any knowledge of the object, the object is judged by the very absence of knowledge *anupalabdhi*. The Bhāṭṭas maintain that non-existence is not identical with its locus but is something additional to it. According to them existence and non-existence are two different aspects of a thing and one is not reducible to other. The ground has two equally real aspects, viz., its own existence and the non-existence of other things on it.

Kumārila is of the view that the negative facts are cognized through non-apprehension (*anupaladbdhi*). Non-apprehension is different from perception, inference, etc., since whereas the latter are ways of knowing positive aspects of things, the former cognizes the negative aspect of them. In perception sense organs and *manas* act in some positive way and there is a corresponding modal change in the self, but in the cognition of the negative aspects of things there is no sense-activity and corresponding modification of the self. What-

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1. प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।
वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता, *S. V.* (*Abhāva*)
2. सर्वं हि वस्तु सदसदात्मना द्विविधम्, *S. D.* (*Abhāva*)

ever activity is there, it pertains to the present locus and not to the object negated.[1]

3. *Jayanta's Criticism of the Bhāṭṭa View of Abhāva*

Jayanta rightly considers the Bhāṭṭas to be the main votaries of negation. Kumārila maintains that the word *pramāṇābhāva* in the *Śabara-Bhāṣya* means the non-occurrence of sense-perception and other means of knowledge. And this is either a particular modification of the soul or the cognition of another object.[2] He states that judgment 'there is no jar here' is not perceptual since it does not owe its existence to the sense-object contact.[3] Kumārila holds that negative is always of some positive entity in some positive locus. As far as the positive locus of the jar is concerned, the cognition is perceptual and as far as the counter-correlate of negation, viz., the jar, is concerned, the knowing factor is memory, but the negation itself is known neither through preception nor through memory, but purely through the *manas*.[4] It necessarily implies a reference to negation of other objects. For instance, when the village of Gauramūlaka with all its positive contents is perceived, the absence of Garga is also directly cognized. Thus, it should be aceepted that the *abhāva* of an object is perceived.

The Bhāṭṭas maintain that there must be similarity between the means of proof and the knowable object. Positive objects are grasped by positive means of knowledge and negative objects by negative means. But Jayanta objects to this view and asserts that negative facts are also included in the totality of conditions that produces positive knowledge. Sometimes, a negative fact constitutes a probans which leads to the inferential knowledge of a positive probandum. The absence of rainfall leads to the inference of the blowing away of the clouds by a storm. Therefore, it is wrong to maintain that a negative fact is known only by means of negative means of proof.[5] Jayanta jokingly remarks that the Mīmāṁsakas

1. *Epistemology of The Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā*, p. 344
2. अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावो नास्तीत्यर्थस्यासन्निकृष्टस्य, *S. B.*, 1.1.5; *S. V.* (Abhāva) 10 ; *N. M.*, I-46
3. संयोगसमवायादिसम्बन्धो नैव विद्यते। नागृहीते हि धर्मत्वं गृहीते सिद्धसाधनम्, *S. V.* (*Abhava*)
4. गृहीत्वा वस्तुसद्भावं स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम्। मानसं नास्तिताज्ञानं जायतेऽक्षानपेक्षया, *S. V.* (*Abhāva*), 27; *N. M.*, I-47
5. सामग्र्यन्तर्गतात्तस्मादभावादपि भावधीः, *Ibid.*, I-51

must understand that articles of worship do not necessarily change with the change of worshipped beings.[1]

As regards the Bhāṭṭa contention that negation cannot qualify the so-called locus—i.e., the ground in the case of the negation of a jar—since it has neither conjunction with the locus nor inherence in it, Jayanta states that there is a third type of relation of the qualifying to the qualified (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyabhāva*) which is quite capable of serving the purpose of perceiving negation.

The only point on which Jayanta agrees with Kumārila is that negation within the range of vision has no need to be inferred. He, however, makes it clear that the negation of an object lying outside the range of vision is a case of inference and sometimes it can also be ascertained through testimony.

Jayanta advises the Bhāṭṭas that they should either hold that negation is absolutely unreal since it has no characteristics or they should accept the Nyāya view that negation is perceived[2].

4. *Jayanta's Criticism of the Prābhākara View of Abhāva*

Like the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins, the Prābhākaras think that *Abhāva* is the non-existence of an object in a specific place, but whereas the Bhāṭṭas maintain that non-existence requires an independent way of knowing, the Prābhākaras feel that it can be cognized by perception. With the Prābhākaras and the Sāṁkhyas, the absence of pot in a room is identical with the bare room. They do not accept non-existence as a separate category and non-apprehension as a separate source of knowledge. In the opinion of the Prābhākaras 'non-existence is nothing but existence and non-perception is nothing but mere perception.' There is no realitiy corresponding to the word 'no'. Reality is always positive and a negative judgment is a subjective mode of apprehending it. A negative judgment is valid, not because a negative fact corresponds to it, but because it refers indirectly to a positive fact.[3] According to the Prābhākaras, *abhāva* has no reality apart

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1. तस्माद्युक्तमभावस्य नाभावेनैव वेदनम् ।
   न नाम यादृशो यक्षो बलिरप्यस्य तादृशः, *N. M.*, I-51
2. सर्वोपाख्यावियुक्तत्वान्नास्त्येवेत्येष वोच्यताम् ।
   अभावश्चाक्षुषज्ञानविषयो वाभ्युपेयताम्, *Ibid.*, I-48
3. *P.P.*, p. 226

from that of an existing thing.[1] *Existence and non-existence* are two aspects of the same thing.

According to Jayanta, Prābhākara's denial of objective reality to negation amounts to saying that perception and non-perception respectively constitute the criterion of objective reality and of the unreality of an object. Jayanta objects to this view and states that perception and non-perception respectively determine the presence and absence of an object. But the presence and absence of an object do not amount to its reality or unreality. For instance, the non-perception of water hidden beneath the earth, does not lead to the negative proposition that water does not exist. The Prābhākaras may contend that there is a difference between conditional non-perception as in the case of hidden water and absolute non-perception as in the case of demons and that only absolute non-perception leads to a negative proposition. But Jayanta retorts that the possibility of the existence of demons is assured by the scriptures and inference. Moreover, if the Prābhākaras deny objective existence to *abhāva*, all the positive objects which are negated by their corresponding negations would be eternal since the Prābhākaras do not regard them as transitory.[2] Moreover, as far as the Buddhists are concerned, they are known to maintain that the words refer to concepts and not to the real. But according to the Prābhākaras a word refers to the real. So, they cannot but accept that the indeclinable *'nañ'* refers to the real and if they do so, they virtually accept the reality of *abhāva*.

Jayanta reminds the Prābhākaras that in denying the reality to non-existence they are not only discarding the time-honoured principle of the realists but also going against the spirit of *Śabarabhāṣya*. He sarcastically remarks that it does not behove him to point out the blunders of the elderly Prābhākaras but it is a fact that the misinterpretation of the *Śabarbhāṣya* by them is astounding.[3]

5. *Jayanta's Criticism of the Buddhist View of Abhāva*

According to the Buddhist 'existence', as Stcherbatsky puts it, refers to the ultimate reality of a point-instant and its cognition is the corresponding pure sensation. A non-existing or absent thing is imagination ; it can produce no sensation directly. Negation is,

1. *Bṛhatī*, (Chow. 1921) p. 91
2. *N. M.*, I-58
3. उपेक्षितश्च भाष्यार्थं इत्यहो नयनैपुणम्, *Ibid.*

therefore, never a direct or original attitude of mind as pure sensation always is. It is always the work of an understanding which calling in mnemonic representations, interprets a given sensation on its negative side. If we have a cognition of the type 'there is here no jar' or 'the jar is absent', the visual sensation is produced by the empty place and not by the absent jar. The absent jar is a representation called forth by the memory and constructed by the intellect; it is not perceived by the senses.[1] It is imagination. The cognition of an absent thing means its presence in imagination. It would be necessarily perceived if it were present, but it is absent and therefore, it is imagined.[2] The Buddhists maintain that reality is not split into existence and non-existence, but consists of existence only and that negation is not a direct way of cognizing reality, it is rather, a round about way and therefore, included in inference. The assertion 'there is no jar' is preceded by an inferential process of which it is the conclusion. Non-apprehension is the reason in this process. The inference can be stated in the following manner ; The existence of a perceptible thing is invariably accompanied by its perception ; the jar which is a perceptible thing is perceived.[3]

Jayanta is aware that the Buddhists are opposed to accepting the ontological reality of *abhāva*. So, he analyses their views and refutes them in the following manner.[4]

The Buddhists maintain that non-existence is never known as an independent object. Jayanta objects to this view on the ground that there are two kinds of cognitions which can be experienced by all, viz., there is jar on this spot and there is no jar on this spot'. The Buddhists are divided in their opinion regarding the content of negative judgment. The Diṅnāga school believes that it is a mere mental construction while according to Yogācāra it is the modification of the self. Jayanta points out that none of these statements about a negative judgment makes any difference between a negative judgment and a positive one. But by an arbitrary exercise of will it is held that a positive judgment is true and a negative judgment is false. So their thesis is not based on sound grounds.

If the positive constructions enable us to grasp real things, and are therefore valid, it may be said that the validity of the negative

1. *Buddhist Logic*, vol. I, p. 363
2. अथ यो यत्र नास्ति स कथं तत्र दृश्यः, *N.Bi.*, p. 101
3. *S. V. T.* (*Abhāva*) 38
4. *N. M.*, I-51

mental constructions may also be accepted on the same grounds. For instance, grasping the colour 'blue' implies grasping the negation of those which are other than blue. Is the negation identical with the jar or different from it ? If the first is accepted, it is nothing but the jar itself, and if the second is accepted, it is the negation of the jar.

Thus, Jayanta asserts that what is apprehended at the time of the cognition 'there is no jar' cannot be merely the ground, because it is also cognized at the time of the cognition of the existence of the jar. It is, therefore, necessary that there must be apprehension of something else and it is immaterial if that something else is called the ground devoid of the jar or the non-existence of the jar on the ground. The Buddhists are of the view that non-existence is not real since it does not come into contact with space, time and the object negated. No relation such as conjunction, inherence, etc., unites negation with them. Even the relation of qualifying to the qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*) presupposes some other basic relation obtained between them. A qualifynig adjective is either conjoined to as in *daṇḍī Devadattaḥ* or is inherent in that term as in *nīlam utpalam*. Here Jayanta asks, 'Is non-existence identical with the surface of the spot or not ?' If it is identical, the spot containing a jar, should also be referred to by the negative judgment that there is no jar on this spot, since the surface of the spot remains the same whether it contains a jar or not. If it is different, it is really a negative fact expressed only in a different language. Thus, the controversy is merely nominal.

The Buddhists contend that the relation of '*viśeṣaṇā-viśeṣyabhāva*' is not real ; it is imaginary. No relation can specially exist between negation and the object negated, since there is neither co-existence nor co-ordination between negation and the object negated. If a jar exists at a particular spot and time, it cannot be absent from that spot at that time. If there is a negation of the jar in a particular spot at a particular time, the jar cannot exist at that time. Jayanta, on the other hand, maintains that in the case of non-existence, the relation of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* is possible without the relation of conjunction or inherence.

The Buddhists also state that even the relation of opposition cannot exist between the negation and the negated object since there is neither coordination nor co-existence between them as there is between a mace and a jar. If non-existence, which may be

supposed to be already existing, should come and assail the jar, then alone it is to be regarded as the opponent of the jar, like a mace which destroys the jar. But it is not possible since their times are different.

Jayanta refutes this view and states that the meaning of opposition is that the existence and non-existence cannot subsist at the same place and the same time and that the destruction of one particular positive object cannot mean the destruction of all objects because the non-existence of a jar has only the jar as its counter-reality.

Moreover, the Buddhists point out, it may be asked, whether non-existence has the nature of coming into existence or not. If it has, it should be regarded as a positive object like a jar; if it does not come into being and yet enjoys existence, it should be considered as eternal.

Jayanta makes it clear that non-existence is of the nature of 'not coming into existence'. Even if it is of the nature of coming into existence, it does not mean that non-existence cannot be distinguished from positive existence because it has been pointed out that there is a difference between two kinds of cognition like that found in the case of colour and taste. Non-existence is of the nature of coming into existence because it follows the presence and absence of its causes. As a jar follows its causes—clay, stick, etc., for coming into existence, similarly it follows its causes, e.g., blow of a mace for its destruction.

Another objection that Jayanta raises against the Buddhists is that if according to them *abhāva* has no objective existence, what is the meaning of negative particle '*nañ*'? If the Buddhists maintain that there is no truth in that every word has real meaning or that some have imaginary meaning or that when a negative particle is connected with a verb, it suggests the cessation of the action denoted by the verb Jayanta points out that in such a case it amounts to discarding the hypothesis altogether. If the Buddhists discard the hypothesis of *abhāva*, what purpose will be served by the eleven-fold division of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) which have been discussed by the noted logician Dharamakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu*.

Thus, Jayanta concludes that *abhāva* is objectively real and the Buddhist thesis that it is not objectively real is not based on sound considerations. Moreover, negation cannot be included in *svabhāva*

inference. The non-perception of a cause, etc., may be regarded as a mark which may lead to inferential knowledge, but the negation of the perceptible thing in itself is one of the conditions of the perception of negation. Refuting the Buddhists point by point, Jayanta states that even if these red-clothed logicians choose to ignore the path of reason and stick to their own faulty contentions, they should at least protect the honour of those ladies who have been brought into the harem of the Buddhist logic in the shape of eleven-fold non-perception. The protection of these damsels, he points out, is impossible without accepting the objective reality of *abhāva*.[1]

Jayanta is aware of the fact that there is difference of opinion regarding the types of *abhāva*. He himself is in favour of accepting only two types of *abhāva*, namely *Prāgabhāva* (Prior-negation) and *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* (Post-negation). He, however, mentions that some other logicians accept the fourfold division adding two more to these, viz., *Itaretarābhāva* (mutual negation) and *atyantābhāva* (absolute negation). Some other logicians add two more types, viz., *sāmârthyābhāva* (negation of the capacity) and *apekṣābhāva* (negation of an object confined to limited space). Jayanta, however, asserts that only two types mentioned by him constitute the two natural divisions of *abhāva*, the rest are artificial. Anyhow, he asserts that *abhāva* is a distinct type of the knowable objects and it is capable of perception by our sense organs.

6. *Conclusion*


We have seen that in the Nyāya, the problem of negation has been disscussed by Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara also. Gautama simply tries to propound that *abhāva* is a fit object of cognition. Vātsyāyana elaborates the point and asserts that negation is a mode of reality and that the positive reals are objects of positive consciousness and *abhāva* is the object of negative consciousness. The differenee in the nature of consciousness explains the difference in the nature of reality. Uddyotakara goes a step forward and maintains that negative judgment denies whereas positive judgment asserts.[2] Negative awareness is direct. Its object is an external object. Thus, though the ontological foundation of Jayanta's views on *abhāva* were already there before his advent, in the Nyāya it is Jayanta who has the credit

1. ननु चानेन मार्गेण यदि भावो निरस्यते । एकादशप्रकारैषाऽनुपलब्धिः क्व गच्छतु, *N. M.*, I-53
2. असत्तु परतन्त्रप्रतिषेधमुखेन प्रतिपद्यते प्रदीपवत्, *N. V.*

of defining *abhāva* for the first time from the epistemological standpoint. He has also the credit of clearly analysing negation and stating that it is not devoid of all causal efficiency but is capable of producing consciousness. *Abhāva* (negation) and *abhāvābhāva* (its negation) do not exist in the same locus at the same time.

As we have seen before, Jayanta gives a detailed account of the problem of *abhāva*. He examines the Bhāṭṭa theory of *abhāva* and *anupalabdhi*. He also pays considerable attention to Buddhist views on the ontological aspects of *abhāva* and tries to establish the validity of *abhāva* as an independent category. He is shocked to see the Prābhākaras refusing to accept *abhāva* as a reality and successfully takes them to task. Almost all the Nyāyavaiśeṣika writers argue this topic against the Prābhākara school. It is Jayanta alone who cites the Buddhist arguments, against the reality of non-existence.[1]

Jayanta's conclusions are devoid of ambiguity. He is of the view that *abhāva* is that which is referred to by a negative judgment, expressed by the negative proposition containing the particle 'nañ'. Though *abhāva* is a distinct type of knowable object, yet it is simply capable of being cognized through the method of perception and there is, therefore, no need of accepting *anupalabdhi* as a distinct way of knowing.



1. अस्माभिस्तु भाववदभावोऽपि ज्ञानजननसमर्थं इष्यते, *N. M.*, I-55

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